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Vox-Exo: Horrors of a Voice reframes the Lacanian object a voice as a horrific 
register of alterity. The object gaze has received, as it does in Jacques Lacan’s work, 
more commentary than voice. Yet recently voice has garnered interest from multiple 
disciplines. The thesis intervenes in the Slovenian school’s commentary of the ‘object 
voice’ in terms of two questions: audition and corporeality. This intervention 
synthesizes psychoanalysis with recent theorizing of the horror of philosophy. In this 
intervention the object a voice is argued to resonate in lacunae – epistemological 
voids that evoke horror in the subject. Biological and evolutionary perspectives on 
voice, genre horror film and literature, music videos, close readings of Freudian and 
Lacanian case studies and textual analysis of ancient philosophy texts all contribute to 
an elucidation of the horrors of the object a voice: Vox-Exo. 
The impetus to address the body stems from a critical intervention in one of the most 
recent and cited works on voice in Lacan’s work; A Voice and Nothing More, by 
Mladen Dolar. Dolar’s trajectory to pursue the ‘object voice’ is to move from 
meaning, to aesthetics, to psychoanalysis. Such a move, the expedited turn to 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, is recalcitrant to tackling the body. This thesis responds to 
the book’s avidity to omit the body from the question of voice.  
Vox-Exo: Horrors of a Voice, contra the Slovenian School’s credo, rearticulates the 
object a voice in terms of corporeality and audition. The significance the a, that 
designates other, autre, stated in Lacan’s works, and numerous commentaries such as 
Jacques-Alain Miller’s and Stijn Vanheule’s, is impressed. With a sustained 
consideration of corporeality and audition, the unknowability and alterity of a is 
demonstrated to be a locus of horror. Object a voice is argued to resonate in lacunae, 







Recollection and remembrance are necessary for the writing acknowledgements and 
thanks. The text here is the most difficult of the thesis, it is painful. But to shirk would 
be selfish. For as much as it is my writing, this thesis is the product of others. Without 
their help, support, encouragement, inspiration and love, texts such as this are not 
produced. Thus, the least I can do is remember and acknowledge their part in this 
project.  
Last summer my grandma, Katherine Barbara Absalom, died after a sudden and 
unexpected storm wrought by cancer. After a brief (and I hold onto this fortune) spell 
in hospital I found myself driving from her house in Reading in the small hours, 
where I’d lived for over ten years, to be present for her last breath. I’d moved in with 
Grandma at the start of my BA at Reading University. From then on I lived with her; 
she washed my clothes and cooked for me. She always listened and supported my 
stumble through life and endured my caprices with a patience I now recognise as love. 
She supported my return to education when I started the MA at Goldsmiths after 
working aimlessly in offices for a few years. Many times I’ve imagined how happy 
she would be to see me graduate with a PhD. In low moments I admit that it was only 
the desire to not let her down that maintained any resolve to persevere. I am probably 
being too candid. I cannot begin to express my gratitude to grandma. Thanks will 
never be enough; indeed given what she did for me it feels pithy. I am only now 
beginning to appreciate her constant practical support as much as her unwavering 
kindness. It is no exaggeration to say that every line of text I produced since college is 
a result of Grandma’s generosity. This thesis is a product of her love.  
Whilst I was living with Grandma, working in office jobs I did not want after 
completing my Fine Art BA I contacted Mark Fisher. I was wary of returning to 
education but Mark encouraged me to come to Goldsmiths. I very nearly did not 
attend the first day but with some spare time, gratis of redundancy, I, at my mother’s 
insistence journeyed into London with nothing to lose. I was very shy and when I 
finally located the room where students where to introduce themselves I forgot to 
mention my name. Mark immediately, excitedly, announced: ‘…and this is Tristam 
everyone!’ Mark was to be my tutor on the MA. He was a constant source of 
confidence, energy and passion. It was not long before my shyness, the feeling of 
being an unwelcome outsider, was transformed into what was probably visible 
precociousness. Debilitating anxiety was turned inside out, I felt like a cool maverick. 
Insecurity burdens vaporised, making way for zeal and élan. Mark encouraged my 
writing no end. I owe any confidence I have to Mark. This project emerged from the 
Vocalities module Mark taught on the course. He was my supervisor for four years. 
During this time I taught alongside him and we became friends. I’d come onto 
campus and Mark would be the only person I spoke to. Sadly, his mental health 
deteriorated. I’m still struggling with the morass of emotions Mark’s death left. All I 
can say is what I’m so glad I did say to him, despite the awkwardness, near the end 
when things were so desperate: that he’d changed my life. This project wouldn’t be 
were it not for Mark. 
The Visual Cultures department has been very supportive. Most plainly I was 
awarded a scholarship to cover the PhD fees. I suspect Mark pushed for this. Pursuing 
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Joanne Dodd, the department secretary for almost all my time on the MA and PhD, 
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from email, notices and necessary minutiae such as room numbers, seminar times. 
I’ve always felt reassured just knowing she was in the department, ready to answer 
questions and help without judgement.  
The first instance, the first smile, the first offer of help. Or the first and following 
patient presence of overseeing someone’s learning. There is a familiar import here. Of 
parents and children – those who have looked after, encouraged and supported me, 
teaching me along the way. There is a good lesson here I am still learning: to be kind, 
to listen and to not take others for granted. 
A number of other people in the department deserve thanks for supporting and 
helping me in a number of ways. Jon Shaw has been a good friend and, at times, a 
chaperone. Simon O’Sullivan has offered support and encouragement over the years. 
Thanks are also due to Alice Andrews whom I marked for on the Modernities course 
primarily as a rehabilitation exercise in returning to campus.  
I met Carey Robinson on the MA and since we have produced various projects on 
voice. She’s listened to my verbal meanderings and glossolalia with pretention to 
continental theory for years; she’s been very supportive. She’s always listened and 
has increasingly given me perspective in my ‘outlook’. She’s also been inspirational. 
A number of our projects have provided me with questions that have driven threads of 
research. Carey – thanks so much! 
Lynn Turner was my second supervisor. I feel so lucky to have found her; she’s been 
an inspiration (read that with connotations of voice). Her support and instruction has 
lifted my work enormously. I am not the most disciplined of writers, or the neatest. 
Despite this, Lynn’s input and patience transformed my approach and execution. 
She’s taught me restraint and imparted an appreciation and respect of form, poise and 
rigor over sheer vim. She certainly has changed the ways I write more than anyone 
(even if I confess I’ve probably been a trifle deaf at times). Working with Lynn has 
allowed me to develop sensitivity to texts; much of the critical drawings out and 
highlighting of certain syntax and phrase choices of others is indebted to her 
supervision. In terms of academic writing she gave me a voice. Lynn, I cannot thank 
you enough. 
Lastly, I thank my family. I give special thanks to Gemma, not only for being a 
wonderful mother to Flora, our daughter whom we love boundlessly, but also for her 
patience and kindness. I also thank my parents. After providing, at considerable cost, 
time and energy most of Maslow’s tiers they have supported me through my learning 
(my default methodology is repeated error). They’ve beared the brunt of my 
vacillations, the modalities of which are too numerous to detail here. Sincerely, 
thanks: thanks for reading Roald Dahl to me, for taking me out walking and lugging 
me to France and back, for accomodating my bikes and dog, Buttons, with the 
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In a philosophical sense, that demons choose to present themselves via voice and 
sound – at once present and absent – is noteworthy. 
– Thacker 1 
 
If it was successfully murdered, why does it recur? Does it not know that it is dead? 
– Dolar 2 
 
This aside of Eugene Thacker’s in In The Dust of this Planet: Horror of Philosophy 
Vol. 1 is one prompt for this thesis, for in it there is an implicit recognition of the 
question of voice in terms of horror. Voice, in this sense, can be taken up to announce 
the horror of the subject: a confrontation with a lacuna, an epistemological – or 
ontological – crisis.  
A second spark of this thesis, and the most referenced text within, is Mladen Dolar’s 
A Voice and Nothing More. This small book, which emerged from the Slovenian 
School in 2006, brought the question of voice attention after gaze had been a focus for 
so long. In explicating the concept of the object voice Dolar, amongst others, make 
frequent recourse to a horror vocabulary.  
These two books have little in common. Firstly, Lacan is not mentioned in Thacker’s 
book, whereas Dolar’s book came from the school that re-ignited interest in the 
flamboyant Frenchman who seated himself– did he knot? – on the throne as heir to 
Freud. In The Dust of this Planet: Horror of Philosophy Vol. 1 turns to a nihilist 
philosophy to de-center human experience and its Sisyphean thought. A Voice and 
Nothing More is a psychoanalytical engagement with voice in relation to the signifier 
wrapped up in a treatise that explicates what Dolar calls ‘the object voice’.  
This thesis takes up Thacker’s opening gambit in the horror of philosophy but utilizes 
it along the way of staging an intervention. The intervention contests Dolar’s posit of 
‘the object voice’. This text seeks to not only explore the gnomic line of Thacker’s to 
elucidate horrors in voice but crucially departs from Dolar’s conceptualization of 
																																																								
1	Eugene Thacker, In the Dust of this Planet: Horror of Philosophy Vol. 1. (Winchester, UK: Zero  
Books, 2011), 28. 
2 Mladen Dolar, A Voice and Nothing More (Short Circuits) (Massachusetts, USA: MIT Press, 2006), 
44, emphasis added. 
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voice. The turn away from Dolar’s stratagem resituates the question of voice in 
Lacanian psychoanalysis to be an urgent concern of the body and the ear. This 
reframing of voice as a tableaux vivant of flesh, cartiliage and membrane warrants a 
different term to that employed by Dolar and the Slovenian school. Thus, the 
corporeal and aural horrors of voice will be articulated as a question of ‘object a 
voice’. It is this departure – of exploring voice in terms of corporeality and audition, 
of listening, being open to the plurality of object a voice (not merely hearing the 
definite article of the object voice) – where horror abounds.  
Dolar’s work has certainly ignited discussion on voice, yet extant commentaries 
seldom develop criticality. 3 John Mowitt’s brief but insightful reading of Dolar’s 
project (in Radio: Essays in Bad Reception) is an exception. The work presented here 
does not pursue the omission of the acoustic that Mowitt detects in A Voice and 
Nothing More; instead two original gripes of neglect (corporeality and aurality) are 
levelled. In this sense a key contribution of this thesis is to take up the questions Dolar 
skillfully circumvents in order to provide a sustained rearticulation of Lacan’s voice 
qua object a as an object of horror. This departure from Dolar contributes to the 
significance Lacan’s work continues to hold for voice yet also addresses and 
articulates the concept of voice qua object a as a pressing question of corporeality and 
aurality. Such an addressal – that Lacan’s most sympathetic, and referrenced, 
proponent expertly and delicately avoids – impresses the distinct relevance that 
Lacan’s work still holds for considerations and discussions of voice and body (or 
voices and bodies). 
On one level the turn towards the body is part of demonstrating an intrinsic 
entanglement that Lacan’s object a is of and from the traumas bodies are subjected to; 
it is at such a confluence where voice is emerges. Voice too is similarly of and from 
various types and registers of trauma – these are articulated consecutively by the 
themes of violence, physical transformation and insidious contagion. In each instance, 
the question of voice and body are afforded a scrutiny that errs close to clinical in its 
sustained attentiveness to the flesh, cartiliage, membrane and tissues. This bent of the 
clinical, this turn towards the body, does not solely elucidate an application of 
																																																								
3 Mowitt’s careful detection of Dolar’s recalcitrance to consider the acoustic qualities of voice is a 
conspicuously measured criticism. 
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Lacan’s voice qua object a to questions of the body; it also impresses the prevalence 
and significance of the body in Lacan’s work.  
On a further level, the sustained consideration of the body as integral to voice qua 
object a, proposes a more prominent and significant role Lacan’s work offers for the 
tableaux of voice and body in the frame of psychoanalysis and interdisciplinary voice 
studies. Lacan has more to contribute to the question of the body in voice than 
contemporary exponents such as Dolar, allow space for.  In this sense the thesis 
contributes to a historiographical revision of the figure of Lacan. Contra the dominant 
and popular sketch of Lacan as an intellectual maverick who succumbed to algebraic 
and topological abstractions in later life, whose ‘work’ has been received as seminars 
from a pedagogical context over and above his psychoanalytical practice, this text 
partly seeks to underscore and evidence the attentions he paid to the body. 4 5 This is 
why issue is taken with Dolar’s too quick move to psychoanalysis. Whereas, as he 
declares, his methodology of enquiry is ‘Army, Opera – Psychoanalysis’ the 
intervention here insists on a thorough appraisal of the question of the body within 
this trajectory. The considerations, scrutinies and sensitivities that Lacan afforded the 
body will be fostered here.    
The intervention in Dolar’s scheme of ‘the object voice’ and the synthesis between 
voice qua object petit a is established in the first chapter, ‘Beyond the Veil of Our 
World’. It is here where the boldest criticisms of Dolar’s vernacular and strategy are 
outlined. The following three chapters – ‘Violence’, ‘Changes’ and ‘Insidious’ 
																																																								
4	Note the remark: ‘analysis can be distinguished from everything that was produced by discourse prior 
to analysis by the fact that it enunciates the following, which is the very backbone of my teaching – I 
speak without knowing it. I speak with my body and I do so unbeknownst to myself.’ Jacques Lacan, 
On Feminine Sexuality, The Limits of Love and Knowledge: Encore, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, 
Book XX, Trans. Bruce Fink, Ed. Jacques-Alain Miller (New York/London: Norton and Company, 
1998), 119. 	
5	See also Suzanne Hommel’s touching recollection in Gérard Miller’s film‘Rendez-vous chez Lacan’: 
‘I was telling Lacan about a dream I had. And I told him “I wake up every morning a 5 o’clock’” and I 
added “It’s at 5 o’clock that the Gestapo came to get the jews in their houses.” At that moment Lacan 
jumped up from his chair, came towards me, and gave me an extremely gentle caress on my cheek. I 
understood it as ‘geste à peau’, the gesture…’ Miller interrupts her account to ‘explain’ that ‘He had 
transformed Gestapo in ‘geste à peau’. Hommel continues to describe the tactile break with analytic 
protocol as a ‘very tender gesture, it has to be said – an extraordinarily tender gesture […] it didn’t 
diminish the pain but it made it something else […] 40 years later, when I recall that gesture, I can still 
feel it on my cheek. It was a gesture as well which was an appeal to humanity, something like that.’ 
Leo Bersani, in Receptive Bodies, notes that Miller’s emphasis and attention is on the master’s ‘play’ 
with signifiers yet Hommel’s account focuses resolutely on tactile qualities (51-53). The instance is 
presented here to highlight that Hommel’s presented account does not mention Lacan ‘saying’ ‘geste à 
peau’. The homophonic play is a silent voice emerging from the interaction of two bodies, from the 
tender attention Lacan paid to Hommel’s cheek.	
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operate as subsequent explicatory drives. Overall, the first chapter details Dolar’s 
avidity to leapfrog to psychoanalysis to elucidate ‘the object voice’ without recourse 
to the body. Whereas his schema is army (language), opera (aesthetics) - 
psychoanalysis, here the trajectory is language, aesthetics – the body (including the 
ear). The first chapter establishes the significance of corporeality and audition, whilst 
uncovering Dolar’s recalcitrance to addressing such questions. ‘Violence’, ‘Changes’ 
and ‘Insidious’ all turn to the question of what voice means for the body it comes 
from or comes into.  
The context of this work within wider fields warrants some explication, for it is not 
merely a retort to A Voice and Nothing More; the thesis contributes to a number of 
dialogues ignited by various texts predating 2006. A plethora of texts have 
contributed to the interdisciplinary field of ‘voice studies’, whilst this thesis is at most 
an atypical voice studies text it does engage in particular facets of enquiry texts that 
are progenitors of the field.  
Considerations of voice within music videos contributes to many discussions that 
emerged from Kaja Silverman’s The Acoustic Mirror: The Female Voice in 
Psychoanalysis. The extensive ruminations on the significance of voice in terms of 
Michael Jackson’s subjectivity in ‘Changes’, attended to via a stereo methodology of 
film theorizing and psychoanalysis, underscores the continued relevance and urgency 
of Silverman’s argument that materials such film continue to operate from an 
ideology of gendered vocalities. In this particular case, it is argued to be a construct 
that male subjects such a Jackson, panders, plays, subverts and parodies. The critical 
auditions of feminine vocalities in ancient texts, folklore and myth in ‘Insidious’ 
impress the deeply gendered hearings of voice in cultural materials prior to cinema – 
contributing to outlining a continuum of engendering narratives via recourse to the 
work of Nancy. A. Jones, Leslie C. Dunn and Barbara Engh in the two former’s 
edited anthology Embodied Voices: Representing female vocality in western culture.  
More recent discussions of voice have murmurated in new materialist and 
posthumanist frameworks.  Whilst this thesis is not explicitly claim to be a direct 
confrontation with the possibilities and questions raised in these emerging projects it 
does contribute to how the concept of voice can be thought beyond the immediate and 
acute definition of a human vocalization. ‘Violence’, despite its foci on vocalization 
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poses the question of voice as a register of exogenous violence wrought on the human 
subject. ‘Changes’ and ‘Insidious’ both take up a concept of voice that is located 
beyond the horizon of the human animal’s subjectivity and body. Certainly, in the 
sense of the project’s interdisciplinary methodology there are similarities with new 
materialism’s ‘transversality across “feminist theory, science and technology studies, 
and media and cultural studies” to which, Norie Neumark, adds ‘media and the arts’ 
as ways of ‘thinking, doing and producing knowledge.’6  A distinctive claim of this 
thesis – one that differentiates the project from others working in new materialist 
and/or posthumanist frameworks – is rather than posing arguments for voices beyond 
a narrow anthropocentric conception but to insist ‘the human voice’ never was: that 
voice is defined by its excess beyond the human’s body and thought. This claim is 
where the project departs from the trajectories of enquiry in works such as Dominic 
Pettman’s Sonic Intimacy: Voice, Species, Technics (or How to Listen to the World). 7 
The claims here impress not the possibilities of voices beyond the human but 
illustrates that ‘human voices’ are distinctly inhuman. 
The title should be explained. Vox-Exo refers to an always other, an always outside – 
what Thacker would term ‘the-world-in-itself’ the objective beyond we never really 
grasp. Thacker argues that when this world paradoxically makes itself ‘known’ – or a 
better term might be sensed – then horror abounds. Here, in terms of voice, it is a 
voice, as a foreign object, from within or without that confounds the subject and 
wreaks horrors. The plural ‘horrors’ of a voice – registers the demonic voices 
referenced in Thacker’s book: ‘we are legion’. Here the ambivalence of a voice being 
always in excess of ‘a voice’, being more than one voice, is taken up. That is to say, 
the voices explored here, whilst singular in example, are never singular in essence – 
there is always a plurality. Additionally, to say a voice, implies voice without 
specificity. A voice that is irreducible to the subject, to sound, to the human and to its 
source. It is precisely in a voice’s irreducibility to such terms where horror emerges as 
unresolvable questions. This plurality and non-specificity of voice has more fealty 
with Lacan’s object petit a – of which voice is one – than the overtly singular and 
specific term ‘the object voice’. The voice is not the focus of this thesis. To add a line 
																																																								
6 Norie Neumark, Voicetracks: Attuning to Voice in Media and the Arts (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts/London, England: The MIT Press, 2017), 8. 
7	Dominic Pettman, Sonic Intimacy: Voice, Species, Technics (Or, How to Listen to the World) 
(Stanford, California, USA: Stanford University Press, 2017).	
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that sounds distinctly Lacanian in its gnomic aplomb we could say: the voice does not 
exist; and there is no human voice. This is the ineradicable alterity of voice, a voice 
that sounds from within and without: an ‘extimate’ voice. 
In addition to Thacker’s text, two other horror theory texts are employed. Each was 
published after Thacker’s. Dylan Trigg’s The Thing: A Phenomenology of Horror is 
employed to confront phenomena that confound and destabilize paradigms of what 
the human body is – it seeks the horror of the other side of the body, a horrific and 
unhuman facet. 8 Ben Woodward’s Slime Dynamics is utilized to detail the possibility 
of a life that continues beyond an anthropocentric presupposition of what life is.  This 
text introduces themes of corporeal incursion and a slippery inexactitude concerning 
the limits of life and death. 9 
A more detailed explanation of each chapter will be provided in a moment. Before 
continuing, the thesis’ recalcitrance and methodological choices warrant explanation: 
firstly concerning the treatment of technology, and secondly concerning the roles 
sound studies play. In terms of technology, vocalization and the interactions of bodies 
and voices are given privileged attention before any consideration of recorded voices, 
amplified voices, or modulated voices. This distinction bears upon a definition of 
technology in the planest, lay, sense. 10 There is already a well-blossomed plethora of 
critical texts that pursue questions of voice and technology, the relationships, the 
implications, the cultures and vocalities. 11 Indeed, such a seam of enquiry is so 
established that texts that consider voices and bodies apart from technology are hard 
to find amidst the cacophony that has resulted from Edison’s toying with the human 
																																																								
8 Dylan Trigg, The Thing: A Phenomenology of Horror (Winchester, UK: Zero Books, 2014). 
9 Ben Woodward, Slime Dynamics (Winchester, UK: Zero Books, 2012). 
10 Not in the wider sense of technology as established in continental philosophy and postructuralism. 
To put it differently, one might say voice is taken as already being technology in this sense but the 
thesis’ does not concern itself with lengthy ruminations of phonographical questions, technics, 
questions of recording and replication. These themes are touched on at times, but the body is afforded 
(overdue) primacy. 
11	E.g. Michel Chion, The Voice in Cinema, Trans. Claudia Gorbman (New York, USA: Columbia  
University Press, 1999);	Brian Kane, Sound Unseen: Acousmatic Sound in Theory and Practice 
(Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2014); John Mowitt, Radio: Essays in Bad Reception. 
(Berkeley, California, USA: University of California Press, 2011); Neumark, Norie; Ross Gibson and 
Theo van Leeuwen, eds. Voice: Vocal Aesthetics in Digital, Arts and Media (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts/London, England: The MIT Press. 2010); Dominic Pettman, Sonic Intimacy: Voice, 
Species, Technics (Or, How to Listen to the World) (Stanford, California, USA: Stanford University 
Press, 2017); Jeffrey Sconce, Haunted Media: Electronic Presence from Telegraphy to Television 
(Console-ing Passions) (Durham and London, UK: Duke University Press, 2000); Jonathan Sterne. The 
Audible Past: Cultural Origins of Sound Reproduction (Durham and London, UK: Duke University 
Press, 2003) 
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ear. Such enquiries are necessary, but one symptom of a focus on technologically 
formulated and/or reformulated voice is a tendency to ignore the body, the flesh and 
cartilage that gives and is given to voice. Technology raises a question of a 
disembodied voice that depletes foci from questions of the corporeal. This 
methodological decision has not been taken lightly, a cursory glance over the genre 
horror fiction nestled in the bibliography shows a wealth of texts that detail the 
horrors of a disembodied voice. But such technologically disembodied and orphaned 
(to supernatural presence) voices open up questions that are already well explored 
over and above the body. Rather than seek to add further commentary, din, to this 
field here the body is considered and takes precedence over its resonance in the 
myriad technologies that re-voice and disembody.  
Many of the examples presented here are diegetic examples portrayed within a 
medium. That is to say some of the voices here are technologically voiced. The music 
videos and records of Michael Jackson are given a lot of attention. Jackson’s voice is 
a technologized voice, it is given to the viewer/listener by virtue of a great recording-
mixing-disseminating apparatus. Indeed, many listeners only hear the voices of such 
performers by technological proxy. However, can it not be contested that the diegetic 
implications of these voices can be considered without recourse to the technology that 
serves their reception? Might a willful deafness to the question of technology serve to 
cultivate a greater sensitivity, attunement, to the body and voice it records and 
sounds? To the retort that this close listening of the body, this unhearing of the noise 
of technics, is a theoretical take one maintains whilst at once allowing one’s ears to 
benefit from its phagic reception, the following question may be levelled: does a 
reading, theorizing or utlization of Plato, Freud, Lacan, Edgar Allen Poe or Stephen 
King require a robust – to the point of fixation – rumination on the technics and 
consequences of the emergence of the Gutenberg press up to its cyan-glowing 
cybernetic zenith? This thesis takes as a given the negative and pursues the horrors of 
voice in terms of body and aurality with the liberty a literary theorist is afforded for 
their readings. A literary theorist is not required to address the Gutenberg press; thus a 
theorist of voice should not be required to address the phonograph.  
For the sake of maintaining fidelity to the body, the threads of this thesis turn away 
away from extensive commentaries of sound and/or listening. One reason for this is 
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that by engaging in discussions of say, Thoreau or Schaeffer, a phenomenological 
prospect is opened up. What is listening, the experience of listening over and beyond 
the rudimentary process of audition? There are two reasons to circumvent this 
question and the wealth of literature addressing it. Firstly, listening presupposes 
subjective experience of sonic phenomena. Yet, as any dealings with voice quickly 
arrive at, and as is key to object a voice, voice is by no means sound. Voices can be 
auditioned, aural hallucinations are a key example, but that does not mean one is 
dealing with sound. On the other hand, just because a voice is listened to, does not 
dispel the issues of active and passive listening explored so well by Schafer. A way to 
strafe this conumdrum is to make distinctions between questions that consider how 
voice is sounded – vocalization – and questions that explore how sounds and voices 
are attended to. This thesis takes the former question as priority over recourse to 
lengthy ponderences of how one attends to voice that, one way or another, gets inside 
the head. Vocalization is framed as violence in the chapter of the same name. 
‘Changes’ builds on that concept and suggests that violent corporeal changes are 
evoked by voice. The examples here are the genre horror narratives of Michael 
Jackson’s work. Of concern here are horrors of voicing and voicings, not horrors of 
listening or hearing. The foci on voicings over how voice is attended to do, however, 
run into a tension – how to discuss the affects of voicing without succumbing to the 
question of listening. This tension is most closely navigated in the final chapter, 
‘Insidious’, that explores voice as analogous to bacteria, slime, virus and parasites 
before travelling near Sirens on its way to voice in ancient Greek pedagogy. However 
the foci on voice in these contagious formulations resist lapsing into questions of how 
sound is received. How a voice spreads is considered, the evidence of its affect upon 
the bodies of those who hear it is considered. But the question of what it sounds like, 
how we hear it, how we experience it – attend to it – is not. How a voice comes to be 
heard is as close as this thesis strays to the question of listening. The Sirens and 
earworms (INMI) are certainly limits of this position.  
Concerning Methodology. As should already be clear, an intervention in a very 
specific articulation of a particular Lacanian concept is the impetus for articulating an 
intrinsic corporeal horror in voice. The argument is then articulated in three distinct 
modes – ‘Violence’, ‘Changes’ and ‘Insidious’. An outline of these chapters will be 
provided shortly. Each chapter contains a distinct methodology. ‘Violence’ draws 
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heavily on scientific texts, texts from social evolution, developmental studies and, 
also, literary sci-fi and theory fiction. This is not theory-fiction; rather it is a mode of 
enquiry that utilizes the impressions of creative works to articulate the imports that 
empirical texts pose. This is not a common methodology, surprisingly. Especially in 
the Slovenian’s school’s psychoanalytical commentaries recourse to empricial data is 
occaisional and scant. ‘Violence’ seeks to underscore the corporeal horrors of voice 
by way of alloying object a to empirical knowledge sets – imposing a coherence 
between Lacanian intellect and the endeavours of science, the clinic. 
‘Changes’ is quite different. This chapter bears a methodology not too dissimilar to 
the close readings of popular culture by members of the Slovenian school – in 
particular that of Žižek. Žižek tends to elabourate via an array of popular culture 
materials – Scott’s Alien franchise, Hitchcock films and science fiction – whereas 
Dolar’s cultural materials (in terms of voice) tend to err on less popular European 
materials such as classic texts, opera and modernist literature. Despite Jackson being a 
figure of which there is a wealth of commentary, and despite his vocalizations being 
highly idiosyncratic, not many texts focus on the role voice played in his work. 
Secondly, psychoanalytical readings of Jackson are also, strangely, lacking – despite 
his persona being a curious knot, a thrilling Matryoshka, of paradox, tensions, ironies; 
thrills of delight and horror. ‘Changes’ takes up these two wanting avenues and posits 
Jackson as a conduit of voices at once horrific and of indeterminate corpus. 
The methodology of ‘Insidious’ contains stratagems from both the previous chapters. 
On one level its argument is made of a continuum of explicatory readings that run 
from genre horror to classic Greek philosophy (resonating the explicatory penchants 
of both Dolar and Žižek). On another level, this continuum incorporates a number of 
scientific texts to underscore the contagious natures of earworms, using such 
empirical studies in amalgamation with close readings develops a methodology that 
shares the employments of discipline in both ‘Violence’ and ‘Changes’. In this sense 
it is a methodological composite of the both the previous chapters.   
Now, each chapter in turn will be outlined in detail. Welcome to orientation. ‘Beyond 
the Veil of Our World’ contains some introductory detail that continues the claims 
made here in greater detail. This opening chapter is where an intervention is staged. 
The opening tone is introductory (hence the brevity of this text) and lays out the 
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thesis’ position and contribution to the omissions and troughs of Dolar’s work. The 
text could stand as a retort to Dolar’s book. Subsequent chapters are more illustrative 
and comprise of a trio of examples that argue, with persistent foci on the body, for the 
horror of object a voice defined contra Dolar’s ‘the object voice’. 
The opening section, ‘Aquiesce to (H)ear: How’s it sound’ refers to vocalization; it 
asks – over and above aesthetic appreciation or linguistic articulation – what is 
required of the body that sounds? This opening section takes up the contention that 
methodologies and causes of sounding can be attended to without recourse to 
subjective ruminations on the phenomenological imports of experiencing sound. The 
passage draws up the argument that Dolar neglects the to address questions of 
audition and corporeality. That Dolar attends to aesthetics and linguistics (the latter 
much more so) over the acoustic qualities of the sounding body. It closes by claiming 
a more clinical, i.e. a more Freudian, approach should not neglect the sounds emitted 
from the body that voices. 
The following section, ‘The So-called Object Voice’ makes two claims. Firstly, that 
the ‘the object voice’ is an inexact phrase for voice as it is located within Lacan’s 
schema. This move is supported by reference to Stijn Vanheule’s works that delineate 
the difference between the partial object and the object petit a. Secondly, the 
similitudes of horror and voice qua object petit a are articulated. This is conducted by 
way of Vanheule’s text and by highlighting the vocabulary and metaphorical choices 
of the Slovenian school’s most significant commentators on voice. Žižek and Dolar 
tend to opt for a vernacular that would be at home in pulp genre horror.  
‘Speaking of the Object a’ addresses voice in its relation to language – its post-
signifier status as a non-signifying excess or residue. The genre horror theme of 
ghosts and undead is carried through. The overriding drive is to further underscore 
Dolar’s recalcitrance to addressing the body. If voice is the excess of a subject within 
language then what should one make of additional sonic emissions? This thread is 
articulated via some biographical details of Lacan (graphed from Roudinesco’s superb 
biographies) and Alice Lagaay’s essay “Between Sound and Silence: Voice in the 
History of Psychoanaylsis”. Voice, here, is couched not as a disturbance of speech but 
an excess of the body over its application to language.  
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 ‘Aphonic Voice’ continues the trajectory of focusing on the structural context of 
object a voice. This contribution to the thread marks out an antinomy: voice is posited 
to be an audible object, but not necessarily a sonic object. Voice, it is posited, may 
resonate where sound waves do not pass. Throughout this presentation of readings of 
voice as object a (this section utilizes Jacques-Alain Miller’s text ‘Jacques Lacan and 
the Voice’) physical horror is writ large. The example of the aural hallucination Lacan 
speak of – ‘Sow!’ – is exemplary in so far as it is a voice heard without sound: a voice 
of horror, ann otherly horrific incursion, a register of the libido’s traverse across flesh.   
Synthesis: Object Horror (Demon Voices) provides a synthesis of object a voice with 
the work of Thacker. Thacker’s opening thought in In the Dust of this Planet: Horror 
of Philosophy Vol. 1 is presented as a lead into the quote concerning demon voices 
presented above. This synthesis then moves through Freud’s reading of a case of 
demonological possession and a passage from Dylan Trigg’s in The Thing: A 
Phenomenology of Horror. Object a voice is framed as an object that announces 
horrors for the subject.  
‘Unknown Horrors’ returns to the ears of the body, detailing instances and 
formulations of voices announcing an epistemological lacuna, a crisis that evokes 
horror in the subject. The acousmatic voice is pitched via readings of David Toop, 
Freud and Otto Rank’s The Trauma of Birth.  
‘Freud’s Vacuum’ is a primer for the following section. It illustrates how Freud’s 
treatment of voice does not attend to sounding, but instead listens for the significance 
of sounds. That is to say: Freud focused on what the body said or failed to say but not 
on the noises it produced and how it produced them. This is provided by way of an 
appraisal of Dolar’s division of aesthetics and language in the chapter ‘Freud’s 
voices’. It is argued that both Dolar and Freud impose meaning on the sounds of the 
body, that each has a tendency towards a hyperphasic ear. That each, in the question 
of voice in terms of aesthetics and language, tends to listen for each in voice rather 
than being sensitive to the body and listening to its voice.  
‘Beyond Beyond The Pleasure Principle’ focuses on two examples of Freud’s ear. 
The text presents Lagaay’s survey of voice in psychoanalysis and Irigaray’s close 
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reading of Ernst’s vocalization in Beyond The Pleasure Principle. 12 It is argued that 
Freud, in writing of Ernst’s ‘expression of interest and gratification, emitting a loud 
long-drawn-out ‘o-o-o-oh’’ moves too quickly to assume it meant fort/go away. 13 
Irigaray’s argument is that Freud does not consider the body in this turn; its distinct 
orality is ‘overlooked’. The additional gloss here is that on top of this subtle 
repudiation of the body there is a lack of consideration of vocalization. The second 
example of Freud’s problematic treatment of voice in the famous text is argued to be 
his reading of Torquato Tasso’s Gerusalemme Liberata (1581). Here, voice resounds 
in the moment of horror, yet Freud takes it up as a marker of repetition. These 
examples serve to illustrate voices from without that whilst coming from traumatised 
and brutalized bodies, also announce horrors, unknowns. This thread is the inclusion 
of the horrors of the vocalizing bodies into the prospect of object a voice: vox-exo. 
The second chapter, ‘Violence’, opens with a return to Dolar’s opening premise of A 
Voice and Nothing More, whereby he pitches a joke that draws the binary of 
aesthetics and language being the two obfuscatory paradigms that conceal ‘the object 
voice’. Dolar’s line in his introduction is that to get past these two veils of voice one 
must turn to psychoanalysis. It is argued in this thesis that this is too quick, that one 
must be sure to turn to the body first, like a good clinician that appraises physical 
maladies and symptoms first. The chapter then shifts, in contrast to the previous 
chapter, to a disciplinary kaleidoscope, it moves from texts considering voice in 
evolutionary, biological, anthropological, psychological and neuroscientific terms. It 
also uses fiction and theory-fiction to illustrate imports from these fields. This is not a 
scatter-shot methodology employed to support an argument. It is a way to re-ground 
voice, as a horrific object a voice, in the body. That is to say, disciplines are brought 
in to not only elucidate the Lacanian schema of the object a voice, but to illustrate that 
the high structuralism of Lacan’s thought continues to find resonance in findings in 
the empirical sciences – in this acute case, the horrors of a voice in bodies. 
In the second section ‘Exquisite Delicacy and Barbarism’ voice is described to be a 
delicate orchestration that brutalizes, co-opts and asphyxiates the body from which it 
issues. ‘Spinal trauma and throats torn with the talk sickness’ extends this vocal 
																																																								
12	Luce Irigaray, “The gesture in psychoanalysis” Trans. Elizabeth Gould, Between Feminism & 
Psychoanalysis, ed. Teresa Brennan, 127-138 (Abingdon, UK, New York, USA: Routledge, 1989). 
13 Sigmund Freud, Beyond The Pleasure Principle, (Connecticut, USA: Martino Publishing, 2009). 12. 
	 21	
inhumanism to a number of levels, phylogenetic, evolutionary and developmental. 
This malady of voice is then amalgamated into Lacan’s comment that the subject is 
‘captured and tortured by language.’ 14  This move retroactively frames the preceding 
empiricism of vocalization qua torture with a horror sheen. It also alloys Lacanian 
conceptions of voice to the suffering body. The chapter culminates in a close reading 
of Lacan and his commentators, and argues that voice in his schema was always a 
locus of corporeal horror wrought from without. 
‘Changes’ takes another shift of tone. Here, close intertextual reading of voice horror 
moments in popular music and music videos illustrate voice as a register of corporeal 
transformation. The first section, ‘Dreadful Symptoms: Corpaural Sleuthing’, picks 
up the delicacy of vocalization detailed in ‘Exquisite Delicacy and Barbarism’ but 
argues that, by virtue of the virtuousic requirements of vocalizing, voice sounds out 
transformations, shifts and changes in the voicer. This priming text brings in Lagaay’s 
comments about the stethoscopic view of voice and speech that emerged from 
psychoanalysis to play along side Anne Karpf’s wealth of details concerning ‘What 
the Voice Can Tell Us’ from The Human Voice: A Story of Remarkable Talent. 15 
After this grounding, the chapter plunges into a reading of Michael Jackson’s music 
video Thriller. Using texts from Kobena Mercer and Margo Jefferson, Thriller is read 
as an exercise in horror-erotic double valence – a Janus-faced thrill. This reading 
incorporates Roland Barthes’ concept of the grain of the voice from the synonymous 
essay. The subsequent section, ‘“Get Away!”’ provides a close reading of a small 
moment at the start of Thriller when ‘Michael’ transforms into a lycanthropic being. 
Just before the transformation takes hold he looks up and snarls ‘Get Away!’ The 
scene is argued to be an illustration of the horrors of puberty, corporeal changes 
wrought from without. Voice considered as a harbinger of change. ‘Inhuman Noise 
and Interspecies Grain in Black or White’ provides a close reading of Jackson’s Black 
or White music video. Here, voice is posited to be evocation of human limits – a 
chimerical, pan-species, voice of plurality, torsions and horror. 
‘Insidious’, in methodology, is a mix of chapters two and three. Recourse to empirical 
studies, fiction, and close intertextual readings are all employed to explore the 
																																																								
14 Jacques Lacan, The Psychoses: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book III 1955-1965, Trans. Russell 
Grigg, Ed. Jacques-Alain Miller (London, UK: Routledge, 1993), 243. 
15 Karpf, The Human Voice: A Story of Remarkable Talent (London, UK: Bloomsbury, 2007). 
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incursions and contagions of voice. ‘Slimy and Wormy’ grounds voice as analogous 
to slime and poses its equivalence with the vital – horrifying – excess of Slime 
Woodward elabourates in Slime Dynamics. This section encompases contagion and 
earworms (INMI – Involuntary Musical Imagery), and finishes on the point of voice’s 
incursion into bodies. Texts from the Žižek and Dolar that exploit a horror vocabulary 
are employed. This weaving not only underscores the argument of an implicit horror 
in voice, but also performs the necessity to explore the question of horror in the object 
a voice. ‘Crazy’ develops the contagion of voice in terms of a parasitic pathogen.  
‘Parasites & Earworms’ surveys a number of INMI as agents of torment and horror in 
literature and film. Mark Twain’s A Literary Nightmare, comments from Stephen 
King concerning earworms, The ‘Cuban Pete’ character in Charles Russell’s The 
Mask, E.B. White’s short story, The Supremacy of Uruguay and Alfred Bester’s The 
Demolished Man are all deployed to illustrate this concept. Nestled within this piece 
is brief sketch of Ophiocordyceps Unilateralis, a parasite that compels a host body to 
behaviors expediting proliferation. It is claimed that an INMI is structurally (for the 
subject/host) analogous to parasites and the aural hallucinations Lacan describes. 
Each is an agent of torment and horror that move through bodies.  
‘Sirens’ Spell’ pivots on the double meaning of spell – to order meaningful symbols 
correctly and the act of casting a magical force. The section focuses on the latter 
modality of spell as a register of gendered vocalities in the history of the Siren figure. 
A number of texts, including the editors’ introduction from Leslie C. Dunn’ and 
Nancy A. Jones’ Embodied voices: Representing female vocality in western culture 
are employed. The reading of the Sirens then extends to incorporate The Voyage of 
Máel Dúin, an ancient Irish text circa 700A.D. These readings continue to elaborate 
the contagious and corruptive potency of voice, but they also introduce, in the seam of 
inter-species voice, a distinct question: for whom are such voices horrifying? The text 
concludes that these ‘spells’ spell out a particular subject’s fears and horrors: a male 
subject’s.  
‘Sounds like us: Vivisection’ addresses the treatment of voice in Aristotle’s writings. 
The passage returns to the question of vocalization and underscores the partition of 
man, the male human animal, from other animals. The section considers Lacan’s 
comments, running along the same annexation of man in terms of intentionality. This 
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section is very much a lead into the following section, Aristotle’s distinctions rest 
largely on empirical observations and a small synthetic leap concerning the presence 
of soul, the larger implications of the question of gender and species in voice are most 
insidiously laid by Plato. ‘Bacchic Frenzy: Forgetting how to walk and speak’ 
continues the thread of division in voice in terms of music. The political drive to 
control voice is illustrated. Early examples of states controlling the insidious nature of 
voice – guarding against the horrors of corrupting earworms – are provided. 
Questions of gender and species within this division of voice continue to be 
addressed. The piece argues that patrician man has guarded (from the ancient Greeks 
fretting over music modes and the Dionysian dithyramb to the review board that 
suggested lowering BPMs in Fabric might prevent drug use) against musical 
enjoyment lest it lead to a ‘hell of unending misery’. Here, enjoyment in music and 
voice are presented as prospects of horror that man has legislated and sought to 
control.  
‘Flauting Sense’ takes up this notion of man guarding against the horrors of voice but 
adds a twist – the horrors are pleasure. This twist is explicated with a debt to Adriana 
Cavarero’s nuanced reading of Plato’s Symposium in For More Than One Voice: 
Toward a Philosophy of Vocal Expression. It is argued that Alcibiades and Plato are 
plagued by the contagious and spellbinding nature of Socratean voice, their love of 
this voice is unrequited: it is a torment. The former’s reaction is to flee the voice. 
Plato’s move is to devocalize logos, meaning and soul, from voice by reducing it to 
script. In each case, these are responses to the physical insidiousness of voice, 
methods of bearing the horrifying corporeality of voice – the horrors, the jouissance, 





Beyond the Veil of Our World  
 
Acquiesce to (H)ear: How’s it sound?  
 
This section considers methodologies of examining the body in voice by drawing out 
the double meaning of the question ‘how’s it sound’. It is posited that the 
requirements of vocalization can be considered without lengthy and distracting 
recourse to phenomenological considerations of experiencing sound. Erring on the the 
sound producing body over reception is groundwork for the intervention in Dolar’s 
strategy of focusing on linguistics and aesthetics over the body. Here, the 
methodological departures that are necessary for foci on the body are outlined.  
 
If voice is the object of enquiry, then what is the nature of this object? What is voice? 
To begin let us consider voice as it is commonly understood, in lay terms, as it is 
immediately thought of when one sounds the word, ‘voice’, in conversation: a sound 
from a body. 
There is no way around this; voice is generally taken to be a type of sound, we might 
call it a sound object, a sonic phenomenon; something with empirical traits, physics: 
something that moves air as well as moves through air and other materials. Audition 
of voice is contingent upon a series of physical requirements: force, movement, of the 
body, the mouth and the ear. These facets of voice, the physics of voice, couch our 
object in sonic and empirical terms. It is in this sense that sound studies and scientific 
texts concerning voice can contribute significantly to the discussion. On this point, the 
chapter ‘Violence’ explores what the human corpus undertakes when vocalizing – in a 
sense explicating what voice requires of the body that sounds, emits, produces it. The 
empirical nature of how voice comes about must not be skipped over, but it is be no 
means the whole story. Many voice studies texts dwell on the empirical aspects of 
vocalization but neglect to reflect on voice in terms of its initial introduction above. 
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Vocalization obfuscates voice. Or we could say a focus on how voice sounds neglects 
how voice sounds. 16  
The physics of sound and the particularities of human vocalization fall short of some 
crucial nature of voice. It resists reduction to both the physics of its production and 
the phenomenon of its sonic and acoustic after life. This is one problem Pierre 
Schaeffer addresses in Solfrege de l’objet Sonore, albeit with a focus on music. 
Recourse to dry empiricism, acoustics and mathematics frame the subject as a science 
but this is then no different a treatment than might be applied to any other sound 
within nature. Voice, like music, is not merely another sound within nature. For the 
scientist it might be treated as such but, if we return to our lay conversation, most 
would suggest there is something different about voice and music over the din of the 
world. We might think of voice as different to other sounds, we might feel it sounds 
different, but the scientist can always claim that, at least in terms of physics, it is 
much like other sounds. To modify the formulation from the last paragraph, one might 
say voice sounds different even if it sounds the same. We are creeping up on the 
question of audition. Schaeffer, in the same text (a transcription of his audio essay) 
counter-poses the other side of this theoretical conundrum. He writes of the sound 
object: ‘the sum of the psychological phenomena of perception’.17  
This ‘sound object’ twists into an ironic term – there is nothing sound about an object. 
One immediate avenue of thought is the phenomenology of audition, listening. 
However, this line quickly results in a general concern of sound studies – asking the 
grand question, what is it to listen?  
There are two broad lines of flight from this bind – either a phenomenological 
endeavor encompassing psychoacoustics with consistent recourse to voice or an 
engagement with sound studies. The former, although perhaps useful for 
contemplating how voice may be heard without physical sound (i.e. aural 
hallucinations), would not leave time for any appreciation of the voice, its ‘texture’ or 
																																																								
16	An opera lover is keen to know about a new tenor’s performance, so he asks his friend, a vocologist, 
how he sounded…  
17	Pierre. “Solfrege de l’objet Sonore” UbuWeb Papers, accessed January 29, 2019, 
http://www.ubu.com/papers/schaefer_solfege.pdf 
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context. 18 A general appraisal of sound studies is not provided for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, to do so would expand the scope of this text beyond the format 
parameters. Secondly, such a survey would, neglect the discipline’s technological, 
musical and artistic cores – for such threads of enquiry, whilst potentially applicable, 
might not be pertinent for a strict focus on voice or its horrors. Thirdly, the question 
of listening, even if it is to a voice, would not only exercise little departure from 
Schaeffer’s foundational work, but would risk an elliptical return: refocusing the issue 
of what is at stake to the ear, as opposed to voice. Thus, questions from other 
disciplines concerning audition, listening, psychoacoustics (and other disciplines that 
examine and/or consider the interplays of our cephalic sensory rig) are employed only 
as far as necessary to develop thought on voice and horror. 19 
To ask of voice: ‘how’s it sound?’ opens up a tension along a continuum from the 
concealed larynx, mouth, the ear, perception and experience, with myriad other 
physics, such as acoustics, along the way. A way to formulate this tension, a way of 
articulating the bind, might be by way of the term already employed previously to 
pose the common expectation of voice: phenomenon. The secondary definition of the 
noun is for something special, this applies to voice well. But the primary definition is 
more germane. Phenomenon: a fact that exists, or is observed to exist, particularly 
when its cause or explanation is in question. The empirical traits of vocalizing and 
audition both fall short the essence of voice, its phenomenon the empirical sciences 
chart well, but the question of voice is by no means exhausted by observations of 
vocalization, audition or the physics of sound. The details of each might go some way 
to provide a basis from which thought can spring, but voice is by no means reducible 
under such modes. How best to conduct a consideration of voice beyond mere 
phenomenon?    
Dolar’s proposition of the Lacanian ‘Object Voice’ in A Voice and Nothing More, 
‘[d]oubtless the most sustained recent reflection on the voice’, is a particular mode of 
																																																								
18	Our opera lover then asked a phenomenologist – much to his regret – before acquiring a recording of 
the performance. After some evenings spent rapt in his apartment listening to the tenor’s voice he 
looked forward to expressing his enthusiasm with a visiting sound studies scholar. They were affable 
enough, but the conversation quickly resulted in torsion, cross-purposes. 
19 Our opera lover was perplexed when his good friend, coincidently an otolaryngologist, said the 
tenor’s voice was ‘perfectly normal.’ ‘It’s no normal voice’ explained our aesthete, ‘it’s magnificent!’ 
	 27	
conducting a pursuit of such an essence beyond the disciplines mentioned thus far. 20 
The book opens with an anecdote about Italian soldiers listening to the beautiful 
sounding command of their leader rather than heeding the semantic content it carries. 
Dolar writes of a ‘third level: an object voice which does not go up in smoke in the 
conveyance of meaning, and does not solidify in an object of fetish reverence, but an 
object which functions as a blind spot in the call and as a disturbance of aesthetic 
appreciation.’ 21 Dolar states that one might show fidelity to meaning by running to 
attack, fidelity to aesthetics by running to the opera and fidelity to the third level by 
turning to psychoanalysis. 22  Language and meaning on one hand, beauty and 
aesthetics on the other, and a third level: psychoanalysis. Physics are absent from each 
turn of Dolar’s claimed premise. The body is passed over, acoustics fall on deaf ears: 
flesh, cartilage, membranes and waves never made the edit.  
A later chapter in A Voice and Nothing More is titled ‘The “Physics” of the Voice’. 
Why the quotation marks? Is this some grammatical register of how, for the question 
of voice, physics are awkward? The quotation marks, not acknowledged or justified in 
the chapter, smack of irk, as if the text is a slip. The chapter glides over any question 
of corporeality. Any warmth or moisture (to evoke the breath of voice) is eliminated 
to the point of being an antithesis to Barthes’ famous essay, ‘The Grain of the Voice’. 
23  
The bulk of the chapter focuses on ‘The Acousmatics of the Voice’. There is more to 
be said about Schaeffer’s reinvigorated term ‘acousmatic’ than can be included in this 
consideration of Dolar’s treatment (or not) of physics. A brief definition: acousmatic 
refers to a sound whose source cannot be identified. Thus, an acousmatic voice would 
be heard without the body being seen. Dolar, here, is of course discussing the nature 
of voice’s capacity for disembodiment and the uncanny and haunting effects of 
hearing a voice coming from nowhere. But there is an irony here: the chapter of the 
book that tackles the “physics” voice does so by focusing mostly on an acousmatic 
voice whereby the source body is hidden, concealed, out of sight. Dolar recounts the 
																																																								
20	John Mowitt, Radio: Essays in Bad Reception (Berkeley, California, USA: University of California  
Press, 2011), 25. 
21 Mladen Dolar, A Voice and Nothing More (Short Circuits), (Massachusetts, USA: MIT Press, 2006), 
4. 
22 Ibid., 4. 
23 Roland Barthes, Image-Music-Text (London: Fontana, 1977), 179-189. Barthes’ text restlessly 
yearns for the body in voice. 
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philosophical origin of the term provided in the Larousse dictionary: ‘“The 
Acousmatics were Pythagoras’ disciples who, concealed by a curtain, followed his 
teaching’. 24 Later in the section he discusses the veil that conceals the powerful 
wizard in Lyman Frank Baum’s Wizard of Oz and goes on speculate how Pythagoras’ 
students felt as their master was the disacousmatized. He writes:  
It may well be that, once the lifted screen uncovered a pitiable old man, the 
disciples’ main concern was to maintain the illusion, so that the disillusionment 
which they must have experienced did not affect the big Other. Another screen 
had to be raised to prevent the big Other from seeing what they saw, and this 
second veil entailed a dividing line between the initiated and the uninitiated. 
Perhaps it is no coincidence that the Pythagorean school was the first to institute 
the division into esoteric and exoteric knowledge, the esoteric being reserved 
for those who had seen the Master, and the exoteric for those who knew his 
teachings merely by his voice, so that the line concerned not the doctrine itself, 
only its form. Does not the term esoteric imply maintaining the veil after the 
veil has been lifted? 25 
 
Concerning the second sentiment regarding esotericism, particularly the final line 
emphasized above, it is tempting to pose a question: does this divulge the 
methodology Dolar subscribes to? Some pages previously, Pythagoras’ veiling is 
declared ‘a stroke of genius which stands at the very origin of philosophy’. 26 A veil 
behind the veil, the pedagogical stroke of genius at the birth of ‘philosophy’ – are 
such sentiments merely coincidental asides in this “physics” chapter that skirts around 
with such reticence both the acoustics and corporeality of voice? 
Perhaps it is no co-incidence, then, that the cover of A Voice and Nothing More, the 
mouth, the corporeal aperture of voice is hidden behind Michael Redgrave’s hand. 27 
The corporeal physical aperture, the mouth, is given due consideration in ‘Violence’.   
Dolar’s neglect of physics does not just apply to just the corporeal interpretation of 
the term, it also extends to acoustics – the physics of sound. Voices are commented on 
as being beautiful or loud, they are described enough to give the reader some sense of 
																																																								
24 Dolar, A Voice and Nothing More, 61. 
25 Ibid., 68, emphasis added. 
26 Ibid., 61: ‘The Teacher, the Master behind a curtain, proffering his teaching from there without being 
seen: no doubt a stroke of genius which stands at the very origin of philosophy—Pythagoras was 
allegedly the first to describe himself as a “philosopher,” and also the first to found a philosophical 
school.’  
27 And Steven Connor’s Dumbstruck: A Cultural History of Ventriloquism. 
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the voices in question – but the physics of sound are only explored as far as 
disembodied voices, how voice jettisons the body from which it issues. Dolar insists 
that ‘the object voice’ is silent and mute – but he must, nonetheless, access his 
elucidation of this object via heard voices, voices with meaning (speech) or voices of 
aural beauty – voices that are discussed in terms of how they might sound or have 
sounded, voices that, most certainly come from a body (even if such a body is 
concealed). John Mowitt, in ‘Facing the Radio’, observes that Dolar ‘avoids wrestling 
with precisely the acoustic character of the void within which the voice as object is 
said to resonate.’28  
This thesis affords foci to the acoustic and corporeal physics of voice. ‘Insidious’ in 
particular will address membranes and waves. Although this is by no means an 
empirical text, such observations are utilized as ways into the question of voice 
beyond phenomenon, object a voice, its horrors: vox-exo.  
Voice here is represented as symptom, danger or disease. Voice, like its antithesis, 
aphasia, or even paralysis, is treated as an object of enquiry that is symptomatic of 
underlying physical and psychic dynamics – traumas wrought in developmental, 
corporeal, psychological, historical or evolutionary terms. Voice qua object of enquiry 
is considered with a clinical approach. This thesis examines the acoustic and bodily 






28 Mowitt, Radio: Essays in Bad Reception, 26-27. 
	 30	
The So-called Object Voice 
 
This section firstly takes issue with Dolar’s (and Žižek’s) use of the term ‘the object 
voice’ and examines other scholars’ research and articulations of Lacan’s partial 
objects and object petit a. Secondly, the symmetries between the object a and 
Thacker’s proposed locus of horror are drawn out. A synthesis between horror and 
object a is commenced. A purpose of both of these moves is to underscore the 
significance of the body. Firstly in terms of the subject’s body within Lacan’s schema, 
and secondly by highlighting a subtext of libidinous corporeality explicated via a 
genre horror vocabulary in the Slovenian school’s texts that describe the silence of 
‘the object voice’. 
 
The works of the Slovenian critical theorists, philosophers and psychoanalysts have 
done much to establish importance of voice in the array of Lacan’s ‘Objet a’. In 
particular the work of Mladen Dolar, whose 2006 book, A Voice and Nothing More, 
argued for voice as a Lacanian object-cause, referring to it as ‘the object voice’. 29 
Such endeavors do, indeed, add much needed foci to the question of voice in 
contradistinction to the dominance of gaze. However, the status of the object voice is 
not always clear in a number of texts and is prone is misinterpretations. It is with an 
aim for impressing greater precision that the ‘object voice’, as it is generally referred 
to by the Slovenian school thinkers (and subsequent responding and elabourating texts 
that emerged from the intellectual nexus), will be referred to in this thesis as: the 
object a voice. 
To begin understanding object a voice with any precision some vagaries need to be 
addressed. This can be conducted via consideration of how the object a emerges 
within Lacan’s schema. The subject of jouissance, as Vanheule writes in The Subject 
of Psychosis: A Lacanian Perspective, is ‘a crucial starting point’ for interpreting 
object a. 30 Vanheule, in ‘The Object a and Jouissance in Psychosis’, outlines a 
																																																								
29 Although he produced earlier texts exploring the same subject the book is certainly the most 
established and thorough treatise on this topic. An earlier edited collection, Gaze and Voice as Love 
Objects, contained just two chapters featuring voice, one of which all too briefly. 
30 Stijn Vanheule, The Subject of Psychosis: A Lacanian Perspective (London, UK: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011), 131. 
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tripartite structure of Drives, Partial Objects and Object a. He also provides a useful 
table listing, in turn, Drives, Partial Objects and Object a. The text begins by detailing 
Lacan’s shift of schema in the 1960s, particularly how ‘aspects of being cannot be 
grasped via language and that the registers of libido and drive cannot simply be 
reduced to the Symbolic.’ 31 This then leads to a survey of the dynamic of the subject 
of jouissance and the Other before focusing on the ‘significance’ the object a has for 
this revised schema. 32  Vanheule conducts this with reference to Lacan’s matheme of 
the field of the Other and the field of the Subject. Considering Lacan’s revised 
dialectical paradigm and the object a’s emergence from this schema is necessary. Its 
omission from the Slovenian school’s works on voice and object a is, at the very least, 
a moot point. Here, through charting Lacan’s post 1960s schema, the complexion of 
object a emerges as one of alterity and corporeality. 
Let’s begin by way of the difference between the subject of the signifier and the 
subject of jouissance. The former ‘'exists', to the extent that its position and identity in 
the world are articulated via the Other.’ 33 Whereas the subject of Jouissance:  
 
refers to the libidinous corporeality of being. It designates a state of being that is 
not (yet) determined by the signifier. The subject of jouissance 'is' but does not 
exist. It designates the human being qua Thing, before it is differentiated by 
means of the signifier. Its identity and its position in the world are not 
articulated. 34 
 
Vanheule states that the relationship between the Other and the subject of Jouissance 
were conceptualized by Lacan in dialectical terms. 35 Most salient, for our question of 
voice, is the character of object a that emerges from this dialectic of the Other and the 
subject of Jouissance.  
 
																																																								
31 Ibid., 125. 
32 Quotation marks because a defining facet of object a is its alterity to the signifying chain, the 
Symbolic. 
33 Ibid., 127. 
34 Ibid, 127. 
35 Vanheule goes on to describe how Lacan’s topological and logical approach did not adhere to 
developmental psychology, histories or causation via a dialogue between Lacan and Piera Aulagnier in 
the latter’s 1961-2 guest lecture. 
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in the tension between jouissance and Other an Aufhebung or upheaval is 
realized, which gives rise to a new component of subjectivity: the object a. The 
object a is a component of libidinous corporeality that is created by using 
signifiers, but that is not represented by means of the signifier. It is an element 
of being that persists in the subject of the signifier, but is not transformed into 
Symbolic existence. 36 
 
There are two points of comment to be made here. Firstly, the sentiment expressed 
here runs along the lines of Lacan’s famous graph of desire where voice shoots out 
like a ‘spectral apparition’ (as Žižek is wont to say) as an affect of the signifying 
operation. 37  The object a emerges from the signifying operation, but is in no way 
compatible with the Symbolic – it is irreconcilable, incompatible, with any mode of 
expression via signifiers. Secondly, note the term ‘libidinal corporeality’: we have 
flesh here. The dialectical transition between the Other and the subject of Jouissance, 
the ‘central terms Lacan puts forward in his dialectical model’, are what ‘gives rise’ to 
the object a, our outbreak of libidinous corporeality – ‘an uncanny life of an undead 
monster’. 38 
The subject of Jouissance is spoken of in terms that recall Freud’s vesicle of organic 
matter – a sensible subject. Lacan, speaks not only of the pleasure principal, but of the 
organism that is sensible to pleasures (which risk overwhelming the organism and 
being experienced as pain). There is a particular sense of the sensitive flesh, the 
fragile corpus, threaded through his writing. Regard Vanheule’s quotation of Lacan, 
from 1970:   
 
If the living being is something at all thinkable, it will be above all as subject of 
the jouissance; but this psychological law that we call the pleasure principle 
(and which is only the principle of displeasure) is very soon to create a barrier 
to all jouissance. If I am enjoying myself a little too much, I begin to feel pain 
and I moderate my pleasures. The organism seems made to avoid too much 
jouissance. 39  
																																																								
36 Ibid., 127. 
37 Slavoj Žižek, “I Hear You With My Eyes” Gaze and Voice as Love Objects, Eds. Renata  
Salecl and Slavoj Žižek, (Durham and London, UK: Duke University Press. 1996), 103. 
38 Vanheule, The Subject of Psychosis: A Lacanian Perspective, 128; Žižek, “I Hear You With My 
Eyes”, 103. 
39 Vanheule, The Subject of Psychosis: A Lacanian Perspective, 128. 
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Vanheule turns to how Lacan proposes a ‘quasi-arithmetical explanation’ to 
understand the transformation the ‘dialectical tension’ produces in the Other and the 
subject of jouissance: the matheme of the division of the Other in Seminar X. A 





This presents two fields. On the left there is the field of the Other, on the right the 
field of the subject of jouissance. The field of the Other is experienced as the external 
world, whereas the field of the subject of jouissance is experienced as internal. 40 
Moving down a level there are lines over the symbols. Looking to the left we see the 
field of the Other. Notice that, as Vanheule writes, the fact that O ‘is presented as the 
element that will be divided makes clear that Lacan still brings into play the primacy 
of the Other: a is the system through which bodily jouissance is transformed.’ The 
subject of jouissance can only be, partly, articulated via the Other.’ 41 The S, the 
subject of jouissance, is divided, hence the overlaid dividing line, via the ‘treasure 
trove’ of signifiers, language, from which it is articulated, partly expressed, in the 
realm of the Other.  
																																																								
40 Ibid., 130. 
41 Ibid., 130. 
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Moving to the right we see the ‘barred Other’. This is what constitutes the 
unconscious, the ‘Other in so far as I do not reach it.’ 42 We could say this is the 
gravity between the signifiers the divided subject has taken from the treasure trove, 
or, what unknown, and unknowable, signifiers are taken as remaining beyond the 
subject. To get at this, doomed partial nature of the dynamic, Vanheule’s closing line 
in the text, and his embedded quotation from Lacan, provides nuance and elaborates 
the scrappy (in that it results in bars, division, and remainders – not inexact), 
Sisyphean, schema of the subject and their unconscious: 
 
The idea is that no matter how much speech is produced about S, some aspects 
of jouissance cannot be articulated via the Other. This idea brings Lacan to the 
conclusion that in our use of language, 'The whole existence of the Other 
suspends on a guarantee that is lacking, hence the barred Other'" (Lacan 1962-3, 
p. 136). The only thing the Other provides to the living being is a medium by 
means of which a subject can be articulated. What it does not offer is a standard 
against which this articulation can be tested, nor does O supply a set of ultimate 
signifiers through which S can be fully named. The bar drawn on O indicates 
that irrespective of how much signifying articulation takes place, something 
remains unsaid. There is no final signifier that can hook up the true signification 
of speech. No so-called 'Other of the Other' gives consistency to the signifiers 
that are actually articulated as a result of this division. 43 
 
There is something else, something that bleeds out of this dialectic, it is the small a, 
bottom left. This is the object a, the remainder of the dialectical tension that produces 
the barred other and the divided subject of jouissance. In the sub-section ‘The object 
a’ Vanheule writes that the object a ‘refers to the element of the living being that 
cannot be inserted into the order of the Symbolic; a component of flesh and blood that 
remains inert in relation to the signifier.’ 44 He then quotes Lacan’s comment that it is 
being ‘in so far as it is essentially missing in the text of the world’ before suggesting 
that as object a is a remainder of the division between O and S, this basic dialectical 
dynamic is a necessary prelude for interpreting it. 45 
																																																								
42 Lacan, 1962, quoted in Vanheule, Ibid, 130. 
43 Ibid., 130-131. 
44 Ibid., 131. 
45 Ibid., 131. 
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It is here where resonance with Freud and the import of partial objects comes in. 
Notably, and again, to underscore the absent body in Dolar’s formulation, it is also 
here where the body’s subjection to libidinous drives, its vicissitudes, is brought in.  
 
In operationalizing the object a Lacan starts from Freud's idea that the 
libidinous drive is expressed in specific erogenous zones, and from Melanie 
Klein's and Donald Winnicott's theory on the partial object which says that 
object relations don't necessarily focus on people, but can just as well be 
concentrated on body parts such as a mother's breast. 46 
 
Vanheule continues to say that, Lacan, ‘in line with Freud […] argues that the object a 
is manifested in specific registers of the drive, which in their turn are connected to 
specific erogenous zones’ 47 and that manifestation of the object a can be located in 
the ‘oral, anal, scopic and invocative registers.’ 48 Vanheule suggests that to grasp the 
precise manifestation of object a in these registers of drive, a lucid distinction 
between ‘the object a and the partial object’ is warranted. 49 He then details various 
partial objects, working in turn through the four registers Lacan speaks of. He writes, 
concerning the invocative register of the drive that ‘the ear is the erogenous zone and 
the object it relates to is sound.’ But also the ‘object a, in its turn, is what remains of 
the partial object upon its transformation by using language.’ 50 This object a, that 
remains of the partial object, is not tangible but a ‘pastiche that covers up the Real of 
being.’ 51 Quite how the term ‘tangible’ is to be interpreted is one of the tensions that 
both Vanheule and Dolar leave unattended. Synonyms for tangible such as physical, 
material, corporeal, – these terms do not sit as harmoniously with Vanheule’s 
previous sentiment of the object a being a libidinous corporeality, nor Žižek’s horror-
laden exclamation of it being ‘an uncanny life of an undead monster’. 52 Is this 
symptomatic of the voice’s troublesome status in philosophy? Something referred to 
																																																								
46 Ibid., 131. 
47 Ibid., 131-132. 
48 Ibid., 132. 
49 Ibid., 132. 
50 Vanheule, The Subject of Psychosis: A Lacanian Perspective, 132. This is a structural definition 
Dolar also emphasizes. 
51 Ibid., 132. 
52 Ibid., 127; Žižek, “I Hear You With My Eyes”, 103. 
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as tactile, textured, bodied yet at the same time, disembodied – at once bodily and of 
the body? 
A brief prime of the Other and the subject of jouissance has been presented, as well as 
some address of how it leads into the object a. A turn to Vanheule’s table is useful 
here. Not least because it will assist in explicating why the term ‘object voice’ might 
be prone to misinterpretation but also because it will elucidate the tensions and 
ambiguities that are beginning to be touched on.  
In the below table there are two entirely distinguished arrays of objects within the 
Lacanian schema. 53   
 
Drive Partial Object Object a 
Oral Nipple Taking in nothing 
Anal Scybalum Giving nothing 
Scopic Image Gaze 
Invocative Sound Voice 
   
Given that the term voice, or experiences, narratives and treatises on the subject 
invariably evoke a sounding thing and audition of such a thing, a term like ‘Object 
Voice’ is potentially prone to misinterpretation between the ‘Partial Object’ and 
‘Object a’. Statements like Salecl and Žižek’s ‘Lacan added to Freud’s list of partial 
objects (breasts, faeces, phallus) two other objects, voice and gaze’ 54 gloss – smudge 
– the categorical distinction between the partial objects and object a. Voice and gaze 
do not stand in the same structural context as breasts or faeces. There are consistent 
conflations of partial objects with object a and umbrella references to the both 
categories as ‘objects’ in extant literature. In the introduction to Sound Effects: The 
																																																								
53	Vanheule, The Subject of Psychosis: A Lacanian Perspective, 133 
54 Salecl and Žižek eds. “Introduction” in Gaze and Voice as Love Objects (Durham and London, UK: 
Duke University Press. 1996), 3. Breast and faeces can be taken as merely less exact, more general, 
terms for nipple and scybalum. Such a difference may be symptomatic of translation. 
	 37	
Object Voice in Fiction. 55 A footnote in Stephanie Swales’ Perversion: A Lacanian 
Psychoanalytical Approach to the Subject also qualifies a move with the same vague 
opening gambit that uses the umbrella term of ‘psychoanalytic objects’ before 
exploring in much more precise detail, via Jacques-Alain Miller, the gaze and voice 
with correct terminology – object petit a. 56 Jacques-Alain Miller, by contrast, in The 
Later Lacan: An Introduction, repeatedly references voice as object a. When 
describing the nipple Vanheule writes ‘partial object’ but subsequently drops the 
specificity when referencing scybalum, image or sound: ‘at the invocative level the 
ear is the erogenous zone and the object it relates to is sound.’ 57 A slightly more 
precise formulation might read: at the invocative level the ear is the erogenous zone 
and the partial object it relates to is sound.  
It cannot elude notice that voice, the object a beyond the phenomenological partial 
object of sound is not something one hears, sings or speaks. But at once, the 
overarching definition of the object a, qua remainder, residue, recalcitrant, irreducible 
to symbolic existence, necessitates that voice, even if it is silent, it is, for the subject, 
contingent to sound; the partial object relating to the invocative drive and the 
erogenous (h)ear. This component of libidinous corporeality, as much as it is mute, is 
only mute ‘after’, sound. It is in this passage, of sounding partial object to silent 
object a, where ambiguity may arise. Voice immediately evokes a sounding thing, but 
the structural residence of object a is a remainder of the sounding partial object. To 
unfold a narrative of a subject’s experience of voice, qua object a, there is a necessary 
perambulation through sound, the partial object. 
Perhaps it is this structural context of object a, that elicits the Slovenian school’s 
leitmotif of referring to the ‘object voice’ as inaudible, silent, stuck in the throat after 
a necessary excursion through the experience and aesthetic characteristic of heard 
‘voices’. 58  The presence of such a refrain in the texts of Dolar and Žižek at once 
underscores a sense of corporeality and embroilment in the act of vocalization as it 
attests to its silence. One can regard the repeated deployment of Munch’s The Scream 
																																																								
55 Jorge Sacido-Romero and Sylvia Mieszkowski. Sound Effects: The Object Voice in Fiction. Leiden,  
(The Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill/ Rodopi, 2015) 
56 Stephanie Swales, Perversion: A Lacanian Psychoanalytical Approach to the Subject (New York, 
USA: Routledge, 2012), 112. 
57 Vanheule, The Subject of Psychosis: A Lacanian Perspective, 132. 
58 Žižek, “I Hear You With My Eyes”, 93, and Dolar, A Voice and Nothing More, 61. 
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(1893) in a similar sense. It is an impressive illustration of the silent corporeal object 
a voice concept’s contingency to the aural partial object in both Dolar’s, A Voice and 
Nothing More and Žižek’s, “I Hear You With My Eyes”. 59 
It is in such discussions of the silent scream where horror returns. Žižek in this turn, 
couches the aesthetic appreciation of music as the partial object which prevents the 
horror or the object a. ‘"Why do we listen to music?": in order to avoid the horror of 
the encounter of the voice qua object. […] it is a lure, a screen, the last curtain, which 





59 Dolar, A Voice and Nothing More, 69; Žižek, “I Hear You With My Eyes”, 93-94. 
60 Ibid., 93. Original emphasis. 
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Speaking of the Object a 
 
Here, the focus turns to object a voice in relation to language. As highlighted in the 
previous section, the motifs of genre horror – ghosts and the undead – in the 
Slovenian school’s texts are further detailed. This serves to illustrate the otherness and 
pluralities of object a. Lacan’s words are introduced as supporting evidence of this 
proposition.  Additionally Dolar’s strategies for strafing the question of the body are 
examined after a brief acknowledgement of Michel Poizat’s influence on his work. 
Lastly, and consisting of the bulk of this section, voice beyond language is argued to 
be distinctly corporeal. This is accomplished through recourse to Lacan’s commentary 
on the hiccup in Plato’s Symposium and Dolar’s discussion of this passage. Lacan’s 
own corporeal sonic eruptions are also considered. It is argued that, contra Dolar (who 
quickly poses coughs and hiccups as signifying), the body is entangled with object a. 
It is argued that voice qua object a, silent or evoked through a sonic expression or 
emission, is distinctly corporeal. It is here where a bold intervention in Dolar’s 
recalcitrance to the body is levelled and the intrinsic corporeality of object a is 
established. 
 
Lacan, in his introductory speech to the ‘Names-of-the-Father’ seminar in Television: 
A Challenge to the Psychoanalytic Establishment, is quite explicit in placing voice as 
that of the Other, as an object a. The a, stands for autre, other. But he is also clear in 
saying that this voice ‘speaks’: 61 
 
The voice of the Other should be considered an essential object. Every analyst is 
solicited to accord it its place. Its various incarnations should be followed, as 
much in the realm of psychosis as at that extremity of normal functioning in the 
formation of the superego. Through seeing the petit a source of the superego, it 
is possible that many things will become more clear. The relation of voice to the 
Other is solely a phenomenological approach. If it is truly, as I say, petit a as 
fallen from the Other, we can exhaust its structural function only by bringing 
our inquiry to bear on what the Other is as a subject, for voice is the product and 
																																																								
61 Incidentally, the text in this quotation directly follows an examination of Alcibiades and Socrates, 
whom we shall explore later. 
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object fallen from the organ of speech, and the Other is the site where "it" — 
ça— speaks. 62 
 
How are we to interpret this speech? Does this voice speak like you and I? Does it 
sound? What does it say? The Slovenian theorists describe ‘the object voice’ as silent, 
stuck in the throat and structurally irreducible to the signifying matrix of language. 
What, then, is the import of Lacan’s declaration that such a voice speaks? 63 Does it 
speak without word or sound? This section elucidates object a voice as at once 
something that might manifest as the experience of speech or a sound with meaning 
despite/by virtue of its structural context of resultant from the signifying operation.    
The voice Lacan speaks of – as a voice that speaks – ought to be, he declares, 
accorded its place by the analyst. But to say ‘the voice’ is not quite right here, for the 
following line plunges this voice into plurality, legion. 64 The voice we have here is 
one of various ‘incarnations:’ ‘ses incarnations diverses’. The phrase immediately 
evokes the ghoulish, uncanny or undead. 65 Incarnations might be interpreted as 
iterations, guises, as the previous term various (or diverses) alludes to. There is also a 
theological implication in the word: the embodiment(s) of a deity, spirit or quality in 
flesh.  
From this invocation of voice manifesting as myriad, incarnations, with all the 
connotations of supernatural, plural, shifting avatars, the methodology of uncovering 
its relation to the Other is proposed as being a resolutely phenomenological question: 
what the Other is for the subject. The context and experience of its existence for the 
subject is a way into fathoming its relation to the Other (and by extension its 
significance for the analysand). 66 It is here where the horror and strangeness of object 
																																																								
62 Jacques Lacan, Television: A Challenge to the Psychoanalytical Establishment, Trans. Denis Hollier, 
Rosalind Krauss, Annette Michelson and Jeffrey Mehlman. Ed. Joan Copjec (New York, USA: W. W. 
Norton & Company, 1990), 87. 
63 The original: ‘La voix de l'Autre doit être considérée comme un objet essentiel. Tout analyste sera 
appelé à lui donner sa place, ses incarnations diverses, tant dans le champ de la psychose que dans la 
formation du sur-moi. Ceci, abord phénoménologique, ce rapport de la voix à l'Autre, le petit a comme 
chu de l'Autre, nous pouvons en épuiser la fonction structurale à porter l'interrogation sur ce qu'est 
l'Autre comme sujet. Par la voix, cet objet chu de l'organe de la parole, l'Autre est le lieu où ça parle.’  
64 Such a pluralism resonating with ‘Legion’ – see Thacker. 
65 Žižek, “I Hear You With My Eyes”, 103. 
66 Lacan as Ghostbuster: ‘tell me what the ghosts say’. 
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a, its horrific alterity, a voice of the Other incurring into the subject’s experience 
begins to unfold on a number of levels. 67  
Let’s return to the question of a voice that speaks. As Lacan states, voice is the 
product, a ‘fallen object from the organ of speech’, par la voix, cet objet chu de 
l'organe de la parole, l'Autre est le lieu où ça parle. Dolar, in A Voice and Nothing 
More opens ‘The Metaphysics of The Voice’ by presenting Lacan’s graph of desire, 
whereby voice runs out, like a protruding limb, as the outcome of the signifying 
operation. 68   Presented below is the version Dolar uses from Alan Sheridan’s 





67 In Adrian Lyne’s psychological horror Vietnam veteran film Jacob’s Ladder (1990) there is an 
impressive evocation of the Other’s speech. The only moment of none diegetic speech in the film 
arrives when Jacob is lying in bed. His wife, from whom he is estranged, visits and tells him she ‘still 
loves him’ after he softly exclaims ‘I’m not dead’. A voice pierces the scene: “dream on…” It is not a 
voice recognizable as any character in the film. The viewer hears the voice, but it evokes an aural 
hallucination within the diegesis. Within the scene a voice is not sounding, his wife and children do not 
react to it. Is this the voice of the Other, erupting, piercing the plain of language, with speech to suggest 
that Jacob is, in fact, dead and that his wife does not love him?  
68 Dolar, A Voice and Nothing More, 35. 
69 Jacques Lacan, Écrits: A Selection, Trans. and Ed. Alan Sheridan (London:   
Routledge, 1989), 234. It should be noted that Bruce Fink’s translation provides a slightly different 
algebra. The difference is of little import for the questions at hand here – it only departs insofar as the 
‘O’ is replaced by ‘A’ and a, maintaining more fidelity to the original French: autre. 
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Dolar asks: ‘So why is there the voice as the outcome? Why does the signifier run out 
into the voice as its result?’ 70 Voice, in the diagram, is a remainder after the 
signifying operation, an excess that cannot be incorporated into the ‘binary logical 
web’. 71 This is the perplexing tension Dolar presents us with: is it to be thought of in 
terms of being pre-reduction to the avatars and symbols of the signifier by virtue of 
the signifying operation? No, its nature must be understood as an ineradicable non-
signifying excess, a structural outcome, resultant, of the signifying operation.  
Dolar couches this as a question of phonology: with a flourish of genre horror 
narration he asks ‘which voice do we find there – the one that phonology has killed? 
If it was successfully murdered, why does it recur? Does it not know that it is dead?’ 
72  This claim is in the second chapter, ‘The Metaphysics of the Voice’. Michel 
Poizat’s works are a heavy influence on this chapter. Dolar, in a note at the back of 
the book, writes: ‘For a detailed account, see Poizat’s remarkable book on sacred 
music, La voix du diable (1991). I draw a lot of the information in this section from 
this source.’ 73 Indeed, Poizat’s The Angel’s Cry: Beyond the Pleaure Principle in 
Opera is a significant psychoanalytical investigation of voice in the Anglophone 
world that predates Dolar’s work. 74 The Angel’s Cry contains horror themes writ 
large; death cries, thrills – jouissance – of ecstasy and horror.  The diagram Poizat 
presents in the ‘Words and Music’ chapter not only places silence/cry in a similar 
structural context as Dolar’s ‘object voice’ (post speech, signifying linguistic 
message, and beyond aesthetic/singing) but also couches this silence as invocatory: 
referencing Lacan’s ‘invocatory drive’. 75  Dolar’s aforementioned deployment of 
Edward Munch’s The Scream (1893) strikes a silent resonance with Poizat’s thesis in 
‘The Silence That Screams, the Other Silence’. 76 
Returning to voice’s subjection to phonology. It is in the opening chapter, ‘The 
Linguistics of the Voice’, where Dolar writes: 
																																																								
70 Dolar, A Voice and Nothing More, 35. 
71 Ibid., 35. 
72 Ibid., 35. 
73 Ibid., 194. Dolar also provides a list of ‘important work, wholly or partly inspired by Lacan’ in an 
endnote to his essay ‘Voice after Lacan’ in After Lacan: Literature, Theory, and Psychoanalysis in the 
Twenty-First Century. The first five works listed are Poizat’s. 
74 Michel Poizat, The Angel’s Cry: Beyond the Pleasure Principle in Opera, Trans. Arthur Denner 
(Ithaca, New York/London, UK: 1992). 
75 Poizat, The Angel’s Cry: Beyond the Pleasure Principle in Opera, 90-91. Footnote 79. 
76 Ibid., 87-92. 
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The inaugural gesture of phonology was thus the total reduction of the voice as 
the substance of language. Phonology, true to its apocryphal etymology, was 
after killing the voice—its name is, of course, derived from the Greek phone, 
voice, but in it one can also quite appropriately hear phonos, murder. Phonology 
stabs the voice with the signifying dagger; it does away with its living presence, 
with its flesh and blood. 77 
 
Dolar, in claiming that phonology dismantled the voice into ‘“elementary structures 
of kinship”’, or ‘mere bundles of differential oppositions,’ rehearses how voice – 
surplus to communication or not – was reduced to differences, presences and absences 
under phonological project. 78 He writes: ‘the prosody, the intonation and the accent, 
the melody, the redundant elements, the variations, and so forth. Bones, flesh, and 
blood of the voice were diluted without remainder into a web of structural traits, a 
checklist of presences and absences.’ 79 
Dolar is deliberately too quick. For he goes on to say that phonology never quite 
completes its reduction of voice into a differential matrix. Despite the phoneme being 
‘the way in which the signifier has seized and molded the voice […] it can never quite 
be tamed into the simple transparent matrix of differential oppositions’. 80 Dolar uses 
the example of The Wachowskis’ The Matrix film, to demonstrate that ‘The signifier 
needs the voice as its support, just as the Matrix needs the poor subjects and their 
fantasies, but it has no materiality in itself, it just uses the voice to constitute our 
common “virtual reality.”’ 81 He goes on to say the phonological operation always 
‘produces a remainder which cannot be made a signifier or disappear in meaning; the 
																																																								
77 Dolar, A Voice and Nothing More, 19. This scene of murder strikes a harmony with Poizat’s 
comment of the double valence of thrill of a penetrating cry beyond language and aesthetic: ‘Are those 
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78 Ibid., 19. 
79 Ibid., 19. 
80 Ibid., 19-20. 
81 Ibid., 20. 
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remainder that doesn’t make sense, a leftover, a cast- off—shall we say an excrement 
of the signifier? The matrix silences the voice, but not quite.’ 82   
Dolar’s first avenue of pursuit for this unsilenced facet of voice, which is seemingly 
recalcitrant to the signifier, is accent, intonation and timbre. 83 This is a straw-man, it 
goes up in signifying smoke on pages 20-23. What follows is perplexing. After a line 
concerning the “prelinguistic” and “postlinguistic” classification of intonation, timbre 
and accent the focus segues to physiological emissions such as coughing and hiccups. 
This thread is then woven into Aristotle’s partitioning of sounds, voices and speech 
by the presence of soul in various species. 84 Coughs and hiccups are acknowledged 
as a break in speech, a ‘disruption of the ascent toward meaning’ before suggesting 
that such corporeal noises ‘are hardly ever simply external to the structure—quite the 
opposite, they may well enter into its core or become its double. We can easily see 
that there is a whole “semiotics of coughing”: one coughs while preparing to speak’. 
85  
To elucidate this point, that the cough or hiccup, that corporeal interruption of voice 
we share with animals, Dolar turns to Lacan’s reference to Aristophane’s hiccupping 
fit in Plato’s Symposium. He writes of Lacan’s Transference seminar, where Lacan 
recounted Alexandre Kojève’s advice: ‘since Kojeve is a very superior sort of person, 
namely a snob, he answered me: "In any case you will never interpret the Symposium 
if you do not know why Aristophanes had a hiccup!"’ 86 Lacan then presses the 
significance of Aristophane’s spasm and highlights the line, in his copy, ‘Pausaniou... 
																																																								
82 Ibid., 20. Emphasis added. 
83 Ibid., 20. 
84 Aristotle’s text is given time later on in this thesis. 
85 Dolar, A Voice and Nothing More, 24. Note the presupposed hierarchy here. Meaning said as if it 
were above the body from which it issues; ibid., 24. Poizat posited the ‘significance’ of coughing in 
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See, Žižek, “I Hear You With My Eyes”, 93. 
86 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book VIII Transference, Trans. Cormac Gallagher. 
Accessed 19 January, 2019. https://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/THE-SEMINAR-OF-JACQUES-LACAN-
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	 45	
pausamenou’. 87  He then asks ‘Why would he have had a hiccup if there were no 
reason for it? I had no idea why he had a hiccup, but all the same encouraged by this 
little push’. 88  The answer Lacan suggests is that both Plato, voiced through 
Aristophanes, and Aristophanes are laughing at Pausanias. Lacan’s evidence for this 
is that in the following sixteen lines Aristophanes repeats the word stop, or pause, a 
series of homophonies and isologies: ‘eternally repeated paus’. 89 Dolar writes that 
Lacan: 
 
spoke in such a way that ultimately the entire interpretation depends on 
understanding this unintelligible voice, for which one can only propose the 
formula: it means that it means. This involuntary voice rising from the body’s 
entrails can be read as Plato’s version of mana: the condensation of a senseless 
sound and the elusive highest meaning, something which can ultimately decide 
the sense of the whole. This precultural, non-cultural voice can be seen as the 
zero-point of signification, the incidence of meaning, itself not meaning 
anything, the point around which other—meaningful—voices can be ordered, as 
if the hiccups stood at the very focus of the structure. The voice presents a short 
circuit between nature and culture, between physiology and structure; its vulgar 
nature is mysteriously transubstantiated into meaning tout court. 
 
This is not the only instance of the sounds and noises of the body’s entrails 
condensing into meaning. Catherine Millot, in Life with Lacan, tells of her visits to La 
Vivarois restaurant with Lacan. The chef, Peyrot, often came over to talk with her and 
Lacan. ‘He always came over to chat with us, or rather with me, as chatter was not 
Lacan’s forte.’ 90 She writes of Lacan scribbling Borromean knots on a sheet of paper 
throughout dinner and responding to her questions with ‘a yes or a no’. 91 Millot then 
recounts a conversation with a manageress at another restaurant. Upon mentioning 
Lacan, the woman told of how Peyrot ‘was convinced that the farts and burps which 
																																																								
87 Ibid., 54; (‘Pausanias paused (sorry about the pun – sophistic influence)’ in Griffith’s translation: 
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Knopf/Random House, 2000), 26 
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Lacan, as a free man, did not restrain in public, were meant to signal to Peyrot the 
syllables of his name!’ 92  
Dolar closes ‘The Linguistics of the Voice’ by posing the ambiguities within the 
tensions he has presented thus far.  
 
If there is no linguistics of the voice, only the linguistics of the signifier, then 
the very notion of a linguistics of the non-voice would seem preposterous. 
Obviously all the non-voices, from coughing and hiccups to babbling, 
screaming, laughing, and singing, are not linguistic voices; they are not 
phonemes, yet they are not simply outside the linguistic structure: it is as if, by 
their very absence of articulation (or surplus-articulation in the case of singing), 
they were particularly apt to embody the structure as such, the structure at its 
minimal; or meaning as such, beyond the discernible meaning. If they are not 
submitted to phonology, they nevertheless embody its zero-point: the voice 
aiming at meaning, although neither the one nor the other can be articulated. So 
the paradoxical facit would be that there may be no linguistics of the voice, yet 
the non-voice which represents the voice untamed by structure is not external to 
linguistics. Neither is the object voice which we are pursuing. 93 
 
The passage is dissatisfying on the few levels. Firstly, it reveals the chapter to be a 
series of ‘straw-men arguments’, of which there is nothing wrong in itself – but are 
the proposed aspects of ‘voice’ set aside too quickly? Linguistics and phonology are 
set up and bushed aside, as are the emissions of the body such as coughs and hiccups. 
It is the sonic emissions of the body that are dealt with most unconvincingly. They are 
quickly plunged into the realm of the signifier and summarized as ‘not simply outside 
the linguistic structure.’ Is it too bold to suggest there is a sound of the body in voice 
that is not in support of any linguistic or significatory structure, as Barthes does in the 
oft-referenced ‘The Grain of the Voice’ essay: ‘The ‘grain’ is the body in the voice’? 
94 Dolar’s claims that one can  
 
easily see that there is a whole “semiotics of coughing”: one coughs while 
preparing to speak, one uses coughing as Jakobson’s phatic communication, 
																																																								
92 Ibid., 45. ‘Translator’s note: ‘Pet’ in French is ‘fart’; ‘rot’ is ‘burp’. 
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establishing a channel for communication proper; one can use coughing as 
bidding for time for re- flection, or as an ironic commentary which jeopardizes 
the sense of the utterance 95 
 
Such a statement, whilst no doubt true up to a point, and a helpful lead into the 
question of hiccups, glosses too readily over the body. Recall the analogy Dolar draws 
up with The Matrix. The scene – where Neo awakens from the virtual reality of the 
Matrix in a cell of machinic amniotic fluid – is one of striking corporeality rivaling 
David Cronenberg’s body-horror scenes from the earlier works in his oeuvre. But 
such striking presence of the body, those white limbs scrabbling about in pink gunk, 
is not mentioned. Confrontation with the physicality of voice, a physicality devoid of 
meaning, is neglected in much the same way albeit for the loaded faecal discriptor 
‘excrement of the signifier’ (weighted with phobic aversion) that the signifying matrix 
cannot quite silence. 96  
Dolar’s subsuming of the sonic emissions of the body in the signifying matrix may be 
a further symptom of his tendency to skirt the body. The most direct address of the 
relation of body to voice is located in a chapter titled ‘The Linguistics of the Voice’, 
whereby coughs and hiccups are couched as signifying, whereas the chapter ‘The 
“Physics” of the Voice’ focuses on the question of the acousmatic voice, where the 
source body is hidden.  
There are two parallels worth posing. Is Dolar’s accommodation of coughs and 
hiccups into the matrix of meaningful significance closer to Lacan’s question of the 
Aristophanes’ hiccups in Plato’s Symposium or Peyrot’s interpretation of Lacan’s 
emissions? The former was given good reason to suppose significance (from his 
philosophical mentor Alexandre Kojève). 97 Additionally, the hiccups are within a 
narrative, Plato is not an inert dictaphone, the presence of hiccups in the text, and 
their resonance with words names, should not be dismissed as coincidence. Peyrot’s 
interpretation, by contrast, is less convincing: the equivalence might well be 
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coincidence, and any significance a pareidolic narcissistic fancy. 98 Is there not a 
difference between Lacan’s non-verbal emissions during his seminars and his 
emissions at dinner? Sometimes the emissions of the body are just that, in voice there 
is sound without significance – not every part of it can be subsumed to meaning. Does 
Dolar’s quick turn to couch hiccups and coughing as playing a part in semiotics bears 
similarity to Peyrot’s fanciful claim? The former proposes significance as a strategy 
to avoid the question of the non-meaning sounds of the body, whereas the latter is, 
one cannot help but feel, a register of a chef’s narcissism. Either way, they both cook 
up significance where it may not be. 
The French historian and psychoanalyst Élisabeth Roudinesco, in her biographical 
works on Lacan often references his voice. In Lacan: In Spite of Everything, she 
writes of his seminars as ‘long running banquets’ where ‘the battles of Freudianism 
unfolded […] via the magic of voice’ 99 She writes that Lacan was ‘possessed of a 
veritable passion for orality’ and that he  
spoke in a voice that was soft, booming or syncopated: a mixture of Sacha 
Guitry for the old France style of things and of Salvador Dali for the sense of 
modernity. He declaimed as he ate, devouring his favourite foods – truffles, 
asparagus, ortolans – and beings and things alike. 100  
 
The confluence of voice and eating, perhaps the most explicitly bodily thing one does 
in public, is apposite. On the point of Lacan’s ‘old style’ we find in the large 
monograph, Jacques Lacan, a reference to psychologist Georges Dumas who ‘left a 
deep impression on Lacan’ during his prentice years. 101 Roudinesco, quotes Claude 
Lévi-Strauss’s vivid description of the pedagogical manner:  
 
He never prepared them, trusting instead to the physical spell he knew he could 
cast over his audience by the mobility of his mouth, twisted into a perpetually 
changing smile. And especially by his voice – at the same time husky and 
melodious, a real siren's voice, with strange inflections recalling not only his 
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native Languedoc but also, even more strikingly, certain ancient modes of the 
music of spoken French. So voice and face, though appealing to two different 
senses, both conjured up the same rustic but incisive style, the style of the 
fourteenth-century humanists, the physicians and philosophers whose race he 
seemed to perpetuate in body and mind. 102 
 
Drawing a lineage of Lacan’s vocal and verbal idiosyncrasies, as appealing as it may 
be, is not an avenue that furthers discussion about the body in voice or voice’s 
relationships to meaning in terms of the question of object a. Alice Lagaay’s 
observations of Lacan’s speeches however, do assist in the formulation of the 
presupposed significance in the non-linguistic emissions of the body. In “Between 
Sound and Silence: Voice in the History of Psychoanaylsis”, she writes that Lacan 
was given to ‘disturbances of voice’ and references Michel de Certeau’s comment:. 
103 
 
Michel de Certeau, who attended Lacan’s seminar, recounts how such sounds as 
coughing, throat clearing, mumbling, the chewing of words and sighing – in 
short, an array of disturbances of the voice – constantly accompanied Lacan’s 
practice of talking or holding speeches, as if what he said was always on the 
brink of dissolving, of retreating or regressing, into a kind of incomprehensible 
physicality. And whilst being clearly audible to the assembled listeners, these 
“scars of phonation”, which would not so much interrupt as constitute the 
master’s speech, remained totally incomprehensible with regard to their 
reference or meaning (Certeau, 2002, p.243). 104 
 
Disturbances from, rather than of, might be more apt. ‘Scars of phonation’ implies 
some damage of the voicing body being wrought on the ideal of a smooth 
communicative flow of meaning. Lagaay’s spotlight on de Certeau’s comments is 
salient on two levels. Firstly, there is the register of corporeality, and 
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‘incomprehensible physicality’ and its resonance with ‘libidinal corporeality’ – the 
scene of Lacan’s coughing, mumbling and sighing may be interpreted as an example 
of the problematic relationship between the signifier and the body, whereby despite an 
organism being put to language an excess, recalcitrant to meaning, persists – and 
speaks, albeit not words. Secondly, alluded to via italicization in the previous line, 
this remainder of the speaking act is assumed as harbouring a mythical significance, 
‘speaking’ an unsaid meaning beyond the horizon of the symbolic. To phrase it 
another way, we could say it is the physical remainder; an incarnation of what is 
unsaid, gets stuck in the throat.  
Returning to Lacan’s graph of desire II: voice runs out, after the signifying operation. 
Structurally it is resultant of the signifying operation and speaking. Would Lacan have 
coughed, cleared his throat, mumbled and sighed were it not for the task of speaking? 
Take the particularly phagous phrase ‘chewing of the words’. The nonsensical sound 
of gnawing, whilst by no means linguistic or understandable for a particular 
significance, is a result of there having words to voice. The chewing of words is 
entangled with the body’s articulation of meaning: it is an excess that falls short of 
sensible execution, a non-signifying excess of the body. 105 The phagous phrase of de 
Certeau also evokes a physicality that strikes significance with two preliminary 
drives. The oral drive’s partial object, the nipple, and the object a of taking in nothing 
and the anal drive’s partial object, scybalum, and object a giving nothing bear a 
notable equivalence to ‘words’ that are stuck in the throat or, as Lagaay terms it 
chewed, neither swallowed nor spoken.  
The immediate retort is that such moments are vocal, heard, whereas object a voice is 
repeatedly iterated as silent, aphonic. When Dolar and Žižek say stuck in the throat 
they mean mute. 106 There is, however, a case for demurring on taking an either/or 
position. Lacan, in his commentary sandwiching the completed graph of desire writes: 
 
The very delimitation of the ‘erogenous zone’ that the drive isolates from the 
metabolism of the function (the act of devouring concerns other organs than the 
mouth – ask one of Pavlov’s dogs) is the result of a cut (coupure) expressed in 
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the anatomical mark (trait) of a margin or border – lips, ‘the enclosure of the 
teeth’, the rim of the anus, the tip of the penis, the vagina, the slit formed by the 
eyelids, even the horn-shaped aperture of the ear (I am avoiding embryological 
details here). Respiratory erogeneity has been little studied, but it is obviously 
through the spasm that it comes into play. 107 
 
It is here where the completed graph is shown. Delving into the intricacies of this 
graph is beyond the scope of this text and would not further the conception of voice 
qua object a further. Voice remains in the same position in the second iteration of the 
graph presented above. Lacan’s comments, however, about the delimitation of the 
erogenous zone and the cut, whilst not immediately helpful for understanding voice, 
warrant some dismantling and application. If object a is the remainder recalcitrant to 
the signifying operation and – in terms of the invocatory drive that results in the 
excrescence of the voice – sound is the partial object, then is the cut that isolates the 
metabolism of invocation the delimitation between speech and sound? Sound is the 
arbitrary locus of the invocatory drive (like the nipple is the partial object of the oral 
drive) – and voice is its resultant remainder beyond the signifying matrix. Might we 
suppose, then, that the interruptions of voice, those physical emissions, that mire the 
invocative flow, are object a? 
For the affirmative it can be said that such emissions of the speaking body are heard 
as registering some occluded meaning and significance. The mumbles, sighs and 
coughs (or hiccups) are taken, as de Certeau takes them to be, as references to a 
meaning beyond comprehension. The peculiar sounds take up some meaning beyond 
meaning, stand in place as a ‘zero-point: the voice aiming at meaning’. 108 Lacan’s 
comment about the significance of respiratory erogeneity, the spasm, resonates with 
his reading of Aristophanes hiccups in Symposium. There is a clinical significance of 
the body at play here that is absent from Dolar’s text. In support of any acoustic 
prospect of object a we might notice the oddly porous categorical sweep Lacan takes 
below the graph. He says, that ‘the cut is no less obviously present in the object 
described by analytic theory: the mamilla, faeces, the phallus (imaginary object), the 
urinary flow. (An unthinkable list, if one adds, as I do, the phoneme, the gaze, the 
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voice – the nothing.)’ 109 Lacan’s array of added object a run from the phoneme 
through to ‘the nothing,’ there is a tension here. A phoneme is distinct, tangible, a 
thing of physical traits and difference; it is the part of voice ‘the signifier has seized’  
– phonemes sound. 110 The nothing, however is precisely that. Might the question of 
object a voice be better thought of not as necessarily silent or tangibly audible 
phenomena but rather a corporeal presence – sonic or not? 
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Here the prospect of a silent object a voice is further developed by considering 
Miller’s, Lagaay’s, Wolf’s and Vanheule’s comments. It is argued that object a voice, 
albeit not necessarily sonic, may well be auditioned. Threaded through these claims is 
a continued illustration of how such a voice is corporeal. Physical horrors, such as 
vivisection, car crashes and screams, underscore this. Overall, this section further 
establishes the structural nature of object a, whilst continuing to synthesize an object 
a voice of horror with distinct corporeality. The text shifts to positing the object a to 
be a vertinginous rupture in the subject’s integrity. Imagery of Lacan’s darning-egg is 
utilized to embroid horror. Lacan’s anecdote of a young woman hearing the insult 
‘Sow!’ ‘voiced to’ her underscores this survey. 
 
A chronological note regarding Lacan’s seminars from 1978, in The Cambridge 
Companion to Lacan, states that after a ‘minor car accident, Lacan appears tired and 
is often silent for long periods of time even in his seminars, in which discourse tends 
to be replaced by mute demonstrations of new twists on Borromean knots.’ 111 Millot, 
in Life With Lacan, writes that by this time (around the time he drew a big sigh and 
left his dinner with Roman Polanski) he ‘was becoming more and more silent.’ 112 She 
writes that in his last seminars ‘the exhibition of chains and knots increasingly took 
over from speech’. 113 Lagaay too highlights the existential significance voice in 
absentia held in Lacan’s final seminars. Unlike the ‘disturbances of voice,’ explored 
in the previous section, she writes of a voice that is deafening by its absence, a voided 
sonority. She writes:  
 
The pivotal role of voice in Lacan’s teachings takes on a peculiarly existential 
dimension, however, in the light of the fact that in the final stages of his life, 
Lacan suffered severe aphasia. Thus, the twenty-sixth seminar of 1978-1979 
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remains “silent”, as by then Lacan had practically lost the ability to talk at all. 
114 
 
The biographical placement of a silent voice in Lacan’s work strikes congruity with 
the Slovenian’s refrain of ‘the object voice’ being inaudible and stuck in the throat. 
The prospect of the ‘pregnant silence’, to employ the well-worn term, resonates with 
Vanheule’s comment that echoes the structural context of voice established thus far as 
beyond significance : that ‘irrespective of how much signifying articulation takes 
place, something remains unsaid. There is no final signifier that can hook up the true 
signification of speech.’ 115 There is a case for drawing up a continuum here, that 
admits some liminal interzone between sound, the partial object, and the silent object 
a voice. Might one draw an extrapolation, from the small disturbances of voice, to the 
long silences employed with Borromean knots to the absolute absence of Lacan, 
departing with a screaming – ‘more Écris than écrits!’ – silence? 116 One way into this 
prospect is to consider the problem of silence. Silence is heard but it is not sound. 
Here the prospect of disturbances and omissions, onomatopoeic or void, unfold as 
possible points on a vector that charts the object a.  
Miller suggests that any question of the relationship a subject, that is of the signifier, 
has to object a, that is recalcitrant to expression and/or accommodation in the 
signifying matrix, presents a tension. Indeed, the question of the subject’s 
phenomenal or experiential relationship to object a is fraught with structural 
preventatives for anecdotal elabouration. Miller suggests that the subject’s relation to 
object a is regarded to be a ‘matricial’ antinomy. 117 He asks how there can be a 
relation between the  
object that is not a signifier, and a subject defined, on the contrary, as what is 
supposed by the structure of language, that is, as subject of the signifier? This 
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is a matricial problem in Lacan’s teaching: he toiled for many years to match 
up these two requirements that may seem animated by an antinomy. 118 
 
The voice and the gaze, the two object a, added as super-structural additions to the 
Freudian drives and their ‘corresponding’ partial objects by Lacan, do not share the 
same physicality of developmental stages. Lacan was explicit in developmental stages 
not being accounted for in his schemes. Vanheule, writes of how in elabourating his 
ideas on object a, Lacan ‘didn't adhere to a developmental psychological perspective.’ 
119 He writes of how Lacan believed ‘that, in the process that gives rise to the object a, 
the dialectical transition should be studied. Speculation about associated interpersonal 
and developmental dynamics is deemed irrelevant.’ 120 Vanheule goes on to cite 
Lacan’s reaction to a guest lecture by Piera Aulagnier in 1962 that explored the 
relation to the partial object to normality, neurosis, perversion and psychosis. 
Vanheule writes: 
 
Aulagnier argued that an individual's relation to partial objects reflects a past 
history, which can best be framed in terms of interactional dynamics between a 
child and its parents. Both in his direct comments on Aulagnier's lecture and in 
the later seminars, Lacan does not follow her developmental logic. Instead, he 
focuses on the logical status of the object and on the dialectical structure in 
which it can be situated, not on presumed causal mechanisms. 121 
 
In light of this fealty to the logic, arithmetic and topology of his scheme’s dialectical 
transition, the Scopic/Image/Gaze and Invocative/Sound/Voice structuration might be 
taken as standing in contraposto to the developmental and historical foundations of 
Anal/Faeces/Withholding and Oral/Nipple/Not-Taking dynamics of Freud’s 
foundational structure. Whereas there are resolutely physical Oral and Anal stages in 
development there are no strictly delineated material scopic or invocative stages. 
Given this, why does Lacan place gaze and voice in the same array as object a that 
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result from the Oral and Anal stages? For Miller the answer is one of necessity, regard 
the adjective, emphasis added, that Miller opts for to evoke the ethereal nature of 
voice:   
 
What put Lacan on to this lengthening of the Freudian list with the objects voice 
and gaze? The answer is simple: it is clinical experience. It is not, in the case of 
the object voice, a meditation on the subject’s monologue with himself in his 
solitude. It is a clinical experience in which gaze and voice manifest themselves 
in separate forms, clearly characterized by their exteriority with regard to the 
subject. (…) it is from the phenomena of mental automatism—so named since 
Clérambault, whom Lacan acknowledged as his only master in psychiatry—that 
Lacan extracted the object voice. Here one speaks of voices, although these 
voices are all immaterial—they are nevertheless perfectly real to the subject. 
They are even what he cannot doubt, despite the fact that nobody can record 
them. 122 
 
It is in light of these comments the placement of voice in the Lacanian schema 
emerges as one that is experience albeit non-phenomenal, or to phrase it another way 
something that is heard that does not sound.  
Bogdan Wolf, writing in Lacanian Coordinates: From the Logic of the Signifier to the 
Paradoxes of Guilt, also explores voice within the guise of the late Lacanian object a. 
It is here where the structural and experiential alterity of the unsounding voice qua 
object a is directly addressed. Wolf, following Miller, writes of a voice as one that 
may be silent and unrecordable and separate from both signifier and signified. 123 But 
to be clear it is not the voice of or from the Other, it is Other: 
 
Lacan does not tell us much about the voice. He mentions it twice or thrice in 
Seminar XI (1977) but we do not hear of it more than that. For Lacan the voice 
is an object in the economy of desire. He marked it with the letter “a”, the 
object a, to designate its separateness and antinomy from other elements like the 
signifier and the signified. This is the novelty. Lacan’s voice is not a substance 
or a materiality in the sense in which language and the unconscious are. The 
voice is aphonic and does not belong to the order of material sonority. (…) In 
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psychosis the voice can be invasive and persecutory as it does not support the 
belief of serving as a message to/from the Other but presents itself as the Other. 
Lacanian voice in the strict sense of the voice object is therefore not the voice in 
speech and does not belong to speaking. 124 
 
Wolf’s moves to silence here is pertinent. Following the early Christian theologian 
and philosopher Saint Augustine of Hippo’s conception of voice Wolf makes 
reference to Gregorian chants. Specifically, he writes of a voice residing in the silence 
between the chants – there is parity here with Lacan’s own pauses and long silences.  
The chants are the sonic call for the response of the Other (God, in this theological 
sense). For Augustine, in Confessions, repeatedly ‘expresses a desire to listen to the 
voice of the Other’this voice of the Other comes from God. It is an inaudible voice of 
the Other that floods the silence between the chants. 125 This sentiment is analogous to 
Miller’s closing remarks in ‘Jacques Lacan and the Voice’ whereby the voice is 
adorned with a horror: ‘voice as such emerges each time the signifier breaks down, 
and rejoins this object in horror […] the voice inhabits language, it haunts it. It is 
enough to speak for the menace to emerge that what cannot be said’. 126 Wolf’s 
explication of this object a voice runs a theological explication. Nonetheless, do 
Gregorian chants confront object a – the horror of silence? Might the chants be 
regarded as a precursor to the array of methods Miller proposes ‘silence’ the object a 
voice? Miller writes: ‘if we organize symposiums, if we chat, if we sing and listen to 
singers, if we play music and listen to it, Lacan’s thesis implies that it is in order to 
silence what warrants to be called the voice as object little a.’ 127  
Consider Lacan’s following comment on voice as  
petit a as fallen from the Other, we can exhaust its structural function only by 
bringing our inquiry to bear on what the Other is as a subject, for voice is the 
product and object fallen from the organ of speech, and the Other is the site 
where "it" — ça— speaks. 128  
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Our excursion from coughs and hiccups to silences has been a necessary 
perambulation that allows an understanding of how the Other speaks. It does not 
necessarily speak as a sound, but it is heard.     
Object a voice manifests as a certain type of vertiginous rupture, a perceived lacuna 
or, to embed a flourish aping the prose of the horror writer Thomas Ligotti, a tear in 
the fragile gauze, the veil, of the world. The silence of God’s deafening voice in the 
space between chants is one that evokes precisely a world beyond the present 
materiality and sonority. The topology of a modified Klein bottle may be utilized at 
this juncture. 129 Contemplate a Klein bottle with a hole in the middle, so that one side 
is faced with its other side, no longer obfuscated by its topological structure but facing 
the unknown part of its own innate structure. Might we place object a voice in locale, 
structurally integral to one side, and manifesting as experience contingent on the 
structure? Lacan, rather than using a Klein bottle to illustrate this particular concept, 
used the example of a darning egg.  
A darning egg is a small, egg shaped, and sized object, perhaps made of wood, 
porcelain or stone used for repairing holes in fabric. The egg can be pressed into the 
heel of a sock (for example), poking and protruding through the offending hole of 
wear, so that the fabric can be sewn up (upon repair covering the darning egg). Lacan, 
as shall be examined shortly, invokes the concept of the darning egg as something that 
presses, stretches and protrudes through the fabric of the subject.  
Before appreciating these select moments of Lacan’s teaching, some time ought to be 
devoted to a particular anecdote of his. Lacan in ‘On a Question Preliminary to Any 
Possible Treatment of Psychosis’ in Écrits: A Selection, tells of a young woman 
persecuted by her neighbours; the woman had left her husband and in-laws to pursue 
a character her mother was disapproving of. 130 The woman had told Lacan of how, 
when walking down a corridor a neighbor called after her: ‘Sow!’ 132 Lacan asked the 
woman what she had said before this event. The woman admitted muttering, perhaps 
not even speaking audibly, ‘I’ve just been to the pork butcher’s…’ 134  Lacan, 
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postulates that this episode is indicative of the woman’s yearn to be fragmented – she 
is ‘prisoner of the dual relationship’ but this strange drive fails to explain the bizarre 
consistency, the seemingly illogical, irrational, thread of import – the inexplicable 
consistency between the offensive remark of the neighbor and the connection it has to 
the inaudible comment of the subject. 135   
Is this where object a voice lurks? As the bump, the darning egg, pressing into and 
rupturing the subject. Voice here is of the Other – it manifests as disparate utterances: 
on one hand the verbal hallucination of a patient suffering from fears of persecution 
and on the other as her ‘pre-cognition’ phrase moments beforehand. The signifying 
chain is broken for the subject, but a voice (not the specific word ‘Sow!’ but a 
consistent voice of a suidaen, piggy, swinish, theme behind the two parts of language 
experienced in the hallway: on the one hand vivisection and butchery, on the other the 
frank announcement of ‘Sow!’) protrudes through.  
A crucial import, as Miller identifies, is that, for the subject, the two experienced 
sentiments, voice regardless of the physics of sound waves, cannot be accommodated. 
It is at this moment, when a fragment of the signifying chain is broken off, broken 
from the subject’s ‘grasp’. The woman cannot cognize the theme of pigs in these two 
moments. Thus, the signifying sequence’s continuity is disrupted: the subject’s cozy 
symbolic fabric is snagged and pulled as consequence of deviated percipiens. 136 
Voice, then, appears in the form of the Other – or, to put it alternatively, where object 
a voice ‘resonates’: 
 
In this respect, what Lacan calls voice is an effect of the foreclosure of the 
signifier that is not reducible, as the vulgate would have it, to the famous 
foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father. Insofar as a piece of signifying chain—
broken because of what we call for now the libidinal charge—cannot be 
assumed by the subject, it passes in the real and is assigned to the Other. The 
voice appears in its dimension of object when it is the Other’s voice. 137          
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But, to recall the mantra echoing around this voice in terms of the graph of desire, this 
voice of the Other, the object a voice (for autre, as mentioned previously, means 
other), is resolutely the outcome of the signifying operation (a signifying operation 
that is not afforded within the subject). Thus, the strange limb of voice, that Dolar 
quips ‘does it not know that it is dead’ is absolutely post-signifying operation, is not 
harboured within the signified percipiens of the subject. Here, we have a striking 
horrific alterity, vox-exo. 138 It resounds from the void/voice of the Other: ‘the voice 
is the part of the signifying chain that the subject cannot assume as ‘I’ and which is 
subjectively assigned to the Other.’ 139 
Miller is quick to pre-empt any misreading. He asks: ‘But, after all, “sow” is also a 
word, a signifier that produces an effect of signification that we call an insult. So are 
we still properly in the register of the signifier and the signified?’ 140 On one level, yes 
– “Sow!” is, of course, a word, an avatar, a sign with a corresponding meaning behind 
it. But this anecdote is not about a woman who wishes to call herself a pig and cannot 
(and hallucinates the insult in the form of a voice of the Other). No, the sign, the word 
that a voice of the Other arrives cloaked in, is unimportant for psychoanalysis. What 
is important is how that object a ‘re-calibrates’ the chain of signification (in terms of 
the subject’s perception). The object a reveals the drive to be a fragmented body only 
through the juxtaposition of the butchering comment and its unaccommodated 
phantom that runs out into the Other (the object a). Object a voice may arrive in the 
costume of signifying words but, as Miller writes: ‘in words that only slightly shift 
those that you have so far accepted, it contains a charge of jouissance that cannot be 
integrated in the signifying chain. (…) In this respect, the voice comes in the place of 
what is properly unspeakable about the subject, what Lacan called the subject’s 
“surplus enjoyment””. 141  
This is why object a voice is an ineradicable excess, as Dolar terms it, a libidinal (or 
jouissance) excess that cannot be assumed within the signifying realm of the subject 
but instead, runs out and sounds from the void of the Other. It may echo back in the 
form of an arbitrary word, but it is the Other’s voice. ‘In this respect, the voice is 
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precisely that which cannot be said’ thought, uttered, comprehended or broached by 
the subject whose signifying chains ‘lie’ in relation to an unspeakable object. 142 
Silence, meaning, speech and acoustics have dissolved in terms of the question of 
object a voice. Object a may arrive dressed in such terms, in the guise such as 
percipiens of the subject but is by no means exclusive to any, nor reducible in such 
modes. There is, however, one facet of the example that persists: the body. The sheer 
corporeality of the scenario is unavoidable. The ‘yearn to be fragmented’ in this 
example – that on one level rests on a dialectical transition of meaning and 
significance for a subject (the percipiens voice of the Other) – locates the body of the 
subject to be at stake of vivisection. Vox-exo, a horrifying alterity, ‘speaks’ to the 
body from which it sounds in.  
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Synthesis: Object Horror (Demon Voices) 
 
This section elaborates on a number of concepts introduced in the previous section. 
Lacan’s example of ‘Sow!’ and the darning egg are further utilized to argue for how 
horrors of voice qua object a are entangled with the body. These narratives are then 
synthesized with Thacker’s concept of horror. The theme of this text is demonic. 
Thacker’s, Lacan’s and Freud’s commentaries on demonic voice all serve to explicate 
a synthesis between horror and object a voice. Resonances between the Lacanian 
object a and Thacker’s notion of horror are key proposals in this thesis. This section 
will introduce some of Thacker’s thought and draw out some parallels – driving at a 
synthesis between Thacker’s work and Lacan’s. Vox-Exo is the term ascribed to this 
synthesis. Trigg’s use of the confounding meteor ALH84001 is then pitched and our 
orbit returns to Dolar’s refrain of object a voice as remainder. Vox-exo, the premise 
of object a voice as a register of horror is established via this commentary.  
 
In ‘From Interpretation To The Transference’ in The Four Fundamental Concepts of 
Psychoanalysis Lacan speaks of the verbal hallucination (which is what the ‘Sow!’ 
anecdote in The Écrits concerns) as an instance of the object a. Miller suggests this to 
be a ‘confrontation’ (he uses the term twice) with the work of Maurice Merleau-
Ponty, in particular his focus on the phenomenological status of motor-verbal 
hallucinations in Phenomenology of Perception. 143 Vanheule, by contrast, suggests 
that Lacan takes up Merleau-Ponty’s work; that it was a ‘crucial source of inspiration 
for Lacan’. 144  Vanheule draws parallels between Lacan’s rejections of both 
intellectualist and empiricist theories of hallucinations and Merleau-Ponty’s work in 
Phenomenology of Perception. After detailing Merleau-Ponty’s arguments he writes 
that Lacan ‘takes up Merleau-Ponty's critique of empiricist and intellectualist theories 
of hallucination.’ A summary of this ‘take up’, or ‘confrontation’, is that verbal 
hallucinations cannot be accommodated by either intellectualist or empiricist theory. 
An empiricist approach does not address how the deaf can hear voices. 145 An 
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intellectualist approach does not address how a subject’s beliefs can create erroneous 
percepta that the subject disbelieves and regards as hallucinations. 146 Vanheule’s 
claims that ‘Lacan rarely cited this work, but clearly borrowed from Merleau-Ponty's 
critique of empiricist and intellectualist theories of hallucinations’ is sustained and 
evidenced. 147 An admission that this turn in Lacan’s work is more a ‘borrowing’ or 
‘take-up’ rather than a ‘confrontation’ is warranted.  
The intricacies of the parallels in Merleau-Ponty’s work and Lacan’s do not further a 
pursuit of the questions concerning horror and voice at hand. Let’s return to Lacan’s 
‘From Interpretation To The Transference’, for it is here where some likeness 
between Lacan’s conceptualization of the object a and recent philosophies on the 
question of horror can be graphed. Late in the talk Lacan, using his example of the 
darning egg, posits a psychoanalyst-as-darner metaphor:   
It is a question of the privileged object, discovered by analysis, of that object 
whose very reality is purely topological, of that object around which the drives 
moves, of that object that rises like a bump, like the wooden darning egg in the 
material which, in analysis, you are darning – the objet a. 148   
 
This sense of something incurring, partially protruding ‘like a bump’, and warping the 
chain – might one say the integrity? – of signification for the subject resonates with 
the Thacker’s proposal of the horror of philosophy in In the Dust of this Planet: 
Horror of Philosophy Vol. 1. 149 On many levels the Lacanian object a, runs close to, 
in its structural role and position, the enigmatic thing of horror in Thacker’s text. 150. 
Thacker’s work does not explicitly align with the lineage of psychoanalysis, nor any 
specificities of Lacanian thought (generally Thacker’s work is couched in the shadow 
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of pessimist and nihilist philosophies). Lacan’s name does not appear the three 
volumes of Horror of Philosophy. 151 Voice features briefly, although it is only 
directly addressed once, in Thacker’s first chapter, his opening gambit, ‘Three 
Quaestio on Demonology.’ 152 Here, the few references Thacker makes to voice place 
it as the partial register, evocation and symptom of horror. As the title divulges, 
Thacker’s focus in this chapter concern the figure of the demon (his later writings 
move to questions of the environmental, ecological and cosmological). Voice haunts 
the examples of possession and demonological presence he provides to detail this 
preliminary stage of his argument. Thacker writes: ‘the only real indication we have 
of this multitude of demons is the enigmatic resounding of the word “Legion.” In a 
philosophical sense, that the demons choose to present themselves via voice and 
sound – at once present and absent – is noteworthy.’ 153 This is the only time Thacker 
is explicit about the significance of voice in Horror of Philosophy. This brief 
acknowledgment of the presence and significance of voice within his preliminary 
moves for his conceptualization of horror warrants more than a note.  
Voice is not a main focus – or even an explicit focus – in Thacker’s ‘Three Quaestio 
on Demonology’ chapter, yet it cannot escape notice that the examples he cites pivot 
around voices and sounds. In an inverse way, one can see in Lacan’s work and his 
later commentators that although horror is by no means a claimed focus or theme in 
texts that explicitly address voice there tends to be a refrain of horror terminology 
and/or themes. Miller, in ‘Jacques Lacan and the Voice’, concludes (not only 
explicitly referencing the horror of voice but also the theme of hauntings) that the 
emergence or sounding of such an object a is steeped in horror. He writes:  ‘If there is 
the voice, it is due to the fact that the signifier revolves around the unspeakable 
object. And the voice as such emerges each time the signifier breaks down, and 
rejoins this object in horror. (…) the voice inhabits language, it haunts it.’ 154 Such a 
comment falls into the tendency for horror, hauntings and vocabularies of Gothic and 
post-Gothic narratives to be employed when discussing voice in Lacan’s work. 
Already, this tendency has been evidenced in lines from Lacan, Dolar, Žižek, Lagaay 
and Vanheule, amongst others. 
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At the beginning of In the Dust of this Planet: Horror of Philosophy Vol. 1 Thacker 
outlines how horror falls within a penumbral and mysterious realm between the 
subjective world and the objective world. He posits that horror is a nebulous zone 
between the world-for-us and the world-in-itself. Thacker writes that the world-for-us 
‘is the world that we, as human beings, interpret and give meaning to, the world that 
we relate to or feel alienated from, the world that we are at once a part of and that is 
also separate from the human.’ 155 Thacker then goes on to concisely delineate the 
opposite aspect, the ‘phantom objectivity’ of world-in-itself:  
 
The world-in-itself is a paradoxical concept; the moment we think it and attempt 
to act on it, it ceases to be the world-in-itself and becomes the world-for-us. (…) 
Even though there is something out there that is not the world-for-us, and even 
though we can name it the world-in-itself, this latter constitutes a horizon for 
thought, always receding just beyond the bounds of intelligibility. 156 
 
The horrifying and penumbral world that lies between these two poles of thought is 
the world-without-us. Thacker writes that ‘the world-without-us allows us to think the 
world-in-itself, without getting caught up in a vicious circle of logical paradox.’ 157 
Thacker’s horror dynamic and his exploration of a penumbral inter-zone between 
these two poles of thought are dialectical in so far as thought strives to think the 
unthinkable, only to, at the very point of such a thought, fold back, solidify and return 
to be precisely that: the thinkable world-for-us. As soon as the world-in-itself is 
thought it ceases to be the world-in-itself and becomes the world-for-us. The Klein 
bottle or Mobius strip, or even a glass sphere one might hold and twist in ones hand 
(like M.C Escher’s famous lithograph) are illuminating visuals for such a concept. 
Such objects evoke the hidden, illusive or illusory that presents an epistemological 
wavering, oscillating or vacillating – a crisis of at once emerging and concealing: a 
shimmering.  
Thacker, in outlining the shadowy or enigmatic nature of the world-without-us, writes 
that it is ‘is in the very fissures, lapses, or lacunae’ in the world-for-us and the world-
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in-itself. This is an important subtlety. The world-without-us is more of a paradoxical 
negative in the world we know. The horrifying world-without-us ‘is, in the words of 
dark mysticism, the “dark intelligible abyss” that is paradoxically manifest’ as both 
world-for-us and world-in-itself. 158 The horrifying nature of the world-without-us is 
the paradoxical incursion of the unknown into the known. It might also be thought of 
as an epistemological crisis – to know one does not know. It is to be confronted and 
confounded by unknown thought, something alien to ourselves, at once uncanny and 
Otherly: something of radical alterity. For Thacker it is this unwanted confrontation, 
this paradoxical moment of having to think the unthinkable, that is horrific – the 
confrontation of a philosophical lacuna. Genre horror, for Thacker, concerns itself 
with horrific confrontations with the unknown, when the world-in-itself somehow 
makes itself paradoxically present, albeit liminal and speculative, in the world-for-us. 
Genre horror is not just about thrills and scares, it is also a philosophical dilemma: 
 
Horror is not simply about fear, but instead about the enigmatic thought of the 
unknown. As H.P. Lovecraft famously noted, “the oldest and strongest emotion 
of mankind is fear, and the oldest and strongest kind of fear is of the unknown.” 
Horror is about the paradoxical thought of the unthinkable. In so far as it deals 
with the limit of thought encapsulated in the phrase of the world-without-us, 
horror is “philosophical.” (…) “horror” is a non-philosophical attempt to think 
about the world-without-us philosophically. (…) genre horror (…) takes aim at 
the presuppositions of philosophical inquiry – that the world is always the 
world-for-us – and makes of those blind spots its central concern. 159   
 
Genre horror, then, in evoking the creeping horror that the world-for-us is not all there 
is, must somehow allude to an unknown otherness. Story craft is very much about 
alluding, hinting and leaving clues for something else. In horror this something else 
tends to have a particularly unthinkable or ‘unnatural’ bent. It must provide strategies 
and narrative that conjure up a sense of the something lurking in shadows, in the 
lacunae. It must imply there is something not of this world-for-us.  
Lacan’s concept of the bump: the object a pushing against the subject’s world’s 
integrity, causing a rupture in the gauze of the subjectivity can be paralleled, or 
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overlaid, with Thacker’s concept of the world-in-itself, partially rupturing into the 
world-for-us. Lacan’s conception of object a being things that move like a bump, 
beneath the signifying chain, distorting, perhaps manifesting as gazes or voices of the 
Other – disrupting the integrity of the subjective weave could taken as shadows and 
echoes of the world-in-itself. Except, these manifestations are not bumps of 
cosmological infinity or ecological catastrophe incurring into our world, they are 
psychological. Thacker, in the ‘Clouds of Unknowing’ preface claims the aim of his 
book ‘is to explore the relationship between philosophy and horror, through this motif 
of the “unthinkable world.”’ 160  Such a project can, in light of horrors of the object a 
voice, be repurposed for the unthinkable subject – the unthinkable us. 
In terms of voice, then, the in-itself that intrudes and manifests as an Object petit a, 
might be an aural hallucination such as ‘Sow!’ This voice is not the cold world-out-
there that Thacker posits as the realm of empirical science (environmental 
catastrophe, astrological physics, xenomorphs and extremophiles: things that 
confound our expectations of the world and what life is) but something all the more 
horrifying. It could be said that it is the foreign part of one’s being, one’s alien side 
piercing through the weave of subjectivity. Lacan’s example of an aural hallucination 
(a voice such as ‘Sow!’) is a horrific incursion. It is ‘the ‘encounter with the filth that 
may support him’: a remnant of our drives, an excess, a vomit of the unconscious, that 
returns as the Other but was nevertheless our lacunae – the blind spot of our being. 161 
This encounter with an unknown part of self, voiced in the macabre ventriloquism of 
the Other, still lurks in the same epistemological lacuna as the edges of science that 
Thacker writes of in In the Dust of this Planet: Horror of Philosophy Vol. 1– albeit 
with a more psychological, cloacal, horror. 162 
The most immediate method of drawing out the structural affinity between Lacan’s 
object a and the horror of Thacker’s dialectic along vectors of voice and horror is by 
way of the figure of the demon: the voice(s) of demon(s). 
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In ‘From Interpretation to The Transference’ Lacan provides a psychoanalytic re-
framing of the Socrates’ demon’s voice: ‘Take Socrates (…) at every moment, there 
is the demonic voice. Could one maintain that the voice that guides Socrates is not 
Socrates himself?’ 163  Lacan’s interpretation of Socrates’ demonic voice strikes a 
chord with Thacker’s exploration of demons: as strange objects masquerading as 
supernatural and/or Other. Thacker does mention Socrates’ demon (daimonion). He 
couches it in terms of agency and free will. Thacker writes that Socrates’ demons  
 
prevent him from taking the wrong course of action, he is invoking this more 
elemental meaning of the demon. The Greek demon is, in a sense, very much 
in keeping with the classical themes of human free will and destiny vis-à-vis 
the will of gods. 164  
 
There is scant horror in Socrates’ demon, it is more of a guardian, a guiding force, not 
‘a malevolent figure’ as Thacker notes. But it is manifest as a voice, an aural 
hallucination, vox-exo. Here is a structural similarity between the Greek daimonion 
and an aural hallucination such as ‘Sow!’ One’s drives are the conjurer of such 
voices, in the case of the latter it is the drive to be fragmented, butchered and 
distributed. Lacan’s suggestion that Socrates’ guiding voice is ‘himself’ further 
supports the proposition that it is, like ‘Sow!’, a voice resultant from the subject’s 
drive yet manifesting qua demonic Other. Of course, the perceived nature and intent 
of this Other voice is vastly different. One is benevolent whereas the other is 
persecutory and derogatory. 
The figure of the demon in Thacker’s chapter, as an avatar for the unthinkable or 
unknowable, accommodates less benevolent voices. He writes of Freud’s 1923 article 
“A Neurosis of Demonical Possession in the Seventeenth Century”. Freud’s study is 
pitched as demonical possession being re-cast from a folk-theistic paradigm to a 
clinical, medical and psychoanalytic framework: a shift from the theistic outside to 
the working of the unconscious. Thacker recounts:  
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Christoph Haitzmann, a young painter who, in or around 1677, sees a priest, 
complaining of convulsions, hallucinations, and a sense of persecution. Aside 
from being an artist, the priest find nothing wrong with Haitzmann – except of 
course that he may be in consort with the devil. 165   
 
Thacker then provides Freud’s remark that the demon is a “father-substitute”, ‘a 
replacement for Haitzmann’s mourned loss, as well as a crisis brough about by the 
absence the father as a figure of authority.’ He then notes that the demon, in Freud’s 
re-casting, is taken to be an ‘externalized projection, and the so-called possession 
really a form of therapeutic purging for Haitzmann’. 166  
This turn in Thacker’s work, although he spends less than a page on the matter, is 
close as he strays into exploring aural hallucinations and/or object a voice. As Freud’s 
text tells us, the was Devil manifested physically in Haitzmann’s case, he asked him 
questions, prompted him and proposed pacts, whilst also appearing in striking 
crimson anthropic form (shown in the artist’s painting). 167 Freud’s recasting of 
Haitzmann’s demonological possession is argued by Thacker to be indicative of the 
shift from medieval demon to the modern demon, after the classical Socratic 
benevolent demon. 168 Thacker delineates his demonological chronology: 
 
The demon historically passes through various phases: there is the classical 
demon, which is elemental, and at once a help and a hindrance (“the demon 
beside me…”); there is the Medieval demon, a super-natural and intermediary 
being that is a tempter (“demons surround me…”); a modern demon, rendered 
both natural and scientific through psychoanalysis, and internalized within the 
machinations of the unconscious (“I am a demon to myself…”) 169 
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This psychoanalytical figure of a demon, qua voice of the Other, is one way into Vox-
Exo, this thesis’ concept for considering the horrors of object a voice. The demon 
voices the cloacal recesses of the unconscious: voice resonates along the drive vectors 
one is subject to. When Thacker writes: ‘the demon often inhabits the edges of the 
human understanding of the world,’ we can think of this ‘human understanding’ as 
subjectivity, as Thacker’s briefly acknowledged internalization of the unknown – the 
voice of the demon is resultant of the machinations of the unconscious. 170  It is a 
voice that sounds out this unknown being felt in the subject – the horror of the object 
a. Ergo, Freud’s analysis of Haitzmann is what Lacan might refer to as the darning the 
horrors object a presents to the subject. The placement of object a, lurks within a 
lacuna – in psychoanalytical terms in the dark recesses of unconscious machinations 
or, to parse it out in Medieval terms, in a dangerous beyond within a world one does 
not fathom. In each case, it remains ‘by definition, a limit; it designates both that 
which we stand in relation to and that which remains forever inaccessible to us. This 
limit is the unknown, and the unknown, as genre horror reminds us, is often a source 
of fear or dread.’ 171  
Dylan Trigg’s The Thing: A Phenomenology of Horror, was published three years 
after Thacker’s first Volume of Horror of Philosophy. This small book, 
unsurprisingly given the title, leans heavily on the work on Merleau-Ponty. 
Phenomenology of Perception is referenced many times along with other works (there 
are ten listed in the bibliography). Lacan also features, although he does not receive 
sustained commentary. Nonetheless, Chapter 4, the ‘The Flesh of the Thing’ opens 
with a quote from Lacan’s The Ethics of Psychoanaylsis: ‘The existence of the void at 
the centre of that reality called the Thing.’ 172 Lacan’s line here, standing on a plinth, 
no doubt informed the book’s title. Lacan’s thought from this work is picked up again 
in part VIII of the Conclusion, where Trigg, impressing the centrality of the body in 
this phenomenology of horror, uses Lacan’s line of horrendous discovery the 
‘secretory glands par excellence, the flesh from which everything exudes, at the very 
heart of the mystery […] the final revelation you are this – You are this, which is so 
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far from you, this which is the ultimate formlessness” 173 Such a line evokes the void 
at the centre of subjectivity with the vivid corporeality.  
Voice is mentioned briefly Trigg’s The Thing: A Phenomenology of Horror. Similar 
to Thacker it is introduced near the beginning of the book and not revisited. Trigg 
opens his thesis by providing an example of an empirical paradox. He recounts how a 
meteor, ALH84001, was found in Antarctica. This lump of ‘rock’, he declares, is one 
of the oldest pieces of the universe (like the statute of Memnon or the statuettes of 
Silenus there is a voice is concealed inside hard material permanence). 174 Trigg 
writes of how within its ‘grey core, fossilized organisms attesting to the existence of 
extraterrestrial life on ancient Mars have been found.’ 175 He proposes that such a 
discovery prompts a number of questions. Life, any life, on earth, we suppose at 
present, started 3.5 billion years ago, ‘1 billion years after the existence of 
ALH84001’. 176 After a brief exploration of the possibilities of panspermia and 
various confounding extremophiles found on earth in recent years he writes: 
 
The questions of what life is and where it can be found, therefore, risk falling 
into circularity, in which both questions simply reinstate what we already know 
about the structure of life. Can thinking breach the limits of its own history in 
order to contend with the alterity of the alien? Or will we remain locked in a 
narcissistic vision of the cosmos, in which the alien is nothing more than a 
doppleganger of our own memories? 
To phrase these thoughts in the language of psychoanalysis, we might ask: 
is ALH84001 an object to be understood in astro-biological terms or is it a 
marker of a different kind, one that reveals the traces of our unconscious long 
before ALH84001 was “discovered” in the Antartica? 177   
 
If the matter found in ALH84001 is, indeed, life, then our parameters of thinking 
about life and where it can be found can plunge into a vicious circularity: where life 
starts and what life is need to be rethought. Trigg’s consideration of ALH84001 then 
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shifts into a question of voice, not only positing the ‘rock’ as an object that transforms 
the our understanding of the universe and confounds established scientific thought, 
but also one of oppression. Such a move, whilst running analogous with the vox-exo 
conceptualization of demon voice also echoes the oppressive nature of this voice from 
the Other, this voice from outside our subjectivity. Trigg’s move to voice here results 
in a conceptualization of a lump of rock that is conceptually harmonious with the 
‘Sow!’ example of Lacan’s and Thacker’s presentation of Haitzmann and other 
demon voices. Trigg branches into a vocabulary steeped in psychoanalysis; he 
references not just oppression and voice but invokes the narcissism of subjectivity. 
 Trigg, by way of an anomalous meteor couches an other-worldly voice, (that is 
ultimately one’s own) to be integral to the narcissism of subjectivity: ‘The cosmos is 
transformed into a site of oppression (…) thereby forcing a confrontation with the 
limits of narcissism. Out there, in the silence without a witness, there is nothing. 
Nothing, that is, except your own voice.’ 178  
Although Trigg’s conclusion to the passage does not dwell much further on the voice, 
and Trigg does is not referencing Lacan here, its conceptual similarity to the object a 
is conspicuous. Trigg even, after presenting a question of the world beyond our own 
asks which avenue leads to such a discovery – ‘science or the unconscious?’ 179 He 
then unpacks the question:  
 
to what extent does ALH84001 mark a reality anterior to human experience? 
With Pascal, there is nausea in the silence of the cosmos – an endless night of 
anxiety and insomnia, in which something opposed to the subject remains as 
that: a remainder. The intervention of ALH84001 allows Mars to speak to us. 
The red planet has been terraformed, not through machines but through its 
symbolic appropriation as a planet that speaks to the Earth by echoing the 
materiality of its voice back to our planet. 180 
 
Such a passage is saturated with psychoanalytical concepts and terms – anxiety, 
insomnia. There are two significant facets. Firstly, that Trigg opts to refer to this 
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horrifying prospect of confounding the subject’s epistemological integrity as voice 
resonates with the Lacanian concept of the object a voice, the voice of the Other. 
Such a parallel is plain enough. Yet the most obvious parallel is the italicized word in 
the middle of the passage after the thumping colon: a remainder, the term used a 








This segment is a change of tack. After the previous two section’s foci on the 
intricacies and nuance of object a voice the focus here is on the question of the 
acousmatic. This focus serves to carry through (on a different register) a number of 
arguments posed previously. Firstly, Dolar’s recalicitrance to confront the corporeal is 
detailed – his commentaries concerning the acousmatic are posed as symptomatic of 
this tendency. Secondly, and the ‘meat’ of this passage, the acousmatic is poised as a 
type of epistemological horror wrought by voice upon the body. After considering 
Toop’s question ‘Is anybody there?’ two major psychoanalytical texts, are brought in 
to underscore the argument: Otto Rank’s The Trauma of Birth and Freud’s Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle. These two texts (of which a close reading of particular passages 
are employed) serve to elaborate how despite the question of the acousmatic being a 
case of no body being visible, it is, nonetheless, a question steeped in bodily 
experience: horror and trauma. 
 
Dolar, as has been referenced already, in ‘The “Physics” of the Voice’ makes 
reference to the etymological lineage of the term ‘acousmatic’. Although lengthy, and 
much of the text proposes points that shall not be pursued, it is worthwhile stating 
them in full before laying claim to departure. Thus: 
 
Chion borrowed the word “acousmatic” from Pierre Schaeffer and his famous 
Traité des objets musicaux (published in 1966, the same year as Lacan’s Écrits). 
The word has a precise technical meaning: according to Larousse, “acousmatic” 
describes “the noise which we hear without seeing what is causing it.” And it 
gives its philosophical origin: “The Acousmatics were Pythagoras’ disciples 
who, concealed by a curtain, followed his teaching for five years without being 
able to see him.” Larousse follows Diogenes Laertius (VIII, 10): “[His pupils] 
were silent for the period of five years and only listened to the speeches with- 
out seeing Pythagoras, until they proved themselves worthy of it.” The Teacher, 
the Master behind a curtain, proffering his teaching from there without being 
seen: no doubt a stroke of genius which stands at the very origin of 
philosophy—Pythagoras was allegedly the first to describe himself as a 
“philosopher,” and also the first to found a philosophical school. The advantage 
of this mechanism was obvious: the students, the followers, were confined to 
“their Master’s voice,” not distracted by his looks or quirks of behavior, by 
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visual forms, the spectacle of presentation, the theatrical effects which always 
pertain to lecturing; they had to concentrate merely on the voice and the 
meaning emanating from it. It appears that at its origin philosophy depends on a 
theatrical coup de force: there is the simple minimal device which defines the 
theater, the curtain which serves as a screen, but a curtain not to be raised, not 
for many years—philosophy appears as the art of an actor behind the curtain. 182 
 
This passage, whilst touching upon Schaeffer’s reanimation of the term and 
acknowledging Chion’s film theory uptake of the concept (which focused more 
precisely on the question of an acousmatic voice), makes a few moves. Such moves 
by Dolar have already been alluded to. Nonetheless, it is worth taking stock of them 
here because it is precisely these moves that will not be taken. Dolar’s invocation of 
acousmatic is a method of flight from the body, whereas in this text the prospect of an 
acousmatic voice will serve as a return to the body – in particular to the fetal or infant 
body. True to the book’s title – A Voice and Nothing More – Dolar immediately takes 
the question of the acousmatic as the body being unseen. A question of audition that 
does not address the body. But which body? Surely, the body that does not see the 
voicer’s body warrants some attention? This is one turn of slight of hand in the 
passage: to take as a given the prospect of the acousmatic voice as one of no bodies, 
when in fact, it cannot be denied, it concerns two – one present, the other sensible.  
The magician then provides a veiled admittance. To conceal and hide the body, to 
speak from behind a curtain is praised as ‘a stroke of genius’ worked at the inception 
of philosophy. Detractors of Lacan might smirk knowingly here mistaking such a 
comment as satisfying validation: that a disciple considers philosophy to be at root a 
job of obfuscation. Yet the closing line is ambiguous, not only is there the seemingly 
tenuous insistence that philosophy ‘appears’ but additionally that it only does so as an 
actor. ‘I’m going to tell you a lie, but I don’t believe it myself!’ is a possible import. 
183  
There is a confession embedded: the line detailing the advantage of speaking from 
behind a curtain. It is posited that a concealed body does not distract: idiosyncrasies, 
ticks or habits of the labour of speaking would not detract from the pure voice of 
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reason, from the words carried in sonority. The scene of the corpus, once veiled, is no 
longer liable to distract, nor detract, from argument. Might such a passage be taken a 
– indeed veiled – declaration that ‘no body’s going to get in the way of my 
argument.’?  
Let’s pursue a different tangent and return to the body, both the body that hears and 
the question of a body in an acousmatic voice. If one hears a voice but cannot see the 
body, then ‘what body does such a voice come from?’ Such a question confronts a 
lack of knowledge – an epistemological lacuna. On some level the acousmatic always 
refers to a philosophical horror, it confounds the listener with a disjunct between 
sense and world.  
The British musician, author and professor of audio culture and improvisation David 
Toop, in the introduction his book Sinister Resonance: The Mediumship of the 
Listener, confronts precisely this question. 184 Toop asks: ‘Am I hearing things? Is 
anybody there? I began a new phase by asking such hypothetical questions.’ 185  Toop 
immediately connects such questions to emotions of terror, fear and horror. He also, 
wraps the emotive question up with experiences from infancy: ‘Why, for example, are 
the frequent modalities of sound – from silence to noise – associated so frequently 
with disquiet, uncertainty and fear, with childhood terrors and a horror of the 
unknown.” 186  
 Toop moves through horrors of the unknown in his preliminary questions. To begin, 
Toop confronts the ontological and phenomenological horror of doubting his senses, 
he asks if the sound is real or a figment of his imagination: Am I hearing things? This 
question is then quickly met with another question, but rather than emerging from 
self-doubt and a distrust of sensory faculties it is epistemological in essence: Is 
anybody there? What is there? What is making that sound? In each turn horror weighs 
heavy – for either by psychological, introspective doubt or outward listening there is a 
confrontation with the unknown. There is a parallel with Thacker’s conception of 
horror, and the structural location of the object a. Toop, in asking such questions of 
the sounds he hears and confessing the doubts and horrors they bring, is articulating 
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an experience not dissimilar in description nor structure of a subject confronted with 
the horror’s of object a.   
Part of the horror evoked by acousmatic voice emerges from the experience of asking 
what sounds mean. We have all come from a world without meaningful sounds to a 
world were every sound has a cause. Our early uterine experience is filled with 
sounds that have no cause, we inhabit (one likes to think) a blissfully simple sonic 
world, listening but not fearing a cause or source. Foeti are not versed in the visible or 
tactile correlate of sound. However, upon birth we are plunged into a kaleidoscopic 
world of vision, sound, touch and smell – it is here we learn that things, tactile, 
visible, aromatic things make sounds. Small children, spend a lot of time banging 
these things, fascinated by the sounds that these new sources can make. Toop touches 
on just this point: “Four and a half months after conception we begin to hear. This is 
the first of our senses to function: hearing dominates amniotic life and yet after birth 
its importance is overtaken by seeing” 187 It is this passage, from a sonic world of 
causeless sound to a world of multiple senses where sound now has causes, 
consequences, sources and origins that Toop highlights as being key for Walter 
Murch, the revolutionary sound designer for films such as The Conversation, THX-
1138, American Graffiti and Apocalypse Now. Murch wrote of this paradox of 
hearing, how all-encompassing audition comes to be overtaken by the other senses 
shortly after birth. 
 
‘The reasons, no doubt, go far back into our evolutionary past,’ he wrote in an 
essay called ‘Sound Design: The Dancing Shadow’, ‘but I suspect it has 
something to do with the child’s discovery of causality. Sound, which had been 
absolute and causeless in the womb, becomes something understood to happen 
as a result of. The enjoyment a child takes in banging things together is the 
enjoyment of this discovery: first there is no sound, and then – bang! – there is.’  
If Murch is right, then sound without apparent source will always return us at 
some unconscious level to our pre-birth state, but with added anxiety and 
awareness, of knowing that sounds should have a cause. It they lack a cause, 
then our need is to invent one. 188  
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Toop then traces this anxiety of sound back to our early beginnings in a cacophonous 
uterine world of causeless sounds and draws attention to Freud’s closing comments in 
‘The Uncanny’:  ‘As for silence, solitude and darkness, all we can say is that these are 
factors connected with infantile anxiety, something that most if us never wholly 
overcome’. 189 Toop states that:  
 
Freud’s description of the uncanny as eerie or frightening, the unhomely 
sensations arising from that which is unfamiliar and uncertain, particularly 
when they are once familiar feelings that have become secret or repressed, 
extended to the uncanny nature of silence and darkness. Inconclusively […] he 
attributed this to infantile anxieties that none of us fully overcome. Such fears 
may be childish, but they are rooted in very deep memories of unknown sounds 
and eerie silences overheard in the dark. Perhaps this returns us again to the 
womb, floating in the darkness, eavesdropping on mysterious sounds from the 
unknown world outside. These anxieties are not easily overcome, so when a 
writer or director needs to evoke atmospheres, administer shocks or summon the 
uncanny, sound is powerful in its capacity to disturb, to unsettle and install 
dread. 190  
 
The acousmatic, the bump in the night and its concomitant horrors, is a philosophical 
flashback (or knockback) to an at once familiar and strange experience – a sonic déjà 
vu. The epistemological status of acousmatic sound is foreign to the adult and also 
familiar from experience in utero and infancy. It is a time machine back to a stage 
when everything was acousmatic, sounds had ‘no causes’. Acousmatic sound is 
uncanny by on two levels. Firstly, ‘we never wholly overcome the acousmatic 
experience’. We do still hear acousmatic voices and sounds – most of which we have 
yoked to familiarity, rubbish bins clattering, foxes screeching, railway lines chinging, 
or cars whooshing. Yet every now and then there might be a sound we cannot quite 
place. It is at such a moment that we plunged back into a visual-sonic experience akin 
to our pre-natal existence. Secondly, post-infancy, when we experience the 
acousmatic sound we are confronted with a deficit. We hear an acousmatic sound but 
should be able to fathom its cause, its place, we should be able to see it. We, as Toop 
describes in his line concerning the terrors of childhood, become fearful, exposed and 
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anxious that something sounds or speaks or grunts that we ought to be able to see and 
locate but cannot.  
The acousmatic – as it is experienced in adult life as horrific or eerie, or uncanny – is 
such because of its tie to our universal uterine experience that has since become 
‘secret or repressed’. Post-infancy acousmatic sound is uncanny on one level and 
horrific on another. In terms of the uncanny it is a return to a once familiar now 
repressed experiential status. In terms of horror it is an encounter with a crisis of 
experiential consolidation – an epistemological chasm, a void.  
Consider the initial trauma of the infant, the small body, coming from a uterine world 
of darkness, a world where everything was acousmatic and sounds just sounded 
without origin or source. The trauma of the infant is its birth, that universal step from 
womb to world. Perhaps, our first trauma is the initial navigation from a merely sonic 
world to a world of many senses, a world where sounds must be matched with and 
correlated to sights, touches and smells.  
Otto Rank, one of Freud’s students, argues the trauma of birth has fundamental 
significance. In The Trauma of Birth (1924) Rank proposes that prior to the Oedipal 
stage the trauma of birth (in particular experiencing of female genitalia before 
repression and subsequently wishing to return to the womb) is relevant for almost all 
future neuroses, phobias and sexual proclivities in both genders. 191 Understandably, 
Freud distanced himself from Rank’s work. Rank’s ‘all roads lead back to trauma of 
birth’ and how ‘all behaviors are essentially returns to the womb’ logics usurp the 
significance of Freud’s Oedipal stage. Rank’s thought is, perhaps in retrospect, a 
touch unsubtle and overambitious in its universal application of the birth trauma. 
Nonetheless, consideration of his theory is a useful way to articulate the relation 
between experiencing acousmatic sound and horror. 
In the preface Rank writes that ‘we are led to recognize in the birth trauma the 
ultimate biological basis of the psychical.’ 192  Rank’s position vacillates between 
arguing that he builds on Freud’s work to arguing for the (contra-Freud) universal 
centrality of the birth trauma. In seeking to establish a biological foundation of the 
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unconscious Rank, perhaps because of the original and universal nature of birth, often 
slips into suggesting that the birth trauma is the biological basis of the unconscious. 
This slip is evidenced in the following passage: 
 
If it has thus become possible to give a biological basis to the Unconsious, that 
is, to the psychical proper, discovered and investigated by Freud, then a second 
purpose of this work is to arrange synthetically, in its wide connection with the 
mechanics of the Unconscious thus founded, the whole psychical development 
of man as shown from the analytically recognized importance of the birth 
trauma and in the continuing attempts to overcome it. 193  
 
The analysis finally turns out to be a belated accomplishment of the incompleted 
mastery of the birth trauma. [Rank’s emphasis] […] it is possible, however, that 
I may be driving back the Ego of the patient to earlier and yet earlier libido 
positions, so that finally it would not be surprising if, in the terminal stage of 
analysis, the last flight of libido were to the intrauterine stage. One might even 
hold that this would be the final result in the case of very prolonged analyses. 
194  
 
Throughout The Trauma of Birth Rank seeks to establish his thesis’ (the significance 
of the birth trauma) with the architectures of Freud that focus on later traumas (such 
as the castration complex, penis envy). At each turn, Rank suggests the birth trauma is 
more primary than the subsequent complexes he seeks to prefix the birth trauma to. 
Rank’s thesis is by no means incompatible with Freud. 195 Nor is it the sole key to 
Freud’s observations and structures.   
In the opening pages of ‘Infantile Anxiety’ Rank describes how the birth trauma is 
evoked by the infant’s bed. When children are left alone in a dark room – such as 
their bedroom at night – they are returned to the sensorial context of the womb albeit 
‘with the important difference that the child is now consciously separated from the 
mother, whose womb is only “symbolically” replaced by the dark room or warm bed’. 
196  Rank then suggests anxieties concerning closed spaces and/or darkness are 
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manifestations of anxiety from birth. 197 An import to impress is that the context of 
acousmatic voices – the dark room – is steeped in histories of corporeal trauma.  
At the same time, the yearn to return to the womb is manifested via partial and 
symbolic avatars (this extends through all modes of intellect and pleasure, according 
to Rank. Note the perhaps too broad a brush stroke in the following: ‘it is easy to 
realize how every infantile utterance of anxiety or fear is really a partial disposal of 
the birth anxiety. […] just as the anxiety at birth forms the basis of every anxiety or 
fear, so every pleasure has as its aim the re-establishment of the intrauterine primal 
pleasure.’ 198  
One might hesitate to echo the sentiment that every articulation of fear or anxiety is 
related to birth trauma. Let’s be optimistic! There is a lifetime’s opportunity for new 
traumatizing experiences. Likewise, to suggest that every pleasure is connected to 
returning to an intrauterine pleasure negates the plethora of pleasures the changing 
body navigates once born. Rank’s proposal, however, is significant for the following 
question. What significance does the acousmatic voice hold in terms of trauma? In 
particular the passage from a world of absolute acousmatic experience to one of 
occasional acousmatic experience amidst a kaleidoscope of other senses?  
Rank writes of the popular children’s game ‘Hide and Seek’, the game where children 
hide in enclosed, concealed and – often-dark – spaces, whilst a chosen seeker strives 
to locate and uncover them. Such games, Rank proposes, serve more than mere 
distraction and folly. 199 He argues that games such as ‘Hide and Seek’, and other 
uncovering-covering-based games, are symptomatic of the birth trauma. He likens the 
games to neurotic symptoms, albeit with pleasurable outcomes for the child. In the 
following passage Rank explains how the mastery of the horrors and traumas of birth 
in the safe ‘unreality’ of symbolic play are not only catharses but pleasurable too: 
 
It should be noticed, moreover, that every playful use of the tragic primal 
motive, which occurs with the consciousness of unreality, works in a 
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pleasurable way in that it advantageously denies the reality of any trauma. 
Examples of this are the typical children’s games from earliest “hiding” (hide-
and-seek) to the games from of swinging, trains, dolls and doctor, which, 
moreover, as Freud very soon recognized, contain the same elements as the 
corresponding neurotic symptoms, only with positive pleasurable signs. The 
game of hiding (also conjuring), which children tirelessly repeat, represents the 
situation of separation (and of finding again) as not of a serious kind; the 
rhythmic games of movement (swinging, hopping, etc) simply repeat the 
rhythm felt in the embryonic state. This rhythm shows, in the neurotic symptom 
of dizziness, the other side of the Janus head. Soon the child’s every game will 
somehow be subordinated to the viewpoint of its unreality. And Psychoanalysis 
has been able to show how, from the child’s game, the higher and the highest 
pleasure-giving unrealities, namely phantasy and art, emerge. Even in the 
highest forms of the Greek tragedies, we are in a position to enjoy anxiety and 
horror because we abreact these primal affects, in the meaning of Aristotle’s 
catharsis, just as the child now works off the separation from the mother, 
originally full of dread, in its game of willing concealment, which can easily 
and often be broken off and repeated at the child’s pleasure. 200  
 
The initial trauma of birth, following Rank, is overcome by re-visiting the trauma 
repeatedly, playing it out, re-living it through the symbolic, and such a cathartic 
repetition also affords pleasure. It is here where Rank’s thesis of 1924 displays 
greatest fidelity to Freud’s famous essay of 1920: Beyond The Pleasure Principle. In 
terms of Rank’s structuration there is the body, subjected to trauma (the passage from 
an acousmatic world to a poly-sensory world), which is then played out as catharsis: 
games that pivot on seen and unseen modalities. In terms of Freud, as shall be 
detailed, we have catharses pitched as symbolic mastery – notably, the mastery in this 
case is executed via voice and language, which in itself, refers to the seen and unseen.  
A number of equivalences run between the body and the acousmatic in each scene. 
Rank’s notion of hiding and seeking being a catharsis of an unconscious trauma (the 
birth trauma) through repetitious and symbolic play is strikingly analogous to Freud’s 
famous case of his grandson Ernst cited in Beyond The Pleasure Principle. In Beyond 
The Pleasure Principle Freud recounts the time he stayed with a mother and child in 
their home for a few weeks. 201 During this time Freud became puzzled by a game 
Ernst used to play. Ernst was essentially a well-behaved child who had, at eighteen 
months, not yet acquired language. Nonetheless, he knew which rooms and objects 
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were off limits and could make himself understood using arbitrary noises to his 
mother and the maid-servant. 202  The infant was accepting of his mother’s 
disappearance and return and accepted her comings and goings without protest: 
‘above all he never cried when his mother went out and left him for hours’ 203  
Freud observed how the child ‘envinced the troublesome habit of flinging into the 
corner of the room or under the bed all the little things he could lay his hands on, so 
that to gather up his toys was no light task.’ 204  The boy would make a sound, ‘an 
expression of interest and gratification’ 205 (o-o-o-oh) that his mother understood to 
mean go away (fort). Freud comments that the child was using his toys and flinging 
them out of sight to ‘play ‘being gone’ (fortsein) with them’. 206 Freud recounts the 
scene of the child ‘playing’ with the spool of thread: 
 
The child had a wooden reel with a piece of string wound round it. It never 
occurred to him, for example, to drag this after him on the floor and so to play 
horse and cart with it, but he kept throwing it with considerable skill, held by 
the string, over the side of his little draped cot, so that the reel disappeared into 
it, then said his significant ‘o-o-o-oh’ and drew the reel by the string out of the 
cot again, greeting its reappearance with a joyful ‘Da’ (there). This was therefor 
the complete game, disappearance and return, […] the greater pleasure 
unquestionably attached to the second act. 207  
 
For Freud this is the infant’s mastery and playing out of his abandonment by his 
mother. On one level the child accepted his mother’s frequent comings and goings. 
But on another level trauma lurked. Mastery, the playing out, of the trauma in the 
symbolic thus afforded great pleasure: o-o-o-oh. Freud writes how the  
 
meaning of the game was then not far to seek. It was connected with the child’s 
remarkable cultural achievement – the forgoing of the satisfaction of an instinct – as 
the result of which he could let his mother go away without making any fuss. He 
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made it right with himself, so to speak, by dramatizing the same disappearance and 
return with the objects he had at hand. 208  
 
Freud then goes on to ask how this accords with the pleasure principal – where is the 
pleasure for little Hans repeatedly re-enacting the traumatic disappearance of the 
mother who raised and nourished him?  
The key thesis of Beyond The Pleasure Principle is that pleasure is not the main 
driver of our actions – there are other forces at play that do not necessarily lead to 
pleasure. Another question one could propose is why is pleasure yoked so tightly to a 
re-enactment of the opposite of pleasure (pain of separation, trauma, anxiety etc). 
What benefit does reenactment of a traumatic event hold for organisms that, 
supposedly, pursue pleasure? In the case of Ernst in Beyond The Pleasure Principle, 
the drive that overrides the organism’s seeking of pleasure, is the ‘power’ instinct: 
 
[Ernst] was in the first place passive, was overtaken by the experience, but now 
brings himself in as playing an active part, by repeating the experience as a 
game in spite of its unpleasing nature. This effort might be ascribed to the 
impulse to obtain mastery of a situation (the ‘power’ instinct, which remains 
independent of the question of the whether the recollection was a pleasant on or 
not. 209  
 
It is no great leap to synthesize Freud’s reading of Ernst’s Fort-Da game with Rank’s 
sentiments concerning hide and seek. Such a synthesis, indeed its possibility, ought to 
be read qua register and demonstration of Rank’s debt to Freud and his operation 
within a resolutely Freudian schema.  
The trauma of moving from acousmatic womb to the multi-sensory world, the trauma 
of consolidating visual and tactile sources for sounds is akin to the departure of the 
mother in Freud’s great essay. A consistency across both contexts is the organism’s 
departure of the mother. Rank’s example is the departure of womb at birth. Freud’s 
case concerns a departure from the breast. In each case a body is distanced from 
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pleasure and nourishment. Hide and seek and Ernst’s spool play can be framed as part 
of a continuum of cathartic symbolic plays that impose mastery over a traumatic 
orphaning from pleasure and nourishment.  
 Behaviours displayed in the shift from acousmatic to a multi-sensory world can be 
interpreted in a similar manner. The body’s emersion into a world where sounds have 
causes, textures and visual correlates, is re-enacted with drums, xylophones or other 
toys. By banging a drum children bring themselves into playing an active part in the 
new world of sounds that have tactile and visual causes. By exploring the causality of 
sound, banishing the acousmatic into a sound with a known source, children master 
their trauma and new station in the multisensory world. As small children bang drums 
their eyes track the sound to its source. Such an exercise is affords the pleasure and 
gleeful fascination of mastery.  
Every now and then, as Toop elucidates so well, an acousmatic sound presents itself 
and we must return to the sonic-to-cause ‘fort-da!’ exercise and begin asking: Am I 
hearing things? Is anybody there? What is there? What is making that sound? Such 
questions, the fossils of a body’s experience, are imbued with the prospect of the 
unknown – horror. This quick excursion through the work of Rank and Freud by no 
means addresses every import of the texts. But it has demonstrated a response to 
Dolar’s pitch of the acousmatic question. The question of acousmatic, especially 
when broached with recourse to psychoanalysis’ foundational texts, is not a question 








Here, the focus on Freud continues. However, the theme of the text is markedly 
different to the previous section. The focus here is how voice is received in the 
writing of Freud. It is argued that Freud had a ‘hyperphasic ear’, and imposed 
meaning over fidelity to the sound of bodies: voice was heard as speech. Instances 
where Dolar shares this tendency are evidenced. This section establishes this critique 
as a primer for the following section, which provides greater detail of Freud’s 
omittance of voice.   
 
 
Freud’s first paper was titled On Aphasia (1891). On a biographical level the paper’s 
title may be read as ominous prophesy; an eerie spectre of the mouth cancer that 
resulted in the loss of his ability to speak. On textual level it could be read as the 
declarative tone of Freud’s treatment of voice in subsequent writings. One might, in 
retrospective, read such a title as inaugurating a procession of texts that consider 
speech and language, are sensitive to its implications, oblique significances, 
disturbances and nuances, but are deaf to voice.  
Perhaps deaf is not the perfect adjective. Dolar, in ‘Freud’s Voices’ notes that Freud 
proclaimed to be ‘recalcitrant to music’. 210 In the same passage he presents a note by 
Freud explaining how he could not enjoy music because he could not ‘understand’ 
music. Yet, as Dolar notes, and even a light skim through biographical texts show, 
Freud was an Opera fan. 211 His writings are peppered with references to Opera and 
song; he would hum his favourite Don Giovanni arias to his dog. 212 Dolar, then 
speculates that Freud’s overt references to not understanding nor enjoying music 
might be a denegation. He asks: ‘Doth he protest too much?’ 213 
Dolar presents a passage from ‘The Moses of Michaelangelo’ (1914) where Freud 
writes that arts, such as literature and sculpture, do ‘exercise a powerful effect’ on 
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him. Such an effect is, Freud claims, concomitant with contemplation and 
understanding. For Freud, the powerful effect occurs ‘when I have been 
contemplating such things, to spend a long time before them trying to apprehend them 
in my own way, i.e. to explain to myself what their effect is due to.’ 214 Conscious 
understanding, reasoning and appreciation are pre-requisites for pleasure, he claims. 
In the following line, Freud’s reasoning is music does not afford pleasure precisely 
because it cannot be sufficiently analyzed. He writes, that whenever he cannot explain 
to himself what the effect is due to ‘as for instance in music, I am almost incapable of 
obtaining any pleasure. Some rationalistic, or perhaps analytic, turn of mind in me 
rebels against being moved by a thing without knowing why I am thus affected and 
what it is that affects me. (PFL 14, p. 253)’ 215 
Dolar asks if there is not an ‘anguish, or even panic, in front of something which 
threatens to enthrall him, flood him, make him lose his analytic stance and distance?’ 
216 Aversion can certainly be an interpretation of the phrase ‘rebels against being 
moved’. Dolar’s observation is that there is a paradox in this quotation from Freud: 
‘he is susceptible to literature and sculpture, but he can maintain his distance and 
analyze how they work; while music does not touch him, but also does not allow for a 
distance—should he surrender to its charm, it would engulf him like a black hole.’ 217 
It is peculiar, the insistence that the experience a powerful and pleasurable effect is 
concomitant on understanding. Especially in terms of musical appreciation, can’t the 
opposite be true? Isn’t one enthralled by what one doesn’t understand, thing that 
might be described as ‘wonderful’? 
Despite the origin of Freud’s peculiar stance on understanding and enjoying music, 
Dolar then moves to suggest that Freud’s deafness to the aesthetics of music, his 
refusal and/or inability to hear music as an object of veneration, allows Freud to listen 
to voices in a different register to the Italian solider. He is deaf, ‘immune’ to the 
aesthetics of voice, the seductive Siren’s song. 218  Dolar writes that Freud’s 
‘immunity to its aesthetics and its seductive Sirens’ song has its counterpart in a great 
susceptibility for listening to voices in another register, and for hearing the voice 
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precisely where the friend of the Italian opera is hearing-impaired.’ 219 We can take 
this sentiment of Dolar’s in terms of the binary he set up at the beginning of the book 
– meaning and aesthetics. If Freud is recalcitrant to musical affect, then perhaps he 
has a rationalistic, knowledge seeking, analytical ear? But this is not Dolar’s take.  
Dolar’s speculates how – and note the embedded caveat of reticence – coming to 
‘terms with the voice may lie at the bottom of the basic insights of psychoanalysis.’ 
220 Dolar posits that voice is a discriminating factor. To begin the ‘voice’ of the 
unconscious is described in textual terms – voice is presupposed as metaphysical, not 
acoustic or bodily (like the voice of an author). Dolar then moves to the question of 
drives and suggests ‘their remarkable feature is that they are silent, stumm, mute, says 
Freud.’ 221 Finally, Dolar arrives at the physical aperture, the mouth ‘eating or 
speaking, that Deleuze dwelled on ‘insistently’. 222 Even in this brief concession to the 
body, the word choice immediately muffles any sonority – if not chewing, then it 
must be articulating meaningful sounds.  
Dolar’s chapter is divided into three of Freud’s voices. ‘The voice as an excess, the 
voice as a reverberation, and the voice as silence.’ 223 The excess concerns the click, 
an aural hallucination of a woman with persecution anxieties and a fear of being 
photographed whilst conducing an affair. The click, is interpreted by Freud as a knock 
or beat of the clitoris – the case resonates with the scene of Nathaniel’s love in E.T.A. 
Hoffmann’s Der Sandmann that Dolar explores in ‘At First Sight’ – man’s view of 
woman as a mechanistic and logical automaton. Dolar comments: ‘Freud rather enacts 
the role assigned to him by the feminist critique—the role of someone who imposes 
his own male fantasies about feminine sexuality on the hapless woman, so that he 
may be unwittingly providing an answer to another question, namely, “What makes 
men tick?”’ 224 Dolar’s treatment of the click lights up two questions. The click is 
couched as an accidental noise that is a marker of an excess not accommodated by 
language for the subject. Dolar, after detailing the significance of infants overhearing 
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parental intercourse and fearing their own accidental noises might give them away 
suggests that: 
 
The situation of the patient would thus be a displaced reenactment of a 
paradigmatic fantasy which is constructed entirely around the kernel of the 
voice, the grain of an inexplicable noise, a mysterious sound, which can appear 
even with the tiniest click. At the origin of fantasy there is a traumatic kernel 
materialized by the voice, the noise—we should allow full latitude here to a 
sonority not pertaining to language. 225 
 
Yet, is accidental noise voice? Is a rumbling stomach, a cracking ankle, a sneeze or 
cough voice? Secondly, is the onomatopoeia click that Dolar plumps for to indicate a 
‘full latitude to a sonority not pertaining to language’ plausible? To re-phrase, is there 
any other onomatopoeic term that mimics absolute minimalism of sonorous content 
with the same brevity and neat concision as click?   
The sub-section ‘Lalangue’, corresponding to the sign-posted ‘voice as reverberation’ 
commences in along a similar problematic methodology. The acoustic nature of voice 
is lost in the din or words: Dolar’s unfurling of the ‘the voice in the formations of the 
unconscious’ takes up the Freudian impress of the significance of slips of the tongue – 
homonymy. To hear words, as sounding like other words, although it takes some 
listening to the voice to hear these doppelgängers returns voice to a servant of 
meaning (albeit plural meanings of interpretation).226 Dolar’s opting to explore the 
‘raw material’ of words, their unconscious processes treated as ‘sonic objects’, their 
particular ‘sonority, resonance, echoes, consonances, reverberations, contaminations’ 
testifies to a confrontation with the acoustic. But it is ultimately an elliptical return to 
word that affords scant time to the acoustic component of voice other than its role in 
spawning meanings for the hearer. Dolar, strafes from any sustained address of the 
acoustic and corporeal facets of voice to pursue at length words and meanings.  
This slippage is embedded within one of the most provoking insights of the book. 
Dolar, after examining by way of Jakobson and Lewis Carroll, how the necessary 
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sonic carrier of speech unavoidable results in an excess: ‘irrelevant surplus’ sounds; a 
‘frivolous addition […] like a bodily parasite on a bodiless creature.’ 227 Dolar then 
moves to make a distinction between hearing and listening: 
 
It is here that we can draw a provisional demarcation line between hearing and 
listening, and between meaning and sense. To be brief: hearing is after meaning, 
the signification which can be linguistically spelled out; listening is, rather, 
being on the lookout for sense, something that announces itself in the voice 
beyond meaning. We could say that hearing is entwined with understanding—
hence the French double meaning (double entendre!) of entendre, entendement, 
being both hearing and understanding, intellect—that is, reducing the heard to 
the meaningful, reducing the audible to the intelligible; while listening implies 
an opening toward a sense which is undecidable, precarious, elusive, and which 
sticks to the voice. Sense […] also alludes to the other use of sense: that of the 
five senses, of the sensual (to say nothing of the sensitive and the sensible). The 
equivoque of sense and sense (the sense of hearing) is, I suppose, structural; it is 
already encapsulated in the “sound and sense” formula, which could also be 
read as “sense and sense.” 228 
 
It is here where Dolar’s lapse back to meaning and the the signifier is evinced. 
Listening is to look (the occularcentricism of the phrase not to go unnoticed) for 
sense, for something that makes sense, beyond meaning.  
John Mowitt, in chapter one – ‘Facing the Radio’ – of Radio: Essays in Bad 
Reception, writes, reflecting his book’s title, that Dolar’s book ‘avoids wrestling with 
precisely the acoustic character of the voice within which the voice as object is said to 
resonate.’ 229 Mowitt’s case for this claim is that Dolar’s  
 
effortless gliding from voice to music, a gliding rendered in an arresting 
formulation late in the text: “What Freud and Kafka have in common … is 
their claim that they are both completely unmusical – which made them 
particularly susceptible to the dimension of the voice” 230  
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Mowitt’s criticism here is that rather than face the voice, Dolar instead recedes into 
music – the aesthetic veneration he (Dolar) claims obfuscates the ‘object voice’. 
Mowitt suggests that Dolar’s logic here one of inverse proportion – ‘The less you 
know about the music, the more you clearly don’t know you know about the voice, 
and vice versa.’ 231 Mowitt’s highlight of Dolar’s tendency to recede into the music 
that obfuscates voice to expedite a flight from (or circumvent any appraisal of) the 
acoustic character of void voice resonates from is the counterpoint to the symptoms of 
Dolar’s examination of Freud presented here. Presented here is the evidence file for 
Dolar’s reticence to tackle this acoustic character manifesting as recourse to hearing 
meanings, words and semantics. Dolar’s preliminary claim, articulated via the joke 
about Italian soldiers, is that there is a voice for meaning, the command obfuscates the 
voice, and the voice of beauty, a fetish object:  
 
I will try to argue that apart from those two widespread uses of the voice—the 
voice as the vehicle of meaning; the voice as the source of aesthetic 
admiration—there is a third level: an object voice which does not go up in 
smoke in the conveyance of meaning, and does not solidify in an object of fetish 
reverence, but an object which functions as a blind spot in the call and as a 
disturbance of aesthetic appreciation. One shows fidelity to the first by running 
to attack; one shows fidelity to the second by running to the opera. As for 
fidelity to the third, one has to turn to psychoanalysis. Army, opera, 
psychoanalysis? 232 
 
Upon proceeding to psychoanalysis Dolar is either hearing (or being on the look out) 
for sense that might mean, and heeding the commands of meaning like a good soldier 
or fetishizing the aesthetics of the voice like the Opera loving Italian soldiers. 
‘Freud’s Voices’ is a particular example of this methodological limbo. The text is 
initiated by querying Freud’s ‘recalcitrance to music’, a lack of fidelity to the voice as 
a fetishistic object of reverence, but no sooner than such an idiosyncrasy been 
established the course of arguing for voice is articulated via a sustained fidelity to 
meaning. Dolar’s flexibility should be applauded, for it seems he can run to both the 
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Opera and to attack. Dolar’s trajectory in ‘Freud’s Voices’, as well as succumbing to 
the bifurcation he wishes to overcome, resonates too well with how voice is treated by 
Freud – aphonic, yet hyperphasic.  
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Beyond Beyond The Pleasure Principle 
 
In this final section Freud’s omittance and/or deafness to voice in his texts, despite a 
biographical conspicuity, is detailed. His reading of Torquato Tasso’s poem 
Gerusalemme Liberata and the anecdote of Ernst in Beyond The Pleasure Principle 
are afforded scrutiny. As argued previously, these close readings of Freud’s 
commentaries underscore this lack of listening to voice. There is a secondary import 
brought in here through close readings of the aformentioned examples. In each of 
these instances the ignored voice emerges from a locus of corporeal horror. When 
voice is listened to in these moments, and when the body behind such a voice is 
considered, trauma and violence are unearthed. Voice, in these contexts, sounds out 
the horrors bodies are subject to. Voice, after these re-readings that utilize insights 
from Irigaray and Caruth, is pitched as a register of horrors unknown wrought from 




Let’s listen closer to voice in Freud’s work and focus on two examples in Beyond The 
Pleasure Principle; the ‘Fort-da!’ scene of his grandson Ernst and the interpretation 
and analysis of Torquato Tasso’s romantic epic, Gerusalemme Liberata (1581). 233 
The following examination of the Ernst scene, how Freud pitches an anecdotal or 
diegetic narrative of voice, is poised with a criticality partly stemming from Alice 
Lagaay’s essay “Between Sound and Silence: Voice in the History of Psychoanalysis” 
and Luce Irigaray’s “The gesture in psychoanalysis”. The reading of Freud’s take up 
of a scene from Gerusalemme Liberata utilizes Cathy Caruth’s chapter ‘The Wound 
and The Voice’ in Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative and History. These re-
readings of Freud’s narratives allow an explication of how, to employ Lagaay’s terms, 
voice emerges through any film of language or fetish reverence to be ‘symptom of, 
and […] gateway to, [an] unconscious’ trauma. 234  But before considering two 
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moments of voice within Beyond The Pleasure Principle the broad problematic of 
voice in Freud’s work ought to be afforded some remarks.  
Voice often plays a key role in Freud’s theses, yet he seldom goes as far as to directly 
discuss or explore the significance of voice in and of itself – either in psychoanalysis 
generally, or in the illustrative narratives referenced. That is to say, voice, as a carrier 
of language, or as a phonic interruption of making sense, is considered qua voice 
subject to language – but the question of voice, especially in relation to audition and 
the body, is given scant attention. Freud’s works are a cacophony of voices, but they 
are badly speaking voices, talking voices, meaning voices. Freud, it seems heard 
voice as speech. As was detailed in the previous section, the audition, and the 
question, of voice is quickly subsumed a focus on meanings. As will be argued over 
the examination of these two moments in the texts, Freud’s work does harbor a voice 
beyond the service of language, but a voice of which the master does not speak.  
Yet, voice permeated Freud’s life. A silent voice haunts Freud and psychoanalysis on 
a number of levels: biographical, practical, metaphorical and theoretical. Voice is 
present in an array of instances and anecdotes Freud developed his theories from. 235 
Voice is there but does not take center stage. Lagaay, in the aforementioned essay, 
writes of the ‘banal’ observation that psychoanalysis would later be referred to as ‘the 
talking cure’. 236 That the voice is referenced, glossed and de-aestheticized, in a term 
that privileges language is apt. Nonetheless, despite this strange torsion of voice into 
talk, voices are no doubt threaded through the life and works of the Father (to use the 
term pointedly for the problematic of gender in this field) of psychoanalysis. There is 
a history of vocal contradiction, stemming from the man who listened to voices and 
Opera, hummed to Jofi, his Chow Chow dog, yet dismissed, by varying degrees of 
convincement, any enjoyment of voice and music. Voice, contra speech, in Freud is 
rarely discussed explicitly, rarely announced as a case in point, but always resonates 
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The lurking centrality of voice in Freud’s work should not be overlooked, as Lagaay 
argues: 
 
Although in the actual writings of Sigmund Freud explicit references to voice 
are but few and far between, it is evident that Freud was in fact a uniquely 
attentive listener to voices and that voice played a central role at the scene of the 
birth of psychoanalysis, that is, at the time of Freud’s collaboration with Josef 
Breuer on the treatment of hysterical patients (Freud, 1990). Voice is and 
always has been relevant to psychoanalysis not only in the rather banal sense 
that psychoanalysis first emerged as a “talking cure”, as a practice, that is, that 
relies heavily on the spoken word; but more profoundly insofar as the voice, and 
in particular certain disturbances of the voice, from stammering and tongue-
clicking, to unintelligible clackings, splutterings and groaning, or to the 
phenomenon of aphonia or total speech loss, came to be seen by Freud as 
manifestations of unconscious conflicts and tensions which it was the purpose 
of psychoanalysis to release. At the origin of psychoanalytic practice the voice 
appears therefore both as a material support for the symptom of, and as a 
gateway to, the unconscious. 237  
 
 A voice, and not speech, being symptom of and gateway to unconscious trauma is 
evident, but not explicitly referenced, in two instances in Freud’s writings. Both 
signal a trauma wrought upon, and sounded out by the subject. One could say that 
voice in these instances is a horrific regurgitation of trauma, a horrifying return of 
terrors and discomforts previously unknowingly ingested.  
A close scrutiny of two examples within Beyond The Pleasure Principle, re-read in 
sonority with Irigaray’s analysis, support the claim that Freud’s treatment of voice 
was more a treatment of speech, of hearing meaning, listening and being on the look 
out for meanings. Freud, it can be said in the following examples, only had ears for 
the command – the film of signifiers, language and meaning that Dolar claims veil the 
‘object voice’. This tendency is firstly evidenced via the reading of Ernst’s 
vocalizations as verbalizations – a Freudian vaccum whereby voice is silenced and 
meanings flower. This is not a distinction Irigaray claims to make, but her text does, 
in considering the significance of the mouth’s gesture in the scene, detail this striking 
difference by way of detailing the sounds the small boy’s body made.  
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In the famous recounting of Ernst’s repetitious act of ‘Fort-da’ in Beyond The 
Pleasure Principle voice is placed in a narrative of sounding a trauma from within a 
supposedly speaking subject. ‘Fort-da’ is a game that Ernst played when his mother 
was absent – exorcising, so the famous argument goes, the trauma of abandonment, in 
particular the mouth from the breast (for this distinctly oral facet is precisely the facet 
Irigaray’s text underscores). The game involved throwing a reel of cotton to and fro 
and voicing ‘Fort’ (far away/gone/go away but vocalized as o-o-o-oh) and retrieving 
the reel by its string and saying da. 238  
Freud’s claim here is that a cathartic playing out of the trauma in the symbolic realm 
(his diegetic mastery of trauma manifest in repetition) is exercised through 
vocalization of signifying sounds. Note, in this translation, the fill ‘so to speak’: ‘he 
made it right with himself, so to speak, by dramatizing the same disappearance and 
return with the objects he had at hand.’ 239 One could edit the line, to provide a choice 
concatenation, to read: to speak made it right. 
Freud argues the meaning of this game was the child’s ‘cultural achievement’. 240 The 
child dramatized his estrangement from the breast, mastering the experience within a 
narrated game. Ernst was, in the first place, a passive subject, ‘overtaken by the 
experience, but now brings himself in as playing an active part, by repeating the 
experience as a game in spite of its unpleasing nature.’ 241  
Freud writes that Ernst, upon receiving the reel, ‘accompanied this by an expression 
of interest and gratification, emitting a loud long-drawn-out ‘o-o-o-oh’’– and even 
goes as far as to provide an onomatopoeia of the boy’s vocalization. 242  But this is 
quickly glossed as signifying sound – ‘which in the judgement of the mother (one that 
coincided with my own) was not an interjection but meant ‘go away’ (fort).’ 243 This 
slippage, the torsion of voice into a signifying utterance, is perhaps symptomatic of 
how Freud’s fidelity errs on the word, not the aesthetic nature of voice. Dolar’s 
representation of Freud’s writing about his anhedonic ear is worth recalling. Consider 
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this line hinting at an aversion to music – ‘Some rationalistic, or perhaps analytic, turn 
of mind in me rebels against being moved by a thing without knowing why I am thus 
affected and what it is that affects me’– might this be doctored, then, too: ‘Some 
rationalistic, or perhaps analytic, turn of mind in me rebels against voice’? 244 
Irigaray examines the significance of how Ernst vocalized (not spoke) these ‘words’ 
in ‘The gesture in psychoanalysis’. Ernst, according to Freud, does not say ‘Fort’ but 
vocalizes an ‘o-o-o-oh’ sound. 245 Irigaray writes: 
 
The child throws the reel away from him, hides it, and then draws it back 
towards him, saying 0-0-0-0 and da, meaning, according to Freud fort-da. He 
throws it away from him over the side of the cot, where it is hidden from him, 
then pulls it towards him, back from behind the cot, so that he can see it. Fort 
means far away [veut dire loin], da means near [veut dire pres). In the economy 
of consonants and vowels, fort (or 0-0-0–0 as it in his discontinuous signal) 
plays on the far-and-near: it is articulated by the mouth's forming a little 
triangle, a triangle formed by lips and tongue: the 0 is inside it, but cannot be 
swallowed. The far away is not introjected; it describes, in the mouth above all, 
a determinate space, a frame, framing, as it were, a space of departure and 
return, coming to a halt with the t, if the word is fort, or with the discontinuity 
of the sound if it is the 0-0-0-0. Whereas the da can be swallowed, a sharp, dry 
mouthful, thus inverting the fort, unless it [da] stays in the back of the palate. 
So, everything also happens in the mouth, between the lips, the tongue, the 
palate, the teeth, the larynx, which may be confused with the oesophagus, both 
of which may in turn be confused with the pharynx, and so on. Da is not sung, 
in any case, it is swallowed. Near, it is introjected; far, it can be mastered: it 
stays in the mouth like a sweet difficult to suck, or else becomes a 
discontinuous signal, difficult to transform into a melody. 246   
 
In this rich passage Irigaray draws out a schism within the repetition of mastery 
played out via a diegetic scene for the subject (the ‘Fort-Da!’ reel game). There is 
Fort, meaning away and Da, meaning there or near. The latter is speech, whereas the 
former is voice. The two are quite different. Hence inverted commas must frame the 
plural term ‘words’. There is not more than one word here. 
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Ernst’s narration, his repetitious diegetic mastery, contains a schism. Da, meaning 
near, is introjected, swallowed. It is mastered, articulated. More plainly, it is a word. 
Da, is speaking. It is spoken. Fort, however, is remarkably distinct from Da. Fort was 
never spoken. It was not a word but a type of sound emitted though Ernst, a voice: ‘o-
o-o-oh’. Irigaray describes fort as a discontinuous signal, it is sung, vocalized, 
describing it as difficult to suck, staying in the mouth. 247 It is apt to recall the 
inedibility of voice, wrought by the denaturalized and signifying mouth, that Dolar 
describes (referencing Lacan in the final line): 
 
By speech mouth is denaturalized, diverted from its natural function, seized by 
the signifier (…). The Freudian name for this deterritorialization is the drive 
(…). Eating can never be the same once the mouth has been deterritorialized—it 
is seized by the drive, it turns around a new object which emerged in this 
operation, it keeps circumventing, circling around this eternally elusive object. 
Speech, in this denaturalizing function, is then subjected to a secondary 
territorialization, as it were: it acquires a second nature with its anchorage in 
meaning. (…) But this secondary nature can never quite succeed, and the bit 
that eludes it can be pinned down as the element of the voice, this pure alterity 
of what is said. This is the common ground it shares with food, that in food 
which precisely escapes eating, the bone that gets stuck in the gullet. 248  
 
…A phōnḗ stuck in the gullet.  
Note the narrative location of Ernst’s voice (contra his linguistic articulation), its 
context, within Freud’s anecdote. Voice, the discontinuous ‘o-o-o-oh’ that plays a role 
in the repetition and mastery of abandonment, sounds in the place of far away, or 
gone. In the regurgitated diegetic limbo of attachment and detachment, suckling and 
isolation, a voiced ‘o-o-o-oh’ emits at the traumatizing side of the play: when the 
breast is gone and pleasure is no more. The far way/gone facet of both the root 
experience and the diegetic mastery and re-enactment is the kernel of the child’s 
trauma. Conversely, the here, da, is said at the point of a gratifying instance of 
comfort. Da is said, as a marker of being reunited with the source of pleasure and 
nourishment. A non-signifying voice sounds in place, in the moment within a 
sequence, albeit diegetic, of the organism’s trauma, whereas the spoken word, by 
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contrast, is said in place of the mollifying act of resolution. Voice sounds in the 
instance of trauma for the subject – it sounds from and for the body’s trauma.  
Irigaray’s oral and vocal focused reading of this scene is important, for not only does 
it develop a sustained terrain of equivoque concerning voicing, speaking and eating 
but it also, points of the difference of Ernst’s two vocalizations: one is said, the other 
is voiced. The text also draws out the sexual differences not accommodated by the 
text that takes the boy as a universal given: ‘Ernst is a boy.’ 249 Taking this profound 
difference between speech and voice in hand, lightly and without dwelling on it as is 
done so here, Irigaray’s argument turns to the gestures of the body that are significant. 
Our focus is slightly different, for voice is the main question at stake, so we have 
taken a different tack to build a continuum of criticality concerning Freud’s treatment 
(or not) of voice. To indulge a heretical sentiment, wasn’t Freud, a bit quick, in taking 
up and agreeing with the judgment of the mother, to hear the discontinuous sound as a 
meaningful signal? Was the hasty interpretation of ‘o-o-o-oh’ as a symbolic word 
(fort) a case of Freud being on the look out for sense but being deaf to voice?  
Later in Beyond The Pleasure Principle, in explicating how persons repeat, 
unwittingly and unconsciously the same fate, Freud references a particularly tragic 
scene within Gerusalemme Liberata (1581) the epic poem by Torquato Tasso. 250 
Although Freud’s point in this turn is, again, not explicitly concerned with voice, it 
does, once again, take center stage in the moment within the diegesis he describes: it 
is a significant and pivotal point in the narrative of Tasso’s poem. 251 Freud does 
make reference to the voice, before explicating how the preceding action is an 
instance of repetition.  
A brief synopsis of the scene is required (Freud provides a cursory outline in the text). 
Tancred, the hero of the poem, accidentally kills his love, Clorinda in battle. After this 
tragedy he wanders into a dense forest. Freud recounts: ‘The hero, Tancred, has 
unwittingly slain Clorinda, the maiden he loved, who fought with him disguised in the 
armour of an enemy knight. After her burial he penetrates into the mysterious 
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enchanted wood, the bane of the army of the crusaders.’ 252 Once in the wood, 
Tancred lashes out at a tree, he hews it down with his sword ‘but from the gash in the 
trunk blood streams forth and the voice of Clorinda whose soul is imprisoned in the 
tree cries out to him in reproach that he has once more wrought a baleful deed on his 
beloved. 253 A translation of the scene in question, by Max Wickert, is presented 
below: 
 
Crazed and distraught, he see before him stand, 
his wounded love, in tears, at whose appeals 
he cannot bear to see that quick blood flow 
or hear that languid sufferer’s sighs of woe 254 
 
Voice, here, cries out at the nexus of violence and trauma being repeated and it 
sounds the horrors inflicted upon a body. This is one facet of Freud’s argumentative 
drive the comparative literature scholar, Cathy Caruth, examines in the introductory 
chapter ‘The Wound and The Voice’ in Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative 
and History. Voice cries out from the wound, at once signaling and being resultant of 
repetition yet also retroactively confirming the act as repetition to its executor. Caruth 
writes: 
 
For what seems to me particularly striking in the example of Tasso is not just 
the unconscious act of the infliction of an injury and inadvertent and unwished-
for repetition, but the moving and sorrowful voice that cries out, a voice that is 
paradoxically released through the wound. Tancred does not only repeat his act, 
but, in repeating it he for the first time hears a voice that cries out to him to see 
what he has done. The voice of his beloved addresses him and, in this address, 
bears witness to the past he has unwittingly repeated. Tancred’s story thus 
represents traumatic experience not only as the enigma of a human agent’s 
repeated and unknowing acts but also as the enigma of the otherness of a human 
voice that cries out from the wound, a voice that witnesses a truth that Tancred 
himself cannot know. 255  
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Freud’s focus on the scene is Tancred’s repetition of the tragic act. Caruth’s focus 
concerns the locus of trauma – the wound and voice that signals the trauma. Caruth is 
clear to indicate that the voice that emerges from a body subjected to violence. 
(Clorinda manifested in arboreous form) is a voice of otherness, an enigmatic voice. 
This voice from the wound, if we take Freudian line concerning the voice heard by 
Tancred, is a voice of psychic tragedy, the repetitious act. Taking the voice of 
Clorinda, having more sensitivity to where the voice comes from akin to Caruth’s 
take, there is a voice – exogenous and supernatural –  that sounds out violence and 
trauma. 
There is a significant horror of otherness, of deafening alterity in each instance. For 
Tancred, voice sounds out the unconscious drive to repeat, the compelling force 
beyond his conscious love for his Clorinda. In this moment voice confronts Tancred 
with his terrible repetition, in a sense announcing his repeated trauma to him. 
Structurally analogous to the case of little Ernst, it is a point of non-verbal 
vocalization resounding from and for trauma. Voice is symptomatic not just of a 
moment of trauma but re-emerges, and erupts from a historic trauma not yet 
accommodated by a subject. Voice in these contexts is symptomatic of and gateway 
to a past trauma. Voice resounds in the context of repetition, it also sounds in the 
moment of a body in stress – either by the abandonment of pleasure or the infliction 
of violence upon it. Voice emerges from the horrors of striking alterity, voicing either 
the repetitive bind of the subject or the barbarity of external violence for the 









‘Phonology kills the voice, it stabs it with the signifying dagger, it does away with its 
living presence, with its flesh and blood.’ 
– Dolar. 256 
 
 
Army, Opera, Flesh? 
 
This section serves to re-establish the co-ordinates of enquiry and points of 
contestation. Some of the examples in the previous chapter find strong resonance and 
continuation in the arguments of this chapter, whereas other thematic touchpapers 
thread though to later chapters.  Overall, the focus in this chapter is the violence 
bodies that ‘give’ voice are subject to: the necessary brutalizations for voice. This 
initial proposition is part of the triptych of explications of the horrors of voice that 
stem from the interventions and critical readings staged in the first chapter. These are 
all part of a continuum of showing how voice, as an object of horror, as object a, is 
inherently corporeal. This chapter in particular, by virtue of a focus on vocalization 
and the local body, emphasizes a clinical approach to voice. This not only alloys 
Lacan’s ‘torture house of language’ to the horrors of the vocalizing body but also 
stresses the continued resonances his work has with empirical studies. 
 
In the introduction of A Voice and Nothing More Dolar, recounts an old joke about 
Italian soldiers. 257 It draws up a binary he utilizes to approach the ‘object voice’ – 
language and aesthetics. The joke: An army commander cries ‘Soldiers, attack!’ No 
one moves. He commands again ‘Soldiers, attack!’ As before, no one moves. Thirdly 
he cries ‘Soldiers, attack!’ ‘At which point there is a response, a tiny voice rising from 
the trenches, saying appreciatively “Che bella voce!” “What a beautiful voice!”’ 258  
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The joke pivots on the stereotype of an Italian: they are opera lovers, not soldiers. It 
allows Dolar to demonstrate the dual nature of voice. There is a voice for language, 
orders and commands but there is also a voice that is a thing of beauty. Dolar states 
that the joke illustrates a double obfuscation of voice: on the one hand there is the 
willful ignorance of the meaning (the words) that commonly obfuscate voice in terms 
of speech and command (one listens to the meaning of the words not the sound), yet 
on the other hand there is the reduction of the voice into a fetishized object of beauty 
– and this too also obfuscates ‘the object voice’.  
To elaborate: speaking and meaning (commands and orders) conceal the voice of its 
service: voice is cloaked by the meaning it sounds. The soldiers have no wish to 
follow this authoritative commanding cloak of voice. So, to avoid the command the 
soldiers instead focus on voice as an object of beauty. Dolar suggests the soldiers pull 
the trick of selective hearing and quips that one might doubt an alternative command  
(announcing an afternoon off to pursue the ‘beautiful girls’ of the town) would be 
ignored. 259 However when the soldiers avoid the command, the call to action, and 
instead focus on voice as an object of beauty they fall into another level of 
obfuscation: ‘the aesthetic concentration on the voice loses the voice precisely by 
turning it into a fetish object’ 260 
The implication behind this move, arguing by a binary of two obfuscatory modes 
(meaning and aesthetics), is that there is a voice irreducible to both meaning and 
aesthetics. There is a voice apart from aesthetics and a voice apart from language and 
meaning. Voice is frequently about aesthetics, beauty, language and meaning but it is 
not analogous. Voice may be thought of in aesthetic terms, it may be heard, perceived 
and listened to, as a sonic object of beauty. It may also be thought of as the sonic 
carrier of language, the ethereal material of words, its lilt and intonation, tone and 
timbre, might suffuse additional meaningfulness into words, into speech. Yet, either 
way it cannot be thought solely in terms of such modes. Voice might partly constitute 
speech but it not reducible to language. It might be an object of aesthetic awe – but it 
cannot be reduced to aesthetics either.  
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But if, to follow Dolar, voice is irreducible to both language and aesthetics, what, 
then, is this remaining facet of voice? Dolar’s argument is that there is another aspect 
of voice, a third level: 
 
(A)n object voice which does not go up in smoke in the conveyance of meaning, 
and does not solidify in an object of fetish reverence, but an object which 
functions as a blind spot in the call and as a disturbance of aesthetic 
appreciation. One shows fidelity to the first by running to attack; one shows 
fidelity to the second by running to the opera. As for fidelity to the third, one 
has to turn to psychoanalysis. Army, opera, psychoanalysis? 261  
 
This ‘object voice’ is the key concept of A Voice and Nothing More. The problems of 
this object voice, its unhelpfully vague phrasing, have already been established in 
‘Beyond the Veil of this World’. So too, has the concept’s consonance to recent 
philosophies of horror. This chapter will continue to pursue voice as an object at the 
borders of established categories – the object that is irreducible to aesthetics and 
language. But, instead of turning to psychoanalysis, like Dolar, we turn to the body 
and ask what voice means for (or against) the corpus that voices. In terms of meaning 
we ask what is required of a body to put itself at the service of meaning, to be set to 
the task of voicing an impersonal and generalized language. Secondly, in terms of 
aesthetics and beauty, what is required of the body to voice an object of beauty? What 
undertaking, pathos, suffering or sacrifice is required of the body to sound so 
beautifully?  
Voice is intrinsically about the body as it is subjected to language or manifested via 
aesthetics. To return to Dolar’s opening binary of meaning and aesthetics, in each 
instance there is a body giving voice: a body that warrants attention. 
Approaching the body warrants recourse to an empirical framework. Before one can 
begin thinking what voice means for a subject we must follow the clinical Freudian 
methodology of exhausting or addressing the biologically and empirical avenues of 
enquiry first before any leap into the metaphysical or psychological. The irreducible 
voice qua ‘object which retains an in-eradictable ambiguity’ shall be explored firstly 
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in biological and evolutionary terms before any excursion into the metaphysical and 
psychoanalytical. 262  Whereas Dolar’s opening trajectory is Language-Aesthetics-
Psychoanalysis, to turn quickly to psychoanalysis, the step in this chapter is to turn to 
the living tissues, the flesh, cartilage and bone of the voicer. Thus: Language-
Aesthetics-Body.  
Why insist on this corporeal facet of voice? Why return to the biological and clinical? 
In a sense this chapter follows the thread of objects delineated in the previous chapter 
– we move from a sonic object to a Freudian and clinical problem before our basis’ 
integration into the Lacanian psychoanalytical. Let us start at the beginning: where 
does it come from? How does is come? How is it made? Such questions return us to 
the body; what is a body undergoing when it gives voice? And if such a voice is, in 
the first instance, in the service of language or aesthetics then what does this mean for 
the body giving voice? It is at this juncture trauma, pain, violence and malady come 
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Exquisite Delicacy and Barbarism 
 
The act of vocalization is the focus here; what voice requires. A number of texts from 
different disciplines are brought in to elaborate the disparate array of bodily processes 
and components co-opted for voice – a corporeal orchestration as delicate as it is 
barbaric. This premise serves to amplify the inhuman nature of voice, to decentre the 
concept of voice from an anthropocentric remit.  
 
Voice has no particular organ of its own. This is one characteristic of voice explored 
by writer, journalist and sociologist Anne Karpf in The Human Voice: A Story of 
Remarkable Talent. She writes how there is no specific organ for voice – ‘it isn’t 
produced by any single organ; rather many different body parts combine into a 
sequence or chain.’ 263 It does not emanate from or reference any specific body part. 
The French otolaryngologist, Alfred A. Tomatis (also referenced by Karpf) writes: 
‘We were given a digestive apparatus and a respiratory apparatus, but no specific 
oral-language apparatus.’ 264 Karpf, spends almost two pages making references to 
how voice is produced by a plethora of parts and processes that have a more crucial 
primary purpose. This passage of the book’s second chapter, ‘How the Voice 
Achieves its Range and Power’, surfs heavily on Tomatis’ research, and his wont of 
positioning voice as a uniquely human quirk of biological utilization against the grain 
of evolutionary and survivalist utility. Karpf quotes Tomatis once more:  
 
‘The ability to cry, to call out, to listen, to willfully make sounds for one’s own 
benefit as one’s own audience and window on life is one of the most extraordinary 
humanizing mechanisms ever observed in the evolution of language.’ 
For the production of the human voice is not just a story of physics, biology, and 
neuroscience, but also a linguistic, phonetic and acoustic event that consists of 
three parts. Beginning by conceptualising a preverbal message, we then encode it 
in grammar and phonetics, only lastly articulating it through the co-ordination of 
muscles that leads to speech. 265 
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The subtext of this passage is language. Both Tomatis and Karpf glide from talking 
about voice to talking about language, meaning, words and communication. The 
implicit argument, the assumed status of voice, is that it is the body subjected to 
language. It is a common sleight of text, a discussion about voice results in a 
discussion of speech.  
In the following section of Karpf’s chapter, the production of voice is afforded greater 
focus. Even in this turn, the acute conception of voice as the sounding of a body 
subjected to voicing language is no less diffused. One symptom of this presupposition 
evident in the text is that, when referencing Tomatis, Karpf sometimes substitutes 
‘voice’ for ‘speech’. Despite these slips, the detailing of what a body undertakes when 
voicing (be it speech or not) are posed impressively by Karpf’s use of Tomatis’s 
research and writings. Following passage details an array of body parts and functions 
co-opted from their primary functions for voice: 
 
The voice is produced, as Tomatis noted, by a system designed biologically not for 
speech but for eating and breathing. Indeed, practically every one of the vocal 
orgains – lungs, trachea, larynx (and vocal folds), pharynx, nose, jaw, and mouth 
(including the soft palette, hard palette, teeth, tongue, and lips) – is an impressive 
multi-tasker, carrying out some other crucial job in the body in addition to 
producing sounds. 
For example, although the larynx is also known as the voice-box, its chief function 
has nothing to do with the voice: it’s to act as a sphincter to prevent anything but 
air entering the lungs. Alexander Graham Bell called the larynx ‘the guardhouse of 
the lungs’. (…) As for the mouth itself, this serves the triple purpose of breathing, 
chewing, and speaking. The tongue in particular, as Aristotle observed, ‘is used 
both for tasting and articulating.’ 266  
  
In relying on Tomatis, Karpf’s text imports an anthropocentric and theological shade. 
Firstly, there is Tomatis’ glaring retrofit of attribution in the term ‘designed’. 
Evolution is not design unless one holds a particular theological position. Secondly, 
and as exemplified by the book’s title (‘The Human Voice: A Story of Remarkable 
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Talent’), these uses of the body, sequestered off for some higher, loftier function, the 
service of voice and/or language, are shaded with a distinct anthropocentricism. Such 
a bold segregation from other animals is not necessarily justified. Many animals use 
their mouths, throats, larynx and lungs for calling when they could just as well be 
eating. 267 Many mammals also employ parts and functions of their bodies, parts used 
for crucial life support, nourishment and breathing, for the service of vocalization. 268 
However, calling and vocalizing alone are not necessarily language – such sounds 
might not be emissions of generalized semiotics with particular and specific 
meanings. Nonetheless, the too quick move, of anthropocentricizing discussions of 
voice, is symptomatic of not only voice’s entanglement with producing speech but 
also its assumed sanctity on the plinth of anthropic accomplishments. Despite the 
book’s title, generally Karpf’s descriptions of vocalization are just that, vocalization – 
not necessarily the human sounding out of language. Additionally, although 
translation is a difficult task, we are not the only animals to vocalize for 
communicative purposes.  
Language-based communication between mammals is a contested issue – do whales 
have a generalized communicative language, an array of semiotic sonic emissions, or 
is it merely communicative sound? Our hesitancy to ascribe language to animals other 
than ourselves and to too readily reduce the communicative methods of other animals 
to mere sound and song exclusive of meaning is registered in the terms ‘whalesong’ 
and ‘birdsong’. Rather than listen to the voice of non-human animals with the awe 
and openness that such a voice might and could be another’s language we domesticate 
a sound of unthinkable possibilities into ‘song’. Don Ihde, the North American 
postphenomenologist and philosopher of science and technology, illustrates this 
tendency well in Listening and Voice: Phenomenolgies of Sound. He writes: 
 
Perception steeped in language poses a problem for us that we may not even 
recognize. For it is a perception that is always too quick to make familiar the most 
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strange and other that we come upon in the world. (…) we give it a name, 
domesticating it into our constant interpretation that centers us in the world. 
I experienced such a novel event when I first heard the recorded sounds of a 
humpback whale. For the first moment the marvelous range and pattern of the 
whale voice presented the unique, never-before-heard. But too soon I began to 
bring this “song” into the familiarity, first of metaphor, then of name. I analogized 
the whale’s voice such that its low notes were “like” those of a bellowing bull, its 
high notes “like” the shrill of a bird, and so on. This had also already been done in 
that the dust cover of the record proclaimed it as “whalesongs.” In so doing the 
strangeness becomes domesticated. (…) 
What does the whale do? Does he sing like a bird, or like the old operatic whale, 
sing of Figaro? Or does he speak the voices of language and communicate with his 
kind? Or all of these? There remains an essential mystery to the voice of the whale, 
a mystery that we have not yet fully entered, but that we might forget if we simply 
allow the whale’s voice to be domesticated as singing. 270 
     
Let’s continue to consider mammalian vocalization on land. In Grooming, Gossip and 
the Evolution of Language Robin Dunbar, the British anthropologist and evolutionary 
psychologist, details examples of apes utilizing generalized vocal sounds to transmit 
information about specific things. 271 He writes, in his ‘First Words’ chapter, about 
the findings of Dorothy Cheney and Robert Seyfarth, whose studies show that the 
vocalizations of vervet monkeys do convey specific meanings to others. Vervet 
monkeys’ ‘calls refer to specific types of predator, and the hearer knows from the 
auditory information alone which type of predator the caller is describing.’ 272 Dunbar 
acknowledges one ‘can already see many hallmarks of human speech in the Old 
World monkeys.’ 273 He illustrates how gelada exhibit the conversational patterns of 
call and response characteristic that human speech also has. 274  
This import of Dunbar’s argument in ‘First Words’ runs both ways. It is not merely 
that many animals might be using basic forms of language (‘In the vervet’s calls we 
have an archetypal proto-language.’ 275) but also that much of our own, supposedly 
unique, human and cultured ways of using language and vocalizing are less to do with 
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highly complex transmissions of information (language) and more to do with 
facilitating social interaction. Group cohesion and emotional bonds are important, and 
as Dunbar points out via citing the trajectory of human relationships, after all words 
are exhausted we revert to the ‘crude hormonal tricks’ of mutual mauling, direct 
stimulation and grooming. 276 Dunbar’s thesis in this step of the book is that language 
served to facilitate older manifestations of relationships, forms that elicit hormonal 
changes (dance, grooming, song etc) more than words ever could do. 
The consistency between Tomatis, Karpf and Dunbar is that vocalization is a highly 
complex orchestration of a series of component corporeal parts. This facet of voice 
stands, be it from a bi-pedal being or not. The purpose of such virtuosic corporeal 
control might be discussed, and the reasons for how and why it came about may be 
argued and contested. So too might the question of if other animals vocalize for the 
purpose of proto-languages or not. But regardless, voice, be it for language or not, by 
humans or not, is a peculiarly skillful endeavor that co-opts myriad body parts and 
various functions.  
The Italian philosopher and feminist thinker, Adriana Cavarero, highlights this aspect 
of vocalization in For More than One Voice: Toward a Philosophy of Vocal 
Expression. She writes ‘lips, mouth, palate, tongue, teeth, (…) larynx, nasal cavities, 
lungs, diaphragm – come together for acoustic purposes.’ 277 Michel Chion, the 
French sound theorist and composer, also notes in The Voice in Cinema, following in 
much the same anthropocentric vein as Tomatis: ‘it paradoxically appears that the 
human body does not have a specific organ for phonation’ 278.    
Dunbar’s breakdown of what vocalizing requires is detailed in a similar vein but he 
adds an additional sensitivity to the exquisite delicacy of vocalization. His emphasis 
on the precarious sequencing of bodily processes and components to produce voice 
highlights the degree to which vocal and/or semiotic sounds rely on fine motor 
control. A finely timed dance of the lips and teeth for consonant articulation working 
																																																								
276 Dunbar, Grooming, Gossip and the Evolution of Language, 148. 
277 Adriana Cavarero, For More Than One Voice: Toward a Philosophy of Vocal Expression, 
Translated by Paul A. Kottman (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2005), 65. 
278 Michel Chion, The Voice in Cinema, Translated by Claudia Gorbman (New York, USA: Columbia  
University Press, 1999), 127. 
	 111	
in unison with regulated breathing is a pre-requisite for producing the desired sound. 
Dunbar writes, referring to speaking (but such observations are applicable to singing): 
 
Speaking requires very fine motor control of the lips, tongue, vocal chords and 
chest, all of which have to be integrated in just the right sequence to produce a 
particular sound. Just try saying the sound a: as in hay – normally produced 
with the corners of the mouth pulled right back so that the lips are narrowly 
parted – but with the lips rounded and pouted as they would be when producing 
the sound oh:. The result is recognizable as an a: sound, but only just; it comes 
out more like a strangled oi: than anything else. In addition to fine motor 
control, speech also requires precise control of breathing so that air is released 
from the lungs in just the right quantity and with just the right amount of force 
(think about the difference between explosive sounds like b or p and softer ones 
like e or c.) 279 
 
Dunbar’s description references a number of crucial processes for vocalizing specific 
sounds but draws special attention to the oral control required to make the sound a. It 
is worth pausing to consider just how delicate an operation vocalization is, just the 
slightest change can de-tune our vocalization and result in erroneous pronunciation or 
delivery. Illness, injury, age, psychological state, emotions can affect the delicate task 
of voice. Karpf writes of how it is not just the mouth, lips and larynx that contribute to 
voice but also most of the torso including the back. 280 She also mentions how 
maladies outside the torso zone can affect voice. 281 Changes to psychological states 
also affect voice. ‘Tongue-twisters’ like ‘She Sells Sea Shells’ test and reveal the 
limits of our vocal dexterity, control and accomplishment. Vocalization is the 
accomplished and fine motor control of the body. It is the ability to breathe, make 
sounds and modulate them into vowels with labial-dentally partitions (consonants) in 
service of communication, language or song: an exquisite but precarious delicacy.  
Tomatis, in recounting a meeting with the Italian opera singer Beniamino Gigli, 
describes how the tenor, famed for his beautiful voice and vocal techniques, re-
learned his vowels. He would stand in front of a mirror, listening to old recording of 
himself and practice the oral shapes and movements, miming along to the sound of his 
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younger self to rediscover the acoustics of the vowels. This activity also alloyed his 
muscle memory and fine motor control with his ear. Tomatis writes: 
 
Having chosen what he considered to be his best recordings, he listened to them 
with headphones while looking in a mirror. He reshaped his vowels by listening. 
(…) He said: “By training in this way, I realized that I had started to open my 
sounds too much; I was off the track. After realizing that, I was happy just to 
make the vowel shapes in front of the mirror without singing. I exercised by 
simulating each aria in this way, in vocal silence, strictly observing the shape 
and size of the vowel.” 282 
 
Breathing, as Dunbar details, must be fine tuned to deliver the right amount of 
exhaled force for the desired sound. There is, however, more to breathing and speech 
than this. Breathing falls in line with the rhythm of words and sentences we utter. 
Breath, arguably the most crucial of all vital activities that support our body, kowtows 
to the arbitrary whims and peculiarities of syntax within whichever language we 
happen to be speaking. The Canadian cognitive psychologist and linguist, Steven 
Pinker, comments on just such a phenomenon: ‘Syntax overrides carbon dioxide: we 
suppress the delicately tuned feedback loop that controls our breathing rate to regulate 
oxygen intake, and instead we time our exhalations to the length of the phrase or 
sentence we intend to utter.’ 283  
Dunbar, in the passage quoted above, doesn’t mention the larynx. It is the larynx that 
sonicizes breath. Upon exhalation, the ‘vocal cords’ within the larynx activate and 
begin to vibrate. When these ‘vocal cords’ being to vibrate they imbue exhaled air 
with sound. This sound then resonates and echoes through the remaining parts of the 
body that fall under the name ‘the vocal tract’. The tongue, palate, teeth, lips, nasal 
cavities all fall under the territory of ‘the vocal tract’ and, through myriad corpo-
acoustic interactions, modulate the sound of the sonicized exhaled air further. The 
single quotation marks used for ‘vocal cords’ denote the tenuous prescription of 
purpose. The primary function of the larynx to is preventing solids from entering the 
lungs. Its ‘chief function has nothing to do with the voice: it’s to act as a sphincter to 
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prevent anything but air entering the lungs.’ 284  The larynx is crucial for the 
prevention of choking; yet we refer to it as our ‘voice box’. Re-purposing 
nomenclature is also evident in the terms ‘vocal-tract’ and ‘vocal-apparatus’. Such 
terms refer to a conglomeration of body parts that have more crucial primary purposes 
that maintain of life. When vocalizing these parts are momentarily co-opted and 
seconded in virtuosic amalgamation.  
It is this nature of voice that plunges questions such as ‘where does voice come 
from?’ into doomed rhetoricism. For voice is irreducible to the body: untraceable to 
any origin. It is a result of many parts and yet reducible to none. Did voice begin as 
the silent air amongst the rafters (the air before inhalation) or is that where it ended up 
fading away in inaudible harmonies and echoes after it has passed through 
momentarily co-opted functions of respiration and nourishment?  
Voice haunts the body and contorts its functions and parts as it goes. Its modality 
bears a striking functional similarity to the demon in William Peter Blatty’s The 
Exorcist (given an almost verbatim cinematic adaptation by William Friedkin). 285 It 
comes from an indiscernible place, a lacuna: an epistemological void. But in the 
moment of announcing itself, via voice, it contorts the body it passes through and 
emanates from, before dispersing into the ether. There may not be the spectacle of 
twisted necks or ‘spiderwalking’ down stairs, but the possession and co-opting of 
breath and body are necessary prerequisites for voice.  
Every part of the body that contributes to voice has a more vital, more important, role 
to do. The lungs ought to take in oxygen and expel the used air with higher levels of 
carbon dioxide but instead they are used for vocalization; we may recall the apoplexy 
of the straining singer as a consequence of this need being neglected. Such strains of 
the body register how much the voice needs vital organs such as the lungs at the 
expense of breathing. Simon Frith, in Performing Rites: On the Value of Popular 
Music, approaches voice under four headings: ‘as a musical instrument; as a body; as 
a person and as a character.’ 286 In terms of approaching voice as a body Frith 
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describes the ‘sheer physical pleasure of singing […] through the exploration of 
physical sensations and muscular powers’. 287 After acknowledging that hovering over 
his approaches to voice is ‘the question (Barthes’s question) of music and sexuality: 
what makes a voice sexy?’ he moves to describe Crash Test Dummies’s hit “Mmm 
Mmm Mmm Mmm” and writes: ‘no one doubted that a major reason for its success 
was the novelty of Brad Roberts’ bass voice, his swollen vowels, the noise rumbling 
back down his throat.’ 288 Frith’s descriptions of Roberts’s skillful use of voice as 
bodily musical instrument are curious; as well as musical pleasure do they not also 
evoke a scene of asphyxiation? 289 
The teeth, tongue and palate, are important for nourishment; in speech they are 
requisitioned for the sonic acrobatics of sounding consonants and modulating vowels. 
Is it hyperbole to exclaim that ‘all this talking is killing me!’? Voice is a harmony of 
vital organs violently employed for an alien purpose. Contra the common cultural 
framing, voice is the sound of the body being used for something other than functions 
that maintain life: the automallum of expression. 
Let’s consider an evolutionary facet of voice. Dunbar, in the ‘First Words’ chapter, 
outlines some evolutionary facets of the gestural theory of language. In particular he 
examines the conditions for and evolutions of the left side of the brain (the part 
responsible for language and conceptualization) to become utilized for speech. 
Dunbar writes of how monkeys, likes dogs, have scapula and chests that are better 
suited to walking on all fours. Apes, however, have scapula that allow the arms to be 
raised above the head – allowing for vertical climbing and breathing independent 
from arm movement. Dunbar notes that ‘in addition to preparing the way for the 
evolution of bipedal walking in our ancestors (…) [this] also freed the breathing 
apparatus from the constrictions suffered by monkeys.’ 290 The constrictions he talks 
of are that of many quadrupeds: when the body weight is over the arms and the 
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scapula are on the side of the ribcage the chests ability to constrict and expand is 
constricted: ‘as a result monkeys can breathe once, and once only, with each stride.’ 
291 
But derestricting the lungs, and increased shoulder mobility (as well as better balance 
for bipedalism) was not the only gain from the evolution of scapulae positioning. 292 
The arms were freed to practice aimed throwing. He writes that aimed ‘throwing is 
clearly important for hunting, so one obvious conclusion is that language evolved on 
the back of throwing. The fine motor control needed for aimed throwing (…) 
provided us with the neural machinery for fine motor control of the organs of speech.’ 
293 Dunbar’s evidencing of this theorem turns to handedness. The majority of human 
animals throw right-handed. Because sensory and motor-control nerves switch sides 
from brain to body it follows that motor control for the right side of the body are 
centered in the left cerebral hemisphere (the side concerned with language and 
conceptualization). 
Eva Maria Eberl, writing in Mammalian Vocalization: An Integrative Neuroscience 
Approach (Handbook of Behavioral Neuroscience), explores the neurobiological 
aspects of gesture and vocalization in primates. Section II.B in ‘Control of gestures 
and vocalizations in primates’ lists evidence that it might not just be the majority of 
human animals, who are right-handed but apes too. Eberl writes: ‘Cortical control of 
gestures in great apes shows human-like asymmetric hemispheric specialization. 
Several studies have reported population-level right-handedness for gorillas and 
chimpanzees.’ 294 Chimpanzees tend to be more proficient with “precision grip’ tasks 
(using the thumb and index-finger) with the right hand. 295 Some studies have findings 
that point to a possible correlation between handedness and bipedalism: ‘Hopkins 
(1993) observed chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and orang-utans (Pongo pygmaerus) 
displaying right-hand preference only when in the bipedal position, but not in the 
quadrupedal position.’ 296 Eberl notes that there is a potential connection between 
handedness and bipedalism before exploring this correlation in terms of 
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communication. The import here is that not only does the move from quadrupedalsim 
free up the lungs for vocalization. It also frees the arms, the tools of gesture, that are 
now free, in evolutionary terms, to specialize in fine-control motor-activity: the type 
needed for complex vocalizations. Eberl writes: 
 
Regarding communication, gorillas and chimpanzees preferentially use the right 
hand for intentional and referential gestures (Shafer, 1993, 1997). In gorillas, a 
left hemispheric bias for motor control during communicative actions has been 
suggested. In a pilot study, gorillas showed a bias toward using the right hand 
synchronous with mouth movements (Forrester, 2008). Hopkins and Cantero 
(2003) observed an increase in right-hand use in chimpanzees when gestures 
were accompanied by vocalization. This finding suggests that communicative 
gestures and vocalizations are both lateralized in the left hemisphere, and linked 
at some level. 297   
 
Two comments are worth consideration at this juncture. Firstly Dunbar’s illustration 
of the connections between gesture and speech are in the service of detailing the 
gesture theory’s shortcomings. Dunbar’s chapter builds to propose that language 
emerged out of necessity for organizing social bonding activities such as grooming, 
dance and song – he is not proposing language emerged solely from hunting. 
Secondly, however, it should be noted that a great deal of Eberl’s research about the 
connections between gesture and vocalization (for the purpose of communication) are 
from studies conducted after the publication of Dunbar’s Grooming, Gossip and the 
Evolution of Language. Noting the chronology of the texts deployed is as far as is 
needed for the question of voice at hand, any further comment on the differing 
positions in the fields of evolutionary psychology and seams of cognitive science that 
focus on language development would be as presumptuous as it would superfluous. 
Let’s return to familiar ground: Dolar’s retelling of the joke about Italian soldiers, 
particularly the instance of the commander shouting ‘Soldiers, Attack!’ 298 Such a 
moment is, perhaps coincidentally, a concise exemplification of the intrinsic violence 
in the body subjected to language. However, the violence here is not the violence of 
war, not of commanding young men to brutalize other young men (and others), but of 
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the speaker. The call for violence is, in itself, in a corporeal microcosm, a call of 
violence. This is the immediate physical level of vocalizing as violence. On a much 
grander level, in terms of evolutionary biology and phylogenetics, the words 
‘Soldiers, Attack!’ can be heard as a voiced zenith of violence in human animals. 
Might such orders of voice be understood as the evolutionary vocal extension of 
aimed throwing?  
The placing of the vocal projectile within the continuum of human violence and 
warfare sits well in a number of histories. This proposal does not need to venture 
outside of its discipline to find compatible accounts. One such account is the human 
history of warfare delineated by the German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk in Terror 
From the Air. 299 What begins as handed organism-to-handed organism combat, once 
the arms are free, then extends to the fine motor control of throwing. 300 The 
organised phalanx, whereby all soldiers operate a spear with their right arm and shield 
with their left is the military correlate of writing with a pen or articulating speech: a 
corporeally asymmetric, aggressive, aimed, projected and finely controlled motor-
neurological organization. The left-hemisphere of the brain required for speech stands 
in contradistinction to voice more generally. Stroke patients whose cerebral 
hemisphere is affected can often laugh but not speak. 301 Speech and complex 
vocalization can be couched in the continuum of the human animals’ arms and 
ballistics based conflict with themselves and other animals. Complex vocalization is 
the immaterial extension of such an evolutionary development; it is a violent 
projectile. It shares much in common with the spear or sword, just as much as any 
pen. 302  
However, there is no classic heroic triumph in this violent modality of voice, it cares 
not for its vessel. Voice is an aggressive projectile that brutalizes the body from which 
it is expelled – the modality of expulsion muddies resonance with the spear, sword or 
pen: contra the traditional phallic figuring, voice masters those who wield it. 
																																																								
299 Peter Sloterdijk, Terror from the Air (Semiotext(e) Foreign Agents Series), Trans. Amy  
Patton and Steve Corcoran (Cambridge, Mass and London: MIT Press, 2009), 13-15. 
300 Dunbar, Grooming, Gossip and the Evolution of Language, 137. Dunbar comments that battle scars 
on fossilized trilobites from 250 million years ago and dolphin skeletons of 20 million years ago 
exhibited asymmetric attack marks. 
301	Sophie Scott, “The Science of Laughter” BBC Health, September 11, 2016 accessed 17 April  
2017, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-37311320 
302 ‘The pen is mightier than the sword’ – Edward Bulwer-Lytton. 
	 118	
Irreducible on a physical level, of no fixed origin or form: we have no vocal 
apparatus. 303  It interrupts, disrupts – terminates – the autonomic protocols of primary 
functions that support life. 304 There is no agency. One’s micro-asphyxiation in the 
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Spinal trauma and throats torn with the talk sickness 
 
This section continues an anti-anthropocenticist narrative of voice in two ways. Each 
of these operates on a different level to the previous section. Here, we move from 
considerations of vocalization to the histories of such an act. The foci here are the 
evolution and developmental scenes of anthropic voice. Firstly as an anomaly of 
bipedalism, an evolutionary malady, a phylogenetic glitch that does not aid survival. 
Here voice is stripped of agency or anthropological distinction and wrought as 
catastrophe, a trauma. Secondly, voice is framed in developmental terms. Each aspect 
concerns the descent of the larynx. The former is an evolutionary descent whereas the 
latter is a developmental descent that occurs in all humans after birth. In each case, 
there is a brutalization of the body – the evolutions and developments that allow 
complex vocalization do so at cost. The rendering of voice qua violent imposition is 
extended here beyond the physical (as established previously) to evoluationary and 
developmental registers. These two registers of the violence of voice are then 
amalgamated into Lacan’s phraseology of the symbolic qua torture house.   
 
 
In an interview Daniel Charles Barker, Professor of Anorganic Semiotics at Kingsport 
College (MVU Mass), gave to a member of the Cybernetic Culture Research Unit in 
1998 he frames bipedalism and the resultant laryngeal droop as a persisting injurious 
trauma of evolution. During the ‘Spinal-Catastrophism’ section of the dialogue 
Barker, so the transcript reads, said: ‘For humans there is a particular crisis of bipedal 
erect posture. I was increasingly aware that all my real problems were modalities of 
back-pain, orphylogenetic spinal injury.’ 305 With specificity to human verbalization 
as resultant of bi-pedalism Barker summarized the confluence of factor’s that 
contribute to upright speech as Palate-Tectonics. Barker, in the interview, described, 
with a precision and vividness redolent of J.G. Ballard’s early prose, how the 
contemporary anthropic vocal apparatus is: ‘a crash-site, in which thoracic impulses 
collide with the roof of the mouth. The bipedal head becomes a virtual speech-
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impediment, a sub-cranial pneumatic pile-up, discharged as linguo-gestural 
development and cephalization take-off.’ 306  
Barker’s render of the physical site of speech and vocalization as a site of trauma, an 
evolutionary impediment, an injury, a thoracic-cranial head-smash, might be read as a 
re-articulation of a sentiment William Burroughs, the North American Beat poet, 
visual artist and science fiction author expressed circa 1961. In the first novel of The 
Nova Trilogy, The Soft Machine, Burroughs refers to the symptoms of the crash site 
as a talk sickness: ‘sick apes spitting blood bubbling throats torn with the talk 
sickness. (…) we waded into the warm mud-water. hair and ape flesh off in screaming 
strips. (…) when we came out of the mud we had names.’ 307 Most immediately the 
line draws the parallels of speech, talking and language with sickness (pre-echoing 
Burrough’s famous sentiment from the second book in the trilogy, The Ticket That 
Exploded, that language is a virus). More significantly the gory scene of bloodied and 
hurt apes with ruptured throats is alloyed to language acquisition. Additionally, the 
image of wading through – and out of – warm mud evokes the classic gendered series 
of silhouettes that cartoon the evolution of human animal’s ascent to bi-pedal posture. 
Both Barker and Burroughs stress the traumatic and violent history of the emergence 
of voice and speech ‘acquisition’, couching it in a horror thematic of corporeal injury, 
a phylogenetic malady or curse. Voice, speech, names and signifiers are re-mixed and 
auditioned as the viral proliferation of the trauma of evolutionary happenstance. The 
human animal’s claim to distinction is a disfigurement, a skull and throat contusion 
wrought by gravity. Human voice is the sound of a mammal’s laryngeal 
maladaptation. Speech and complex vocalization are outcomes of the evolutionary 
glitch: the larynx drooping as a result of verticality, a quirk of phylogenetic 
development.  
Whilst drenched in a gore-horror tapestry, the Barker and Burroughs texts delineate 
the same narrative of voice as rigorous studies of drier tone. The American 
evolutionary biologist and cognitive scientist William Tecumseh Fitch, writes of a 
number of differences between the adult human larynx and that of other mammals. 
His work touches on the developmental shift the laryngeal position is subject to in 
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humans. Fitch’s text underscores how the larynx has, speaking in phylogenetic terms, 
undergone a strange slip in human animals. He writes: 
 
(A)natomical studies comparing the vocal tract morphology of humans with 
non-human mammals suggest that the human vocal tract is fundamentally 
different from that of all other mammals. In particular, the resting location of 
the standard mammal larynx is high in the throat, and typically engaged in the 
nasopharynx, allowing animals to swallow fluids and breathe simultaneously. 
This position, and ability, also typifies human newborns. In contrast, the resting 
position of the larynx in adult humans is much lower in the throat. While this 
makes it impossible for us to engage the larynx in the nasopharynx, and thus to 
breathe and swallow simultaneously, it does appear to make possible a wider 
variety of vocal tract shapes, and thus speech patterns, than would otherwise be 
unattainable.  In particular, the “descent of the larynx" that occurs in human 
ontogeny, gives adults a vocal tract with a horizontal oral tube and a vertical 
pharyngeal one. This two-tube vocal tract allows the production of quantal 
vowels such as /i/, /a/ and /u/, that feature in the vowel systems of most human 
languages 308   
 
Evolutionarily, phylogenetically and ontogenetically adult humans stand apart from 
all other mammals. By contrast to other primates humans have greater vocalization 
abilities. The human’s dropped larynx, allowing an extended vocal tract, enables more 
vowels and more ways to modulate and contort sounds than other mammals. Vocal-
tract length is, by relative mammalian comparisons, long in humans. Whilst this 
grants the ability, paired with fine motor control, to produce a plethora of complex 
vocalizations it also brings another difference: a choke-risk. 
In comparison to other mammals humans have a much higher risk of choking. This is 
because the human pharynx is relatively long and our larynx is, comparatively, slung 
low in the neck. Humans have a ‘dropped’ laryngeal set up. Other mammals, whose 
‘vocal-tract’ is relatively much shorter, do not exist under the same choke hazard as 
humans.  
Karpf underscores this difference with conversational concision. She writes: ‘Apes, 
dogs, and monkeys, on the other hand, have mouths and tongues that allow them to 
swallow food without the risk of blocking their larynx, and eat and drink while they 
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breathe.’ 309 The caveat of ability for complex vocalizations is constant jeopardy, of 
which Karpf quips: ‘this is the trade off: talking makes us breathe and eat less 
efficiently, and splutter when drunk. Though we can speak, we can also easily choke 
on our food. Apes do neither, which is why they don’t need to learn the Heimlich 
manoeuver.’ 310  
The adult human larynx lies in a position so low that choking is possible and a 
significant lethal risk. It is, according to the North American National Safety Council, 
the forth-leading cause of unintentional injury death. 311 According to the British 
Office of National Statistics, there were 219, 185 and 220 deaths from obstruction of 
the respiratory tract in the years 2014, 2015 and 2016 respectively. 312 The adult 
human larynx in particular rests in a lethal position, but one that affords the finely 
control and modulation of vocalization to serve complex articulation of speech. 
Utterance is bittersweet, it has a tragic undertone: the cost of human speech is a 
lurking and malignant peril.  
The human larynx did not drop as an evolutionary ‘response’ to the survivalist 
applications of clearer or more complex vocal communications. It is a biological 
glitch resulting from ascent to pi-pedal verticality. Fitch notes: ‘As early humans 
gradually adopted an erect posture, it gradually brought the position of their head 
back and up so that it tipped back at the base of the skull, thus causing the neck to 
emerge and the larynx to descend.’ 313 Our ancestors lunged and teetered around for 
some time with the choke-threat before waxing eloquently over supper. The cause of 
the laryngeal descent was not ‘adaptive’ evolution; more a co-incidental corporeal re-
organization resultant from bi-pedal verticality. Contrary to any supposition of fate, 
anthropological superiority, evolutionary accomplishment of ‘design’, human voice is 
an abnormality. Such a prospect at once de-centers the animal from its narcissism and 
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disavows the classic modality of its assumed uniqueness and difference over other 
organisms.  
Healthy newborns cry at once. Clearing of fluid from the airways is necessary 
physical reflex for the first breath to be taken. Akin to a hiccup, sneeze or cough there 
is no intentional affect in this first cry; it is a physical process that happens to make a 
sound. The human animal’s initial emission of sound after birth is instinctive and 
reflexive. However, it is not strictly the first time the organism has produced sound. 
Sound making predates birth. Producing sound, like hearing, resides in the acousmatic 
intra-uterine stage. Karpf, in her exhaustively researched book, lists a number of 
instances for noisy foeti. She writes, imposing a sense of self-development: ‘human 
foetus may be practicing the use of its voice already in utero.’ 314 In detailing the 
phenomena, vagitus uterinus, she cites an example from 1923 whereby a physician 
eavesdropped, listening through the mother’s stomach wall, on a foetus’ sounds. She 
describes how ‘George Ryder, heard the sound of a baby crying after he had applied 
traction with forceps. Listening via stethoscope, his assistant and nurses said the 
sounds were ‘high and squealing, much like the sound of a kitten.’ 315  
Subsequent infant cries yield nourishment, comfort and care. Infant cries do not 
change for hunger or pain; initially the cry ‘signals’ distress only. Many things may 
cause distress but the causes of distress do not illicit different types of cry. The 
simplicity of the infant’s distress cry does not detract from its crucial validity with 
regard to the genesis of cultivating a voice. Crucially, at each cry of distress an 
interaction (one hopes) follows. Karpf, makes the persuasive argument that by the 
connection of a sonic reflexive reaction to distress yielding care a a germ 
communicative voice is inaugurated. Karpf’s argument rests on the development of 
vocalization, from a prolonged vocal reflex to stress to an intermittent vocal emission. 
She proposes that newborn’s ‘cries are desperate because they haven’t yet realized 
that they’ll produce a response.’ 316 Around six to eight weeks later vocalization 
changes a prolonged cry to an intermittent, cry-pause-cry, pattern. It is a vocalization 
pattern that, Karpf argues, affords a space to listen. She writes that six to eight week 
old infants ‘go quiet after a bout of crying, to listen for their parent’s footsteps. If they 
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don’t hear them, they then resume crying. The cry is no longer simply a reflex – now 
it’s begun to be one side of a conversation.’ 317 Karpf’s claim is that there is a 
development from a sounding physical reflex to distress to an intentioned 
vocalization. This shift is summarized as a move to voice characterized by leaving 
space for hearing the care provider, entering into ‘dialogue’ that necessitates pauses in 
vocalization; taking turns: ‘Within a couple of months of being born, babies leave a 
space for a response to their cry: they’ve learned the art of turn taking.’ 318  
Following Karpf’s line, in the transition from reflexive cries of distress to signaling 
distress cries embedded within a turn taking matrix, an important shift happens. The 
new cry has an expectation, indeed it is a minimal mode of call, not merely a sonic 
emission of the body; but a cry for: a vocalization for. The minimal structures of 
verbal communication emerge as the infant human is distanced from the breast; 
quarantined off from pleasure and constrained in the perilous house of language. The 
physical violence of voice stalks the human in developmental stages. It emerges as the 
pleasures of infancy recede.  
The pause, the wait, the supposed listening that floods the silences in the 
intermissions of the infant’s cries shares a number of traits with the object a voice. It 
is emergent from a minimal ingress into language which presupposes a – one hopes 
benevolent – other. It is silent, stuck in the throat. It is alloyed to the body of the 
organism undergoing physical distress.  
Consider subsequent laryngeal development in the human infant. The position and 
functional capacity of infant larynx are different to adult larynx. The former cannot 
choke during ingestion, yet some words are impossible to articulate and sound – the 
infant is biologically suited to the comforts of nourishment and care. Adult humans, 
however, can choke, cannot simultaneously breath and ingest, yet can accomplish a 
complete articulation of the semiotic noises of their language. Infants larynxes allow 
simultaneous breathing and swallowing but cannot produce a full range of sounds. 
Fitch touches on this aspect of human’s difference to other species when he writes: 
‘the resting location of the standard mammal larynx is high in the throat, and typically 
engaged in the nasopharynx, allowing animals to swallow fluids and breathe 
																																																								
317 Ibid., 99. 
318 Ibid., 99. 
	 125	
simultaneously. This position, and ability, also typifies human newborns.’ 319 Karpf, 
highlights that it is precisely this development of the laryngeal position that allows 
highly articulate vocal expressions. She writes that a ‘child’s growing mastery of the 
sounds of speech is partly the result of the gradual descent of its larynx and the root of 
its tongue during the first two to six years of its life’. 320 
Young children often have difficulty articulating certain words. Their tongue is 
clumsy and not under their full control. Anecdotally, ‘yellow’ can be a frustrating 
single word tongue twister; it may be pronounced as ‘lellulow’ or ‘yayolo’. The 
infant’s tongue and larynx are still descending into positions that would afford the 
tongue the space for the dexterity required to master the full phonetic range of their 
native language.  
At crawling stage human infants cannot vocalize with the same complexity as adults, 
but by the time they are teetering around, venturing and gaining distance from the 
source of care, their larynxes are dropping and the burden of language looms: a 
sadistic semiotic encumbrance begins to shadow their corpus. The laryngeal 
development necessary for complex vocalizations human traces the small body’s 
estrangement from the breast and its increasingly bi-pedal mobility. In addition to the 
previously details co-opting of organs and functions in the service of complex voice, 
the necessary biological preliminaries for vocal language have an inverse relationship 
to the proximity to pleasure and sustenance. 
Development of the larynx in infants is a physical microcosm of the evolutionary 
descent of the larynx. Laryngeal shift in evolutionary terms tracks the ascent to bi-
pedalism in infant development from crawling to walking upright. As the individual 
acquires, or is acquired by, as they master, or is mastered by, language it re-postures 
from a supine state, to quadrupedal movement to vertical bi-pedalism and the 
jeopardy of foreign objects obstructing our respiratory tract looms. As the human type 
emerged as an upright mammal, as it waded out the mud, a choke risk and language 
(names) burdened it.  
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The array of developmental and evolutionary findings and hypotheses presented in 
this section synchronize with Lacan’s characterizations of language as a ‘torture 
house’. Entrance into the symbolic, the birth of the subject in both developmental and 
evolutionary terms, may be figured as attendant to the human’s ascent to verticality 
with a concomitant lowered laryngeal formation affording verbal dexterity and 
possible suffocation. This demonstrates that an appraisal of the body is not 
incompatible with elucidating a Lacan’s object a voice. Secondly, such a welding 
continues to underscore the alterity of voice. Thirdly, the synthesis displays the 
continued relevance of Lacan’s thought in light of empirical findings in other 
disciplines (a take lacking the Slovenian school’s approach). A turn to the body, can 
be a key tool for illuminating Lacan’s concepts. 
Lacan, during the third year of his seminars made a claim that has been taken up 
numerous times. The text at the front of The Psychoses: The Seminar of Jacques 
Lacan Book III 1955-1956, states that he gave ‘a concise definition of psychoanalysis: 
‘Psychoanalysis should be the science of language inhabited by the subject. From a 
Freudian point of view man is the subject captured and tortured by language.’’ 321 
Some elaborations on this line from Žižek and the Italian philosopher Lorenzo 
Magnani will be considered shortly. Firstly, the context of this line deserves from a 
cursory note.  
The seminar was given, at the Société Française de Psychanalyse, on the centenary of 
Freud’s birthday, May 16th 1856, some seventeen years after his death in London at 
the outbreak of the War. The talk was titled: An Address: Freud in the Century. The 
presentation is a grand survey of Freud’s work. The nuances of Lacan’s take cannot 
all be accommodated here, but a few particular lines evoke heavily the notion of the 
tortured organism, the human animal subjected to a rational language that cares not 
for its pleasure or comfort, in Freud’s work. Lacan said, summarizing the Father’s 
underlying questions within his oeuvre, that what concerns Freudian anthropology is 
‘what possesses man and makes him, not the support of the irrational – Freudianism 
isn’t a form of irrationalism, on the contrary – but the support of a form of reason of 
which he is more victim than master and by which he is condemned to advance.’ 322 
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Various thematic prerequisites of torture pepper this line: prerequisites of possession, 
ensnarement, constraint, victimization, and subjection. In the following turn Lacan 
declares that this is the ‘red thread that passes through all of Freud’s work.’ 323 He 
then elaborates the overriding question of Freud’s work, declaring that he ‘only ever 
asked himself one question’ which is: ‘how can this literal logos take hold of an 
animal who doesn’t need it and doesn’t care about it – since it doesn’t concern his 
needs?’ 324 Lacan, then moving to ask what Freud’s philosophy was, returns the line 
quoted above that concludes that man is ‘the subject captured and tortured by 
language.’ 
Such a verdict is supported in two ways. Firstly, by way of providing a different tone 
of translation of Freud’s from a note the original German 1938 preface to Moses and 
Monotheism and secondly by uncovering a buried musical refrain in the Latin version 
of Oedipus at Colonus, dated 1388. The first strategy may be influenced by the figure 
of Heidegger who had visited Lacan’s home at Guitrancourt the previous year. 
Heidegger’s return to teaching after the war was famed for its commentaries (over and 
above the French reception of his problematic and sympathetically glossed 
philosophies). 325 During the preceeding year the two had spent time together and 
Lacan, in Autumn of 1955 began work on a translation of ‘Logos’ (indeed, although 
not in this particular seminar, his work is addressed and articulated a number of times 
in the seminars from this period). It was in this text that, Roudinsco writes, Heidegger 
maintained ‘that the German language, being superior to all others, was the only one 
capable of rediscovering the original truth of the Greek tongue and thus providing the 
human race with a doctrine of salvation through which it could transform the world.’ 
326 Given his personal circumstances this raises an emboldened question mark over 
his political sympathies. 
The note of Freud’s that Lacan re-translates focuses on a response to Bernard Shaw’s 
line that ‘that man would be capable of achieving something only if he could live to be 
																																																								
323 Ibid., 242. 
324 Ibid., 242. 
325 See Roudinesco’s comment about Jean Beaufret’s blinkered adoration in ‘Tribute to Martin 
Heidegger’ chapter of Jacques Lacan, Trans. Barbara Bray (New York, USA: Colombia University 
Press, 1997), 221-226 specifically. 
326 Roudinseco, Jacques Lacan, 226-227. 
	 128	
three hundred years old’. 327 Lacan, continuing to provide the translation he contests 
states ‘I do not believe this prolongation of life would have any advantages unless, as 
the translation goes, the conditions of the future were totally transformed. 328 Lacan, 
then provides his own: ‘In German, this has quite a different sense – many other 
things would have to be profoundly altered, at the base, at the root, in the 
determinations of life.’ 329 Lacan suggests that this note, written in 1938 (one cannot 
today, thankfully, quite imagine the dire circumstances of the author – persecuted on a 
political and cellular level) echoes a line of the chorus that accompanies Oedipus on 
approach to the wood of Colonus. Lacan says:  
 
I’m astonished that nobody – except for someone who rendered this into Latin 
reasonably well – has ever managed to translate properly the mê phunai that the 
chorus then utters. It’s reduced to the value of a verse that says it’s better not to 
have been born, whereas the sense is absolutely clear – the only way to 
overcome all this business of logos, the only way to be rid of it all, would be not 
to have been born like this. This is the very sense accompanying the gesture of 
the old Freud, when he rejected with his hand any wish that his life be 
prolonged. 330  
  
Lacan’s exhibition of linguistic prowess, the shades and leanings of translations, as 
well as the biographical context of all three thinkers mentioned cannot, sadly, be 
afforded any further accommodation in this thesis’ present format. There are however, 
a number of imports from this passage of Lacan’s that bear on the argument – that 
voice is violence upon the organism’s body – at hand. Žižek’s take up of Lacan’s line 
‘the torture house of language’ is useful here. Žižek drives at impressing Lacan’s 
departure from Heidegger. 331 One of the many texts, the ‘writings’ of Žižek’s this 
sentiment is present in, is titled ‘Why Lacan is not a Heideggerian’. In the essay 
‘Language, Violence and Non-Violence’ (and elsewhere) he writes, rearticulating 
Lacan’s remarks that the entire psychopathology ‘deployed by Freud, from 
conversion-symptoms inscribed into the body up to total psychotic breakdowns, are 
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scars of this permanent torture, so many signs of an original and irremediable gap 
between subject and language, so many signs that man cannot ever be at home in his 
own home.’ 332 Žižek’s commentary of difference is to claim it is precisely the ‘dark 
torturing other side of our dwelling in language’ that Heidegger ignores. 333  
The pertinent point of Lacan’s interpretation of Freud’s nihilistic comment is 
precisely his departure from Heidegger. His torturous, distinctly corporeal thematic 
tone, is the addition that Lacan, in his take up of Freud’s remarks (that follow the 
vector of turning back to the body – as this thesis insists), couches language as a 
violence the subject is, (un)well, subjected to. Text from Žižek’s voluminous Less 
Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism states that this is a 
persistent addition Lacan adds over the German’s motif of language qua house of 
being:  
 
Throughout his work, Lacan varies Heidegger’s motif of language as the house 
of being: language is not man’s creation and instrument, it is man who ‘dwells’ 
in language: ‘Psychoanalysis should be the science of language inhabited by the 
subject’ Lacan’s ‘paranoid’ twist, his additional Freudian turn of the screw, 
comes with his characterization of this house as a torture-house: ‘In the light of 
the Freudian experience, man is a subject caught in and tortured by language’ 
334  
 
Žižek, in the above passages, is not strictly writing about a form of physical suffering 
and torture, but the passages are laced with violence. Language is spoken of qua 
violence upon the organism. In a further text of Žižek’s, where most of the above 
lines precede, a distinctly corporeal consequence of the torture house is described. 
The following text is lifted from the preface, titled ‘Why Lacan is not a Heideggerian’ 
in the new edition of The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology. 
 
																																																								
332 Žižek, “Language, Violence and Non-Violence”, 4. Also see Žižek, Trouble in Paradise: From the 
End of History to the End of Capitalism (London, UK: Allen Lane, 2014), 171-172 and ‘Preface to the 
New Edition: Why Lacan is not a Heideggerian’ in The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political 
Ontology (London, UK: Verso, 2008) vii-xxi. 
333 Ibid., 4. 
334 Slavoj Žižek, Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism (London, UK: 
Verso, 2012), 870. 
	 130	
 Thus when Lacan implies that Heidegger misses a crucial dimension of 
subjectivity, his point is not a silly humanist argument to the effect that 
Heidegger overly ‘passivises’ man, turning him into an instrument of the 
revelation of Being, and thus ignoring human creativity. Lacan’s point, rather, is 
that Heidegger misses the properly traumatic impact of the very ‘passivity’ of 
being caught in language, the tension between the human animal and language: 
there is a ‘subject’ because the human animal does not ‘fit’ language; the 
Lacanian ‘subject’ is the tortured, mutilated, subject. 335 
 
This physical torture of the human animal trapped in language is then extrapolated on 
to body as a scene of violence, damage and mutilation. Following the last line, Žižek 
claims ‘This is how Lacan locates rituals of initiation that require the violent cutting 
and mutilation of the body’ and evidences the comment with Lacan’s from words 
from 1959. 
 
“The rituals of initiation assume the form of the changing of form of these 
desires, of conferring on them in this way a function through which the 
subject’s being identifies itself or announces itself as such, through which the 
subject, if one can put it this way, fully becomes a man, but also a woman. The 
mutilation serves here to orientate desire, enabling it to assume precisely this 
function of index, of something which is realised and which can only articulate 
itself, express itself, in a symbolic beyond, a beyond which is the one we today 
call being, a realisation of being in the subject.” 
—Jacques Lacan, Le désir et son interprétation, 20th May 1959. 336 
 
It is this second line that strikes pertinence with the proposition of there being an 
intrinsic corporeal horror in the relation of voice and body. Returning to the infant’s 
pause, the reflex of distress muted to accommodate a listening of the other, is this not 
a mutilation of the body’s reflex in service of the symbolic? What orientation does 
this obliteration of the cry of, to be replaced with a cry for, for an invocation, serve? 
In this sense might we regard the voice of the infant, the voice vivisected with 
anxious bouts of listening, as voice after the signification complex proper – that is to 
say, a voice after language, that emerges resultant but nonetheless irreducible to the 
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signifying operation? Additionally, the silence that intermittently cloaks the cry – is 
this not the terrible deafening silence of object a voice, a voice of the other, that the 
organism’s early phenomenological and ontological development unfolds in relation 
to? 
Such an application of Lacan’s thought and Žižek ‘s commentary is immediate and 
local in its interpretation of significance for the body. The take rests on the vocabulary 
employed by each that evoke the corporeal horror of torture and mutilation. This 
immediate and local take up finds resonance in a passage from Italian philosopher 
Lorenzo Magnani. This particular section is a direct commentary on both Lacan and 
Žižek’s description of language. Notably, language as a torture and mutilation the 
subject is ensnared within – ‘Lacan’s paranoid twist’ – is emphasized in particularly 
physical terms. In Understanding Violence: The Intertwining of Moral and Religious 
Violence: A Philosophical Stance he writes, quoting the same lines of text from Žižek 
and Lacan consecutively:  
 
[A]cknowledging Lacan’s ideas, Žižek tells us that it is man that ‘dwells’ in 
language in a sort of constitutive passivity, and not language that dwells in 
humans: ‘man is a subject caught and tortured in language’, language is the ‘big 
Other’, and, again, human animal does not ‘fit’ language: […] 
An eloquent explanation of this kind of violent effect of language, which 
constitutively affects the individual psyche, is illustrated by the case of 
mutilations, where parts and/or aspects of the real body suffer – so to say – from 
the ‘signifier’ effected by the language activity. The semiotic pressure 
established by language constrains the body […]. 337 
 
In Magnani’s implementation of Žižek’s writing on Lacan’s ‘torture house of 
language’, the ‘paranoid twist’ that departs from Heidegger, the physical constraint, 
suffering – the brutalizing facet of language – is drawn out. The real body suffers as 
emersion in the symbolic constrains and binds the body. Recall the imposition of 
speech on rhythms of autonomic respiration – the constraints of language imposed on 
breathing are a low-level asphyxiation: semiotic strangulation. On this level, the 
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coming of voice as concomitant with entrance into the symbolic, imposes suffering on 
the body. 
On a wider level, the developmental and evolutionary trajectory of the corporeal 
formulation (the ascent to bi-pedalism) necessary for complex vocalization can be 
framed as the human animal’s mutilation in the torture house of language. The 
gendered series of silhouettes that depict the ascent of man in evolutionary terms (but 
which also reflect developmental progress) is the scene of a gradual accommodation 
in the torture house of language. The human animal’s voice rests as an outcome of 
entrance into the symbolic. Emerging voice and standing up right lie in a continuum 


























This chapter extends the conceptualization of voice, the object a voice of alterity and 
corporeal trauma – vox-exo – and argues it to be a locus of transformation. A change 
wrought from within and without the subject. Rather than pursuing a Freudian 
presupposition of voice – to be a barometer of changes within the subject in as far as 
it delivers verbal language – timbre, tone, texture, volume and acoustics shall be 
listened to over and above the words such characteristics may articulate. This 
stethoscopic logic seeks to listen to lacunae – listen for transformations, mutations, 
variations, and shifts from or to states the listener (or indeed the voicer) may not 
know. 338 A series of diegetic examples from genre horror will be examined. Each 
concerns a moment of horror, often at the affective zenith of the narrative. In each 
case the stability of the human subject is put in a crucible of crisis, made precarious 
by an inhuman voice.  
To commence this thread a brief survey of how psycho-physiological changes 
modulate voice deserves representation. Although an exhaustive survey of how the 
gamut of psycho-physiological changes affects the corpus, and in turn voice, is 
beyond scope of the thesis’ present format, consideration of a few examples is 
warranted. These considerations further underscore the notion of voice as an exquisite 
delicacy elaborated in the previous chapter, ‘Violence’. Secondly, in approaching how 
delicate voice is altered (othered) as a result of psychological and physical dynamics 
an appreciation of voice as a ‘canary in the coalmine’, a voice that announces 
transformation, is established. Voice shall be framed as a horrorific harbinger of 
corporeal change. 
Although the examples that follow do not concern typical illnesses of the body or 
mind, the positioning of voice as a ‘tell’ of some unseen transformation will be 
explored. For example, immanent lyncanthropic transformation in Michael Jackson’s 
1982 music video Thriller is presented as a moment where voice announces a coming 
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horror. Specifically this is a horror of epistemological deficit. The turn to genre horror 





Dreadful Symptoms: Corpaural Sleuthing 
 
Here voice, by virtue of its exquisite and delicate co-opting of multiple physical parts 
and protocols, is posed as a barometer that sounds out transformation: a ‘tell’ of flux. 
This premise is related to Lagaay’s observation concerning Freud’s suggestion that 
‘disturbances’ of speech were ‘manifestations of unconscious conflicts and tensions’. 
339 These moves pave a path to proposing voice sounds change to what one cannot 
fathom: signaling a lacuna, a horror. This is established to serve as a theoretical 
primer for the role voice plays in subsequent sections, signaling a shift from human to 
something else, something horrific. 
 
Karpf, in the opening chapter, ‘What the Voice Can Tell Us’, in The Human Voice: A 
Story of Remarkable Talent, writes:  
 
[t]he voice is a stethoscope, and transmits information not only about 
anatomical abnormalities but even illnesses. Our risk of coronary heart disease 
can be predicted, it’s been claimed, on the basis of voice characteristics like 
volume and speed alone. Doctors have even maintained that picking up on 
changes to the sound of the voice can be life-saving in cases of throat cancer 
and people contemplating suicide. 340  
 
Karpf then details an analysis of Joseph Hazelwood, the captain of the Exxon Valdez 
oil tanker that, in 1989, ran aground and caused a catastrophic oil spill in the Gulf of 
Alaska. Hazelwood was accused of being intoxicated with alcohol at the time of the 
incident. He was acquitted in 1990. Karpf writes of how analysis of tapes of his voice 
from the day before the disaster and the day of revealed he ‘didn’t only misarticulate 
words […] at one point he called his ship ‘Ekshon Valdez’ – but also took 50 per cent 
longer to say its name at the time of the accident than the day before.’ 341 Karpf, in the 
following passage, reels off further bio-acoustic reductions and mentions a 
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‘drowsiness-predictor for pilots and air-traffic controllers based entirely on readings 
from their voice.’ 342  
 Listening for what voice may divulge of the voicer, corpaural sleuthing, operates on 
a number of levels. Taking Karpf’s examples in turn, voice is taken to be a register for 
respiratory, esophageal-cellular, psychological, neuro-chemical and fatigue-based 
alterations of the human. One aspect of voice that may contribute to its telltale status 
is its modality of production from and through the human body: its delicacy.  343 
Karpf writes that, due to having not dedicated voice apparatus, many disparate body 
parts come together for voice. 344 Voice requires an orchestration of multiple body 
parts that culminate in a harmony. The symphony, however, is easily disrupted – it is 
fragile: unsound. This coming together is a distinctly sequential and temporal process; 
it is a ‘sequence or chain.’ 345 It is as a result of this complexity – corporeal, 
sequential and temporal – where delicacy and precarity of voice emerges. Such 
complexities of production contribute to the capriciousness and sensitivity of voice, 
its easily affected nature. Voice qua ‘canary in the cave’ is taken to be a delicate and 
sensitive barometer for physical, neurological or psychological variations.  
Karpf, in ‘How Our Emotions Shape the Sounds We Make (and Other People Hear 
Them)’, describes a how ‘a group of aphasics listened to a speech being made by 
President Reagan, the so-called Great Communicator, they fell about laughing 
because they detected his histrionics and false cadences.’ 346 Karpf goes on to quote 
from the anecdote (from Oliver Sacks’ The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat): 
‘They have an infallible ear for every vocal nuance, the tone, the rhythm, the 
cadences, the music, the subtlest modulations, inflections, intonations, which can give 
– or remove – verisimilitude to or from a man’s voice’. 347 Karpf provides a further 
line from Sacks which, running a sensorial balance sheet logic (a deficit in one sense 
being offset by additional sensorial abilities), suggests ‘‘Something has gone… it is 
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343 Detailed in ‘Violence’, voice production requires the co-opting of an array of physical components 
and protocols.  
344 Ibid., 22. 
345 Ibid., 22. 
346 Karpf, The Human Voice: A Story of Remarkable Talent, 134. 
347 Ibid., 134. There is a distinct gendering here that supposes that voice, its under-coding of emotions 
and nuance, beneath the words may negate earnestness  
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true, but something has come, in its stead, has been immensely enhanced’ 348 The 
sentiments resonate with the preliminary aspect of Dolar’s opening proposition in A 
Voice and Nothing More, that meaning, language and words obfuscate voice. Karpf’s 
presentation is not critical – she reserves that for an endnote whereby she references a 
study that points to only aphasics’ ability to lies pick up on non-semantic information 
was contingent to observations of facial expression. 349 
Karpf, in the following paragraph begins with somewhat tempered proposition that 
runs the same methodological sequence of Dolar’s (meaning, aesthetics; 
psychoanalysis) within the question of voice. The implication of Karpf’s sentiment is 
that we may all be like aphasics are proposed to be: we might not take a person’s 
word, we might listen out for what a voice conveys; and by doing so make inferences 
concerning the voicer’s psyche. She writes (invoking psychoanalysis): 
 
Potentially we each possess the skills of an aphasic. Most of us have an 
intuitive, post-Freudian sense of the intimate relationship between voice and 
psyche, embodied in words like tongue-tied, stiff-upper-lip, or lump-in-the-
throat. At some level we’re aware that that the voice acts as an exquisite psychic 
barometer, sensitive to micro-shifts in feelings, registering what words try and 
conceal. 350  
 
Karpf’s line however, bleeds out of the very focus it attests to. The question of voice 
quickly becomes a question of the execution of speech. The proposition that voice is a 
psychic barometer, that it may divulge some meaning not stated in speech, turns into a 
barometer that divulges by virtue of how speech is delivered. Voice is only heard, is 
only sensed in terms of verbal delivery. ‘Tongue-tied’ and ‘lump-in-the-throat’ are the 
inability of the voicer to articulate speech, the inability to verbalize words. Such lay 
terms refer to momentary aphasia – the impairment of the production of speech. The 
terms Karpf lists as symptoms of voice are more verbal disturbances not vocal 
disturbances.   
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As has been touched on already by way of Alice Lagaay’s essay “Between Sound and 
Silence: Voice in the History of Psychoanaylsis” the disturbances of voice and 
speech, the aberration of normalized standards or verbalizing meaning such as 
‘tongue-clicking, to unintelligible clackings, splutterings’ were ‘seen by Freud as 
manifestations of unconscious conflicts and tensions’. 351  
 The underlying question in Karpf’s presentation of the aphasics study and the 
following invocation of psychoanalysis folds into manifesting an ear that, a la Freud, 
is attuned speech but not voice: a question of how voice delivers or gets in the way of 
speech. The implicit ableism of hearkening deviations, hearing the ‘disturbances’, 
from an expected standard of articulation and verbal aptitude has a strict ear; an ear 
that does does not listen to voice. 
Changes and modulations to the sound of voice rather than disturbances of speech 
will be the focus in the studies presented in following sections of this thesis. That is 
not to say the voices of foci are non-communicative. The focus in the Thriller 
example is a speaking voice. But tone, timbre and other acoustic properties are 
considered over and above the execution of speech.  
Despite the aforementioned inexactitudes, Karpf’s chapter does move to provide an 
array of examples of how corporeal changes (stemming from an emotional state) can 
modulate voice. Once more, Karpf provides a dazzling series of examples. All of 
which are pertinent to a number of points proposed within this thesis. Firstly, the 
examples are an antithesis to Karpf’s previous articulation of voice as a psychic 
barometer. Whereas previously Karpf wrote of voice as it fell short of language, or 
failed to produce language (in the lay terms of lump-in-the-throat or tongue-tied) the 
examples detailed focus on acoustical changes without recourse to how they stand in 
service or disruption of verbalization. By proposing these examples of how emotional 
or psychological states modulate voice Karpf reinstates the causal thread of voice as 
gateway to the unconscious without succumbing to hyperphasia or ears for speech 
alone. Voice is pitched as pertinent to psychological states on the basis of acoustic 
properties. Secondly, the move displays a case in point of the relationship between 
inferences from the voice to psychological states and changes. The inference inscribes 
the crucial position of the body. Karpf’s exploration of the question of what voice 
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divulges of psychological states turns to the body with a clinician’s scrutiny, 
surmising the thread of psychological state, to corporeal symptom to further register 
and sounding out in voice on the basis of acoustic variations. She writes: 
 
When we’re stressed or excited […] our laryngeal muscles tense up, making the 
vocal folds tauter, so that the speaker has to produce more pressure to force the 
air through. The vocal musculature is a highly sensitive instrument. […] 
Emotional states like deception, conflict and anxiety can change breathing, 
which in turn influences subglottal pressure and so impacts voice. […] Simply 
remembering an emotion – a happy event, the shock of an accident – affects the 
movement of the diaphragm. […] Changes in facial expression also affect the 
pharyngeal muscles. In a grimace, the corners of the mouth are turned down, the 
vocal tract shortened and its walls tensed. This helps makes the voice higher, 
more nasal, and narrower. When a person is apprehensive or fearful, their voice 
‘shrinks’ as the mucous membranes become dry. 352  
 
Many of the above examples Karpf provides are related to the affects of negative 
valence: stress, conflict, anxiety, shock and fear. 353 Such endogenous modulators of 
voice operate by corporeal proxy: a sounding body. As psychological changes bring 
physical variations voice is affected in turn. Voice, then, is taken as a holistic register 
that sounds out how neurological and or psychological states impact the body.  
Voice also betrays corporeal changes autonomous from emotions and conscious 
anxieties. As Karpf details by way of the accusations levelled at the captain of the 
Exxon Valdez oil tanker, changes to the body that are not necessarily psychological 
(but neuro-chemical) also affect voice. A virus causing blocked sinuses or a sore 
throat is akin to a hangover, in structural terms. A physical symptom of an exogenous 
agent is sounded out. Voice might develop a nasal inflection if we are congested or 
																																																								
352 Karpf, The Human Voice: A Story of Remarkable Talent, 134-135. 
353 Emotions connected to aversive stimuli (e.g. fear, horror or panic) elicit the sympathetic nervous 
system, the ‘fight or flight’ response, whereby our heartbeat increases, our pupils dilate and our bodies 
become primed for escaping or defeating evolutionarily familiar dangers. A common example of voice 
reflecting our fear-modulated brains and bodies is nervous public speaker. In evolutionary terms 
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differentiate between the eyes of hostile groups and earnestly expectant attendees of colloquium, 
wedding or business conference. Nervousness, essentially a fear of the group’s gaze, is conspicuously 
noticeable in speakers; the voice is the give-away. The voice quivers, or consonants are stuttered or 
sentences rushed. Breathing whilst talking suddenly seems difficult, we might even speak in a slightly 
higher pitch than usual as our corporeal tenseness affects the vocal chords. Nonetheless, at root it is the 
physiological changes of fear that manifest themselves in our changing voice. 
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deliver a hoarse timbre or uncharacteristic baritone if the throat is inflamed and sore. 
We might not sound ourselves. 354  
In this sense voice in genre horror is considered as sounding out profound corporeal 
change. Rather than voice modulations being employed to evoke the psychobiological 
nuances of fear, horror, sadness or panic the significance is extended to dramatic 
fantasy. Voice is posed as conving a profound corporeal change, a change of body, 
perhaps from one type of being to another. Voice, in such diegetic contexts, is not 
evoking a change of a body such as fearful trembling, a spasm of grief or a hoarseness 
wrought from illness but reflect a body’s transformation from ‘natural’ state to 
supernatural state; e.g.: the transformation from human to werewolf. This vocal hint at 
an ontological transformation – a change in being – and a concomitant and ominous 
change in body as well as personality, is often preliminary to the more visual and 
corporeal transformation. In genre horror vocal change is frequently the primary flag 
that a human is changing into something else, something horrific. 
Following the Thackerian concept of horror – of being confronted with a lacuna of 
knowledge: being aware of an epistemological deficit – voice hints that something is 
afoot: but what, we do not know. 355 In the following examples it is voice that 
announces a change to something unknown. In each case, the viewer knows the voicer 
is changing into something, the voice sounds out flux but nothing more. It is this 
question – what type of thing? – that follows the philosophical structure of horror 
Thacker sets our in In the Dust of this Planet: Horror of Philosophy Vol. 1. Voice of 
change in genre horror, be it of endogenous or exogenous impetus, confronts the 
viewer with a lacuna – it alludes to a physical or psychological change the viewer 
cannot begin to fathom. The examples in this chapter all pivot around voice sounding 
out a change from human form into fantastic, horrific or supernatural forms.  
																																																								
354 Theresa May, the UK Prime Minister at the time of writing, when speaking to Parliament on May 
13th 2019 said ‘I may not have my own voice but I do understand the voice of the country.’ This is not 
the first time her voice has been dramatically affected. At the 2017 Conservative party conference She 
croaked through her speech until a coughing fit halted proceedings altogether. After a tentative rally of 
applause and support the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Philip Hammond delivered a ‘cough sweet’ to 
the PM. In a pleasing synergy of presentation materials, the F of the slogan ‘Building a Country that 
Works for Everyone’ on the blue board behind the PM then succumbed to gravity. This is a twofold 
example of physics impeding communicative lucidity.    
355 Thacker, In the Dust of this Planet: Horror of Philosophy Vol. 1., 4-9. 
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Thriller: Parallel Thrills 
 
This section continues the premise of voice qua register of flux. This is articulated by 
way of Michael Jackson’s Thriller. The music video is explored to introduce three 
concepts. Firstly, the double valence of thrill is employed to underscore 
horror/eroticism with regard to the body. Secondly, this video is argued to contain a 
genre horror narrativization of puberty, this is framed specifically as the horrors of 
corporeal change wrought from without and sounded out via voice. Thirdly, the grain 
of the voice and commentaries in and around Barthe’s famous text are brought in to 
further render voice as a locus of corporeal relation in terms of thrill, frisson and 
horror. Each pivots around the triangulation of voice, body and horror and serve as 
primers for a much closer reading of a particular moment in the following section, 
‘Get Away!’. 
 
Michael Jackson’s Thriller (1982), directed by John Landis, contains an instance of 
horrific corporeal transformation. 356 Much has been said about the video’s influence, 
its massive cultural reach and its various accolades within the entertainment industry. 
It won two Grammy awards, and four MTV awards, including, in 1999, being number 
one in the Greatest Music Videos of all Time. It sold over 9 million copies of the 
VHS reproduction. 357 The eponymous record, Kobena Mercer writes, ‘sold over 35 
million copies worldwide and is said to be the biggest selling LP in the history of 
pop’. 358 Some might say more. 359 
Much has also been said about the horror themes within the 13-minute video. The 
centre-piece zombie dance is, now, much copied, mimicked and parodied. The voice 
of veteran horror-film actor Vincent Price is notable for delivering a monologue, a 
rap, during the video and song. Price also provides his infamously sardonic cauldron-
																																																								
356 Thriller, Directed by John Landis (USA: Optimum Productions, 1982), Digital File. 
357 “Michael Jackson’s Thriller,” Wikipedia, accessed March 4, 2019, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michael_Jackson%27s_Thriller_(music_video) 
358 Kobena Mercer, “Monster Metaphors: Notes on Michael Jackson’s Thriller” in Sound and Vision: 
The Music Video Reader, eds Simon Frith, Andrew Goodwin and Lawrence Grossberg (London, UK: 
Routledge, 1993), 93. A prescient line –Jackson’s Janus face and his double life, and this reading of 
schizophrenic Thriller qua eroticism and horror have taken on an uncomfortable new level significance 
since the original draft of this chapter. See Leaving Neverland HBO/Channel 4 2019. Dir. Dan Reed. 
359 “Did Thriller Really Sell a Hundred Million Copies?’,” New Yorker, accessed April 2, 2019, 
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gargle cackle, precisely at the moment when Jackson breaks the fourth wall and grins 
directly at the viewer at the end of the video. Margo Jefferson writes the piece is: ‘a 
short masterpiece, a perfectly thought through and executed horror tale. It is the tale 
of the double, the man with two selves and two souls, like Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, 
like Poe’s William Wilson or Dorian Gray and his portrait. The everyday man and his 
uncanny double.’ 360 
Two selves and the change from one to an other. Transformation: a marked change in 
form, nature or appearance from one thing to another. But in witnessing 
transformation, in that penumbral interzone of flux, isn’t the question always: to 
what? 361 This section explores Thriller’s Janus-dualism in terms of the (ambiguous 
valence) prospect of thrill; ergo, genre horror, some biographical details and Barthes 
concept of grain as eliciting jouissance. 362  
Thriller is a pop music video allegory concerning doubles, things being within, one 
being two; a person being more than they seam. Indeed, it may be read as an exercise 
toying with the notion of authenticity. 363 If the person(s) in the video are multiple, 
and hold significance on different levels, a pluralistic mode of engagement is 
necessary to explore at once Michael, ‘Michael’ and Michael Jackson. Thus, close 
readings of a subject/protagonist within a scene segue into ruminations on the private 
individual perfoming the role. Similarly, the protagonist is taken in relation to a public 
persona (and the received composite of bilateral significance and inter-relations 
between these ‘characters’). Engagement with these tensions are addressed in a 
mercurial and capricious approach (or approaches). Strafing engagements befit the 
nexus of subjects: the chimerical Michael/Michael Jackson. 364  Frith’s four-fold 
approach to voice ‘as a musical instrument; as a body; as a person; and as a 
character’ is partially shared in considerations of Michael Jackson qua performer 
perfoming a song and routine, as a body, a person and a character.  
																																																								
360 Margo Jefferson, On Michael Jackson (New York, USA. Vintage Books/Random House, 2007), 15 
361 The question resonates with biographical parallel of Jackson’s transformation into an liminal and 
unique figure of vague race and gender. An excellent account of this transformation is Jefferson’s 
chapter “Alone of All His Race, Alone of All Her Sex” in On Michael Jackson. 
362 A close reading of the infamous moment of lycanthropic transformation within the video will be 
given more scrutiny in a following section. 
363 Released in 1982, one cannot help but recall the spectre of Ted Bundy (the ‘charming’ serial killer 
who shoplifted in a suit and predated his victims with his arm in a cast, the ruse of vulnerability, a wolf 
in sheep’s clothing). 
364 Articulated in terms of an alternate vector, the modality encompases a sequence of levels for a 
multifaceted focus to be rendered and re-rendered: unpacking a Matryoshka subject/object. 
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Frith also, in Peforming Rites, writes of tension; of excess inherent in performance, 
between what is meant (the score, the routine) and what is read (how we perceive the 
performance). 365 One of the most successful perfomers in music history warrants an 
analysis that is not limited to score and routine but also considers its execution 
(performance), and the relations of these aspects in terms of biographical and cultural 
context. That is to say: why sing and dance that, this way, now, then, given what’s 
happened? 366 
The title, as Kobena Mercer highlights in “Monster Metaphors: Notes on Michael 
Jackson’s Thriller”, is utilized in the chorus for Janus-meaning ambiguity. Mercer 
writes: “The lyrics evoke allusions and references to the cinematic genre of horror 
films, but only to play on the meaning of the word “thriller.””367 To begin, Mercer 
recounts the lyrics, that weave the story of “viewing some… gruesome horror movies 
with a lady friend””. 368  
 
It's close to midnight and something evil's lurking from the dark 
… You try to scream, but terror takes the sound before you make it 
You start to freeze, as horror looks you right between your eyes 
You're paralyzed. 369 
 
For Mercer, these verses are in the first person, but consistently refer to ‘you’. ‘Who 
is this “you” being addressed?’ he asks, rhetorically, before suggesting the pun within 
the title is revealed in the ‘semantic turnaround of the third verse and chorus’ 370 
 
Now is the time for you and I to cuddle close together 
All thru’ the night, I’ll save you from the terror on the screen 
I’ll make you see that [Chorus] 
																																																								
365 Frith, Performing Rites: On The Value of Popular Music, 1996, 206.  
366 This strategy also considers, and takes as a given, persona in a similar manner as Philip Auslander 
takes up Frith’s model: ‘Following Simon Frith, I see a performer in popular music as defined by three 
layers: the real person (the performer as human being), the performance persona (the performer’s self-
presentation), and the character (a figure portrayed in the song text)).’ (Auslander, Performing Glam 
Rock: Gender and Theatricality in Popular Music, 2006, 4).  
367 Mercer, “Monster Metaphors: Notes on Michael Jackson’s Thriller”, 38. 
368 Ibid., 38. 
369 Ibid., 38. 
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This is thriller, thriller-night, ‘cause I could thrill you more 
than any ghost would dare to try 
Girl, this is thriller, thriller-night… So let me hold you close and a killer, 
thriller, tonight. 371 
 
Thriller plays on a “double entendre of the meaning of “thrill”” 372 In addition to the 
semantic pun, the word-play, of ‘thrill’’s neutral valence (thrills might be pleasurable 
or scary) there is an additional sonic facet to consider in the sense of a homophonic 
play. Was this double meaning of ‘thriller-night’ a Casanovan machismo brag of 
‘thrill-her’ night?  
Margo Jefferson, in On Michael Jackson, draws attention to the strong themes of the 
macabre and freakish spectacles that resonated so profoundly with Jackson in later 
life. 373 Jefferson mentions some of the ‘disciplinary’ tactics his father used on 
Jackson and his siblings. She then references the figure of a German chapbook 
character from the early 16th century; Till Enulenspiegel (scatological pranks where 
his pedagogical methodology of correcting vices). Jefferson suggests there was a 
‘freaky Till Enulenspiegel quality to some of the abuse.’ 374 She writes of how 
Jackson’s father  
put on ghoulish masks and scared his children awake, tapping on their 
bedroom window, pretending to break in and standing over their beds, waiting 
for them to wake up screaming. This adds a new dimension to the monsters in 
the haunted mansion of Thriller. 375 
 
Later in the book, in the chapter ‘Home’ – a pointed oxymoron for a touring family – 
Jefferson describes members of the Jackson family in turn. 376 She briefly references 
the older brothers recreational activities, activities that occurred in close proximity to 
Michael in the various hotels and motels they stayed at during their Jackson 5 years. 
Jefferson catalogues, her brevity evoking the glib sibling cruelty, a couple of the 
brother’s nicknames for their younger brother: ‘They had the usual sibling ways of 
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373 See ‘Freaks’ chapter in Margo Jefferson, On Michael Jackson (New York, USA. Vintage 
Books/Random House, 2007), 3-27. 
374 Ibid., 34. 
375 Jefferson, On Michael Jackson, 34. 
376 Ibid., 28-52. 
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getting back at Michael. Cruel nicknames (“Liver Lips” and “Big Nose”), the light 
bullying all older children have at their command, plus the right to set the general 
pace of daily life.’ 377 On this last point of elder’s privilege she expands: ‘This was 
especially true when it came to sex: Jackie, Tito and Jermaine flirted and fucked to 
their heart’s content in plain sight of Michael.’ 378 
Perhaps such experiences, the father’s abuse and the brother’s conduct of sex, were 
not ‘in plain sight’. Perhaps such experiences were close enough to be audible (and 
olfactory) in the shared rooms each night during tours, but not necessarily in sight. In 
this sense the sounds of bodies – the neutral valence of thrill – opens a speculation. 379 
Were the vocal registers of thrill heard with an incorrectly assumed negative valence 
in the small hours? Are they hurting her/him? In this sense, one wonders about the 
genesis of the term ‘thriller night’. Taking the homophonic possibility of the term, 
thrill-her – perhaps this promise was not experienced by young Michael in same sense 
as his brother’s might’ve employed the term? One speculates if young undercover 
Michael perceived the brothers’ thrills and their father’s nocturnal thrilling in equally 
negative valence. The likely biographical genesis of the Janus-sensed Thriller, the 
play between terror, horror and sexual frisson is all the more troubling, in light of this 
early possibility of acousmatic horror. 380 
Mercer argues that this tension, between the two types of thrill, is conjured in the 
demarcations of voice that Roland Barthes detailed in his ‘The Grain of the Voice’. 381 
Mercer writes: 
 
sexuality is perhaps the central preoccupation of the soul tradition. But […] the 
power of soul as a cultural form to express sexuality does not so much lie in the 
literal meanings of the words but in the passion of the singer’s voice and vocal 
performance. The explicit meanings of the lyrics are in this sense secondary to 
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the sensual resonance of the individual character of the voice, its “grain.” […] 
the “grain” of the voice encodes the contradictions of sexual relationships, their 
pleasures and pain […] In “Thriller” it is the grain of Jackson’s voice that 
expresses and plays with this sexual subtext and it is this dimension that 
transgresses the denotation of the lyrics and escapes analytic reduction.  382 
 
Mercer’s reading of Jackson’s Thriller follows a demarcation Barthes appropriated 
from Julia Kristeva (and in turn Šaumjan Soboleva) and applied to song: the pheno-
song and the geno-song, positing the concept of ‘grain’ as characteristic of the latter. 
383 Although Mercer does not directly reference these terms his reading is clearly 
working from the difference between the sensuousness of voice and the coded 
language level of the lyric. There is the word and how the word is said.  
Barthes defines the pheno-song as language in the broadest sense. He writes that the 
pheno-song ‘covers all the phenomena, all the features which belong to the structure 
of the language being sung, the rules of the genre, the coded form of the melisma, 
[…] in short, everything in the performance which is in the service of 
communication’. 384 The geno-song by contrast is that which cannot be reduced to 
language, cannot be coded. Two facets of geno-song should be considered. Firstly, it 
concerns the sonic characteristics of a singing voice. Secondly, the geno-song 
harbours the ‘grain’ of voice. It is this ‘grain’ that Barthes argues to register the 
corporeal, sensual, jouissance and frisson of voice’s relation to the body from which it 
issues. Barthes writes: 
 
The geno-song is the volume of the singing and speaking voice, the space where 
significations germinate ‘from within language and its very materiality’; it 
forms a signifying play having nothing to do with communication, 
representation (of feelings), expression; it is that apex (or that depth) of 
production where the melody really works at the language – not at what it says, 
but the voluptuousness of its sounds-signifiers 385 
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Barthes provides two illustrative examples of the difference between the grainy geno-
song and the coded pheno-song: consecutively Charles Panzéra, the Swiss operatic 
and concert baritone (whom he favours) and Dietrich Fischer-Dieskau, the German 
baritone and conductor. When writing of Fischer-Dieskau, Barthes, in all but word, 
frames his voice as perfect but boring and lacking any sense of the corporeal. He 
writes that Fischer-Dieskau is  
 
assuredly an artist beyond reproach: everything in the (semantic and lyrical) 
structure is respected and yet nothing seduces, nothing sways us to jouissance. 
His art is inordinately expressive […] and hence never exceeds culture: here it 
is the soul which accompanies the song, not the body. 386 
 
Barthes diagnoses Fischer-Dieskau’s anodyne inoffensiveness as symptomatic of the 
tyrannical privileging of respiration in singing pedagogy: ‘the whole of musical 
pedagogy teaches not the culture of the ‘grain’ of the voice but the emotive modes of 
its delivery – the myth of respiration’. 387 What follows is a lament of perfect singing 
that lacks grain. It is a passionate turn as if a ‘writer’s Beaujolais’ has delivered him 
from intellectualism. 388 The passage contains an abrupt leap, almost non sequitur, 
disparaging the organs of respiration before succumbing to a phallocentric 
conceptualization of the pleasures of the body: 
 
How many singing teachers have we not heard prophesying that the art of vocal 
music rested entirely on the mastery, the correct discipline of breathing! […] 
The lung, a stupid organ (lights for cats!), swells but gets no erection; it is in the 
throat, place where the phonic metal hardens and is segmented, in the mask that 
significance explodes, bringing not the soul but jouissance. With FD, I seem 
only to hear the lungs, never the tongue, the glottis, the teeth, the mucous 
membranes, the nose. 389  
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On Charles Panzéra, he writes (one can see in this passage Panzéra’s term ‘patinated’ 
– Barthes’ word choice, ‘grain’, is no doubt a register of his admiration and fealty to 
the baritone’s approach to singing): 
 
Panzera’s art, on the contrary, was in the letters, not in the bellows. […] With 
regard to the consonants, too readily thought to constitute the very armature of 
our language […] and always prescribed as needing to be ‘articulated’, 
detached, emphasized in order to fulfill the clarity of meaning, Panzera 
recommended that in many cases they be patinated, given the wear of a 
language that had been living, functioning, and working for ages past 390  
 
Mercer’s description of how it is Jackson’s voice evoking the thrills of Thriller, in 
thematic juxtaposition to the lyrics, clearly plays on Barthes’ uptake of the 
Soboleva/Kristeva demarcation. It also runs Barthes’ embedded parallel of thrills 
implicit in the term jouissance. Mercer’s line – ‘the “grain” of the voice encodes the 
contradictions of sexual relationships, their pleasures and pain’ – locates the 
ambiguous and/or vacillating valence of thrill in the same sense as Barthes’ 
jouissance in the grain of Jackson’s voice. 391 
Mercer’s diaphonic proposal that the grain of Jackson’s voice evokes the sexual thrill 
in contradistinction to the horror themes of the lyrics not only carries over Barthes 
partitioning of song along the Soboleva/Kristevan differentiation of geno-text (the 
realm of grain) and pheno-text. Mercer’s argument also takes up Barthes’ emphasis 
on the sensual/corporeal relation grain evokes in voice. The sense of corporeal 
relation, sensuous, yet phantom in its quasi-tactile nature, is maintained in Mercer’s 
reading of Jackson’s voice. Barthes writes: ‘The ‘grain’ is the body in the voice as it 
sings, […] I am determined to listen to my relation with the body of the man or 
woman singing or playing and relation is erotic’. 392 Similarly Mercer pitches voice, 
qua medium for corporeal seduction and interaction, in terms of Jackson’s infectious 
rhythmic funk. More specifically, the relation of bodies is levelled in terms of an 
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Jefferson’s exploration of Jackson’s liminal and paradoxical performances of gender(s). See Jefferson’s 
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incitement of dance, the compelling of the body. Mercer firstly frames dance with an 
erotic prospect. He writes of dance as a ‘cultural form and erotic ritual, […] a mode of 
decoding the sound and meaning generated in the music.’ 393 After priming the reader 
with the erotic prospect of dance Mercer then couches Jackson’s soulful voice in 
Thriller as an ‘incitement of the listener to dance, to become an active participant in 
the texture of voice, words and rhythm, soul music is not merely “about” sexuality, 
but is itself a musical means for the eroticization of the body’. 394 
Mercer’s text effectively re-articulates Barthes’ corporeal and erotic articulation of 
grain to draw out not just the ambiguous valence manifest in the voice/lyric dynamic 
of Thriller but also to articulate the libidinal infectiousness of a voice that effects the 
listener’s body. Barthes writes ‘I can hear with certainty – the certainty of the body, of 
thrill’. 395 Mercer’s application of the intrinsic thrill of grain – the frisson of erotic 
corporeal relation – works well to articulate the affective potency of Jackson’s voice 
and addresses his idiosyncratic and rhythmic dynamicism. Mercer’s contribution, his 
reading of Thriller as libidinous seduction and horror is pertintent in the present 
context of narratives concerning Jackson. Listening to Thriller now and sensing these 




393 Mercer, “Monster Metaphors: Notes on Michael Jackson’s Thriller”, 39. 
394 Ibid., 39. 
395 Barthes, Image-Music-Text, 188, emphasis added. 
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“Get Away!”  
 
Here, a close reading of a moment of vocal change in Michael Jackson’s Thriller is 
provided to elucidate concepts introduced in the previous section. The double valence 
of thrill qua horror/eroticism and pubescent voice change are posed as evoking the 
horrors of changes wrought from without. This reading then leads into an engagement 
with the vectors Dolar draws out in his re-telling of the ‘Che bella voce!’ joke. It is 
argued that torsion between meaning and voice, what is said and how it is said (or 
snarled) introduces, a penumbra – and within this epistemological chasm horrors 
abound. The moment of Michael barking ‘Get away!’ is proposed to be the antithesis 
of a speaking automaton. Rather than uncanny wonderment, there is a scene of 
defacement, a masking: an emergent mask of the unknown object of horror. Voice 
reduces the body to façade, a veil for horrors one can but dread.   
 
After a caveat establishing that Michael Jackson “in no way endorses a belief in the 
occult” we see the gore-blood font of the title, Thriller, shimmering against black. We 
hear breathing. Slow wispy breaths; are these Michael’s? When was the last time you 
heard the intimacy of respiration, in the dark, without the seeing a face? These are 
heavy breaths. Exhaustion – what cause? Exertion? Haste? From passion or fear? 396 
The breathing stops and the slasher-font title fades. 397 We hear the ribbit of an 
amphibian serenade, the din of telegramming cicadas and stridulating crickets. We are 
in the country: oppressive nature. A car rolls past trees in the dark of the night, twigs 
snap underneath its tyres. Its engine splutters and cuts out. Michael and his girl are in 
the car. Picking up the thread of reading Thriller as a dialectic horror-romance. 
Mercer writes: 
 
In the opening sequence equilibrium is established and then disrupted. The 
dialogue and exchange of glances between Michael and “the girl” (as male and 
female protagonists of the story) establish a “romance” as the narrative pretext. 
The girl’s look at Michael as the car stops hints at a question, answered by 
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bemused incredulity on his face. Did he stop the car on purpose? Was it a 
romantic ruse, to lure her into a trap? The girl’s coquettish response to 
Michael’s defence (“Honestly, we’re out of gas”) lingers sensually on the 
syllables, “So. . . what are we going to do now?” Her question, and his smile in 
return, hint at and exacerbate the underlying erotic tension of romantic intrigue 
between the two characters. 398 
 
This moment has the sex-death thrill dyad of teen horror: teenagers venture away 
from the suburbs (rural locales, Hollywood would have us fear, are chock-full of 
lethal threats – either maniac yokels or supernatural beings), on an odyssey of sexual 
awakening, a covert quest for romantic experience. 399 The ‘girl’ (played by Ola Ray) 
is not asking Michael a question – she’s asking Michael, almost on the viewer’s 
behalf, to resolve the erotic tension of the narrative pretext. Reid Kane, in ‘The King 
of Pop’s two bodies, or Thriller as allegory’, writes that the scene ‘stages a 
paradigmatic display of heteronormative sexual virility, in which the varisty-jacket 
sporting boy with car “runs out of gas”, an idiomatic attempt at seduction.’ 400 After 
‘the girl’s’ question the scene cuts and we see feet clicking against a pavement.  401 
The girl’s legs walk alongside Michael’s, his Blue Jeans rolled to display ice-white 
sports socks and shiny black Bass Weejuns slip-ons. The scene is theatrical 
Americana – a sort of horromance. 402 As the camera pans up we see their 50s get up, 
a normative burlesque pairing of cheerleader and top jock.  
This opening segment is, according to director John Landis, partially based on the 
1957 film I Was A Teenage Werewolf. 403 Mercer writes ‘their clothes – a pastiche 
																																																								
398 Mercer, “Monster Metaphors: Notes on Michael Jackson’s Thriller”, 42. 
399 Sex is the premise that leads to death, a demise. A petite-mort becomes mort proper, usually in the 
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penetration. Texas Chainsaw Massacre is just as much about middle class townies experiencing the 
thrill of the local boys one summer as it is an exercise in re-hashing the back-water deprivations and 
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400	Reid Kane, ‘The King of Pop’s two bodies, or Thriller as allegory,’ The Resistible Demise of  
Michael Jackson, ed. Mark Fisher, 233-243 (Winchester, UK: Zero Books, 2009), 237. 
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cars, girls (objects without names) and school-sport backdrops. 
403 John Landis, “John Landis on the making of Michael Jackson’s Thriller: ‘I was adamant he couldn’t 




fifties retro style – connote youthful innocence, the couple as archetypal teen lovers.’ 
404 Jefferson too notes the loaded retro costumes:  
 
Thriller begins as Michael, wearing red leather, walks along a deserted street 
with a fresh faced, pony-tailed girl in a felt skirt, white blouse and saddle 
shoes. They are 1950s vintage teenagers. (We rarely saw such Negro boys and 
girls next door in the 1950s). 405   
 
Returning to the diegesis, it is clear the car has run out of fuel. ‘I’m sorry I didn’t 
believe you.’ The girl says (it wasn’t a ruse). ‘Can I ask you something?’ Asks 
Michael in his boy-smooth lilt. They are alone, just dark trees and foliage foley. 
Jefferson offers commentary: 
 
“You know I like you,” he tells her, shyly but winningly. “And I like you,” she 
says eagerly. “Will you be my girl?” he asks. “Oh, yes,” she answers. But 
there’s something he wants to say to her. A shadow crosses his face. “You know 
I’m not like the other guys,” he says, to which she responds, “I know. That’s 
why I like you.”’ 406 
 
With starched formality Michael asks: ‘I was wondering if… you would be my girl.’ 
407 She is delighted. ‘Oh, Michael’ she sighs and they embrace. Michael, then, 
presents her with a ring. ‘It’s beautiful.’ She says, holding her hand up to admire the 
forged material symbolizing ownership. ‘Now it’s official’ smiles Michael.  
Michael, however, has one more thing to say, something difficult to say – a 
confession. He looks up timidly. ‘A shadow crosses his face. “You know I’m not like 
other guys,” he says, to which she responds, “I know, that’s why I like you.”’ 408 
																																																								
404 Mercer, “Monster Metaphors: Notes on Michael Jackson’s Thriller”, 42. 
405 Jefferson, On Michael Jackson, 15. 
406 Ibid., 15-16. 
407	Invoking ‘the theme of possession’. See	Reid Kane, “The King of Pop’s two bodies, or Thriller as 
allegory’ in The Resistible Demise of Michael Jackson, edited by Mark Fisher, 233-243 (Winchester, 
UK: Zero Books, 2009), 237	 
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Michael, now serious and unsmiling goes on: ‘no, I mean I’m different.’ 409 His girl, 
now confused, asks him what he is talking about before an array of horror tropes is 
unleashed. A flute solo, in an eerie, suspended or diminished sounding scale, evoking 
confusion or ominous uncertainty, flutters and twists. Dark clouds part to reveal a full 
moon. 
Michael looks scared, he bends double holding his stomach as if in pain. His face is 
hidden from view. He gives a slight yelp before folding over, out of shot. His girl 
asks: ‘are you alright?’ We hear a strange croaking, a deep whine or growl. What is 
happening to Michael? He is obviously in pain; something has suddenly brought this 
on. The deep guttural noises imply a drastic physical change or awful symptom is 
underway. But what? Moments later, our questions are answered. Michael looks up at 
his girl and barks ‘get away!’ Jefferson writes of this as ‘The defacement.’ 410 
It is a strange, horrifying voice, an inhuman voice – it sounds as if it comes from two 
places at once, its resonance artificial. There is an odd dissonance, a gravelly metallic 
quality to the words. It sounds quite unlike the Michael we knew from the beginning 
of the video. His soft, boyish voice is coarsened, deepened and pained. It is a voice 
with over-drive added, distorted and crackly: bristling with noise. Voice hits the 
viewer before Jackson’s appearance sinks in. 411 His eyes are yellow, bright yellow 
like cat’s eyes, and his teeth are now pointed. The T of ‘Get Away!’ reveals two rows 
of vicious-looking incisors. Michael is transforming: a ‘grotesque metamorphosis’. 412 
Jefferson, writes that Michael ‘turns from a beautiful young man into a hairy, red-
eyed werewolf.’ 413 He then  
The moment is similar to the transformation scenes in John Landis’ An American 
Werewolf in London (1981). The depiction of hair and nail growth, excruciatingly 
extending limbs, protruding bones, is achieved by the same make-up team and 
follows a similar cinematography. Rick Baker’s transformative make-up effects are 
effectively transposed from the Werewolf transformation scenes in An American 
																																																								
409 Of course Michael is ‘not like other guys’ the scene is eerily close to biographical parallel. The 
superstar Michael adored, loved, and categorically not like other guys. Allegedly, when Michael 
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410 Jefferson, On Michael Jackson, 16. 
411 In cinema physics are backwards, sound is faster, more immediate than screen. 
412	Kane, “The King of Pop’s two bodies, or Thriller as allegory”, 237.	
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Werewolf in London onto Michael in Thriller (only this time the transformation is to a 
type of “Werecat”). 414 Why is Michael’s voice so striking when ‘he’ says ‘Get 
away!’ in this opening hypo-diegetic sequence?  
In An American Werewolf in London a transforming body is depicted and the 
character, David Kessler played by David Naughton, vocalizes. But this voice does 
not announce with quite the same horrifying effect as Michael’s ‘Get away!’ There 
are a few differences between Michael’s transformation and that of David Kessler 
worth highlighting. Michael’s transformation occurs just moments into Thriller, in the 
hypo-diegetic film-within-a-film. This hammed-up 1950s B-movie horror is revealed 
to be a horror film Michael and his girl watch in a cinema. Nonetheless, during these 
opening moments one is not certain what makes the ‘50s Michael ‘not like other 
guys’ or why he folds double when a shadow falls across his face. When Michael 
looks up and barks ‘Get away!’ it is the first time the viewer can perceive (see and 
hear) that a profound physical change is at hand. David Kessler’s transformation in 
An American Werewolf in London occurs, by contrast, almost an hour into the film 
whereby the viewer knows exactly what sort of change is coming. Secondly, in An 
American Werewolf in London, the visual clues of lycanthropic metamorphosis are 
delivered well before any vocalization can signal the horrific change. The voice that 
sounds from Kessler comes after the body undergoes great change – we see his hand 
growing, his body elongating, this back sprout thick black hairs, we see his teeth 
change and his posture revert to quadrupedalism, all before ‘his’ voice sounds 
unusual.  
The ‘Get away!’ moment in Thriller is quite different. It has horrific impact because it 
announces change but does not confirm what change is meant. In a sense the guttural 
‘Get away!’ that vents from the body of Michael is the first clue that a corporeal 
change is imminent (in tandem with his yellow eyes and sharp teeth). It is a liminal 
voice, a sound of change but not a voice resultant from a completed change. Kessler’s 
voice, in structural contrast, limps behind the spectacle of make-up and prophetic 
effects – all of which imply a transformation the viewer not just understands but 
expects. The vocalization from the almost completed lyncanthropic transformation of 
Kessler is an affirming return to cohesion: a werewolf that looks and sounds like one. 
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look too hideous’,”  
	 155	
Once the prosthetic special effects have established Kessler’s change into a werewolf 
in visual terms the vocal component sounds out in resolve – he looks like a dog, and, 
now, sounds like one too. Michael’s transformation is an inversion of Kessler’s. A 
voice that does not sound like Michael arrives first, along with minimal clues (just the 
teeth and eyes) that a change is looming. 
A further difference is that this moment of voice in Thriller is also a 
command/warning. ‘Get away!’ is speech – albeit voiced in a guttural and harsh tone 
one might not expect from the boyish teen in the varsity jacket. This additional 
difference invites an uncomfortable import. From Aristotle to Lacan, language is 
presupposed as exclusively human – whales and birds may have song but only 
humans speak, only humans, so the fallacy goes, apply vocalization to language. 
Thus, when Michael seems to growl ‘Get away!’ a tension opens up. A split nature is 
evoked. Due to the utterance of a human language one takes Michael to still, on some 
level, be the same human being who honestly ran out of gas (the caring human, now 
concerned for ‘his girl’). The command frames the figure of Michael as not 
completely ‘de-humanized’ beyond the horizon of human (in this case American-
English) language. This is, however, voiced in a voice that is radically different from 
the young man we’ve witnessed for a few seconds of dialogue previously. Thus, voice 
and its words sound out in a striking lyncanthropic contraposto – a dissonance of 
species, a question of being, opens up in this voice. The utterance is a schizo-voice: 
voicing the anthropic concern of the human-teen in, and through, an ‘inhuman’ 
phonic palette (which we shall return to at the end of this section).  
The following moments show Michael’s transformation into a fully transitioned 
werecat through the elaborate make up artistry of Rick Baker. These are much the 
same as the bulk of the werewolf transformation scenes in An American Werewolf in 
London. 415  What follows is important if we are to broach the most obvious 
interpretation of this voice change – the emergent animal vocalization as allegory not 
just for the laryngeal development from boy to man, but as an animalist voicing of 
normative male sexuality. Kane writes of how once Michael has finished 
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transforming ‘[t]he creature corners the girl, pinning her down, overwhelming her 
with masculine/animal sexual virility run amok.’ 416 Note the forward slash in Kane’s 
comment – suggesting the video’s depiction of physical dominance and predatory 
devouringas either/or human male sexuality and animal. 417 
Mercer writes that, ‘werewolf mythology – lyncanthropy – concerns the 
representation of male sexuality as “naturally” predatory, bestial, aggressive, violent – 
in a word, “monstrous”’. 418 He notes that the Werecat ‘chases her, pins her down’, in 
an act of physical dominance. Mercer continues:  
 
the monster’s dominant position and the supine position of the victim suggests 
rape, fusing the underlying sexual relation of romance with terror and violence. 
As the monster, Michael transformation might suggest that beneath the boy-
next-door image there is a “real” man waiting to break out, a man whose 
masculinity is measured by a rapacious sexual appetite, “hungry like the wolf.” 
419 
 
The werecat scene is notably a hypo-diegesis. After were-Michael gets ‘his girl’ we 
cut to see Michael and another girl watching the scene in a cinema. This story within 
a story, film-within-a-film, narrative location of a super-masculinized teen (to horrific 
supernatural proportions) could be interpreted as Jackson’s expression of discomfort 
and cynicism for his re-vamped macho and adult persona. Epic records were pushing 
to portray Jackson as a ‘red-blooded’ young man. In the main sequence his red leather 
jacket, designed by Deborah Landis, was designed to make him appear more ‘virile’. 
420 The deep red trousers and V-shaped jacket of the main sequence are so overblown 
that Michael appears like a caricature of heteronormative masculinity. Was this short 
hypo-diegesis within Thriller Jackson’s part-veiled critique of a record company 
wishing to portray him as a safely marketable sexually normative adult male? Landis 
said ‘The reality is, it was a vanity video. Everything that happened on 'Thriller' 
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happened because Michael wanted to turn into a monster.’ 421 It is as if he is 
performing the absurdity of his new image – so you want me to be virile and red-
blooded huh? 
Michael’s transformation can be regarded as metaphor for puberty and awakened 
sexual desire. The growth of hair, whiskers and fur where there was none before. The 
sudden change in temperament from an innocent and polite young man to one of 
violent impulse and predatory aggression. The corporeal transformations of puberty 
are caricatured, in Thriller, as B-movie body-horror tropes. The werecat has a larger 
head, longer fingers, bigger arms, feet and hands. For the child-superstar that did not 
want to grow up, the soul superstar who wanted to remain a boy forever in a Never-
Neverland, the effects of puberty are aptly couched in the vocabulary of horror – 
something to fear. Landis, commenting on the popular tendency to couch puberty in 
terms of supernatural transformation, said that in adolescence:  
 
youngsters begin to grow hair in unexpected places and parts of their anatomy 
swell and grow (…) Everyone experiences these physical transformations in 
their bodies and new, unfamiliar, sexual thoughts in their minds. No wonder 
we readily accept the concept of a literal metamorphosis. 422  
 
A parallel between the absurd transformation from boy to werecat within the horror-
film hypo-diegesis and the ultra-macho crimson leather wardrobe of the main cinema 
date/zombie narrative leads to a pointed question: which is the more horrific depiction 
of imposed maturity? The date/zombie sequence is an extended metaphor for the 
enforced dressing up and posturing as a virile young normative male – doing the 
moves but ‘dead inside’. The were-cat hypo-diegesis, by contrast, might well be an 
elaborate metaphor of how Jackson regarded growing up. This latter prospect is a 
change of the body; the former is merely a change of wardrobe. One can always 
disrobe off set, whereas, the body, as biographical detail sadly evidence, is not so 
																																																								




easily shed. To re-purpose Landis’ comment: ‘'Thriller' happened because Michael 
wanted to turn into a monster’: 423 because he didn’t want to turn into a monster.  
 The change of voice that sounds the words ‘Get away!’ also evokes a particularly 
corporeal horror of puberty in terms of voice. The scene is pubescent male voice 
transformation writ large in the tropes of 1950s B-Movie Horror. It reanimates, within 
a horror-genre narrative and pretext, sudden changes of voice resultant from the 
increase in vocal tract length that occurs at the onset of puberty in humans. This voice 
change (sometimes referred to as voice mutation or voice break) results in 
approximately an octave drop in vocal tone for adult male humans. 424 In Foundations 
of Voice Studies: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Voice Production and Perception 
Kreiman and Siditis detail this pubescent ‘mutation’. They write that males: 
 
Undergo voice mutation (“change in voice”) as a result of laryngeal growth. 
Although mutation is highly variable and can last up to three years (…), the 
process usually begins between ages 11 and 14, and lasts between eight and 26 
months (with an average duration of about 18 months). During this time, the 
angle of the male thyroid cartilage decreases to about 70-85 degrees. (The angle 
remains fairly constant in females throughout life (…)) This narrowing, 
combined with the disproportionate growth in the membranous part of the vocal 
folds, results in the protrusion of the apex of the cartilage, called the thyroid 
notch of “Adam’s apple.” (…) The bulk of the thyroarytenoid muscle also 
increases, and the vocal folds thicken and change shape as a result. (…) This 
causes important changes in how the vocal folds vibrate. 425 
 
Kreiman and Siditis then detail how these changes, in turn, alter the sound of voice. 
426 Physical changes manifest through a voice of ‘greater overall amplitude’ and 
‘richer harmonic structure’. 427 They also describe how ‘[r]apid change in the size and 
configuration of the vocal folds also causes pitch breaks (sudden, unwanted shifts 
between modal and falsetto phonation) in male voices as males learn new muscular 
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patterns to control the new shape of the vocal folds.’ 428 Note, that such sudden and 
unwanted shifts of voice sound out the lack of lack of control, the possession 
thematic,that typifies puberty qua curse. In a sense, the body transformed and 
possessed by a foreign and unfamiliar force affects the human’s mastery of voice. 
The anxiety and horror this sudden and unwanted lack of control might yield for a 
person such as Jackson (whose career and self identity one might argue) can be 
sympathized with if not fully imagined or empathized. Jackson was originally a child 
singer, and his body changed remarkably in the period between early Jackson 5 
recordings and the Thriller LP, by which time he was 24. The horror of puberty 
possessing the corpus, affecting vocal tract cartilage, creating strange new growths, is 
re-enacted in ‘Get away!’ as a supernatural and lycanthropic force. The Kreiman and 
Siditis passage is peppered with terms that would not be out of place in the margins of 
a horror movie script. The throat and its cartilage are written about in terms of 
‘mutation’, ‘disproportionate growth’ and ‘protrusion’.   
When Michael looks up and reveals his teeth and yellow eyes, when he snarls ‘Get 
away!’ in a noise-laden metallic rasp: was this how Michael feared his voice might 
sound once puberty had transformed him from a boy? Referring, once again to 
Director John Landis’ remark that Thriller happened ‘because Michael wanted to turn 
into a monster’ we can regard Thriller is not only a vanity project about mainstream 
depictions of a public adult persona and physical horror trope expressions of puberty 
but as a candid autobiographical expression of the dread and horror of pubescent 
voice mutation.  
There is a further biographical parallel to consider. Gratis of an Itunes-fickle sonic 
survey of Jackson’s later hits, the horrifying moment of ‘Get away!’ is eerily 
prescient. It is not unlike Michael’s future voice. ‘Get away!’, viewed today, is a 
horrifying vocal premonition, a phonic-spectre. 429  
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Thriller harbours a horrifying kernel of the changes ahead. Listening to the Thriller 
album, Jackson’s voice is mostly disco-synth smooth. Even on “Beat It”, the most 
aggressive expression of machismo on Thriller, Jackson’s voice is smoothly sonorous 
and tuneful. It seldom breaks into the strained rasp and growl of his later sound. Bad 
(1987) contains a radically different voice. Listen to the gasps, rasps or yelps on a 
record such as “Another Part of Me” (from Bad) or the rabid gnashing, jibbering and 
clucking back track on “Smooth Criminal” (also Bad, 1987). The soulfulness of 
Jackson’s early voice is melded to asignifying ‘animalistic’ vocal tics: snaps, barks 
and bites erupt spasmodically between more soulful lines. By 1992’s Dangerous 
Jackson would be more Werecat than the soul-cat of his earlier recordings. “Jam”, 
“Why You Wanna Trip On Me” and “Black or White” barely contain any of the 
boyishly smooth vocal tones of his earlier voice, the voice of Off The Wall and 
Thriller (1979 and 1982 respectively). In the albums that followed Thriller, when 
Jackson is not barking words in raspy rhythmic spasms of staccato glossolalia, he 
howls anguished lines, strained gravely and hoarse, more like the pained vocal tear of 
Cobain’s raw baritone than the voice of the smooth young man from The Jackson 5.  
The moment in Thriller when Michael growls ‘Get away!’ is a horrifying precursor of 
what had yet to come on a number of levels – massive physical changes, increasingly 
reclusive, a voice hoarsened and prone to break out in unrepressed gnashes of fervid 
aggression and bubbling predation. 430 This brief moment in the 1950s horror-spoof 
hypo-diegesis at the beginning of Thriller, despite being theatrical and synthetic, is 
much closer to the future Jackson than the ‘virile’ red leather jacket of the main 
narrative. It vocalizes not just Jackson’s anxieties about adulthood but sounds out his 
future voice with uncanny accuracy: a vocal spectre, a horrifying omen, that at once 
disrupts the viewer’s epistemological security of the body on screen and registers 
unfathomable corporeal changes.  
Biographical prescience aside, it is worth returning to a comparison of this horrifying 
vocal moment with the ‘Che Bella Voce!’ joke Dolar utilizes in his introduction in A 
Voice and Nothing More. This liminal verbal torsion between lycanthropic voice and 
human language returns us oncemore to the two obfuscatory modes of voice that 
Dolar claims obfuscate ‘the object voice’. Dolar’s approach takes this binary as an 
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either/or premise (for example, the Italian soldiers in the introductory ‘Che Bella 
Voce!’ joke hear voice but seem deaf to the command). 431 But is it not the case the 
the affective and distinctly corporeal essence of this verbal growl, lies in a voice that 
resists to be taken in either signifying or aesthetic registers but oscillates between? In 
this tension between articulated speech, the meaning of which is overcoded with 
voice, and a voice not of the young man on screen but is, nonetheless, in service of his 
sentiment; a chasm, a lacuna, opens. Is it in the opening up of this penumbra where 
the horror of object a voice emerges?  
Of course, unlike the Italian soldiers the viewer does not hear a voice of beauty, but 
its timbre and sonic character are highly affective (in negative valence). Yet, there is a 
command, an instruction of ‘Get Away!’ This is the torsion of the scene that evokes 
horror: not the grain of the voice, not the sound or sense of the body, nor the words it 
carries but a voice of a mercurial body beyond each.   
After presenting the ‘Che Bella Voce!’ joke, Dolar ventures to use a passage from 
Walter Benjamin’s ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’. More specifically Dolar 
uses Benjamin’s account of an automaton chess player created by Wolfgang von 
Kempelen (later taken over and toured by Johann Neopmuk Mälzel) as a 
prolegomenon. This passage is a jump; there is a break in the text from the preceding 
‘Che Bella Voce!’ example that sets meaning and aesthetics as antithetical foci that 
obfuscate ‘the object voice’.  This subsequent section, concerning the chess player, 
does not address beauty. Nor does it address language. Dolar provides details about 
the origins of this chess automaton. 432 Its history, although fascinating, does not need 
to be recounted here.  Benjamin’s text describes the puppet ‘in Turkish attire’ 
whereby ‘a little hunchback who was an expert chess player’ pulled the strings. 433 He 
then writes of a ‘philosophical counterpart to this puppetry’: ‘The puppet called 
“historiographical materialism” is to win all the time.’ 434 Dolar, declares that the 
main focus of Benjamin’s text, ‘historical materialism and theology’, be left aside. 435 
																																																								
431 Dolar, A Voice and Nothing More, 3. 
432	Dolar, A Voice and Nothing More, 6-7. Dolar has a tendency to use automatron. See his use of the 
figure of Olimpia (an automaton from E.T.A Hoffmann’s The Sandman in Mladen Dolar. “At First 
Sight” in Gaze and Voice as Love Objects, eds Renata Salecl and Slavoj Žižek (Durham and London, 
UK: Duke University Press, 1996), 144. 
433 Ibid., 5. 
434 Ibid., 5. 
435 Ibid., 5. 
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He then asks a question that lies at the heart of the instance of horror when ‘Michael’ 
snarls ‘Get Away!’: ‘Who is literally pulling the strings?’ 436 
Dolar, some pages later, suggests the point of the story is how the chess automaton 
was presented. The attraction was part of a double bill. Kempelen presented his 
speaking machine as an introductory spectacle to the chess player. Dolar writes that 
‘the sequence of the two is crucial.’ 437 He elaborates: 
 
The difference between the two was ostentatious and didactic: first of all, the 
chess automaton was constructed in such a way as to appear as human like as 
possible – it made the pretense of being engrossed in deep thought, it rolled its 
eyes, and so on – while the speaking machine was as mechanical as possible: it 
did not try to hide its mechanical nature; on the contrary, it exhibited it 
conspicuously. Its main attraction was the enigma of how something so utterly 
non-human could produce huma effects. The anthropomorphic thinking 
machine was counter balanced by the non-anthropomorphic speaking machine. 
438 
     
Dolar continues to explicate the significance of how the speaking machine and chess 
player were presented. He argues it was the voice machine that was the necessary 
prerequisite for the chess player to appear as a thinking chess machine: ‘The first 
machine was the secret of the second, and the second, the anthropomorphic puppet, 
had to enlist the services of the first if it was to win.’ 439 Dolar’s argument then 
abruptly brings in Lacan’s line: ‘there is a cause only in something that doesn’t work.’ 
(from The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis) He then explains:  
 
The cause appears only at the point of a hitch in causality, a limp, a troubled 
causality – and this is precisely where Lacan situated the object, the object-
cause. But this can perhaps also be seen as the lever of thought, as opposed to 
the anthropomorphic masquerade of thinking. 440  
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438 Ibid., 8-9. 
439 Ibid., 10. 
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As Mowitt notes in other turns, Dolar’s tone has tentativeness: can perhaps also. 
Dolar then, provides the following conclusion:  
 
We could bend or transform Benjamin’s thesis: if the puppet called historical 
materialism is to win, it should enlist the services of the voice. Hence the need 
for a theory of voice, the object voice, the voice as one of the paramount 
“embodiments” of what Lacan called object petit a. 441  
 
Dolar’s contribution, at this introductory stage is clearly marked by the difference in 
phraseology. He declares: ‘the object voice’ contra object petit a. Further still, note 
that the text winces and holds at length the term that evokes the corporeal: 
“embodiments”. 
Yet, it is in the register of the body that the scene of the two machines is significant. 
The speaking machine’s ‘uncanniness’ as Dolar terms it, stems from the production a 
‘uniquely human’ voice via mechanical means. 442  Michael’s hoarse bark of ‘Get 
Away!’ within Thriller is the opposite of the speaking machine – the body looks 
human, but the voice is a radical departure from the voice associated with the 
adolescent boy on screen and Jackson more generally. Michael’s ‘defacement’, as 
Jefferson terms it, is an inversion of the trajectory of introduction of the speaking 
machine introduced as a primer before the chess automaton. The illusion of being is 
shattered, but not by defacement. Rather it is radical voice that masks the body it 
erupts from: the body is reduced to a horrific mask by the voice. Dolar describes the 
sequence of the speaking machine before the chess automaton as a weak teleology 
whereby the ‘former made the latter plausible’. 443 In terms of ‘Get Away!’ it can be 
said that voice renders the body on screen implausible, a mere mask of something 
unknown. The scene is an antithesis to the wonderment of the automaton whereby 
voice reduces the corpus to horrific façade, one liable to monstrous change. Whereas 
Dolar suggests that voice may act as the lever of thought – ‘as opposed to the 
anthropomorphic masquarade’ – might it not also act as provocation of horror 
unthinkable?  
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Inhuman Noise and Interspecies Grain in Black or White  
 
Now, we turn to another music video in Jackson’s oeuvre: Black or White. Via a close 
reading of the figure of Jackson within a particular scene in the music video voice is 
posited to be a modality operating beyond anthrocentric limits: a chimerical, pan-
species, voice(s) wrought from torsion and horror. A plural object a voice, a voice of 
alterity, is argued by an extensive reading of Black or White and engagements with 
the writings of Mercer, Jerfferson, Frith, Barthes and Dolar. Throughout these 
articulations the significance of the body is impressed. The section concludes with a 
synthesis of the concepts introduced thus far in this chapter. Voices in excess of and 
irreducible to a singular body are couched as a genre horror register of the inherent 
plurality of voice: vox-exo, the horrors of object a voice: voice qua legion.  
 
In “Glove, socks, zombies, puppets: The unheimlich maneuvers and undead 
metonyms of Michael Jackson” Sam Davies writes ‘Jackson’s voice, with its constant 
appeal to the unspeakable, its recourse to a spasmodic, tic-like, wordless vocabulary, 
carries the virus which disperses him in inhuman parts.’ 444 The line highlights 
Jackson’s frequent recourse from language – his voice’s recession into an 
unspeakable modality of ticks, shrieks, hiccups and clucks. This observation echoes 
Barthes’ partitioning of song in terms of granular (patinated) geno-song and coded 
expression of the pheno-song. Secondly, this departure from language is couched as 
animal – a departure from the ‘the human’. Davies’s line draws up a voice departing 
from language to be a departure from the human.  
Although, on one level, the notion of animals as being outside the privileges and 
torments of language is an anthropocentric position (one that runs from Aristotle to 
Lacan) the suggestion of Jackson’s voice as gateway to an inhuman presence 
resonates with multiple facets of his oeuvre. Most immediately Jackson consistently 
campaigned (in the modes of dance and song) against any normative notion of ‘the 
human’. This project frequently manifested as Jackson’s transformations into other 
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Michael Jackson”, The Resistible Demise of Michael Jackson, ed. Mark Fisher (Winchester, UK: Zero 
Books, 2009), 229. 
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people, animals, werewolves, zombies and invisibility. Taking each theatrical 
transmutation in turn there is within the limit of the human a flight from individual to 
plurality. In terms of instances of morphing into other animals there is an interspecies 
transcendence. There is a departure from the natural in changes into supernatural 
figures such as werewolves/werecats and zombies. Lastly, there is the existential 
symptom of neurotic want of invisibility; emancipation not just from various forms 
but also from flesh and blood: the wholesale escape from materiality. In each case, as 
evidenced by a number of texts, a question of gender, either as an aestheticization, 
sub-version, meld or amalgamation takes place. However, over and above the 
question of gender is a question of body. Reformulating the phrase connoting fame 
and infamy, not just anybody, Jackson’s repeated transformations, reinventions, 
inhabitation and flights to and from various forms may be read as a claim for any 
body and, equally, no body.     
Mercer quotes the audience reaction to early footage of Jackson’s performance on a 
1983 TV special celebrating Motown’s twenty-fifth anniversary. The text reads: 
 
The audience almost visibly tensed as Michael’s voice… took complete control, 
attacking the songs with that increased repertoire of whoops, hiccups and gasps, 
with which he punctuates the lyric to such stylish, relaxing effect. And then he 
danced. The cocky strut of a super confident child had been replaced by a lithe, 
menacing grace, and his impossibly lean frame, still boyishly gangly, when 
galvanized by music, assumed a hypnotic, androgynous sexuality. 445 
  
In the video promo for Beat It (1983), Jackson wore a hyper-masculinized wide 
shouldered red leather Jacket. The jacket would also feature in Thriller (1984). It was 
																																																								
445 Mercer, “Monster Metaphors: Notes on Michael Jackson’s Thriller”, 49. This image, of the 
spasmodic granulated voice and coming from an agile and lissome body, immediately evokes a feline 
silhouette. There is a history of black performers courting and re-appropriating colonial western 
notions of the primitive through the figure of the cat. Maria J Guzman, in her influential thesis “Grace 
Jones in One Man Show: Music and Culture”, in exploring Grace Jones’ re-appropriation of the tropes 
of primitivism and androgyny draws out precisely this appropriation operating in an interspecies 
modality. Guzman writes of how the ‘primitivist symbol of black female sexuality, the wild cat (…) 
has been used to symbolize black women in art and theatre since the early 20th century.’ Maria, J. 
Guzman “Grace Jones in One Man Show: Music and Culture” (MA. College of Fine Arts of Ohio 
University, 2007), 29. Placing Jackson in this continuum is not quite right, for he does not slot into 
such a lineage for a number of reasons. Firstly, the examples Guzman employs are female and 
embedded in the history of ‘popular images and stereotypes about the black female body, at once 
desirable and unsettling.’ Ibid,. 25. 
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designed to evoke the grown up Michael, to impress the image of Michael as a virile 
young man. 446 In retrospect the aesthetic looks overcooked, tipping – tragically and 
with pointed critical force – into camp. 447 This doomed vein of performing motifs of 
western masculinity carried through into the dance routine of Beat It whereby Jackson 
‘disarms the street gangs with his superior charm as he leads an all-male cast through 
a choreographic sequence that synthesizes the cinematic imagery of The Warriors and 
West Side Story.’ 448  
Jackson’s performance of normative masculine sexuality extends not just beyond the 
supposed notions of what a young black heterosexual male should be by blurring the 
borders of high camp, rock glamour and traditional machismo tropes, but pushed the 
enacted paradox into different species. In an earlier video for a single off the Thriller 
record, Billie Jean (1983), when performing in the guise of a solitary, brooding, 
predatory and powerful young man Jackson’s figure slips into feline form.  
Jefferson notes how, Jackson’s play with western gender normativity was not just 
notably non-binary but always exercised through the voice and body. 449 She writes:   
 
Michael Jackson has been a sexual impersonator since age five. As a child, he 
played adolescents and men. Once he became a man, he played up, down and 
around masculine sexuality. The real erotic power was always in the rhythms 
of his voice and body. 450  
 
Jefferson’s final line in the above comment echoes the Panzéra-Barthes granular 
discourse of voice-body-eroticism. A choreographic and vocal example of this erotic 
																																																								
446 Lauren Goode. “Deborah Landis, Designer of the Red Jacket Michael Jackson Wore in “Thriller””. 
The Wall Street Journal. June 30, 2009. https://blogs.wsj.com/speakeasy/2009/06/30/deborah-landis-
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448 Mercer, “Monster Metaphors: Notes on Michael Jackson’s Thriller”, 49 
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450 Jefferson, On Michael Jackson, 100. 
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power manifesting as physical and vocal impersonations is evident in Black or White. 
451  
Taking up Jefferson’s opt for the charged term ‘power’ it cannot escape comment that 
Black or White dramatizes the destructive potential of sounds in physical terms. 452 In 
the musicless street scene, the figure of Jackson on his knees ripping his shirt off, 
cries out (the vocal over-coded with a ripped shriek of a feline vocalization) and the 
Royal Arms Hotel neon sign behind him begins to spark before falling from the 
building front (we’ll return to this scene shortly). 453 
The video’s performance section contains people of varying ethnicities morphing into 
one another in sequence, all the time miming along to Jackson’s voice: a cinematic 
ventriloquism of Jackson singing through all the ethnicities and cultures of the world. 
This narrative of Jackson as a post-gender, post-race unfolding chameleon – Jackson 
qua messianic T-1000 pop-superstar – is then revealed as a ‘soundstage all along’. 454 
The video then segues into a further narrative after the song has finished, the camera 
pans back and on the studio floor a panther growls and prowls out of the studio, down 
noir moonlit metal stairs. The large cat is CGI stretched, ripped up from 
quadrupedalism into an Astaire-gangster version of Michael Jackson. 455  David 
Stubbs, in “The “King” is dead; long live everything else” describes the scene as a  
 
deserted, smoky street set that reminds of a cross between something from The 
Terminator and Singin’ In The Rain (…) he (…) undertakes his entire 
																																																								
451 As music videos go, it is the ur-form of corporate indulgence and excess overriding thematic 
consistency and narrative coherence that typified Jackson’s later work and wont of portraying a global 
trans age-gender-sex-ethnicity-species messiah figure. 
452 Macaulay Culkin, in an opening skit of playing up the Spinal Tap idiom ‘up to eleven’After being 
told to turn his music down, wheels guitar amps into the living room and, upon striking an overdriven 
power chord, blows his father played by George Wendt, through the suburban roof of the family home 
into space. 
453 This musicless/scoreless scene, read in Frith’s terms, smacks of confession. Frith writes of the 
score/routine as a safety net for embrassment of ‘performer and audience alike. It is this safety net 
which the performance artist abandons, and one can therefore conclude that the essence of performance 
art is, in the end, embarrassment, a constant sense of the inappropriate.’ (Frith, Performing Rites, 1996 
206). Whether this is a moment of media performance art or not cannot be broached here. What is 
certain is that there is a strong sense of embrassment, of inappropriateness, of awkwardness about the 
scene. 
454 “On A Soundstage All Along,” TV Tropes, accessed September 10, 2018 
http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/OnASoundstageAllAlong 
455 This is not the only time Jackson has transformed into or from a cat. He does in Billy Jean and, as 
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repertoire of tense, angular robo-moves like they were a set of karate 
exercises, grabbing constantly at his crotch as if afraid that that’s the next 
thing part of him that’s going to drop off.  456  
 
It is in this scene, a marked tonal departure from the rest of the video, where the 
‘scandalous’ crotch grab dance routine is performed. 457  Time changes everything. 
Not dissimilar from the ultra-macho silhouette and virility signaling hue of the 
Thriller red leather jacket, there is something amiss. It is not the presentation of 
normative masculinity but more of a statement of masculinity. 458  Is it a question of 
misarticulated claim or performative parody of masculinity or a deft accomplishment 
of both? The street scene is liminal on a number of levels. It is the torsion of two 
facets, an interzone: a ‘cross between something’. 459   
Cracks: Stubbs writes that the sequence ‘comes across like an immaculately set and 
choreographed psychotic episode, conceived and executed at Jackson’s behest.’ 460 
The scene is filled with anger, frustration and directionless imploding altruism (hate), 
a sort of aggressive messianic love (born from torment?): ‘there’s an undercurrent of 
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Michael Jackson, ed. Mark Fisher (Winchester, UK: Zero Books, 2009), 76. 
457 Jefferson describes the paradox of Jackson’s crotch clutching as ‘at once desperate and abstract.’ 
Jefferson, On Michael Jackson, 102. 
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wasn’t real, it was symbolic. Not a penis but a phallus.’ Jefferson, On Michael Jackson, 102. Ibid., 102. 
This note of Jefferson’s it one of a few comments she makes about the paradox of his dance, or what 
I’d refer to as postural antinomies. There is the crotch grab – at once insisting on a male appendage but 
also covering, concealing and denying and touch. Then there is the Billy Jean crouch – crouched down, 
hiding, diminishing in stature – but on tiptoes. There is the classic ‘arms out chorus stance’, all rock 
ballad torso, microphone in hand, head up… but with funky-chicken legs – all knock-knee’d and 
pigeon-toed. In the 1983 of Billie Jean performance he works wields these antimonies like a magician. 
All half-mime tricks (one white glove) half singer-dancer (gold microphone and sparkly socks). We see 
him throw dice, he takes an invisible comb out of his pocket, slick’s his hair fifties style, and replaces 
the imaginary prop. To do away with his trilby hat, the real prop he’d hide his doe-eyes under in later 
years vampiric mystique, he fakes the crowd. He snaps right, head jutting rightwards, arm held out the 
trilby presented to the right of the stage before snapping his right wrist, the hat flies across his body 
into the audience his left, he duped half the crowd, misdirection, a magician – body motion antinomies. 
459	David Stubbs, “The “King” is dead; long live everything else” in The Resistible Demise of  
Michael Jackson, 76. The sequence is steeped in flux, a penumbral indeterminacy. The only conviction 
is for its lack – the figure of Jackson qua schizophrenic, vacillating from grimace and grin. 
460 Stubbs, “The “King” is dead; long live everything else”, 76. 
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implacable, inordinate and inappropriate rage inherent in late Michael Jackson.’ 461 
The sequence finishes when, after smashing a glass bottle, a car’s windows and panes 
of glass on adjacent buildings, Jackson drops to his knees, rips his vest, crouches 
over, puts to hands on the floor and melts back into a panther. Stubbs’ comment 
‘inappropriate rage’ not only resonates with Frith’s discussion of inappropriateness 
and embrassment in performance but also his suggestion that as well as a performance 
involving a double enactment of star personality and song personality there is a 
second ‘complication’ of ‘the site of desire – as a body, and as a person’. 462 Frith 
notes that just as ‘discussions of voice and body are haunted by questions of sexuality. 
So are discussions of the body as body.’ 463 Thus, although the following comment 
does commence with a concern for singing, the sentiment, as Frith notes, goes for the 
body too. Frith writes: 
 
Singing, as an organization of vocal gestures, means enacting the protagonist 
in the song (the right emotions for the part), enacting the part of the star (the 
moves in keeping with the image), and giving some intimation of a real 
material being – a physical body producing a physical sound; sweat produced 
by real work; a physicality that overflows the formal constraints of the 
performance. 464 
 
Could it not be posited that the undercurrent of inordinate and inappropriate rage that 
Stubbs observes is, in this particular scene, overflowing? Isn’t this a scene whereby 
the site of desire, the body and its physicality, are foregrounded, over and above the 
‘double enactment’ of performance?  
Consider the role of voice within this routine. The spectacle of violence and the 
sexualized dance routine distract from voice within the video. At the start of the 
sequence we hear Jackson’s gibbering rasping staccato scatting along with his tapping 
																																																								
461 Ibid. Additionally, note the Jekyll and Hyde flips of intonation running through his lines. One 
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and shuffling footwork (an onomatopoeic Street-Fighter killer-combo phonic-
percussive counter-score). At the end of the sequence, as he drops to his knees, his 
screams, one is lead to believe explode a nearby neon hotel sign, sparks fly. As he 
continues to scream the luminous tubes come loose and the sign falls to the floor. It is 
implied that Jackson’s voice, his phonic wrath, had destructive force.  
But is it Jackson’s (human) voice? Between the less rage-drenched intro of his 
characteristic erratic/erotic popping, locking and taut-tap-dancing mechanicism – 
replete with a spat-whisper staccato adlib – and the raging finale of smashing, 
shouting and screaming through the set another voice is heard. 465  Stubbs notes that 
the scene is not accompanied by music; the only ‘soundtrack’ is a dual vocalization of 
Jackson and a grating feline yowl. Stubbs describes these sounds as ‘treated growls 
[…] half-panther, half-human.’ 466 The scene sounds the dual voice of both of 
Jackson’s corporeal visual iterations – one human, one panther. Jackson’s voice is 
overlaid with feline sounding growls; the sort of ripping snarl a panther might make. 
The street sequence is wordless but contains a cacophony of vocalizations, not all of 
which sound human. 
At the beginning of the sequence we see a domestic cat jump from a dustbin. It emits 
the classic back-alley stretched and torsional meow (another noir-trope). As Jackson’s 
popping and locking routine intensifies he emits his first demi-feline snarl – a metallic 
rasping drawl. He then makes the first crotch grab of the section. On top of a car, 
crowbarring through the windscreen, he emits a second pantheresque yowl. A second 
later, after the close up of a suggestive index finger crotch caress, he emits another 
torn snarl. After throwing a dustbin through a window he then stands atop a vent, a la 
Marilyn Monroe in The Seven Year Itch, and his shirt rises up and he strikes a number 
of poses. 467 Jackson then pluralizes in a visual-vertigo of infinite refrain; his voice is 
part wind howl part panther yowl. The steam clears and he runs and spins before 
dropping to his knees. He rips open his shirt and vest; the ripping sounds are overlaid 
with the sound of a pained cat, an animal noise. 
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The scene is Astaire-noir horror: quintessential Jackson. It carries through the genre-
horror themes of Thriller, with the following two – candidly titled in retrospect – 
albums Bad and Dangerous. 468  The half panther, half Jackson vocal may be 
auditioned as interspecies noise, a noise that evokes horror. In introducing voice – 
which is not one – a voice that is at once human and non-human, horror is evoked. A 
vocalization carrying noise of an unknown other inaugurates the epistemological 
crisis that defines, following Thacker, horror. In particular, this noise of an other, a 
plural corporeal noise – the grain of bodies. 
Barthes, in ‘The Grain of the Voice’, references ‘noise’ in a discussion comparing two 
sung deaths: that of Mélisande in Debussy’s Pelléas et Mélisande and of Boris’ 
Godunov’s death in Mussugorsky’s eponymous opera. Barthes’ text is taking a 
similar argumentative form, but of differing import, as his comparison of a prosaic 
and pheno-song mode of Dietrich Fischer-Dieskau and the more granular and geno-
song eroticism of Charles Panzéra. For Barthes neither of these death-song examples 
is erotic – each, he argues, is prosaic and standardized. Nonetheless, it is at this 
juncture he brings in the concept of noise. Barthes laments that Mélisande ‘dies 
prosodically’. 469 He writes:  
 
Mélisande dies without any noise (understanding the term in its cybernetic 
sense): nothing occurs to interfere with the signifier and there is no 
compulsion to redundance; simply, the production of a music-language with 
the function of preventing the singer from being expressive. 470  
 
																																																								
468 These two subsequent albums introduced a gangster sensibility to Jackson’s performances, lurking 
predation rehearsed and replayed. By the release of Black or White Jackson’s eyes were often hid 
behind a trilby hat in his performances. Pale, thinner, hiding in the shadows (biographically, 
choreographically and figuratively) he resembles a number of horror protagonists. Here, in human form 
in the street scene, wearing dark trousers and a shirt, he resembles a resurrected Eric Draven (The 
Crow, 1994) after ransacking a prohibition era film’s wardrobe (Smooth Criminal is essentially Marvel 
Comics villain Morbius the Vampire doing Bugsy Malone). In this context, that the other form Jackson 
adopts in the scene is that of a panther – an apex predator defined by its melanism – strikes as being 
one of hitherto overlooked significance. 
469 Barthes, Image-Music-Text, 187. 
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Barthes’ complaint about the death of Boris in Mussogorsky’s opera is that is 
‘expressive or, if preferred, hysterical; it is overloaded with historical, affective 
contents.’ 471  
Barthes noise is corporeal interference, the body interfering with the production of 
voice. Barthes writes: ‘The ‘grain’ is the body in the voice as it sings, the hand as it 
writes, the limb as it performs.’ 472 In each case it is the corporeal interfering with the 
mode of producing a performance, in terms of voice it is the voicer’s body adding 
additional sound over articulation. Barthes’ specific examples are Panzéra’s body 
interfering with the production of sung words (most notably consonants) and Wanda 
Landowski’s harpsichord playing that ‘comes from her inner body and not from the 
petty digital scramble of so many harpsichordists’. 473  Barthes’ epistemological 
certainty is striking; there is a surety in his sensing the body via the additional noise it 
adds to musical expression. He writes: ‘I know at once which part of the body is 
playing – if it is muscled like a dancer’s calves, the clutch of the finger-tips (…) or if, 
on the contrary, it is the only erotic part of a pianist’s body, the pad of the fingers 
whose ‘grain’ is so rarely heard’ 474 Barthes then suggests that the long playing record 
has flattened these corporeal frissons into pheno-text perfection (like Fischer 
Dieskau). Grain, for Barthes, is by no means exclusive to voice – it extends to all 
forms of music. But one thing is sure – the body from which ‘grain’ issues and is 
heard or felt in distinctly corporeal terms.  
The British music journalist, critic and author Simon Reynolds, in the essay ‘Noise’ in 
Audio Culture: Readings in Modern Music, describes the connection between noise 
and horror – effectively taking up the notion of Barthes’ grain/noise and arguing it to 
be a locus of horror. Reynolds claims noise and horror are both defined by a departure 
from meaning, that it is from such congruence that noise is horrific. Noise, Reynolds 
argues, in so far at is an unmeaning sound, is alloyed to horror. He writes: 
 
																																																								
471 Ibid., 186. One wonders of the dismay Barthes might feel where he to hear the clichéd phonic 
platitudes of television talent show singing – the standardized guttural retching to ‘punk-up’ covers, the 
overblown breathiness of faux intimate ballads or the blue-eyed-soul post-Winehouse tendency of 
evoke pathos with a vocal-fry affectation. 
472 Barthes, Image-Music-Text, 188. 
473 Ibid., 189. 
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Noise is about fascination, the antithesis of meaning. If music is a language, 
communicating moods and feelings, then noise is like an eruption within the 
material out of which language is shaped. We are arrested, fascinated, by a 
convulsion of sound to which we are unable to assign meaning. We are 
mesmerized by the materiality of music. This is why noise and horror go hand 
in hand – because madness and violence are senseless and arbitrary (…) and the 
only response is wordless – to scream. 475   
 
Later in the essay he couches the concept of noise as breakages in the voices of 
singers. Reynolds makes explicit reference to Jackson, before invoking Barthes’ 
formulation of grain in terms of ‘genotext over phenotext’. He writes: 
 
noise occurs in moments, tiny breakages and stresses dispersed all over the 
surface of music, all kinds of music. Maybe we should listen out for the noise in 
the voices of […] Prince, Michael Jackson – the way they chew and twist 
language not for any decipherable, expressive reason […], but for the gratuitous 
voluptuousness of the utterance itself. In their voices, you can hear a surplus of 
form over content, of genotext over phenotext, semiotic over symbolic, 
Barthes’s “grain” (the resistance of the body to the voice) over technique. 476 
 
The argument, that Jackson’s voice had grain, is, persuasive. However, consider the 
word, grain, qua jouissance as a further register of Jackson’s erotic horror. Grain, like 
the double reading of ‘Thriller’, the word itself may be heard as an inadvertent 
portmanteau of ‘grown’, ‘groan’ and ‘pain’. 477 Reynold’s employment of the term 
comes in during a narrative that is about noise qua unknown interference. He writes of 
grain as an ‘interference, something which blocks transmission (…) This dark, 
unimaginable matter of horror and sickness is a kind of cultural noise, causing a 
blockage and destabilization of the codes by which we make sense of the world.’ 478 
Here, Reynolds’ framing of grain as a noise is an interference that wreaks 
epistemological destabilization, bringing horror, departs from Barthes’ thesis. 
Barthes’ conception of grain is something that re-establishes corporeal relations 
																																																								
475	Simon Reynolds, “Noise”, Audio Culture: Readings in Modern Music, eds  
Christopher Cox and Daniel Warner (New York/London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2007), 57. 
476 Ibid., 58. 
477 The groans that result from the pain of bring grown. 
478 Ibid., 55, emphasis added. 
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through voice and yields frisson, jouissance and eroticism. Barthes uses the term 
noise, but as patina, something special or unique. There is no negative valence. In 
terms of Michael Jackson, there is both. On the one hand his staccato gnashing and 
scatting evoke the sense of the corporeal body – the groove and funk of his music that 
compels the body into animation. Mercer details the infectiousness of dance, the 
rhythmic dynamicism communicated (or felt) through Jackson’s voice.  
 
While the “grain” of the voice encodes the contradictions of sexual 
relationships, their pleasures and pain, the insistence of the rhythm is an open 
invitation to the body to dance. Dance, as a cultural form and erotic ritual, is a 
mode of decoding the sound and meaning generated in the music. In its 
incitement of the listener to dance, to become an active participant in the texture 
of voice, words and rhythm, soul music is not merely “about” sexuality, but is 
itself a musical means for the eroticization of the body 479   
 
Although this understanding of grain is closer to Barthes’, it differs in one striking 
aspect: rhythm. Rhythm is devoid from Barthes essay. Nonetheless, each text puts 
‘grain’ in terms of erotic relation between bodies. Barthes’ does so in terms of sound 
texture and patina whereas Mercer does so in terms of rhythm and movement. Each 
takes as a given a relation between bodies – known bodies. 
Reynolds, by contrast, denies this epistemological-corporeal certainty. Instead he puts 
‘grain’ in the context of something interfering. This formulation of ‘grain’ is more 
appropriate for the instances in Jackson that explore transitions between species. The 
panther yowl layered atop his anguished screams in the Black or White street-rage 
segment certainly sound as interference, sound from elsewhere, and are notably 
lacking any rhythmic or funky eroticism. This animal noise-grain erupting into 
Jackson’s voice is notable in another key music video – Thriller, where, again, 
Jackson transforms into a cat. 480 
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In the Black or White street segment, noise, as the interference of unknown bodies, 
can be taken in a plural guise: noises. There is a double interference of a large cat’s 
yowl overcoding Jackson’s own modulated cries. Additionally, there is the 
mechanical gibbering of Jackson’s scat, an oral percussive score amalgamated with 
his feet. To underscore Barthes’ deployment of noise as a cybernetic term, one sees 
Jackson’s pneumatic popping and locking as error: a robot going wrong before 
systemic psychotic breakdown. The scene follows a main sequence where a messianic 
Jackson morphs between multiple ethnicities and species, yet in the noir-lit street 
Jackson resembles a cyclone of post-Korova Astaire performance cues fused with a 
funky-chicken-glitching-strutting T-1000. Jackson’s in a funk. Imploding frustration, 
charged repressed sexualities and interspecies ambiguity are voiced in terms of 
Michael’s grain – a thematic Neverland of the groans of pain of being grown. Grain 
as horrific noise strikes an unnerving relevance: as a voicing of thrill: at once 
jouissance, horror, anguish, frustration, eroticism and violence. Jackson’s grain is the 
interference of not just a body, but bodies.  
An implication of this prospect of a pluraility of bodies in terms of horror will be 
summarized in the closing paragraph. Before this the noises of object a voice in erotic 
thrill shall be attended to; specifically the potentiality of object a voice to manifest as 
sonorous multiplicities from within and without a body.   
Late in Dolar’s book, in the ‘Freud’s Voices’ chapter (as has been touched on already 
see ‘Freud’s Vacuum’) Freud’s “A Case of Paranoia Running Counter to the 
Psychoanalytic Theory of the Disease” (1915) draws commentary. To recall, it 
concerns a young woman who, with fear of being photographed during infidelities 
hears ‘a click’ that interrupts proceedings. Dolar writes, in commentary on a 
commentary: ‘The prospect of lovemaking was interrupted by a mysterious sound, a 
noise, a click, a knock, a beat, a tick.’ 481 Dolar, after articulating how this noise is a 
retroactive interpretation of paranoia, writes: ‘The tiny noise, the inexplicable tick, is 
like a grain of desire, a small provocation which triggers off massive consequences. 
And to start with we could say: in the unconscious it doesn’t only speak, it ticks, and 
																																																																																																																																																														
The imagery of domestic cat to Tiger mirrors the Jackson 5 child coming of age and emerging as a 
young man – but, as soon as he does, he changes into a predatory cat. Chronologically, Thriller is the 
next instance of inter-species transformation, followed by Black or White. 
481 Dolar, A Voice and Nothing More, 131, emphasis added. 
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perhaps there is no ça parle without a ça cliquète.’ 482 Dolar’s stray into describing 
aural phenomena as grain and noise serves application here well. That the noise of the 
body and desire is presented in this turn as a minimal sonic expression, an austere, 
neat and concise tick, or click, is a notable register of the book’s recalcitrance to 
confront corporeality reflected in sonorous terms. Nonetheless, the last line is 
pertinent – the unconscious does not speak. There are a lot of noises and sounds 
between a mere click and full speech. Might the grain of desire be more than just a 
click? Dolar suggests that the click evokes Freud’s stereotypical primal fantasy of 
overhearing parental intercourse. Dolar then comments:  
 
The situation of the patient would thus be a displaced reenactment of a 
paradigmatic fantasy which is constructed entirely around the kernel of the 
voice, the grain of an inexplicable noise, a mysterious sound, which can appear 
even with the tiniest click. At the origin of fantasy there is a traumatic kernel 
materialized by the voice, the noise—we should allow full latitude here to a 
sonority not pertaining to language. 483 
  
Here, Dolar acquiesces to the possibility of ‘the object voice’ in sonorities not in 
service of speech extending beyond the minimalism and brevity of clicks, ticks and 
knocks. He does not go further. Let’s do so here with a drive to interpret the 
cacophony of inhuman growls, yowls and snarls in the wordless Black or White street 
scene.  
The immediate take would be to hear such noises as the further register of Jackson’s 
motel-room double valence thrill – a formative scene of horror whereby violence and 
libido reverberate. 484 Are these noises, of which the striking plurality adds weight to 
a biographical significance (brothers), a reenactment? 485 But this mode of application 
is not quite right; we are comparing a subject’s aural phenomenon (a hallucination, 
the click) to the highly developed group project of the music video. There are, 
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484 In continuation of this nocturnal rooting, the scene is a dream sequence departure from the main 
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485 Resonating with Laplanche. ‘that seduction, or a traumatic sexual exposure of the child, is indeed at 
the bottom not only of all hysteria but also of any subject formation.’ – Dolar, A Voice and Nothing 
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however, a number of equivalences to be drawn out. Both are scenes of non-human 
noises sounding within and without a body ridden with desire. It is in this modality 
that horror emerges. Is it not the plurality of ‘inhuman’ voices sounded through 
Jackson that lends the scene its horror?  
The click, in Freud’s case, comes from within and without: it is not a clitoral beat as 
Freud suggested or the clock’s ‘ticking’ as the subject supposed. Freud wrote that the 
subject ‘heard a noise like a click or a beat.’ 486 Is this line to be taken as meaning a 
series of clicks or the singular minimal instance of a click? Might a click, even with 
the singular determiner, also refer to a clicking of clicks? Object a voice here is one of 
pluralism, not ‘the object voice’ (singularly determined).   
The yowls and torsional vocalizations of the street scene, and the gnashing rabid 
scatting and percussive breaths, are atomized – are at once endogenous and 
exogenous vocal expressions. The cacophony can be read as symptomatic of desire’s 
insidious diffusion beyond a singular body. Dolar, in the closing section before his 
treatment of ‘the click’ (note his choice of the definitive singular) writes: the ‘drives 
don’t speak, although they make a lot of noise, they provide the clamor of life – but 
only the libido, Eros, whereas its counterpart, the mysterious death drive, keeps silent, 
invisible and inaudible, albeit omnipresent.’ 487 Is a clamor not an accumulation of 
noises; a panoply of sounds? The Black or White street scene is a scene of noisy 
drives as much as deathly silence; the misty and deserted moonlit street hosts a figure 
that is the locus and conduit of a plethora of noisy life.  Jackson is a vessel for voices 
that extend beyond the human singular. Here is the horror of desire sounded as non-
human plurality; object a voice from within and without: vox-exo. 
To explicate why this pluralism of voice is horrific, let’s return once more to Barthes. 
Barthes’ line that most succinctly defines the experience of grain is ‘the ‘grain’ is the 
body in the voice as it sings, the hand as it writes, the limb as it performs. (…) I am 
determined to listen to my relation with the body of the man or woman singing or 
playing and that relation is erotic – but in no way subjective.’ 488 Note the tonal shift 
that occurs when the first line is edited to reflect the pluralism of grain presented in 
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this analysis of Black or White ‘the bodies in the voices as they sing, the hands, the 
limbs’. 489 This is the horror of Black or White: granulatities not grain. Over and 
above the liminal explication of frustration (in a funk), the violence and sexualized 
performativity, the grain(s) of Jackson’s voice(s) are irreducible to a referent of a 
singular or fathomable body. 490 A voice of grains, patina from multiple bodies, noise 





489 Ibid., 183. 
490 Poizat’s highlight of the heterogenous character of Kundry in Wagner’s Parsifal holds a similar 
sentiment. There are numerous points of equivalence. He writes: ‘Wagner’s letters to Mathilde 
Wesendonck indicate that this character, a synthesis of several female characters who appear in 
Wolfram’s epic, represented an important breakthrough for him in the composition of the opera. But is 
Kundry truly one woman? She is first of all the Grail messenger: Kundry is an angel. But she is also 
the temptress, the sorceress, Klingsor’s slave and accomplice: Kundry is a demon. She thus represents 
in its purest form that image of The Woman ever present in opera, the privileged medium of The Voice 
in its purest embodiment  as object. It therefore comes as no surprise that her vocal score calls for cry, 
plaint, moan, and then the silence to which the entire third act confines her despite her continued 
presence on stage.’ (Poizat, The Angel’s Cry, 194.) 
491 This line added in 2019. It is difficult not to read the Black or White street-scene as a confessional 
antithesis to the video’s main theme of Jackson qua messianic man of all people. A theological reading 
is on the cards. Whereas much of the performance section sees Jackson in a white shirt at various 




This chapter continues the explication of corporeal horror in voice. It is the third in a 
trio of articulations. ‘Violence’ focused on the brutalizations voice wreaks upon the 
body whereas ‘Changes’ explored voice as a harbinger of unthinkable corporeal 
change. This chapter investigates the contagious and insidious nature of voice. 
Examining how voice moves through bodies, infects, possesses and proliferates 
serves to illustrate a third level of the intrinsic corporeal horror in voice: its 
insidiousness.	
 
Slimy and Wormy 
 
Here, the parallels between voice, slime and worms are drawn out. Surveying the 
symmetries voice has to these genre-horror props illustrates its excess and 
irreducibility. Voice is delimited from anthropic framings and re-couched in the mire 
of genre horror. Syntheses between voice qua object a, genre horror themes and 
horror of philosophy are produced. These syntheses are employed emphasize the 
inhuman modalities of voice. The text then moves to consider involuntary musical 
imagery (INMI); voice is framed as virus, something that worms (sometimes 





Old English slim "slime," from Proto-Germanic *slimaz (source also of Old 
Norse slim, Old Frisian slym, Dutch slijm "slime, phlegm," 
German Schleim "slime"), probably related to Old English lim "birdlime; sticky 
substance," from PIE root *(s)lei- "slimy, sticky, slippery" (source also of 
Sanskrit linati "sticks, stays, adheres to; slips into, disappears;" 
Russian slimak "snail;" Old Church Slavonic slina "spittle;" Old Irish sligim "to 
smear," leinam "I follow," literally "I stick to;" Welsh llyfn "smooth;" 
Greek leimax "snail," limne "marsh, pool, lake," alinein "to anoint, besmear;" 
Latin limus "slime, mud, mire," linere "to daub, besmear, rub out, erase"). As an 
insult to a person from mid-15c. Slime-mold is from 1880. 492 
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Phlegmy, slippery, sticky, smeary, muddy, fecal… The etymology of slime oozes 
material indeterminacy and filth: filth that is expelled and gets everywhere, excessive 
and uncontainable: contagious. Dross, gunge and scum that sticks and smears… The 
Latin limus refers to mud, slime and muck. It also refers to feces within the bowels, 
filth and pollution. 493 A plurality haunts the term. It never ends. There is always 
more. And it gets everywhere, from within and without. Slime shares a number of 
qualities with voice. 
In slime there is rampant vitality. The etymology is steeped in swampy gooey life: 
snails, marshes. This life is an excessive vitalism, an insidious life: a life that seeps, 
creeps and oozes. Such a life repulses; a repugnant life that brings a nauseous 
shudder, a horror.  
Voice is seldom described as slimy. A foreign force’s modulation of voice, the 
symptoms of ill-health, a virus or malady, are commonly described with an insistence 
on solid presence – rough, grating, gravelly or cracked calcify the sliminess of voice 
into a solidifying lexicon. There is, however, a particular archaic term that alludes to 
the slimy and viral nature of voice: Phlegmatic.‘“Any trade doing here?” he asked 
phlegmatically,” to lift an example from Thomas Hardy’s The Mayor of Casterbridge. 
494 Merriam-Webster defines the term as ‘resembling, consisting of, or producing the 
humor phlegm.’ 495 The following section details a series of connections, trails, 
smears and residues that contribute to the prospect that the term is unnervingly more 
apt than other adjectives that seek to frame voice with a determinably solid 
materiality. Voice, in its structural indeterminacy, its sliminess, is more phlegmatic 
than rough or gravelly. It seeps. It produces and proliferates, resounds and echoes. It 
infects like a virus or takes up residence like a parasite. Voice is a slimy phenomenon, 
more akin to a worm, a creepy-crawly, than anything solid or dry. Slimy phlegm is a 
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symptom of incorporeal life infecting and living in a host. Voice, too, ‘lives’ in and 
through us.  
In Slime Dynamics Ben Woodward explores the philosophical implications of slime. 
496  This slim(y), garishly verdant paperback broadly follows a similar line of 
argument as the opening chapters of Thacker’s In the Dust of this Planet: Horror of 
Philosophy Vol. 1. 497 Rather than focussing on demons, the foci are microbial, 
bacterial, viral and slimy. Slime, is proposed to be a material that confounds – 
something of horrifying ontological instability. Woodward glosses slime, viruses, 
bacteria and parasites as concepts that invoke a destabilizing uncertainty, an 
epistemological precariousness.  
A cultural similarity between slime and voice is the genre horror trend of referencing 
a supernatural presence. Each tends to be presented within a similar narrative context. 
An acousmatic voice, heard without the body being seen, is a popular methodology of 
registering and evoking a supernatural presence. Slime is deployed in horror fiction 
and film in much the same fashion. It is often a register of an unthinkable entity – 
ghouls and other supernatural entities and/or forces sometimes leave a slimy trail: 
ectoplasm. Slimer in Ghostbusters (whilst perhaps not the ur-example) is an example 
of this in popular culture. 498 
Woodward begins ‘The Nightmarish Microbial’ chapter by way of Stephen Jay 
Gould’s anti-anthropocentric remarks concerning how the human evolved from 
bacteria. Rather than privileging humans as the ‘peak’ of a linear and hierarchical 
evolutionary ‘progression’ Woodward echoes Gould’s point that ‘we are only an 
accidental outgrowth as a result of episodic and pointless addition.’ The 
anthropocentric privileging of the human (a complex organism that itself categorizes 
others (including its own) on the basis of arbitrarily perceived differences in form) is 
symptomatic of the fallacy that evolutionary progress is analogous to increasing 
biological complexity. Woodward, quoting Gould, writes:   
 
																																																								
496 Ben Woodward, Slime Dynamics (Winchester, UK: Zero Books, 2012). 
497	Eugene Thacker, In the Dust of this Planet: Horror of Philosophy Vol. 1. (Winchester, UK: Zero  
Books, 2011). 
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He goes on to say “Our impression that life evolves toward greater complexity 
is probably a bias inspired by parochial focus on ourselves, and consequent 
overattention to complexifying creatures, while we ignore just as many 
lineages adapting equally well by becoming simpler in form.” 499  
 
Delusions of anthropocentricism are not limited to evolutionary contexts. Such 
fallacies shade understandings of what life is. Decentering the human and accepting 
an entanglement with the world, negating the annexed throne of solo man – are 
potentialities wrought by slime, viruses and parasites. Exploring these prospects 
uncovers parallels of proliferation in voice, viruses, parasites and slime. Additionally 
the prospect aids the render of a resolutely inhuman voice – or rather, to parse the 
thought with a Lovecraftian shudder, the horrifying inhumanism of voice.  
Woodward writes, following some writings of Nick Land, Reza Negarestani and 
Eugene Thacker of a ‘radical or epidemic openess’. 501 One import of his move 
through these thinkers’ work is the horror of being confounded by forms of life that 
do not adhere to an anthropocentric presupposition of what life is. In a sense 
Woodward is posing the question of which terms we recognize and cognize as ‘life’. 
He writes of putrefaction and disease as forms of rampant life, an excess of life that 
not only ‘serve as an uncomfortable reminder of how tenuous our so-called dominion 
over nature turns out to be’ but also negate what we understand death to be. 502 ‘The 
microbial is not only a terrifying means of death (given its invisible nature) but also a 
killing of death itself, in the putrid obfuscation of contagion.’ 503  
This Mobius nature of vitalism is something that voice also harbours. In broad terms, 
is this not why voice is often posited as an eerie presence – a living death or a non-
living emanation of the living? Dolar notes the Klein bottle resonance of voice –
paradoxically at once vital and necrotic – in ‘The “Physics” Of The Voice’. 504 He 
writes of how voice is the ‘mere oscillation of air which keeps vanishing the moment 
it is produced, materiality at its most intangible and hence most tenacious form.’ 505 
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Intangible and tenacious; such adjectives apply to microbial life and viruses 
referenced in Woodward’s book. Dolar underscores the fold of life into death when he 
invokes the Latin phrase Verba volante, scripta manent (spoken words fly away, 
written words remain) – reversed by Lacan to propose that voice remains and letters 
fly. 506 Dolar, in this move, seeks to open out a vivre-mort paradox within the kernel 
of voice. The move is subtle. He writes: ‘The first obvious quality of voice is that it 
fades away the moment it is produced. Verba volante, scripta manent: Lacan reversed 
this classical proverb, since it is only the voice which remains there, on the spot where 
it was emitted and which it cannot leave,’ but then, consecutively, he adds in the 
vivre-mort fold: ‘where it is born and where it dies at the same moment’ 507 
Dolar, throughout A Voice and Nothing More, returns to this vivre-mort antinomy, 
this shudder-evoking indeterminacy of voice. It is close to a leitmotif in the writings 
of Dolar and Žižek. Žižek, repeatedly couches voice as ‘neither dead nor alive: its 
primordial phenomenological status is rather that of the living dead, of a spectral 
apparition that somehow survives its own death (…) the uncanny life of an undead 
monster’. 508 Dolar’s question of voice – ‘does it not know that it is dead?’– is a 
further reformulation of the horror of not knowing if something is dead or alive. 509  
Dolar’s question rests on the living dead/undead presupposition, but it immediately 
leads to a further question: do dead things ‘know’ they are dead? The undead emerges 
at the point at which Dolar presupposes an ontological consideration for a non-living 
entity. Voice, virus, putrefaction, slime and microbial nightmares – are a 
heterogeneous array of horrors that oscillate in the uncanny fold of being at once 
living and dead. They exist in the passage, the hyphen, of vivre-mort.   
The uncertain ontological status of such horrors is symptomatic of an anthropocentric 
epistemology for contemplating life, specifically a drive for a physically delineated 
view of life. It must be like us, with a clear border (and to recall Woodward’s use of 
Stephen Jay Gould, the more complicated the life form, the better). The intangibility 
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of voice confounds our expectations of clearly demarcated phenomena in much the 
same manner as the porous and insidious nature of viroid ‘life’. The physics of voice 
hold similarity with microbial life and viruses. Voice and viruses are physically vague 
in themselves and insidiously physical things in that they exist and move in and 
through us. Woodward writes: 
 
This horror is found in the physical framework of the virus itself. The 
curable/destructible confusion and the network obfuscation of virus 
transmission meet yet another ambiguity – one which is within the virus itself. 
Debate still continues over whether viruses are organic compounds 
(components of life) or forms of life themselves. (…) While viruses contain 
RNA or DNA they are not made of cells and replicate only by hijacking cells of 
organisms to spread themselves. 
Where the qualification of life may be difficult to place on the virus’ squirmy 
chained body, the event of disease is, as Eugene Thacker points out, even more 
complex as it functions on the macro level as an assemblage of living forms 
such as the case of the Black Death, “bacillicus-flea-rat-human.” 510 
 
Viroid life cannot be grounded in terms of physics. It is not a body in space, it 
certainly moves through space, it has effects and consequences, but it is irreducible to 
the anthropocentric view of living things.  
The modality of voice is viral. The literary scholar Steven Connor, in Dumbstruck: A 
Cultural History of Ventriloquism, opens his book with a now oft-quoted observation: 
‘voice comes and goes. For you, it comes from me. For me, it goes out from me.’ 511 
Such an observation, Connor’s ‘jump off’ for his treatise on ventriloquism, is as much 
to do with the intangibility and tenaciousness of ‘the “physics” of voice’ as it is to do 
with voice’s phenomenology being one of infectiousness and contagion. Not only 
does it seep, echo and bleed, sound and resound through acoustic space in ways we 
cannot see, touch or fathom: it does so, akin to a virus or parasite, in and through us.  
Žižek pastes ‘I hear myself speaking, yet what I hear is never fully myself but a 
parasite, a foreign body in my very heart. This stranger in myself acquires positive 
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existence in different guises’. 512 Voice is, once again, formulated as a form of 
inhuman life that infects, like a virus or parasite, and ‘lives’ in an inhuman modality. 
To worm, used as a verb, is ‘to achieve something by insidious procedure (usually 
followed by into).’ 513 The noun, worm, is defined as an ‘insidiously tormenting or 
devouring force.’ 514 In Merriam-Webster a horrific definition of the term ‘wormlike’ 
is provided: ‘something that torments or devours from within.’ 515 The figure of the 
worm has been used to describe the insidious nature of sound. Particularly ‘catchy’ 
songs, rhymes and jingles have been describes as ‘earworms’ – melodic voices that 
worm inside and get ‘stuck in the head’. The etymology of the term ‘earworm’ is 
vermiculated with themes of infection and incursion.  
A Merriam-Webster article about the etymology of the term ‘earworm’, “The Wriggly 
History of ‘Earworm’: I just can’t get you out of my head”, states that ‘earworm’ is a 
possible calque of the German Ohrwurm. The article goes on to elaborate how the 
term has an etymological history tied to corporeal incursion – the entry of one small 
organism into another. In part it is related to earwigs that were believed to crawl into 
human ears. 516 According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, the term – previously 
applied to a virulent pest that burrowed into the ears of corn – was subsequently 
applied to name the phenomena of INMI around the ‘late 1950s and early 1960s’. 517 
Jakubowski et al write of how ‘Involuntary musical imagery (INMI, also known as 
“earworms”) is the experience of a tune being spontaneously recalled and repeated 
within the mind.’ 518  
Oliver Sacks, in ‘Brainworms, Sticky Music and Catchy Tunes’, in Musicophilia: 
Tales of Music and the Brain, notes in parentheses that ‘One newsmagazine, in 1987, 
																																																								
512 Žižek, Gaze and Voice as Love Objects, 103. Certain text’s of Žižek are repeated in multiple books 
and essays. 
513 “Worm,” Dictionary.com, accessed April 6, 2018 http://www.dictionary.com/browse/wormlike  
514 “Worm-like,” The Free Dictionary, accessed 7 April, 2018, 
https://www.thefreedictionary.com/worm-like  
515 “Wormlike,” Merriam-Webster, accessed 6 April, 2018, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/wormlike 
516 “The Wriggly History of ‘Earworm’: I just can’t get you out of my head”, Merriam-Webster, Word 
History. Accessed June 6, 2018. https://www.merriam-webster.com/words-at-play/earworm-meaning-
origin 
517 Ibid. 
518 Jakubowski, K. and Finkel, S. and Stewart, L. and Mu︎llensiefen, D. 'Dissecting an earworm: 
Melodic features and song popularity predict involuntary musical imagery.' Psychology of Aesthetics, 
Creativity, and the Arts. Vol 11 (2), May 2017, 122-135. 
	 186	
defined them, half facetiously, as “cognitively infectious musical agents.”’ 519 The 
chapter title references worms – but it also employs two adjectives. ‘Sticky’ evokes 
the putrid and slimy, whereas ‘Catchy’ is common parlance for contagiousness. Such 
a definition of INMI, as infectious agents, as beings with their own agency, runs 
along the vermiform theme possibilities of voice explored here. Let’s consider the 
anxiety of the ear, its vulnerability to an entity, an agency, of insidious coming and 
going. 
There is an obvious entomological etymology at play within the term. Earworm refers 
to a non-human insect that was feared to worm, crawl or creep its way into the ears of 
those asleep (or another vulnerable plant organism such as the anthropomorphized 
‘ears’ of corn). The Merriam-Webster article closes by citing the popular horror writer 
Stephen King, who, it argues, popularized the term that had been in English use since 
the 1980s. A biographical confession from an article of King’s is employed in the 
article. It is lifted from ‘Stephen King on songs that stick in your head’, first 
published in Entertainment Weekly. King writes:  
 
A couple of months ago, I woke up at three in the morning, thirsty as hell 
(probably because I’d donated blood the day before), and shambled into the 
bathroom for a glass of water. I was 20 percent awake at best. And as I turned 
on the faucet, I realized I was singing this: “They say a man should always 
dress/For the job he wants/So why’m I dressed up like a pirate/In this 
restaurant?” 
 
Dear God, I thought, I’ve been infected by an earworm. 
 
My friend the Longhair says that’s what you call songs that burrow into your 
head and commence chewing your brains. The dreaded earworm can turn even a 
great song into something you’d run from, screaming at the top of your lungs. If 




519 Oliver Sacks, Musicophilia: Tales of Music and the Brain (New York/Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf, 
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520	King, Stephen. ‘Stephen King on songs that stick in your head’ Entertainment Weekly. April 17, 
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It is apt that Merriam-Webster point to one of the most successful living horror 
writers to define sonic earworm. The entomological etymology of common parlance 
for INMI is a series of prescient referents to the equivalence worms and worming 
agents have to the physics of audition – the ears are open orifices.  
The Canadian composer, writer and environmentalist R. Murray Schafer writes the 
‘sense of hearing cannot be closed off at will. There are no earlids. When we go to 
sleep, our perception of sound is the last door to close and is also the first to open 
when we awaken.’ 521 This acute and succinct observation of Schafer’s nestles in the 
‘Ears and Clairaudience’ section of the introduction to The Soundscape: Our Sonic 
Environment and the Tuning of the World (originally published in 1977). The 
argument in this turn is that clear and focused hearing is an accomplishment and not a 
given, that much of the western world (due to privileging the eye over the ear amidst a 
noisy industrialized environment) has lost sensitivity and attentiveness of hearing. 
The section finishes by citing the media theorist Marshall McLuhan and commenting 
on noise pollution. Schafer writes: ‘The very emergence of noise pollution as a topic 
of public concern testifies to the fact that modern man is at last becoming concerned 
to clean the sludge out of his ears and regain the talent for clairaudience – clean 
hearing.’ 522 
The ear’s over exposure to sonic material – one might say, disparagingly, detritus – is 
noted with subjective tone by Sacks in the closing paragraph of ‘Brainworms, Sticky 
Music and Catchy Tunes’, his chapter on earworms. The passage, moves from tut-
tutting observation of the democratization and portability of listening practices to 
lamenting the contemporary prevalence of music being piped into public spaces 
before finally implying we are swimming in the seas of sonic effluvia where there is 
an omnipresence of catchy worms that arrive unbidden. 523 He writes: 
 
Half of us are plugged into iPods, immersed in daylong concerts of our own 
choosing, virtually oblivious to the environment—and for those who are not 
plugged in, there is nonstop music, unavoidable and often of deafening 
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intensity, in restaurants, bars, shops, and gyms. This barrage of music puts a 
certain strain on our exquisitely sensitive auditory systems, which cannot be 
overloaded without dire consequences. One such consequence is the ever-
increasing prevalence of serious hearing loss, even among young people, and 
particularly among musicians. Another is the omnipresence of annoyingly 
catchy tunes, the brainworms that arrive unbidden and leave only in their own 
time—catchy tunes that may, in fact, be nothing more than advertisements for 
toothpaste but are, neurologically, completely irresistible. 524 
 
The vulnerability of the aural orifice is laid heavy. Consider the vocabulary employed 
to propose the ear’s always-open exposure to sounds. The ear is impuissant to 
pollution, to unwanted incursions that leave it dirtied and unclean (the vocabulary of 
McLuhan and Sacks is thematically undifferentiated form that of slime and scum). 
There is also a distinct subtext of contagion, of unwanted exogenous sonic muck 
incurring, penetrating or creeping, into the ear. The sentiment, in terms of the always-
open ear and the fear of external filth, unfolds in disconcerting synchrony with the 
definitions of the earworm. Earwigs, earworms, are carriers of filth that threaten to 
worm into the body through the ear. Likewise, sound, the noise pollution so prevalent 
in much of modern life, is conveyed in terms of filth: a noise that incurs unwanted 
into one’s ears. Ugh! It gets everywhere! 
Published two years before Schafer’s The Soundscape: Our Sonic Environment and 
the Tuning of the World, Robert Erickson’s Sound Structure of Music carries the same 
sentiment concerning the vulnerability of aural orifices. In the first chapter, Robert 
Erickson writes: ‘We cannot close our ears; we have no ear lids. When a sound is loud 
enough, or especially meaningful – one’s name, a baby’s cry – one may react to it 
though asleep. Sounds that are unimportant to us are ignored, asleep or awake, even 
when quite loud.’ 526 The passage harbors anxiety for sounds that creep into the ear. 
Echoing the anxieties of nocturnal earwigs wandering into our heads. It is, following 
Sacks, dreadful that the ear is subjected to a cacophony (the prefix of fecal 
denigration) of sonic effluvia, but it is doubly unsettling that, like the prospect of the 
nocturnal earwig, we may well not, or are not, aware of penetration. Due to the 
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structural openness of the ear, anything and everything can incur into us (awake or 
not).  
Some sounds warrant conscious attention precisely because they cannot be placed. 
Sonic effluvia may register something unknown. Erickson writes: ‘When we hear a 
strange sound – thinking “What was that?” – we focus upon it, listen carefully, wait 
for a repetition. We try to identify it. Once it has been identified we relax.’ 528 
David Toop, in ‘Chair Creaks, But No One Sits There’ in Sinister Resonance: The 
Mediumship of the Listener, elaborates on this anxiety. He opens the ‘Floor Ee-
Creaks’ sub-section by recounting two occasions his home was invaded and burgled 
at night (in itself a satisfying biographical and (un)homely meta-text to the 
vulnerability of the ear – the ‘last door to close’, as Schafer terms it). 529 In addition to 
the staging of (h)ear-qua-house resonance, an ever vulnerable opening, there is a 
nocturnal gothic horror staging that recalls Nietzsche’s aphorism 250 from Daybreak: 
Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality: 
 
Night and music – the ear, the organ of fear, could have evolved as greatly as it 
has only in the night and twilight of obscure caves and woods, in accordance 
with the mode of life of the age of timidity, that is to say the longest human age 
there has ever been: in bright daylight the ear is less necessary. This is how 
music acquired the character of an art of night and twilight. 530 
 
Toop’s passage focuses on the nature of sounds that sound when one is asleep or 
slumbering in a liminal dozy state. The second recollection of burglary by Toop, 
highlights the question of what or how ‘unheard’ sounds awaken. The sounds, in this 
instance, are not vocal, he is dealing with the domestic disturbances of locks being 
sprung open and creaking floorboards. Nonetheless, each is an instance of a human 
sound incurring into an other via the ear that, seemingly, fails to sleep and close like 
other senses. Voice, in Sinister Resonance: The Mediumship of the Listener, is a 
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literary elephant in the room. Toop’s array of haunting and eerie sounds is 
overwhelmingly vocal. Similar to the sentiments of Schafer and Erickson detailed 
previously, the passage’s somnolent pre-text evokes the nocturnal fear of the earwig 
and incurring into always-open ears. The human cephalic organization can be squared 
with the break-in points of the home. Toop writes: 
 
I was woken during the night by a burglar who had sprung the lock on the front 
door and was at that moment stealing my wallet downstairs. Thought I had no 
consciousness of hearing a sound I knew there was an alien presence within the 
familiarity and security of my private place, my home. I walked to the top of the 
stairs, not knowing why, and saw a man run out of the front door. Some mystery 
surrounds the question of why we wake when we do, not always the noise of a 
drunk in the street or the breaking of a window. A terse passage of dialogue 
from Cormac McCarthy’s novel, The Crossing, encapsulates this mystery: 
 
What woke you? he said 
You did. 
I didn’t make a sound. 
I know it. 531 
    
Later in the section, Toop glides from detailing a house-door-room-cochlea 
continuum to propose that such a harbinger of ‘threat, unease, disturbance, fear (…) 
enters in the way of an animal or insect: mouse, rat, spider, cockroach, fly, wasp, 
woodworm or the uncanny ticking of death-watch beetles’. 532  
The term earworm registers the horror of an exogenous thing entering the body: the 
penetrative ability of sound to be heard without consent. 533 As Toop underscores, via 
a distinctly horror-laden and ominous vocabulary, there is always the question of what 
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gets in. Not only have we no agency over sonic incursion, but frequently unidentified 
foreign objects, when they do appear on the radar of consciousness, signal a horror – 






This section focuses on the torment of vocal contagion. On a number of levels this 
text is a continuation of the previous section. Voice, in particular as it resounds as 
INMI, is framed here as parasitic pathogen. Themes of torment, contagion and 
possession are employed to underscore the similarities between voice and bacteria or 
viroid life forms. Further distancing voice from an anthropocentric framing. After a 
brief framing of vocal contagion, examples of popular music earworms – contagious 
melodic voices that stubbornly lodge in one’s head – are introduced. 
 
Voice is a foreign object, sometimes identified, sometimes unidentified, by vulnerable 
aural orifices it creeps into. Vox-exo qua ‘insidiously tormenting or devouring force.’ 
534 Something that ‘devours from within.’ 535 Voice has a penetrative modality with a 
concomitant risk of contagion. 536  The potential for a vocal earworm to infect the 
mind is a recurring theme in popular music. Such music is often described in folk 
parlance as containing an infectious or catchy hook.  
Empirically observed examples of vocal contagion are found in affective empathy 
studies and/or emotional contagion studies. Many of these studies focus on voice as 
both the medium and evidence of emotional contagion. The mode of contagion 
proliferation is vocal-aural-vocal. Kari Weil in “Empathy”, in The Edinburgh 
Companion to Animal Studies, addresses empathy in terms of its general submission 
to the affective turn. A trend, somewhat bolstered by advances in neuroscience, which 
adds to the project of rendering previously ‘human’ traits (such as empathy) as pre-
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conscious affects akin to nervous reflexes the human shares with other animals. Weil 
provides a commentary on the Dutch primatologist and ethologist Frans De Waal’s 
arguments in The Bonobo and the Atheist. She writes ‘De Waal argues that our 
capacity for empathy, and indeed for morality, is not what separates us from non-
human animals, but rather is grounded in our biology and derived from our primate 
origins.’ 537  Weil’s continued commentary on how De Waal’s work contributes to the 
decentering of the subject is worth following a little further: 
 
De Waal’s work highlights the key role that empathy plays in the affective (or 
counter-linguistic) and ethical turns in critical theory (…) A return to the body 
and the pre-cognitive as the material ground of emotions, the affective turn 
often relies upon evidence from neuroscience. For example, mirror neurons, 
which make one imitate or feel the expressions seen on another, were first 
discovered in macaques. ‘Putting it in neuroscience language, we activate neural 
representations of motor actions in our own brain similar to the ones we 
perceive or expect in the other. That we do so unconsciously has been tested 
with facial expressions on a computer screen.’ Whereas science used to think of 
empathy as a cognitive skill, De Waal explains, we now know better: ‘humans 
don’t decide to be empathic; they just are’ 538 
 
This couching of empathy as non-conscious and neuro-biologically based eliminates 
empathy from the shrinking cart of uniquely human traits. Weil’s thread leads to a 
dethroning of the traditional markers of what it is to be human that in turn lead one to 
appreciate that animals such as dogs may be better empathic readers than many 
human animals.  
Within the eliminativist materialism project, affect and emotional contagion studies 
that pivot around voice are useful in approaching a conception of voice that lives in 
and through arbitrary bodies with open aural and oral orifices that serve its 
proliferation. Such studies illustrate affective contagion of voice. This contagion is 
not only symptomatic of the vulnerability of the ear to sound, but also details how a 
voice lives on, and is sounded out, via the bodies it spread through.  
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The social psychologist Daniel C. Batson writes how, in 1976 Sagi and Hoffman  
 
presented one- to two-day-old infants either with tape-recorded sounds of 
another infant crying, with sounds of a synthetic nonhuman cry, or with no 
sounds. Those infants presented with another infant’s cry cried significantly 
more than those presented with a synthetic cry or with silence. 539  
 
Batson presents this study as evidence of vocally induced and manifested empathy as 
pre-conscious. His argument is an eliminativist materialist posing of the crying infant 
to be a body responding in accord to its survival. He likens the infants to tweeting 
birds in a nest, competing for the attention that coincides with nourishment. Batson 
firstly poses what look and sound like empathic vocal reactions as human 
competitiveness: ‘crying in response to another infant’s cry may be a competitive 
response that increases the chances of getting food or comfort. (The infants in the 
Sagi and Hoffman study were tested 1 to 1-1/2 hours before feeding time.)’ 540 Before 
reinterpreting the scenario in the figure of a different species. He then poses a 
hypothetical scenario: ‘imagine that we did a similar study using baby birds in a nest. 
We would not likely interpret the rapid spread of peeping and open-mouth straining 
once one baby bird starts peeping and straining as a rudimentary empathetic reaction.’ 
541  
Affective empathy studies such as these – and interpretations such as Batson’s – focus 
on voice as both medium and symptom of contagion lend an evidenced explication for 
the render of voice as a inhuman mode of contagion (particularly something 
autonomous from conscious thought and agency). Reframing voice as inhuman 
contagion is not the drive of such studies, nor the commentary from Weil, De Waal or 
Batson: they have different foci. Nonetheless, this emergent secondary import of such 
studies falls into a history of voice being detailed as a contagious agent. Additionally, 
such such studies negate traditional markers of the human: faculties of self-control, 
agency and conscious thought.  
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The Sagi and Hoffman study rests on technological playback of voice. It shares this 
technics with popular music. From the dissemination of standardized notation (itself a 
subset of post-Gutenberg technology) to the mechanical developments of the 
phonograph and gramophone, to telegraphy and electromagnetic modes of 
transmission right up to the vinyl-tape-CD-MP3/internet/vinyl aural smorgasbord of 
contemporary music distribution, some form of technology, has been a prerequisite 
that both shapes, sounds and resounds popular music. The relationship of voice and 
technology is far too broad a theme to survey at this turn. Yet a brief consideration of 
how vocal earworms in popular music are sounded (in the widest sense) through 
technology leads to an obvious analogy thematic questions of contagion, infection and 
proliferation. 542 
Technologically afforded disseminations of voice in popular music shares modality 
with how viroid life lives (and kills) through progressions in technological networks 
or commerce. In terms of how a voice lives and infects, proliferates and spreads – 
through a global network of commerce, via differing technological advances of the 
ages, before finally passing into the head of a host body through an open orifice – 
there is little distinguish it from a virus or bacterium that has lived through humans 
and other animals. Woodward, in Slime Dynamics, describes how ‘[t]he virus, the 
viroid, the deadly bacterium, all crept into center stage prior to the turn of the 
twentieth to twentieth first century.’ 543  He elaborates the equivalence: ‘The vague 
swarming of the deadly microbial and subsequent paranoia emerged alongside the rise 
of a globalized and interconnected world, where proximity and speed elevated the 
potency and spread of contagion.’ 544  Woodward quotes Thacker: ‘“Microbes 
establish networks of infection within a body, and networks of contagion between 
bodies, and our modern transportation systems extend that connectivity across 
geopolitical borders.”’ 545 Appreciate the echo of acoustics: the plurality of voices 
being transmitted across the same borders by technology.  
The spread of bacteria or transfer of viroid ‘life’ is structurally analogous to the 
dissemination of voice via phonographic and tele/cyber-phonographic methods. The 
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haunted record or supernatural presence registered via telephonic means are horror 
trope analogues to the structural equatabilities of voice and virus. 546 Barbara Engh, in 
‘Adorno and the Sirens’, in drawing up a history of gendered telephonic bodies, 
touches on this technologically afforded contagion. She writes of Edison, ‘raising the 
voices from the dead’. 547 Edison, opened a gateway, a new space of where voices 
might sound. However, as Engh notes, the new aural and vocal space Edison opened 
up did not usurp the written word as he imagined. Engh describes how Edison 
predicted that the phonograph would do more for the poor than the printing press, that 
it would ‘replace the newspaper [and] elimate the position of secretary-typist’. 548 
Engh writes of how the most overlooked capacity of the machine would be the basis 
of its commercial viability:  
 
Although its inventors had imagined that it would also record sound, the 
phonograph’s commercial viability turned out to consist in its playback 
function, of mass-produced music. Capital prevailed in the form of the record 
industry, for as long as people produced their own recorded materials, the 
market for the phonograph was limited. 549  
 
There is a gloss to be made here concerning Capital’s genocide of folk-voice and 
common vocality. Disemminating technologies have, since the phonograph’s 
commercial rise usurped and eradicate local musics and familiar music production 
and installed mass marketed and produced vocals in their place. 550  Recalling 
Woodward’s comments, the equivalence of popular music and technologically 
disseminated diseases, is structurally evident on a number of levels. Passage through a 
global network culminates in an airborn interaction subject to proximity. The popular 
music earworm is a phonic equivalent of a virus’ insidiousness and proliferation 
through globalized interconnectedness and militarized bio-warfare. 551   Radio, 
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television, CDs, mp3s and internet platforms for disseminating popular music are, in a 
sense, new avenues viral voice may be spread through just as increased air-travel and 
commercial global interconnectedness increasingly disseminates species to new 
territories. 552 
Stewart et al’s “Dissecting an Earworm: Melodic Features and Song Popularity 
Predict Involuntary Musical Imagery” examines pop songs likelihood to produce 
INMI, in 3,000 participants. 553 The study was limited (in order to address recency 
and popularity factors) to songs that had been in the UK Singles chart (thus ruling out 
advertising jingles, classical music or children’s songs). Of the 1,558 charting songs 
mentioned, the most frequently mentioned, 33 times, was Lady Gaga’s “Bad 
Romance”. Kylie Minogue’s “Can’t Get You Out of My Head” was the second most 
frequently mentioned charting pop song in the study – mentioned 24 times. 554  Studies 
such as these bring with them a number of presuppositions and impositions. Despite a 
number of studies addressing how, where and why the data sets are considered and 
evaluated, the concluding remarks tend to be exported into journalistic 
generalizations. One must only regard the findings as limited to the data set. A 
particular territory’s popular music singles sales chart is subject to many factors of 
control, censorship and doctoring. Further to this, a fixation on melodies that adhere 
to Western standardized notation is a further paradigm that warrants such findings to 
be regarded as acute and contextual (contra the objective sheen granted to them in 
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/aca0000090. NB. Minogue’s biggest hit registers the insidious nature of 
catchy pop melodies – at once an industry insider’s brag of the music ‘going viral’ and a sentiment of 
infatuation. “Kylie Minogue’s Official Number 1 Singles’ Sales Revealed!,” Official Charts, accessed 
September 22, 2016, http://www.officialcharts.com/chart-news/kylie-minogue-s-official-number-1-
singles-sales-revealed-__3849/  
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common discussions). Infection does not heed borders, nationalities or standardization 
– to approach the subject of earworms and their capacity for sonic infection within 
such limits is problematic.  
Woodward’s observation regarding the globalization of infection as a result of 
increasingly interconnected commercial networks presupposes a contagion moves 
through non-human network. Proliferation and contagion is not subject to 
anthropological structures, but will spread through networks of human making. 555 
There are, of course, different strains and types of infection. Cholera, for example, is 
caused by a number of different bacterium (Vibro cholerae). There is no Spanish 
Cholera. To ask such a question is to narrow the scope of enquiry so that evaluations 
can adhere to a distinct set of presuppositions, a paradigmatic approach. The 
narrowing scope of such evaluation is exemplified by the following lines from 
Stewart et al concerning an ‘anomaly’ in the melodic feature extraction stage of the 
study:  
 
The full melody line of each of the 202 songs (including all verses, repetitions, 
etc.) was also extracted for use in some of the subsequent analyses. During this 
process, it was noted that one INMI tune (“Funky Cold Medina”) was 
comprised primarily of spoken words rather than a melody line. As such, this 
song and its matched non-INMI tune were excluded from subsequent analysis. 
556 
  
Thus, because a reported earworm, an INMI, “Funky Cold Medina” did not match the 
musical paradigm the authors sought to work with, it was excluded from further 
consideration and evaluation. The track in question is a vocal track consisting of 
spoken words, a rap by Tone Loc with a minimal percussive backing track and 
electric guitar samples – a proto nu-metal hip-hop rock skeleton. The elision of Tone 
Loc’s rap from the study points firstly how elusive the properties of earworm are. The 
phenomena of IMNI, what makes a song catchy, is shrouded in more mystique than 
viruses, pathogens and bacteria. The material properties and protocols of proliferation 
																																																								
555 Woodward, Slime Dynamics, 14. 
556 Stewart, L et al “Dissecting an Earworm: Melodic Features and Song Popularity Predict Involuntary 
Musical Imagery”, 127. 
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and infection are better understood in the interest of healthcare. Secondly, Tone Loc’s 
rap raises the question of voice. Earworms are often voiced, not merely musical, not 
merely speech, but a voiced manifestation of what Dolar considers the two 
obfuscatory modes of voice. How often is it the musical lyric that lodges and repeats 
in one’s head? Voice harbors a lacuna of contagious, possessive, influence over the 






Parasites & Earworms 
 
Here, the survey of INMI shifts to literature and film. These examples of vocal 
contagion then lead into a sketch of Ophiocordyceps Unilateralis, a parasite that 
compels host bodies to behaviors that expedite reproduction. This array of examples 
of vocal contagion is posited as sharing a modality to the aural hallucinations Lacan 
spoke of. The text concludes by impressing the symmetries of object a voice, INMI 
and parasites. These equivalences are posited as registers of the urgency of the body 
in voice, at each turn there is corporeal horror: voice moving, infecting and living 
through bodies. 
 
In William Burroughs’ 1967 novel The Ticket That Exploded, he describes the word 
as a virus. The description is potted with adjectival choices that not only evoke the 
word as something that invades and infects, but also something that makes one ill. He 
compares the word to a flu-virus. Reading the passage today, one cannot help but 
regard the passage as holding an eerie prescience for the human immunodeficiency 
virus (HIV, first clinically observed in 1981) that would be signaled, with striking 
symptomatic resonance, by flu-like symptoms. Burroughs writes, parsing the word as 
virus, drawing a parallel of its co-opting of the respiratory apparatus and underscoring 
its capacity to infect the brain: ‘The word is now a virus. The flu virus may once have 
been a healthy living cell. It is now a parasite organism that invades and damages the 
lungs. The word may once have been a healthy living cell. It is now a parasitic 
organism that invades and damages the central nervous system.’ 557 
Mark Twain’s short story, A Literary Nightmare (1876), contains an example of a 
textual earworm, a voice of words that infects, like a language virus. Twain’s story 
describes a contagious voice that never sounds but leaps from printed word to 
repetitious mental torment through the eye. Nonetheless, despite the voice being 
unsounding, its symptoms are distinctly corporeal and horrific voice. The short story, 
told in first person, details a rhyme that lodges within the narrator’s consciousness 
after he reads them in a newspaper. Mark, the protagonist, in the first line, asks the 
reader (of male pronoun) to read the offending lines: ‘Will the reader please to cast 
																																																								
557 William Burroughs, The Ticket That Exploded (London, UK: Penguin, 2014), 56. 
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his eye over the following lines, and see if he can discover anything harmful in 
them?’ 558 Then the ‘jingling rhyme’ is detailed in text. It goes like this: 
 
“Conductor, when you receive a fare, 
Punch in the presence of the passenjare! 
A blue trip slip for an eight-cent fare, 
A buff trip slip for a six-cent fare, 
A pink trip slip for a three-cent fare, 
Punch in the presence of the passenjare! 
CHORUS 
Punch, brothers! punch with care! 
Punch in the presence of the passenjare!” 559 
 
Every sound reminds him of the ditty. He tries to distract himself from the incessant 
earworm, he goes for a walk but this doesn’t dispel the parasitic rhyme. The narrator 
is a writer, just like Stephen King and his famous part-biographical scribe-grump Jack 
Torrance in The Shining. 560 The much-parodied repetition of ‘All Work and No Play 
Makes Jack a Dull Boy’ manic symptom in Kubrick’s adaptation is not in the novel. 
561  But there is a similarity, prompting one to contemplate the continuum of writers 
writing about writer’s problems. Like Torrance (and one might quip writers generally 
– ed.), Mark, is easily distracted. For when he goes to write he can only write out the 
tormenting lyrics. He is a vessel doomed to parrot and echo the contagious text. 562  
																																																								
558 Mark Twain, The Best Short Stories of Mark Twain (Modern Library Classics) (New York, USA. 
Modern Library/Random House, 2004), 67. 
559 Ibid., 67. 
560 Stephen King, The Shining; Carrie; Misery: Three Novels In One Volume (London, UK: Chancellor 
Press, 1992). 
561 The Shining. Digital File. Directed by Stanley Kubrick. UK/USA: Warner Brothers/Hawk Films, 
1980. 
562 This symptom, of course, resonates with Burrough’s concept of language being a virus. It can, 
additionally, be read as a fantastic and exaggerated example of how filler words and ticks (the parallel 
with the small arachnid parasitiforme intended) plague one whose vocation is conducted in the medium 
of word (explored briefly in “Accelerations and speed limits: An essay on the vocal limits of 
semiocapitalism”). To embed a contemporary tick of irking semantic antinomy in Burroughs’ line: 
‘Language is, like-literally, a virus.’ From ‘y’know’, ‘um’, ‘like-literally’, to the managerial verbal-
excess of pseudo-Deleuzian abstraction (‘irregardless’, ‘moving forwards’ ‘scope’, ‘granularities’) or, 
on campus, the halting baroque pedagogy of ‘let us, then, now, unpack the problematic implicit in such 
a dialectic’. There is also, Freud’s problematic tick thesis concerning feminine sexuality – the clitoris 
couched in horological synthesis.  
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This is precisely what Sacks observes in Twain’s short story, he writes of a narrator 
‘rendered helpless after encountering some “jingling rhymes”’. 563 He then quotes the 
passage that best deals the contagion and torment of the rhyme: 
 
They took instant and entire possession of me. All through breakfast they went 
waltzing through my brain. . . . I fought hard for an hour, but it was useless. My 
head kept humming. . . . I drifted downtown, and presently discovered that my 
feet were keeping time to that relentless jingle. . . . [I] jingled all through the 
evening, went to bed, rolled, tossed, and jingled all night long. 564  
 
Some time later Mark, looking ill, tired and vacant, meets a friend, Rev. Mr. ———, 
for a walk. As they walk Rev. Mr. ——— talks constantly but Mark is plagued by the 
jingle and cannot concentrate on the conversation. The catchy jingle is so plaguing 
that he cannot listen or answer his companion. Mark can only repeat the lyrics, 
entranced, zombie-like, cursed. Here he passes the jingle on, it transfers, like the 
‘third type’ of demon referenced by Thacker, ‘the word-of-mouth among the people, 
which itself spreads like a disease.’ 565 Mark, murmurs the jingle absentmindedly 
before noticing that the curse has transferred: 
 
The Rev.  Mr. ——— turned a lack-luster eye upon me, drew a deep sigh, and 
said, without animation, without apparent consciousness: 
"Punch, brothers, punch with care!  Punch in the presence of the passenjare!" 
A pang shot through me as I said to myself, "Poor fellow, poor fellow! he has 
got it, now." 566 
 
The catchy jingle, like viroid life that lives through a multitude of organisms (i.e. The 
Black Death “bacillius-flea-rat-human”) is manifested as, and via, an assemblage of 
bodies. 567 The jingle exists through Mark and The Reverend. Much like parasites that 
move from one host to another, the insidious ditty can take up residence in another.  
																																																								
563 Sacks, Musicophilia, 43. 
564 Ibid. 
565 Thacker, In The Dust of This Planet: Horror of Philosophy Vol. 1, 28. 
566 Twain, The Best Short Stories of Mark Twain (Modern Library Classics), 68-69. 
567 Woodward, Slime Dynamics, 18. 
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The transfer (exorcism of one and infection for another) operates via voice. The 
remainder of Twain’s story details the woes of The Rev. Mr. ——— who, at a funeral 
speaking engagement, cannot speak but only mutter the lines of the jingle.  
The Reverend confides in Mark and resigns himself to a life of torment. ‘Something 
tells me that my tongue is doomed to wag forever to the jigger of that remorseless 
jingle.  There—there it is coming on me again: a blue trip slip for an eight-cent fare, a 
buff trip slip for a—"’ 568 Mark notes how the Reverend‘s murmurings grew faint and 
he sank into a peaceful trance, some respite from the jingly torment. Luckily for the 
Reverend, Mark (who one feels should take responsibility for his friend’s suffering, it 
was, after all, a consequence of his own relief, inadvertently passing the jingle on) 
saves him from admittance to asylum. Mark is now savvy to the jingle’s modus 
operandi – it exists through transfer. It cannot be got rid of, but can be passed on. 
Exorcism of the jingle is always a matter of contagion – of transmitting it to another 
host. Sacks, in his commentary on Twain’s story, details the passage of infection, 
moving through bodies and minds, succinctly: ‘narrator meets an old friend, a pastor, 
and inadvertently “infects” him with the jingle; the pastor, in turn, inadvertently 
infects his entire congregation.’ 569  The narrator, Mark, in the closing line tells of 
how he  
 
took him [the Reverend] to a neighboring university and made him discharge 
the burden of his persecuting rhymes into the eager ears of the poor, unthinking 
students.  How is it with them, now?  The result is too sad to tell.  Why did I 
write this article? It was for a worthy, even a noble, purpose.  It was to warn 
you, reader, if you should came across those merciless rhymes, to avoid them—
avoid them as you would a pestilence. 570 
 
By giving a lecture, the Reverend transferred the parasitic affliction to eagerly 
listening students. 571 Although much of the short tale describes the anguish and 
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571 Note that the two forms of transfer. From Mark to Mr. ——— then from Mr. ——— to countless 
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torment of the jingle, an explicit reference to the horror of voice’s contagiousness is 
delivered in the closing line: the catchy, tormenting jingle is likened to pestilence. 
Punch, Brothers! Punch like both a virus and parasite it moves through an array of 
bodies; it lives a transitory life and only manifests as an aberration of an organism’s 
functioning. Punch, Brothers! Punch, has a vague agency – a way of compelling its 
host to proliferate its spread, a knack for infection – for moving from host to host.  
The jingle shares this trait with a number of parasites. There is no need to 
exhaustively appraise the taxonomy, but one warrants mention. Ophiocordyceps 
Unilateralis (sometimes referred to casually as the Zombie Fungus) is a type of 
parasitic fungus – an entomopathogen – that infects insects (hosts), in particular ants. 
Like, an earworm, Ophiocordyceps Unilateralis alters the behaviors of a host body to 
expedite reproduction. In the case of the ant, the parasite compels the host to climb 
vertically, away from its nest, at which point spores irrupt from the body. The 
alteration, one might say possession or puppetry, of the ant’s behavior is 
advantageous for the parasite’s procreation. In the case of Ophiocordyceps 
Unilateralis, it is the more effective dispersal of its spores. Bekker et al write: 
 
Fungal parasites within this genus alter the behavior of their ant hosts in ways 
that facilitate the dispersal of spores. Foraging ants presumably get infected 
when these spores attach to, and penetrate, their cuticle, after which their body 
is colonized, as has been shown for related fungal entomopathogens such as 
Metarhizium (Clarkson and Charnley 1996). After the colonization period, the 
ant abandons its normal activities and leaves the nest. Once outside, the infected 
ant climbs up the foliage where it latches onto vegetation (Andersen et al. 2009; 
Pontoppidan et al. 2009). Atrophy of the mandible muscles prevents the animals 
from falling as they (typically) die hanging upside down from a leaf or twig 
(Hughes et al. 2011a; C. de Bekker, L. Quevillon, P. B. Smith, K. Fleming, D. 
Gosh, A. D. Patterson, and D. P. Hughes, submitted for publication). After 
death, the fungus grows out of the cadaver. It uses its host as a carbon source 
and as a base for propagation and dissemination of spores (Andersen et al. 
2009). The cycle ends with the production of a stroma (stalk) from which sexual 
spores are transmitted to new ants. 572 
																																																																																																																																																														
medium of voice. Mark inadvertently passes the jingle on to Mr. ——— and he to his students by 
vocalizing it. 
572 Charissa de Bekker; Martha Merrow and David P. Hughes. “From Behavior to Mechanisms: An 
Integrative Approach to the Manipulation by a Parasitic Fungus (Ophiocordyceps unilateralis s.l.) of Its 
Host Ants (Camponotus spp.)” Integrative and Comparative Biology, Volume 54, Issue 2, 1 July 1st 
2014, 166–176. Accessed July 19 2018. https://academic.oup.com/icb/article/54/2/166/2797855 
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The pathenogizing parasite that compels and takes possession – using the host body as 
a zombie puppet to maximize the effectiveness of its spread to other bodies – shares a 
modality with the pernicious Punch, Brothers! Punch. Both pathogens compel the 
host corpus into an action that expedites proliferation. The body, be it an ant, a human 
writer or reverend, inadvertently produces actions (movements or vocalizations – of 
which the latter is also the former) that facilitate the spread of infection to other hosts. 
In the case of A Literary Nightmare Mark, the narrator, cannot help but rehearse the 
dreadful jingle during conversation with the reverend. Once the reverend is infected, 
he does the same – but rather than pass to earworm from one to another he does so 
more like the proliferation of Ophiocordyceps Unilateralis – he speaks from a vantage 
point and spreads the jingle to a large group.  
The Twain tale does not specify if the reverend was reading from a page during his 
lecture or not. But it is clear from the outset that Mark, the narrator, first read the 
jingle in a newspaper. An alternative term for page, or paper is leaf. From the vantage 
of the leaf both Punch, Brothers! Punch and Ophiocordyceps Unilateralis hold 
maximum potential for a virulent infection of multiple bodies to become pathenogized 
hosts. Although Twain’s tale is largely anecdotal and does not offer much context 
outside of the narrator’s subjective experience – an inevitable symptom of first person 
fiction – one wonders who else read the offending jingle in the newspaper Mark 
picked up. Newspapers, especially during the time of Twain’s writing, were widely 
circulated and a dominant form of information dissemination. Punch, 
Brothers! Punch could be couched as a proto-viral, a pre-cursor to the Internet meme 
(the Dawkinsian term itself alluding to proliferating procreation that moves through 
host bodies).  
The parasite earworm, that leaps from the leaf to torment and compel the body and 
mind of the host(s) is reflected on a textual and meta-textual level. Firstly, the narrator 
asks the reader to read the infectious lines. ‘Will the reader please to cast his eye over 
the following lines, and see if he can discover anything harmful in them?’ 573 This re-
voicing of the infecting rhyme brings the jingle too close to phone. It imposes 
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contagion on the reader before the narrator tells of the horrors it brings. Secondly, on 
a meta-textual level, the publishing history performs a pathogenic editorial symptom. 
The original title was A Literary Nightmare, it was subsequently published in later 
volumes as Punch, Brothers, Punch – the story’s title was replaced with the chorus 
line of the contagious rhyme featured within the narrative. The change in the title of 
the short story can be read as an editorial meta-text that performs the viral nature of 
the rhyme in print.   
Let’s now focus on some more pointed uses of pathogens. Eugene Thacker, in 
‘Cryptobiologies’, writes of instances whereby disease and contagion are weaponised. 
He describes two methods of proto-biological warfare:  
 
Thucydides remarks that, during the Peloponnesian war, there were rumours 
of the wells being intentionally poisoned—a possible early example of 
biological warfare. The mediaeval practice of catapulting diseased and/or 
decaying cadavers of soldiers and animals would carry this further. 574 
 
Horror writer Stephen King’s domestic torment of his wife takes a mode of spreading 
infection, albeit of sonic medium and INMI symptom: the malicious infection of an 
earworm. King, with glee, tells of his strategy for maximizing the earworm’s potential 
for infection. He would wait till she his wife was engaged in errands before launching 
a sonic parasite through the home architecture. His earworm of choice was the Latin 
infused Mambo No 5 by Lou Bega. 575  King confesses: ‘Concerning this last one, I 
want to share that my wife once informed me that she would disembowel me with her 
sharpest Ginsu knife if I played the extended version one more time. I waited until she 
																																																								
574 Eugene Thacker, “Cryptobiologies” Artnodes, Issue 6 (Barcelona, Spain: Universiat Oberta de 
Catalunya: 2006) Available at Posthuman Destinies: Science, Culture and Integral Yoga. Accessed 
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infectious nature of sound to loved ones: an indulgence in light melodic torment. Of all the riffs I know 
Jackson’s Bad was most effective (perhaps due to how well known the song is) and an ideal melody to 
be rehearsed on a guitar with no other instrumental accompaniment available.    
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was running errands, then played it…not once but several times.’ 576 King notes that 
‘Latin-tinged songs […] scored high on the this-makes-me-crazy meter’ 577 On the 
Stephen King forum there is an Earworm Friday topic thread. 578 There are a number 
of Latin themed popular songs posted in the form of YouTube videos (although one 
cannot help but notice that the opening post of the thread is an embed of Kylie 
Minogue’s aptly titled ode to and for cerebral infection: Can’t Get You Out Of My 
Head).  
A weaponised Latin-themed earworm, the infectious, compelling and corrupting 
nature of song, is pushed to comedic exaggeration in the comedy-fantasy film The 
Mask (1994). 579  In this scene Stanley Ipkiss (played by Jim Carrey), wearing the 
Hulkesque pale-green ego-amplifying mask, is on the run from police. He exits a park 
and with CGI acme-style exaggeration hammers, chains, boards up and bolts the gates 
behind him – only to turn around and see a mass of police cars and law enforcement 
officers lying in wait with guns and spotlights trained on him. Recalling Ren & Stimpy 
cartoons, his skull facia, eyes and tongue shoot from his mask projecting into the area 
of threat in horror – defacing panic. Ipkiss, The Mask, is cornered. 
 A police officer tells him through megaphone that ‘it is all over’ and he is warned to 
put his hands over his head; non-compliance will result in open fire. Various gun-
Foley sounds are heard, implying the lethal menace of phallocentric firearms being 
‘cocked’ ready for discharge. But Ipkiss has an idea – his eyes narrow and he grinds 
his teeth (lesser hesitations outside of Hollywood fantasy have resulted in unarmed 
civilians being shot dead on the streets of North America). He clicks his fingers and 
says ‘hit it!’ In addition to the spotlights trained on him others light up. Some 
percussive Latin music starts. Ipkiss is now Cuban Pete, a Cuban heeled, satin-shirted, 
maraca wielding Svengali… He begins to dance, with the knowing, cajoling, 
predation of a holiday resort entertainer. An infectious melody comes on. A ‘cop’ – 
gun raised and pointed at Ipkiss/Cuban Pete – begins to shrug his shoulders in time 
																																																								
576	Stephen King ‘Stephen King on songs that stick in your head’ Entertainment Weekly, April 17, 
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579 The Mask, directed by Chuck Russell (as Charles Russell), (USA: New Line Cinema; Dark Horse 
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with the beat. As Cuban Pete sings, he shakes his hips and more officers begin to 
move in unison. Cuban Pete then throws his maracas away and provides a series of 
dance references, swinging around Singing In The Rain street furniture like parking 
meters, street lamps and seesawing a builder’s trestle. Then after the second verse, 
Cuban Pete sings ‘Chic-chic-ky-boom, Chic-chic-ky-boom, Chic-chic-ky-boom’ 
(thrice, unlike previously). He then Merlin-waves his fingers at a police officer 
stoically pointing a gun at him, we hear a stardust sonic twinkle. A spell is cast.  
The police officer starts singing. She sings, at first with confusion but then with zeal: 
‘He's a really modest guy, although he's the hottest guy, In Havana, in Havana’. The 
badge on her hat glints viridescent. Cuban Pete grabs the officer and we see others 
singing along. Cuban Pete proceeds to invade the officer’s personal space on top of a 
car: a Hollywood-musical dance sequence that at once depicts and makes light of 
sexual assault. He picks her up, she slaps his face twice and rather than pursuing her 
further (a la Bond) he lets her go and she pirouettes into the arms of her law-
enforcement colleagues. A conga line is then formed behind Cuban Pete. The scene is 
one of chaos and revelry. Cuban Pete departs before the two officers from the Park, 
Lt. Kellaway and Doyle, who have spent the scene scaling and climbing over the park 
walls, can break up the party.   
Although fantastic, it is a succinct example of song’s disarming infectiousness, its 
contagion – how it passes from one body to another and proliferates through a crowd. 
The police threat is neutralized by their compulsion to sing along with Cuban Pete: 
The Mask effectively utilizes the contagious nature of song for his own ends – 
stripping the police officers of agency, compelling them to sing and dance before 
making his escape. 
Pawley and Müllensiefen, in a study of sing along behaviors in pubs and clubs in the 
north of England, note how a number of evolutionary theories suggest music’s 
development in humans may have been due to its capacity to aid ‘social bonding and 
cohesion, and synchronizing group mood’. 580 Cuban Pete’s exploitation of the social 
human animal via the medium of voice is an example of song’s capacity to override 
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political power structures. Cuban Pete slots into a continuum of disruptively 
infectious ‘corrupting’ song, a lineage Dolar draws up, from Chinese emperor Chun 
(c. 2200 BC) to Plato to the various theological containments of song’s infectious 
power. 581 
E.B. White’s short story, The Supremacy of Uruguay, originally published in The New 
Yorker, November 25, 1933, tells of a Uruguayan who notices the potent and 
insidious power of voice. In this case a tenor’s croons are amplified and his voice 
ricochets and permeates deep into the urban space:   
 
A platform had been erected on the marquee of one of the theatres, and in an 
interval between speeches a cold young man in an overcoat was singing into a 
microphone, “Thanks,” he crooned, “for all the lovely dee-light I found in your 
embrace … “ The inflection of the love words was that of a murmurous voice, 
but the volume of the amplified sound was enormous; it carried for blocks, deep 
into the ranks of the electorate. 582  
 
The description of how the tenor’s amplified voice seeps and echoes into every nook 
and cranny of urban architecture is another testament to voice’s sonic insidiousness. 
583 On the same page the narrator describes ‘the great slimy sounds of the love 
embrace’ 584 The narrator’s chosen adjective to describe insidious contagion of voice 
is slimy. 
White details the enchantment that results of hearing voice. Voice, an invisible and 
powerful mode of 20th century propaganda, can brainwash, take over and enchant The 
protagonist in White’s story then exports this powerful brainwashing strategy to his 
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homeland. His development is to augment the infectiousness of voice with military 
aviation: 
 
Ten months later he had perfected and turned over to his government a war 
machine unique in military history -a radio-controlled plane carrying an electric 
phonograph with a retractable streamlined horn. Casablanca had got hold of 
Uruguay’s loudest tenor, and had recorded the bar of music he had heard in 
Times Square. (…) His theory was that a squadron of pilotless planes scattering 
this unendurable sound over foreign territories would immediately reduce the 
populace to insanity. Then Uruguay, at her leisure, could send in her armies, 
subdue the idiots, and annex the land. 586 
 
The canny Uruguayan’s plan worked. Everyone who hears the tenor’s voice is 
reduced to state of voice-haunted zombie.  
 
The effect was as Casablanca had predicted. In forty-eight hours the peoples 
were hopelessly mad, ravaged by an ineradicable noise, ears shattered, minds 
unseated. No defense had been possible because the minute anyone came within 
range of the sound, he lost his sanity and, being daft, proved ineffectual in a 
military way. After the planes had passed over, life went on much as before, 
except that it was more secure, sanity being gone. No one could hear anything 
except the noise in his own head. At the actual moment when people had been 
smitten with the noise, there had been of course, some rather amusing incidents. 
A lady in West Philadelphia happened to be talking to her butcher on the phone. 
“Thanks,” she had just said, “for taking back that tough steak yesterday. And 
thanks,” she added, as the plane passed over, “for unforgettable nights I never 
can replace.” 587 
 
The phonograph carrying drones of Uruguay unleashed madness on the world. As 
detailed above, those infected can only mindlessly parrot the lyrics. But there is a 
further analogy too which extends past the remit of vocalization: those tormented by 
the incessant vocal earworm cannot write either, albeit to scrawl out the vacuous 
lyrics of the tenor. In White’s story the: 
 
																																																								
586 Ibid., 202. 
587 Ibid., 202. 
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‘Linotype operators in composing-rooms [were] chopped off in the middle of 
sentences, like the one who was setting a story about an admiral in San Pedro: 
 
I am tremendously grateful to all the ladies of San Pedro for the wonderful 
hospitality they have shown the men of the fleet during our recent maneuvers 
and thanks for unforgettable nights I never can replace and thanks for 
unforgettable nights I nev-  588 
 
The voice’s power to infiltrate and take over, to torment and render ‘crazy’, to plague 
the non-consenting listener is a register of its horrific contagious potency – an 
unwelcome incursion that erodes agency, the mastery of one’s body: self control.  
In an inversion of the traditional horror philosophy we have seen in Thacker, the 
infectious voice doesn’t make the listener aware of a lack or knowledge but instead, 
and just as horrifically, surreptitiously erodes the subject’s agency of mind and 
autonomy. Rather than being alerted to a lack of knowledge one is alerted to a lack of 
agency and control of one’s faculties. Mind and body are plunged into a vicarious 
remove: self doubt and distrust. The beguiling voice yeilds Cartesian skepticism. 
Voice’s spell yanks the ontological rug out from under those exposed. Vocal 
contagion manifests in the same modality as the ‘demon’. 589  The ‘evil mind, who is 
all powerful and cunning’. 590 
Infectious vocal earworms are not always a case of listeners falling victim and 
becoming unwittingly enchanted and robbed of agency. The protagonist of Alfred 
Bester’s The Demolished Man, Ben Reich, willfully seeks out an infectious earworm. 
Set in the 24th century; Reich is the head of a vast business empire that spans the solar 
system (Monarch Utilities & Resources). Due to a paranoid misunderstanding Reich 
sees the elimination of his competitor D’Courtney as his only option and sets out kill 
him. However, in the 24th century, 70 years have passed since the last murder. The 
telepathic reading of minds ‘peeping’ is common practice. Espers, a people with the 
																																																								
588 Ibid., 203. 
589 None of the versions I have access to use the anthropic term ‘demon’, but a wealth of later analyses 
frame Descartes move as such. Such framing is apt, for Descartes uses terms such as ‘mind’, ‘energies’ 
and ‘cunning’ to describe the force. He also (though there might be some difference in the original 
Latin from 1641) uses ‘they’ and ‘their’. There is certainly an anthropomorphic narrative employed to 
express the sentiment of doubt and skepticism. 
590 René Descartes, Meditations and Other Metaphysical Writings (Penguin Classics) Trans. Desmond 
M Clarke (London, England: Penguin, 2000), 22. 
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telepathic ability to deeply read minds, can even read the unconscious thoughts of 
others (whereas non-Esper ‘peepers’ can only discern the conscious thoughts of 
another. Reich’s pursuit of murdering D’Courtney without his intentions being 
detected by either Espers or Peepers is almost impossible, particularly because both 
Reich and D’Courtney employ and are surrounded by Espers.   
Reich’s solution to this problem is to acquire a ‘temporary mind block’. 591 He travels 
to Psych-Songs, Inc on Melody Lane (leading one to believe the production of catchy 
advertising jingles is large industry in this science fiction future world). Psych Songs 
Inc.’s work extends to earworms used for political repression; Bester writes that it 
was ‘run by a clever young woman who had written some jingles for his sales division 
and some devastating strike-break songs for Propaganda back when Monarch needed 
everything to smash last year’s labor fracas.’ 592 Reich asks the ‘clever young 
women’, Duffy:  
 
 “What’s the most persistent tune you ever wrote?” 
“Persistent?” 
“You know what I mean. Like those advertising jingles you can’t get out of 
your head.” 
 (…) Duffy winced in recollection. “Hate to think of it even now. Guaranteed to 
obsess you for a month. It haunted me for a year.” 
“You’re rocketting.” 
“Scout’s honor, Mr. Reich. It was ‘Tenser, Said The Tensor.’ (…) 
																																																								
591 Alfred Bester, The Demolished Man (SF Masterworks Series) (London, UK: Gollancz, 1999), 29. 
592 Sacks, in ‘Brainworms, Sticky Music and Catchy Tunes’ in Musicophilia briefly mentions Nicolas 
Slonimsky. ‘a composer and musicologist, was deliberately inventing musical forms or phrases that 
could hook the mind and force it to mimicry and repetition, as early as the 1920s.’ (See Sacks, 
Musicophilia: Tales of Music and the Brain, 42) Slonimsky’s intention in his work cannot be gleaned 
from his introduction to Thesaurus of Scales and Melodic Patterns. (Nicolas Slonimsky, Thesurus of 
Scales and Melodic Patterns (New York, USA: Schirmer Books, 1975).  But it is notable, contra 
Stewart et al’s study, that much of the book focuses on, in Tom Schnable’s description, ‘Indian scales, 
North African and African styles, Middle Eastern modes, and more.’ (Tom Schnable, “Rhythm Planet: 
Coltrane, Nicolas Slonimsky, Modal Music and Trance”. KCRW. June 15, 2011. Accessed 6 July 2018. 
http://blogs.kcrw.com/music/2011/06/coltrane-nicolas-slonimsky-modal-music-and-trance/ 
) Maria Konnikova, writing in The New Yorker, states that Slonimsky was a great influence on Frank 
Zappa and John Coltrane. (Maria Konnikova “Anatomy of an Earworm” The New Yorker, February 28, 
2014. Accessed 6 June, 2018. https://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/anatomy-of-an-earworm ) 
Schnable’s blog post, in expounding the trance like qualities of Coltrane’s Slonimsky-informed 
improvisations, notably lapses into granting the music a possessive and infectious sonic agency. He 
writes, of Coltrane studying Slonimsky’s patterns and modes and speculates that ‘perhaps this was why 
Coltrane could make his soprano saxophone sound more like the Indian shehnai, the Indian oboe used 
by snake charmers to hypnotize cobras.’ (Tom Schnable, “Rhythm Planet: Coltrane, Nicolas 
Slonimsky, Modal Music and Trance”.) Like King’s comment on Latin music, Cuban Pete and the 
omission of Tone Loc, there is distinctly colonial attitude. 
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“Let’s hear it.” 
“I couldn’t do that to you.” 
“Come on, Duffy. I’m really curious.” 
“You’ll regret it.” 593 
  
Reich opts to infect himself with a vocal earworm, a jingle that would engulf his mind 
with its incessant repetition so that any peeper hoping to read his mind would 
perceive, ‘peep’, the catchy jingle rather than his murderous intent. The following 
passage describes how Duffy sings the earworm jingle and it immediately resounds in 
Reich. The lines of the song also interrupt the text, evoking the contagious torment in 
the reader: 
 
(…) A tune of utter monotony filled the room with agonizing, unforgettable 
banality. It was the quintessence of every melodic cliché Reich had ever heard. 
No matter what melody you tried to remember, it invariably led down the path 
of familiarity to “Tenser, Said The Tensor.” Then Duffy began to sing: 
 
Eight, sir; seven, sir; 
Six, sir; five, sir; 
Four, sir; three, sir; 
Two, sir; one! 
Tenser, said the Tensor. 
Tenser, said the Tensor. 
Tension, apprehension,  
And dissention have begun. 
 
 (…) “You little devil!” Reich started to his feet, pounding his palms on his 
ears. “I’m accursed. How long is this affliction going to last?” 
“Not more than a month.” 
 (…)As Reich had planned, the song established itself firmly in his mind and 
echoed again and again all the way down the street. Tenser, said the Tensor. 
Tenser, said the Tensor. Tension, apprehension, and dissention have begun. 
RIFF. A perfect mind-block for a non-Esper. What peeper could get past that? 
Tension, apprehension, and dissention have begun. 594  
 
 Reich succumbs to the infectious ditty, not as an unwilling victim robbed of agency 
but as a shrewd conscious torment installed to obfuscate his homicidal intent. Reich’s 
auto-infection with contagious tormenting voice is a case of cunning application. In 
																																																								
593 Bester, The Demolished Man (SF Masterworks Series), 47-48. 
594 Ibid., 48-49. 
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this sci-fi narrative the melodic voice and the infectiousness of the earworm – INMI – 
to strip conscious lucidity form a human is taken as a given and used as a plot device. 
Bester’s earworm is not inventive; it is a slightly exaggerated description of 
advertising jingles.  
These fictional examples of the insidiousness of voice all pertain to a voice’s delivery 
of words. The lyrical earworm can be regarded as an inversion of Dolar’s first 
claimed mode of obfuscation. Rather than language and meaning obfuscating voice, 
the lilt, rhythm and inflection of the lyrical delivery beguiles over semantic content. 
Yet INMI, lyrical rhyming jingles, earworms are not the reduction of voice to a fetish 
object, an object of aesthetic reverence. This penumbral position the earworm holds 
when considered in terms of the language/aesthetics binary Dolar draws up at the 
beginning of A Voice and Nothing More is not enough to declare the vocal earworm 
to be an object a. There are, however, a number of observations worth positing for 
their contribution to the re-contextualizing of the prospect of the object a voice in 
terms of audition, the body and horror.  
The sequence of earworms presented here, as well as sharing a parasitic modality, all 
take the form of an exogenous voice that manifests as an aural hallucination, an 
internal resonance within a host body. Vocal earworms (INMI) manifest in a similar 
form as the aural hallucinations that Lacan described. In the sense of internal 
resonance, one key characteristic earworms share with the genealogy of object a voice 
is its autonomy from sound. Both are voice aural phenomena but not, limited to sonic 
modalities. The method of contagion may be via sound or text. Additionally, 
manifestation is a silent resounding within a host body.  
Earworms, by virtue of their status as aural mirages, manifest in an analogous 
modality as an object a voice: as silent but nonetheless experienced: heard. A further 
equivalence to consider is the corporeal horror implicit in the earworm and the object 
a voice. There is a torment, a horror, a stripping of agency in all cases here as well as 
a possession and compelling of the body that mimics the mode of viruses and 
parasites. All affect the body – the arbitrary vessel – they move, propagate, 
disseminate and sound within and through. The claim here is not that tormenting 
earworms are forms of object a, but that an appraisal of voice in the modality of such 
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phenomenon leads to a conception of voice that incorporates the traits of the object a 










         
This section departs from the previous threads of slime, worms, INMI, bacteria, viroid 
life and parasites. The focus here is how certain vocalities are gendered; how female 
voices and vocality are framed as a beguiling or enchanting spell, to be avoided or 
controlled like, with deliberate connotations of contagion, the plague. The figure of 
the Siren is a key example. Voice qua spell continues the explication of insidious 
voice with regard to the body and maintains project of deanthropocentricising voice. 
The readings introduced here contribute to an articulation how certain framings of 
voice – vocalities – are registers of horror. The horror here is a particular subject’s; 
these vocalities expose an engendered reception of voice. 
 
Spell, qua verb, refers to the array of letters that create words – their order. Spell, qua 
noun, is magical, powerful – it is a force, but not order. Like mist: mysterious, like 
voice: diffuse. Spells, particularly those from women: mermaids, sirens and witches 
have historically been framed as curses to be guarded against on a number of levels: 
physically, politically and legislatively. 595 
There is a categorical shift at play in the preceding line. The moves from spell to 
spells moves from a way something is done, to a sense of force that is impossible to 
quantify or discern. It carries an ominous portent. In this shift there is a lurch from the 
known to the nebulous. Secondly, the guarding against spells is articulated in three 
terms – physical, political and legislatively – that bridge from the material prospect of 
spells to their immaterial incarnation. It is here where voice as spell finds its parallel 
with the spectre of contagion horror: the plague.  
In the introduction to Embodied Voices: Representing female vocality in western 
culture Leslie C. Dunn and Nancy A. Jones address the difference between voice and 
vocality. They write that the ‘move from “voice” to “vocality” implies a shift from a 
																																																								
595 Poizat’s writes, within a delination of gendered vocalities, of ‘sirens who charmed unwary sailors 
and lured them to their death.’ – the footnote to this line is: ‘Charm: from the Latin carmen, magic 
spell, incantation, song. (Poizat, The Angel’s Cry, 150.) 
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concern with the phenomenological roots of voice to a conception to vocality as a 
cultural construct.’ 596 They then note the important link of embodiment at play in and 
between the two terms. They write:  
 
[b]y specifying female vocality, we also assert the centrality of gender in 
shaping that construction. Here our third term comes into play. As a material 
link between “inside” and “outside,” self and other, the voice is, in Nelly 
Furman’s words, “the locus of articulation of an individual’s body to language 
and society.” Since both language and society are structured by codes of sexual 
difference, both the body and its voice are inescapably gendered. 597 
 
Gender is not the only factor at play in the embodying between voice and vocality. 
Race, its vocality and embodiment, is also plays a significant construction in terms of 
voice. 598 
Returning to Dunn and Jones’ introductory remarks, and the focus on female voice, 
vocality and embodiment, the following passage yokes the traditional framing of 
female voice as disorder, unbound nature and physical materiality. Although the 
authors are not deliberately intending to frame female voice as an object of horror 
there is a striking parity of vocabulary and theme. The themes employed below are 
not what the authors posit female voice to be, but rather how normative and 
traditional framings of female voice – vocality – come with a palette of associations. 
Such associations, emphasized below, resonate with the thematic pitch of genre horror 
and contemporary theorizing of horror. Dunn and Jones write: 
 
The anchoring of the female voice in the female body confers upon it all the 
conventional associations of femininity with nature and matter, with emotion 
																																																								
596 Leslie C. Dunn and Nancy A. Jones, “Introduction” in Embodied voices: Representing female 
vocality in western culture, ed. Leslie C. Dunn and and Nancy A. Jones (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 2. 
597 Ibid. 
598 For an excellent discussion (utilizing as an example a vocal coach’s deeply bodied and clichéd 
comments about different voices) see Nina Sun Eidsheim’s Ph.D thesis, particularly the section 
“Performing Race: Shaping Vocal Racialized Timbre”. Nina Sun Eidsheim, Voice as a technology of 
selfhood : towards an analysis of racialized timbre and vocal performance (Ph.D UC San Diego, 
2008), 205-209. 
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and irrationality. More concretely, it leads to associations of the female voice 
with bodily fluids (milk, menstrual blood) and the consequent devaluation of 
feminine utterance as formless and free-flowing babble, a sign of uncontrolled 
female generativity. 599  
 
We see in this passage the same thematic pallet as Woodward and Thacker explore, 
albeit not along the lines of gender, in their work on horror and philosophy. In the 
above instance, female voice evokes an array of unthinkable excesses that run amok 
in genre horror – nature unbound, excessiveness, formless, unfathomable, material – 
not solid material, a rampant form of slippery life that does not adhere to traditional 
patrician rationalism.  
The second line of the passage links to female sexuality. Dunn and Jones write that 
such associations ‘further point to the identification of women’s vocality with her 
sexuality: like the body from which it emanates, the female voice is construed as both 
a signifier of sexual otherness and a source of sexual power, an object at once of 
desire and fear.’ 600 This last line in the paragraph ends with the dreaded noun so apt 
for horror, retroactively inscribing an allusion to the horror pallet vocabulary framing 
of female voice and vocality in the preceding line.  
The equivalences between horror, voice and female vocality qua objects of 
desire/fear, objects that are ‘natural’, irrational, formless and uncontrolled, operate in 
terms of both voice and vocality. In terms of voice (the physics of voice and audition 
to not need to be rehashed too laboriously at this turn), sound is formless and 
uncontrolled – it is ethereal, radiates without light, its insidious and penetrating. This 
chapter has already addressed such physical horrors of voice. Such horrors of 
emission and emersion – and the hope of controlling exposure – are a significant facet 
of the following maritime narrative. In terms of vocality, the following texts are 
examples of how gender and horror are over-coded onto the body and voice of the 
female figure within western narratives. That is to say, following Dunn and Jones, 
gender is inscribed in the voice as it is heard, it is embodied through the prism of 
culture and languages the texts emerged from. The observation, the additional quality 
																																																								
599 Dunn and Jones, “Introduction”, 3, emphasis added. 
600 Ibid., 3 
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proposed here is that there is a conspicuous horror thematic in such symptoms of 
female vocality.  
Consider Sirens, what Melissa Mia Hall introduces as a ‘seductive icon of horror and 
the supernatural’. 601 This is indeed the figure Dunn and Jones move to discuss in the 
following paragraph of their introductory text. They write: 
 
The archetypal figures of this seductive but dangerous vocality are the Sirens, 
whose song lures men to their destruction with a false promise of bliss. Yet 
Odysseus proves able to resist that lure, and in some versions of the story the 
Sirens must die when their vocal power is “mastered” by a greater masculine 
power. This narrative pattern (…) recurs throughout the history of Western 
literary and musical traditions, producing a series of cultural icons that figure 
the mythic relationship between gender and vocality. 602 
 
The sirens introduced at this juncture highlight a narrative pattern. The seductiveness 
of the feminine voice is framed as an object of horror, a beguiling voice to fear and 
guard against. There is a distinct theme of contagion. From sirens, to birds to music 
there is a maelstrom (male-storm) of framing voice as the corrupting figure of 
woman, and, ergo nature unbound.  
The theme of unbound nature, chaos of vitality, extends to the corporeal figuring of 
the Siren as an interspecies being: at once feminine and avian. The physical figure of 
the Siren is an amalgamation of woman and bird. Sirens were composite beings, 
accounts state various compositions – either female bodies with bird’s heads or birds 
with the faces of women, sometimes sparrows sometimes swans. 603 This figure of 
horror that operates in a modality of contagious and excessive nature – voice – 
manifests as a penumbral silhouette that embodies the confounding of man’s ordered 
taxonomy and categorizing of nature. On another, more immediate level, the figural 
																																																								
601	Melissa Mia Hall, “The Siren” in Icons of Horror and the Supernatural: An Encyclopedia of Our 
Worst Nightmares, Volumes 1 & 2. Ed, S.T. Joshi (Westport, Connecticut, USA: Greenwood Press, 
2007), 507. 
602 Dunn and Jones, “Introduction”, 3. 





blur of woman and bird, falls into a long continuum of engendering that places one 
gender in nature.  
The recurrent narrative pattern of the archetypal Siren is one of seductive but 
dangerous female voice and vocality in the mode of beguiling but disordered excesses 
of nature. In this sense it is the tension between two spells, one verb, ordered and 
correct(ed), the other a noun. The juxtaposition of these two different spells is the 
difference, the dichotomy, of the enchanting but dangerous generative magic of the 
natural world (which includes women) and the supposedly ordered state of men that 
regard themselves as separate masters of the world. 
Consider the narrative of the Sirens in The Odyssey. 604 Odysseus, the eponymous 
hero of Homer’s epic, is warned (by Circe) of the power of the Sirens’ song: 
 
'and now pay attention to what I am about to tell you- heaven itself, indeed, 
will recall it to your recollection. First you will come to the Sirens who 
enchant all who come near them. If any one unwarily draws in too close and 
hears the singing of the Sirens, his wife and children will never welcome him 
home again, for they sit in a green field and warble him to death with the 
sweetness of their song. There is a great heap of dead men's bones lying all 
around, with the flesh still rotting off them. Therefore pass these Sirens by, and 
stop your men's ears with wax that none of them may hear; but if you like you 
can listen yourself, for you may get the men to bind you as you stand upright on 
a cross-piece half way up the mast, and they must lash the rope's ends to the 
mast itself, that you may have the pleasure of listening. If you beg and pray the 
men to unloose you, then they must bind you faster. 605 
 
Odysseus can listen provided he is incapacitated, provided there is no possibility of 
him acting upon the spellbinding voice(s) he hears. His crew must not listen, they 
must bung their ears with wax to blot out song. Here, the physicality of voice – its 
incurring, insidious characteristic – is writ large. Biological intrusion, the risk of 
contagion follows a trajectory that genre horror narratives take up with regard to 
parasites, spores and viruses. The equivalence of Odysseus and his men with intrepid 
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London, 1900) Accessed December 18, 2018, 
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protagonists of biohazard sci-fi horror is the fear of the other life breaching one’s own 
physical limits. The wax the men bung their ears with is the epic/aural analogue to a 
hazardous materials body suit. The Sirens’ voices’ are autonomous from physical 
limits, like parasitic spores, bacteria and other figures of corporeal horror, precautions 
must be taken to ensure it to not incur into the body.  
Let’s visit the moment when Odysseus and his men venture into a territory within 
‘earshot’ of the Sirens’ voices: 
 
When we had got within earshot of the land, and the ship was going at a good 
rate, the Sirens saw that we were getting in shore and began with their singing. 
  
"'Come here,' they sang, 'renowned Ulysses, honour to the Achaean name, and 
listen to our two voices. No one ever sailed past us without staying to hear the 
enchanting sweetness of our song- and he who listens will go on his way not 
only charmed, but wiser, for we know all the ills that the gods laid upon the 
Argives and Trojans before Troy, and can tell you everything that is going to 
happen over the whole world.' 
  
"They sang these words most musically, and as I longed to hear them further I 
made by frowning to my men that they should set me free; but they quickened 
their stroke, and Eurylochus and Perimedes bound me with still stronger bonds 
till we had got out of hearing of the Sirens' voices. Then my men took the wax 
from their ears and unbound me. 606 
 
In Homer’s text the Sirens are musical, they sing and call out to Odysseus. They 
beckon him and promise knowledge, enlightenment. The enchanting sweetness of the 
Sirens’ voices is such that Odysseus loses himself and looks to his men in the hope 
that they will untie him from the boat mast. Upon hearing the Sirens’ voices, bound to 
the mast, Odysseus’ consistency dissolves – he gives orders that contradict his 
previous commands. Eurylochus and Perimedes, deaf to the Sirens’ song, ears bunged 
with wax, remember their leader’s earlier instructions and act accordingly, fastening 
him tighter, ignoring the commands he gives whilst under the spell of the Sirens’ 




the Siren’s voices and succumbing to their spell. 607  When Odysseus is enchanted by 
the Sirens’ song, the military order, the chain of command, is dissolved. Upon 
hearing, and enjoying, the Sirens’ song his status within the ship is outside of the 
crew’s military structure. The crew ignores his command, his voice, and to treat him 
more as a captive than leader.  
Sirens feature in more than one essay in Dunn and Jones’ Embodied voices: 
Representing female vocality in western culture. Charles Segal, the North American 
scholar of Greek and Latin literature, in “The Gorgon and the nightingale: the voice of 
female lament in and Pindar’s Twelfth Pythian Ode”, writes that in archaic and 
classical Greek literature female voice serves two purposes. He argues it is employed 
either to ‘embody the beauty of song […] and immortalize the deeds of men’ 608 or to 
‘lament […] expressing sorrow at death of kings and heroes’. 609 In this framing, the 
roles of female voice are pitched as either lending a body to aesthetic reverence or 
mourning and immortalizing the actions of men. Segal, does not highlight this aspect 
(his focus is altogether more acute and concerns the particular subjects of the essay 
title) nonetheless, even this general remark concerning female voice in Greek 
literature inadvertently sums up the patrician acoustics that female voice resounds, or 
echoes in. 610  
Segal does, however, offer a more precise comment about the effects of female voice 
in these instances – one that not only evokes jeopardy, pestilence, rot and disorder (a 
series of registers for the horrors of nature unbound) but also magic and force. He 
writes how in both roles the female voice has a  
 
dangerous side and awakens ambivalence in the male-dominated society of 
early Greece, in part because women are associated with pollution, corruption, 
decay, and disorder. In its aural appeal and its power to dispel cares by its 
																																																								
607 This aural quarantine, as well as being a guard against corruption and spell, can be regarded as an 
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“charm,” thelxis, the female voice also exercises magical power and seduction. 
611  
 
Segal writes the ‘songs of the Sirens and of Circe in the Odyssey are the earliest and 
most famous examples.’ 612 He describes how Siren song would lure Odysseus off 
course – noting that the only victims of the song are men. He also notes how Circe’s 
beautiful song is used similarly to lure the companions of Odysseus before 
transforming them into animals. Moving from these examples Segal argues that, in 
terms of the epic narratives in Greek literature, ‘the danger of the female voice is 
closely associated with its physicality’ before referencing Odysseus’ physical 
stopping of the sound penetrating the ‘organs of hearing.’ 613  
In the same collection, Linda Phyllis Austern’s essay, ““No women are indeed”: the 
boy actor as vocal seductress in late sixteenth- and early seventeenth- century English 
drama” makes reference to the Sirens. 614  Austern, in addressing narratives of 
feminine vocality, recourses to this early maritime example within Homer’s Odyssey 
– she writes: ‘by far the most prevalent, are the immoral stage sirens who use music 
as a means to pursue their own sexual pleasure, often to the utter destruction of men 
who become caught in their webs of enchantment.’ 615  
Austern contextualizes this ur-example of female vocality, as a harbinger of both 
libido and death. She poses the Siren voice, and its cultural legacy, to evoke at once 
libidinal frisson and the horrors of impedning death. Siren voice is framed as a Janus 
natured acoustral jouissance. 616 After positing such a voice to embody and signal, 
like a spectre, at once libidinal frisson and impending death she argues Sirens are the 
‘foremothers’ of the ‘stock archetype of English Renaissance fiction’. Austern 
describes the Siren’s echo in English Renaissance fiction as an:  
																																																								
611 Charles Segal, “The Gorgon and the nightingale: the voice of female lament and Pindar’s Twelfth 
Pythian Ode”, 17. 
612 Ibid., 18. 
613 Ibid., 18. Segal also notes that the effects of Circe’s song are also neutralized by direct physical 
means. 
614 Linda Phyllis Austern, ““No women are indeed”:the boy actor as vocal seductress in late sixteenth- 
and early seventeenth- century English drama” in Embodied voices: Representing female vocality in 
western culture, ed. Leslie C. Dunn and and Nancy A. Jones (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), 83-102. 
615 Ibid., 91. 
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absolutely deadly woman who is ruled by her insatiable sexual appetite and who 
attracts men through a glittering web of lies, deceit, and musical artifice [… 
whose] presentation ranges from the benign […] to the fatally attractive 
courtesans of Jacobean and Caroline drama whose glances are poison and 
whose voices are death. 617 
 
Once again, the Siren voice and its legacy and analogues are couched as at once 
enchanting, spellbinding, beguiling (on one hand employing the vocabulary of intense 
love) whilst also bringing a risk. The thread running through the Siren’s episode in 
Homer’s epic, and the observations brought forward by Segal and Austern, can be 
summarized briefly as explicating a double meaning of spells. The fold of spell: spells 
of enchantment (love) that are also spells of possession, contagion and infection 
(death).  
David Toop, the British composer, musician and author, presents The Voyage of Máel 
Dúin, an ancient Irish text from approximately 700A.D., as an account that highlights 
the sinister nature of sound in Sinister Resonance: The Mediumship of the Listener. 
This is symptomatic of Sinister Resonance. 618 Toop’s argument declares to concern 
sound despite many of his examples being vocal – a categorical specificity he does 
not acknowledge. 
The Voyage of Máel Dúin, explored by Toop, sits within the continuum inaugurated 
by the stock archetype of the Sirens. Part of the narrative is very similar to Odysseus’ 
brush with the Sirens in Homer’s epic. Máel Dúin and his men’s confrontation with 
voice contain analogues to Odysseus’s voyage within earshot of the Sirens. 619 
However, unlike the forewarned Odysseus, Maeldun and his men suffer the 
consequences of hearing the enchanting voices.  
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Toop does not provide the original text, (written in Old Irish), he focuses on 
Tennyson’s poem, The Voyage of Maeldun (1880). 620 He writes that Tennyson ‘set 
off on his own romantic voyage’ in comparison to earlier translators of the text Lady 
Gregory, P. W. Joyce and Whitley Stokes. 621 Concerning the Tennyson’s version 
Toop comments it is  
 
built upon the theme of hearing and sound. He wrote, for example, of the Silent 
Isle, a place of barkless dogs and songless larks where ‘a silent ocean always 
broke on a silent shore.’ Maeldune and his men abhor this paradise, quiet as 
death, where streams, waterfalls and birds may be viewed in all their beauty but 
not heard. Their voices, usually manly and warlike, become ‘thinner and fainter 
than any flittermouse-shriek’. 622 
 
It is the absolute absence of sound being framed here as sinister. The scene is ripe for 
pitching as an example of the horrors of inaudible ‘object voice’. Such a framing 
would be a continuation of the muffling of voice in Dolar’s project. It would also 
further explicate the voided nature, the vacuum ‘the object voice’, we are told, 
‘resonates’ in. A possible root, of the tendency towards silence can be found in 
“Jacques Lacan et la Voix” by Jacques-Alain Miller in La voix (1989, colloquium 
proceedings from January 1988). An English translation is not at present available, 
however, Miller’s line: ‘If we make music and listen to it,… it is in order to silence 
what deserves to be called the voice as the object a.’ 623  Is present in a number of 
Dolar’s texts. 624  
Toop provides a reading of another passage – the Isle of Shouting – that draws out 
two concepts of female vocality outlined by Linda Phyllis Austern. Toop privileges 
descriptive fervor over criticality. He writes:  
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As for the isle of speaking or shouting birds, this was a seductive sound, 
according to Joyce. The question of what manner of beings might constitute 
such a spectral heterophonic choir motivates the sailors to row for many hours, 
from the faint edges of a sonic territory to its core. 625  
 
Toop’s commentary of Joyce’s translation presents the seductive, enchanting and 
magnetic (in the Homeric sense) characterization of Siren (female/avian) voices. A 
parallel with possession and spell is not a stretch. He then implies that the sailors 
discover the source of such song, disacousmatize the voice heard at sea, and adds: 
‘Their curiosity satisfied, they sail on, as if merely perplexed.’ 626  Before any further 
rumination, the Tennyson text concerning the scene should be presented. The forth 
stanza details the Isle of Shouting: 
 
And we carne to the Isle of Shouting, we landed, a score of wild birds 
Cried from the topmost summit with human voices and words; 
Once in an hour they cried, and whenever their voices peal’d 
The steer fell down at the plow and the harvest died from the field, 
And the men dropt dead in the valleys and half of the cattle went lame, 
And the roof sank in on the hearth, and the dwelling broke into flame; 
And the shouting of these wild birds ran into the hearts of my crew, 
Till they shouted along with the shouting and seized one another and slew; 
But I drew them the one from the other; I saw that we could not stay, 
And we left the dead to the birds and we sail’d with our wounded away. 627 
 
Toop argues Tennyson’s translation, by contrast, emphasizes the physicality of voice. 
The corporeal affect of voice is amplified to destructive force. In a turn that smacks of 
gamer vocabulary – but gets to the point succinctly – Toop writes that Tennyson’s 
text amplifies ‘the shouting of these wild birds to weapons level.’ 628 The result of 
such vocal force upon bodies within sonic reach is described as apocalyptic. One 
recalls John Martin’s 1853 painting ‘The Great Day of His Wrath’: ‘men and cattle 
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fall dead, buildings collapse and catch fire, crops wither.’ 629 Toop then adds a 
additional nugget of commentary: the violence and destruction of voices is not only a 
powerful sonic and physical force but also an insidious and infectious spell that 
overcomes the men and compels them to chaotic barbarity. Toop even opts to use the 
term ‘inflamed’ that immediately evokes not only infection but carries dermatological 
and symptomatic connotations. ‘Maeldune’s men are infected and inflamed by its 
destructive force. Shout leads to shout and before long they are seizing and slaying all 
over again.’ 630 The forth stanza details the Isle of Shouting: 
 
And we carne to the Isle of Shouting, we landed, a score of wild birds 
Cried from the topmost summit with human voices and words; 
Once in an hour they cried, and whenever their voices peal’d 
The steer fell down at the plow and the harvest died from the field, 
And the men dropt dead in the valleys and half of the cattle went lame, 
And the roof sank in on the hearth, and the dwelling broke into flame; 
And the shouting of these wild birds ran into the hearts of my crew, 
Till they shouted along with the shouting and seized one another and slew; 
But I drew them the one from the other; I saw that we could not stay, 
And we left the dead to the birds and we sail’d with our wounded away. 631 
 
As observed previously, in Tennyson’s text the source of corrupting, violent and 
contagious voice is emitted from birds. Siren song is figured in an avian guise. Not 
dissimilar to the corrupting magic of the Homeric Sirens, the effect is one of chaos 
whereby aberrations to order and violence of nature take hold, possess and compel. 
Like the effect on Odysseus, one notable effect of such voice is military disorder – 
chaos spread to men. The crewmembers of Maeldun’s boat become violent and attack 
each another. Compelled by the shrieks they lash and slay each other, intoxicated by 
voice they succumb to insensate butchery until Maeldun leads them off the isle.  
The scene can be read in two ways. One option is to take the classical line of 
contagious feminine Siren voices (that Austern delineates and criticizes). The birds of 
Tennyson’s text and the dual species of Joyce’s translation are avatars for infectious 
feminine voice that only leads to violent horrors and corporeal destruction. Another 
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option underscores the vocality of voice in narratives such as The Voyage of Máel 
Dúin and subsequent translations and iterations. One could add, and this is close to an 
antithesis of Toop’s fantastic and vivid reading in Sinister Resonance, that the onus 
does not rest in voice but in men. Thus: does it only take birdsong to spark men into 
violence and disorder? The answer to this question can be located in Tennyson’s text. 
Might one read Maeldun’s prudence as an affirmative to the posed question? By the 
ninth stanza Maeldun is canny to the risks of voices and intervenes before his men 
become spellbound: 
 
And we past to the Isle of Witches and heard their musical cry— 
‘Come to us, O come, come’ in the stormy red of a sky 
Dashing the fires and the shadows of dawn on the beautiful shapes, 
For a wild witch naked as heaven stood on each of the loftiest capes, 
And a hundred ranged on the rock like white sea-birds in a row, 
And a hundred gamboll’d and pranced on the wrecks in the sand below, 
And a hundred splash’d from the ledges, and bosom’d the burst of the spray, 
But I knew we should fall on each other, and hastily sail’d away. 632  
 
In this scene voice is that of witches. The source of voice has reverted to a classic 
figure of vilified women. This matriarchal group follows the narrative mode of 
Homer’s Sirens. Their voices call out to the sailors, tempting, luring and enchanting 
them. The scene has a distinct air of Bacchanalia, revelry: the unchained enjoyment of 
pleasure (be it corporeal or sonic). There is, as in Odysseus’ voyage past the sirens, a 
distinct gender dichotomy running along themes of contagious voice and corrupting 
song. Men may are led astray from the prescribed grid of military order. Misconduct 
is resultant from enjoying a female voice. 633 
The horrors of a corrupting and infectious voice have, in this introduction of a 
distinctly gendered vocality, opened up a number of questions; a Pandora’s Box (to 
continue the theme vilifying the female human). A key facet of the thread in this 
section is the conflation of the female body with nature in terms of voice. In a sense, 
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birdsong, sirens, witches are all cursed with the same vocality. The narratives 
surveyed thus far all exhibit framings of voices, their contagion and horrors, steeped 
in misogyny and ornithophobia. The horrors are that of a particular subject: patrician 
horrors of the other cast as the unknown, the disordered, the corrupting and 
enchanting. The spells of voice explored here are not really spells, but they do spell 
out men’s fears and horrors.   
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Sounds like us: Vivisection  
 
Treatments of voice in Aristotle’s writings are examined here. These foci serve to 
illustrate the issues of gendered voice detailed in the previous section. Here, the ways 
voice has been subject to various partitions between the male human animal and 
others are explored. These treatments of voice are approached via Dolar and Lacan 
along with recourse to Aristotle’s texts. This re-engagement with Lacan returns to the 
dichotomy of speech and voice. The partition of logos and phone is framed as a 
politics of voice: a politics presupposing the exclusivity of language and the human 
male.  
 
The previous section, ‘Sirens’ Spell’, spelled out an aspect of voice cast as horror: the 
sonorous, sensuous, enchanting voice of the other (which is not man). Such voices, 
are explicitly sonorous, the physical contagion and force of voice is writ large, as is 
the melodious nature of beguiling spells. Words have been given scant attention, it is 
almost as if the men of such tales hear voice but not speech. ‘Come here’ the Sirens 
sing in Homer’s Odyssey: were these words understood as a semantic performativity 
of song, attesting to the irresistible draw of their chorus? What else did the Sirens 
say? Did Odysseus hear the words or just the melodic enchantment of the song? The 
same question can be levelled at Maeldune’s men on the Isle of Shouting. The 
corrupting physicality of voice is described; but what were the avian creatures 
shouting about? 
Let’s return to Che Bella Voce! In Dolar’s binary formulation of a voice that delivers 
sonorous words there is a Mobius characteristic. We are led to believe that no sooner 
does one hear the words, there is, without doubt, a sonority one’s ears fail to listen to. 
Conversely, there is the premise that should one, like the opera-loving Italian soldier, 
listen to the melodic nature of the voice, then the meaning of the words is neglected.  
This formulation is a construct. Voice may be sonorous without delivering any 
meaning, without being in the service of language. Similarly, words to not require 
sound. The type you’re reading now can serve as example. The ‘Che Bella Voce!’ 
formulation does, however, illustrate a vivisection that has haunted voice – how to 
hear the words of voice without risking the insidious slimy spell of their sonority? 
	 231	
Dolar’s section ‘A Brief Course in the History of Metaphysics’ within his second 
chapter, ‘The Metaphysics of the Voice’ outlines this dynamic well. One import of 
Dolar’s survey is that the sonority of voice is consistently deemed as feminine, 
natural, sensuous, corrupting and contagious – something to be guarded against. 634 
The words, the meaning and language of voice are, by contrast, the concern of men. 
This line drawn through voice builds a partition whereby men are interested in words 
– others concern themselves with the rest of voice. Such a project finds is registered 
in the sniggering emasculation of the Italian, the stereotype in the joke – they are not 
men, not soldiers, but effeminate opera lovers. 
Language, logos and sense have been prized targets of annexation from voice. These 
cherished objects, the projects of which various men presuppose, need the residue of 
voice to be sloughed off. Voice must be muffled; its insidious, irksome slime must be 
guarded against lest it taint metaphysical purity, ideal.  
Voice, as an entanglement of words, meaning, language, sonority and sensuous 
melody, has posed a problematic morass for those who wish pursue projects of 
division between man and non-man. One overarching symptom of such projects 
manifests as the simultaneous discredit or demonization of corporeal and/or sensuous 
facets of voice over a privileging of language, meaning, and thought. The vivisection 
of voice, the annexation of logos from phone, operates across vectors of politics, 
species and gender. Central to these procedures on voice – of guarding meaning and 
thought against sonorous contagion or sensuous corruption – is the question of soul.  
Both Plato’s and Aristotle’s works contain moves for the fraught quest of delineating 
voice from word. We see, in each case, troubled inscriptions of limits between voice 
and language – such attempts are often played out in metaphysical, physical or 
zoological terms. In each case, and they are quite different cases, they share a 
similarity: the attempt to quarantine the insidious resonance of voice.  
Aristotle’s formulation of voice, what voice is, deserves attention before any 
consideration how word is cleaved from voice. His moves pivot along presupposed 
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differences between species, of the presence of soul, to methodology of phonation 
before being argued as a political difference. In order to not mis-render Aristotlean 
voice, and its relation and context alongside the question of species and soul, some 
close readings of particular passages are required. 
Before embarking on such a task the placement of his frankest statements regarding 
voice should be noted. A pertinent facet of the text hides in plain sight. The most 
direct addresses of voice, and its definition, are found in De Anima. One can suppose, 
even before reading the text, that the question of voice is intrinsically couched in a 
question of soul: that, by virtue of the question of voice being housed within a larger 
text concerning the question of soul, there is, for Aristotle, a strong connection, a 
contingency or even a causal relation between soul and voice. Indeed, there is on a 
number of levels, texturally, thematically and physically. It should be emphasized this 
is not the soul as it to be understood by today’s terms. Soul, for Aristotle, is, in a 
sense, the material of meaning. 
The section within De Anima that focuses on voice is the second part of chapter 8, 
titled ‘Hearing’ (in Hugh Lawson-Tancred’s translation) and concerns the nature of 
sound for the most part. In J.A. Smith’s translation no title has be retroactively 
provided. However, the opening lines of each declare the fold at which voice (and 
what we might call soul) operate across today – hearing and sound.  
In Lawson-Tancred’s version the text commences thus: ‘But now let us first 
determine about sound and hearing.’ 635 Smith’s version is less portentous. It begins: 
‘Now let us, to begin with, make certain distinctions about sound and hearing.’ 636 
Translation quibbles aside the context of Aristotle’s distinctions of voice come within 
a treatise on soul and meaning and then within a passage concerning both hearing and 
sound. To gloss over the text and suppose what voice is for Aristotle, resting only on 
its textual context, its reference within the book, within a chapter, before any 
thorough reading of the passage or its nuances, it could be supposed that voice is 
contingent to soul, audition and sound. This is not wrong, but it is not the whole story. 
There are some important nuances within the text.  
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In Hugh Lawson-Tancred’s translation of Aristotle’s De Anima there is the following 
line:  
 
Now voice is a kind of sound of an ensouled thing. For none of the things 
without soul gives voice, though some are said by analogy to give voice, such 
as the flute and the lyre and whatever other of the things without soul have the 
production of a sustained, varied and articulate sound. 637  
 
Notice that although inanimate musical objects are said to have what we might 
suppose is a soulful sounding sound, they do not quite have voice, because, they do 
not have soul. This is a quite clear distinction the voice section of the chapter opens 
with: voice is contingent to soul, and soul is the preserve of the living. One wonders 
what Aristotle would think about antique musical instruments that contain a patina of 
acoustic properties difficult to replicate in other objects. Might we assume that he’d 
discount any unique property of an object and instead suppose that such instruments 
are mere conduits for the vital soulful voice of the player? There is, even in this turn, 
a linearity of contingency that negates any plurality of soul and installs its 
determination within the body, an animated body: a body with soul.  
Aristotle subsequently makes a further division. Not all animals, for Aristotle, have 
soul. ‘But many of the animals do not have voice, such as the bloodless ones and, of 
the ones with blood, the fish.’ 638 In the following line Aristotle’s example is the 
Achelous fish that make sounds with their gills ‘or some other such part.’ He 
proclaims that the example fits his account, because gills to not contain the pneumatic 
mechanisms of other animals, such as land mammals, which breathe. Note that what 
is at stake in this turn is already absolutely vocalization. Aristotle is not answering a 
question of what sound a voice makes, but rather is focused on what biological 
process, and of what biology, constitute voice. Aristotle is not tackling a question of 
audition but one of vocalization. This is evident in the following line whereby the 
argument structure is laid out in syntax without committing to specificity (at least in 
this translation). He writes that ‘everything gives sound by something striking and 
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against something and in something, and as this last is air it is reasonable that only 
those things that admit air should give voice.’ 639 Just because a fish makes a sound 
does not mean it has voice – the distinctions rests on whether or not air is taken in and 
out to strike against the soul.  
The argument at this stage is a striking physical account of voice. Aristotle’s 
definition of voice rests on air being breathed in and striking ‘against something’: an 
internal soul. Marcello Zanatta, in his survey of Aristotle’s references to voice, 
“Voice as Difference in Aristotlean Zoology”, makes the same observation 
concerning the stark biological empiricism of the argument in this turn. He writes that 
Aristotle’s conception of voice is ‘developed both from the point of view of the 
emission process and of the bodily parts controlling this function.’ 640 Later in 
Aristotle’s text, the crucial role of the soul’s engagement within the process of 
vocalization is pronounced. 
 
It is then the striking of this inhaled air by the soul in these parts of the body 
against the so-called windpipe that is voice. For it is not every sound of an 
animal that is voice, as we have said (for it is possible even with the tongue just 
to make a some sound and to make a sound like coughing), rather it is necessary 
that that which strikes be ensouled and have a kind of imagination, as voice is a 
kind of sound with meaning, and not, like a cough, just of the in breathed air, 
though it is this that it strikes the air in the windpipe against the windpipe. 641   
 
This lurch from strict empiricism (vocalizing processes in different animals) to the 
theorizing of soul’s necessity for voice is highlighted by Lawson-Tancred. In an end-
note to his translation he writes ‘In this curious passage, Nuyens, with some 
plausibility, detected one of the clearest traces of instrumentalist theory’ 642 Indeed, 
Aristotle’s proto-Instrumentalism, the leap from observation to theorizing – from 
biological prerequisites of vocalization to the supposed interaction to inhaled air with 
soul – does not go unmentioned by Zanatta either, who refers to the positing of 
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voice’s contingency to striking upon soul as being ‘enunciated in a synthetic form’. 
643   
But this is as far as Zanatta pursues the synthetic embedding of soul within the 
Aristotlean concept of voice. Instead, Zanatta draws up a number of instances in De 
Anima and Historia Animalium, where Aristotle, via empirical evidencing and 
without recourse to synthesizing theory, explores how different vocal apparatus may 
lead to different voices, and for different ends of communicative efficacy. 644 
Although the contingency of voice to soul is not Zanatta’s core focus his survey of 
Aristotle’s comments concerning voice still reveal the presupposed causation of air 
striking soul leading to voice.  
Zanatta references the passage from De Anima (quoted above) that juxtaposes 
ensouled animals with flute and lyre. 645 He writes that ‘voice is peculiar to animals, 
in so far as it is linked to a certain activity of the soul’. 646 For the remainder of the 
text Zanatta refers to soul twice more. His declared focus is to open up the nuance in 
Aristotle’s text that shows an anticipation of animal communication contra the 
traditional ‘human language on the flat opposition between man and animal.’ 647 
There are three comments to be made here. Firstly, the distinction between a 
specifically gendered human and all other species, although not acknowledged nor 
commented on any further, does display a fealty to Aristotle’s text. Zanatta does not 
provide any further commentary on this division that not only rests on species but 
gender too. Secondly, the presupposition that communication and language is the 
same thing is a deafening moot point. Thirdly, although the survey is persuasive in 
terms of analyzing the varying formulations of vocalization and language across 
species, the synthetic kernel of soul within the process is not given the scrutiny that 
biological differences are. The closing line of the conclusion – ‘On the other hand, 
these analyses cast new light on the Aristotelian theory of language as such, in 
particular with respect to the relation between the activity of the soul and voice 
articulation.’ – betrays a certain framing of soul, in particular a metaphysical framing 
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of soul, at odds with its materiality of the time: pneuma. 648 Zanatta does not address 
the ‘synthetic’ role of soul in Aristotle’s accounts of vocalization in various species 
and objects. This will be examined in light of the Cavarero’s commentary later, it will 
reveal not merely an anthropocentricism already evident in its embeddedness in 
phonation apparatus (that are distinguished by degrees of similarity to the human 
vocalization apparatus and protocols), but additionally leads to a patrician paradigm 
that dichotomizes, installs a ‘flat opposition between man and animal.’ 649  Or, to be 
more precise: ‘man and [other non-man] animals’.    
Laid on top of Aristotle’s synthetic necessity of soul for voice is a communicative 
hierarchy that privileges speech. Despite non-human animals having voice qua 
emitting sounds from a windpipe whereby air strikes the soul, and despite some 
animals, heeding Zanatta’s elucidation of some nuances in the texts, having 
communicative ability, there is, in other works by Aristotle, a hierarchy that places 
speech over voice (and voice over mere sound). Dolar, surveys these instances in A 
Voice and Nothing More. In ‘The Politics of Voice’ he opens with a long passage 
from Aristotle’s Politics (the following quotes are taken from the same edition Dolar 
uses). Aristotle’s vivisection of voice, his cleaving of word from a natural and 
corrupting mess, is presented as operating along a distinction between man and 
animals: 
 
Now, that man is more of a political animal than bees or any other gregarious 
animals is evident. Nature, as we often say, makes nothing in vain, and man is 
the only animal whom she has endowed with the gift of speech. And whereas 
mere voice (phone) is but an indication of pleasure of pain, and is therefore 
found in other animals (for their nature attains to the perception of pleasure and 
pain and the intimation of them to one another, and no further), the power of 
speech is intended to set forth the expedient and inexpedient, and therefore 
likewise the just and unjust. And it is a characteristic of man that he alone has 
any sense of good and evil, of just and unjust, and the like, and an association of 
living beings who have this sense makes a family and a state. 650  
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Here, we already sense the kernel of implicit hierarchy. Voice is mere voice, despite 
being contingent to striking upon a soul, and not speech. Voice may evoke and affect 
the pleasure and pain of the soul but is no good for designating ‘the expedient and 
inexpedient’, which is to say, it is not practical, cannot be utilized for arguing and 
stating what is best, just, or unjust. In this turn, voice might reflect the pain or 
pleasure of a certain toxic or sweet berry but it cannot state ‘the red ones are bad’ or 
‘the blue ones are tasty’.   
Animals have voice; they too can emit a sound when experiencing pleasure or pain. 
Voice is the emitting of sound with some intentful drive, an expression. Just as birds 
sing and dogs bark, humans cry in sadness, shriek or laugh in excitement, hum in 
pleasure and scream in pain – this is voice; it does not have a strictly semantic 
meaning. For Aristotle, voice is intrinsically natural; it is ‘just’ a sonic expression of 
living beings, ensouled things – the sonic sound of inhaled breathed air striking 
against the soul within the windpipe. For Aristotle, voice is the vocal expression 
before language is added into it (as if Lacan’s diagram were to be read right to left). 
Speech is voice with meaning: a sound that also signifies. Dogs bark, but they do not 
bark orders, meanings or words like a military commander. 651  
Zanatta touches on this difference between immediate affectations of the soul, the 
direct expression of pleasure or pain and more abstracted, expedient, speech. He 
quotes a passage from De Interpreatione: 
 
«now spoken sound are symbols of affections in the soul, and written marks 
symbols of spoken sounds. And just as written marks are not the same for all 
men, neither are spoken sounds. But what these are in the first place signs of  –  
affections  of  the  soul  –  are  the  same  for  all;  and  what  these  affections  
are likenesses of – actual things – are also the same» (tr. Ackrill) 652 
																																																								
651 Of course, we all know that in human social power relations the structure does not rest on the 
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are the symbols of spoken words. Just as all men have not the same writing, so all men have not the 
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Lacan now. We can see, in a few moments of his thought that the difference between 
symbols of an affectation of the soul and mere affectations of the soul are the 
difference that separates human animals from other animals. Owen Hewitson, in his 
essay ‘What Does Lacan Say About…The Signifier’, draws out a number of instances 
that pitch humans as distinct from other animals by virtue of the exclusivity of the 
symbol. Firstly, he points to Seminar III, where Lacan utilizes the scene of Man 
Friday’s footprint in Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe (1719) as a tool for explicating 
the trace, sign and signifier. 
 
Let’s begin with the biological sign. In the very structure, in the morphology, of 
animals there is something that has this captivating value due to which its 
receiver, who sees the red of the robin redbreast for instance, and who is made 
for receiving it, undertakes a series of actions or henceforth unitary behaviour 
that links the bearer of this sign to its perceiver. Here you have what gives us a 
precise idea of what may be called natural meaning. Without otherwise seeking 
how this might take place in man, it is clear that by means of a series of 
transitions we can manage to purify, neurtralise, the natural sign. 
 
Then there is the trace, the footprint in the sand, the sign about which Robinson 
Crusoe makes no mistake. Here sign and object separate. The trace, in its 
negative aspect, draws the natural sign to a limit at which it becomes 
evanescent. The distinction between sign and object is quite clear here, since the 
trace is precisely what the object leaves behind once it has gone off somewhere 
else. Objectively there is no need for any subject to recognise a sign for it to be 
there – a trace exists even if there is nobody to look at it. 
 
When have we passed over into the order of the signifier? The signifier may 
extend over many of the elements within the domain of the sign. But the 
signifier is a sign that doesn’t refer to any object, not even to one in the form of 
a trace, even though the trace nevertheless heralds the signifier’s essential 
feature. It, too, is the sign of an absence. But insofar as it forms part of 
language, the signifier is a sign which refers to another sign, which is as such 
structured to signify the absence of another sign, in other words, to be opposed 
to it in a couple” (Seminar III, p.167). 653 
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Hewitson summarizes that firstly ‘The sign is the equivalent to the code in the animal 
kingdom. It is a complete equivalence of thing and meaning that allows for no 
ambiguity.’ 654 Secondly that ‘The trace is the mark of an absence, a missing object 
like the foot in the sand of Man Friday.’ 655 And Thirdly that the ‘signifier is a sign 
without any referent. It does not refer to anything, although it shares with the trace 
absence as its fundamental feature.’ 656 Despite the location of voice in Lacan being 
post-signifier we can see in this turn, following Hewitson, a similarity concerning 
human speech and affective vocalization of other animals. There is an anthropocentric 
arrogance of assuming humans are the zenith of communicative beings that have 
broached a new paradigm of the signifier, the symbol without direct correlation, 
without strict referent, to its signified. 657 
Hewitson subsequently presents a very similar passage of Lacan’s teachings from 
Seminar VI. In this seminar Lacan waxes on the subject of Man Friday’s footprint in 
Robinson Crusoe. He frames the footprint as an effacement of the trace (this is 
Lacan’s piedalogical formulation of the palimpsest signifier). Lacan ‘writes’: 
 
I spoke to you about Robinson Crusoe and about the footstep, the trace of 
Friday's footprint, and we dwelt a little while on the following: is this already 
the signifier, and I told you that the signifier begins, not with the trace, but with 
whatever effaces the trace, and it is not the effaced trace which constitutes the 
signifier, it is something which poses itself as being able to be effaced, which 
inaugurates the signifier. In other words, Robinson Crusoe effaces the trace of 
Friday's footprint, but what does he put in its place? If he wants to preserve the 
place of Friday's footprint, he needs at least a cross, namely a bar and another 
bar across it. This is the specific signifier. The specific signifier is something 
which presents itself as being itself able to be effaced and which subsists 
precisely in this operation of effacing as such. I mean that the effaced signifier 
already presents itself as such with the properties proper to the unsaid. In so far 
as I cancel the signifier with the bar, I perpetuate it as such indefinitely, I 
inaugurate the dimension of the signifier as such. Making a cross is properly 
speaking something that does not exist in any form of locating that is permitted 





657	See criticism of Lacan’s anthropocentricism in Jacques Derrida’s ‘And Say the Animal Responded’ 
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locate things, but they do not do it intentionally with something said, but with 
traces of traces. 658 
 
At this juncture the nuances between trace, sign and signifier do not need further 
comment. What warrants underscoring, however, is the striking similarity in structure 
of language and species. Obviously the final line contains the slippage of not just 
declaring animals as ‘non-speaking’ but the syntactical division ‘the animals’ that 
presupposes the author and his readers are not of the same category. Lacan rests the 
anthropocentric exclusivity of language on its signifying dimension – being divorced 
from that which it signifies. Both Aristotle and Lacan share an insistence on a series 
of partitions. Speech is a symbol or an affectation of a soul. The signifier is, too, 
symbolic, without specific referent – it concerns a constellation of generalizable and 
interchangeable signs. Aristotle and Lacan both emphasize the great importance 
between, for example’s sake, the vocalization of pain and the spoken declaration of ‘I 
am in pain.’ The former is a firm referent of the malady affecting the vocalizer, 
whereas the latter is abstracted to a generalizable symbol. Yet, in each case, and 
despite the Lacanian location of voice as posthumous to the necrotic signifier – 
speech cannot quite be disengaged, cleaved or vivisected from voice. It is either a 
necessary phonological step (in Aristotle’s formulation) or an unavoidable outcome of 
the signifying operation (for Lacan). Voice, insidious, ineradicable and irreducible 
gets everywhere like irksome slime.  
The lofty enterprise of language (to delineate the just and unjust by way of symbols) 
must be protected from the voice. Across this division the metaphysical battlements of 
man and others are overlaid. This is precisely the politics of voice that Dolar examines 
in chapter of the same name. On the same page as the Aristotle quote (presented 
above concerning the differences between man and bees and what is “expedient and 
inexpedient, and therefore likewise the just and unjust”) Dolar adds commentary in 
Aristotle’s voice. 659 He writes:  
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mere voice is what animals and men have in common, it is the animal part of 
man. It can indicate only pleasure and pain, experiences shared by both animals 
and humans. But speech, logos, does not merely indicate, it expresses or, better 
still, it manifests: it manifests the advantageous (useful) and the harmful, and 
consequently the just and the unjust, the good and the evil. If one receives a 
blow, one may well scream, that is, emit voice to vent one’s pain, and that is 
what a horse or a dog would also do. But at the same time one can say: “I have 
been wronged” (harmed, ill-treated), and thereby the speech introduces the 
measure of right and wrong. It doe not just give vent to feelings, it introduces a 
standard of judgement. 660   
 
The differences between speech and voice are glossed here with another dimension. It 
is not just a case of practical application (the expedient) or significatory difference 
from affect or impression (as in Lacan’s comments) but one that is necessary for 
morals, judgements. For Aristotle, mere vocal expressions cannot navigate and 
communicate moral or political conundrums but words and speech can. Animals may 
emit sonic expressions of their feelings, but they do not communicate what is right, 
just or expedient. Thus, without speech (a voice imbued with meaning, yoked to 
language, logos,), without a sound signifying something, one is forever rendered 
apolitical and immoral. Speech is what builds cities and makes moral laws and 
honorable states, as the final line of the passage presented both here and in Dolar’s 
chapter suggests: ‘And it is a characteristic of man that he alone has any sense of 
good and evil, of just and unjust, and the like, and an association of living beings who 
have this sense makes a family and a state.’ 661 
This is the dichotomy of voice and speech extrapolated into politics. Phone is distinct 
from logos. Sound is distinct from semantics and language. Music is apart from law 
and order. And it is precisely the exclusivity of man and language that sets this type of 
animal apart from the chaos and din of other natures. The problem in all of this is 
guarding logos from the contagion of phone.	
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Bacchic Frenzy: Forgetting how to walk and speak 
 
This section continues to explore the divisions imposed on voice detailed previously: 
the polarization of logos and phone and the supposed exclusivity of language to man. 
Here, some of the ways these divisions have been imposed are examined; in 
particular, the ways voice and music have been subject to control. Through these 
readings, the insidious and contagious aspect of voice is re-established as an object of 
horror for men of state. Examples of how musical pleasure has been guarded against 
and quarantined are posed as symptomatic of their horror of voice. 
 
Logos and phone. Such a polarizing formulation is by no means original to Aristotle. 
Aristotle’s position can be regarded as an extension of Platonic logocentricism: the 
primacy of language, meaning and thought over sensuous sound, the body and voice. 
Plato (Aristotle’s teacher) repeatedly displays an almost phobic aversion to voice and 
the possibilities of enjoying sound without strict meaning or language. Plato was not 
the first figure to fear and actively repress the arousing and infectious potency of 
voice whilst insisting the word of law, the language of good sense and meaning, is 
followed without any sensuous or emotional distraction. Dolar references a very early 
instance of such a sentiment: ‘Chinese emperor Chun (c. 2200 BC) offers the 
following simple precept: “Let the music follow the sense of the words. Keep it 
simple and ingenuous. One must condemn pretentious music which is devoid of sense 
and effeminate.”’ 662  In this quote, and resonating with Zanatta’s re-voice of 
Aristotle’s sentiment, a ‘flat opposition between man and animal’ is drawn up. 663 A 
gendering division segregates meaning and language from sound and melody. Voice 
qua enjoyable sonic is feminine where voice yoked to the code of language and put to 
moral, just and expedient ends is masculine.  
This is the binary at play in the narratives of Odysseus and the Sirens and Maeldun 
and his men visiting the islands of strange nonsensical sounds. Notice too, recalling 
the previous explorations of sound qua slime, how Dolar, in rearticulating Platonic 
logocentricism and its resultant binary of gender (the sensuous and the sensible) 
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couches the sonic mode of voice, the voice unchained from language, in a vocabulary 
that evokes the fear and anxiety of the infectious, potent and contagious. Dolar writes: 
 
Music, and in particular the voice, should not stray away from words which 
endow it with sense; as soon as it departs from its textual anchorage, the voice 
becomes senseless and threatening – all the more so because of its seductive 
and intoxicating powers. Furthermore, the voice beyond sense is self evidently 
equated with femininity, whereas the text, the instance of signification, is in this 
simple paradigmatic opposition on the side of masculinity. (Some four thousand 
years later, Wagner will write in a famous letter to Liszt: “Die Musik ist ein 
Weib,” music is a woman.) The voice beyond words is a senseless play of 
sensuality, it possesses a dangerous force, although in itself it is empty and 
frivolous. 664  
 
This, senseless play of sensuality can be regarded as symptomatic of privileging one 
sense over another sense. In ‘Freud’s Voices’ Dolar (in perhaps the most strikingly 
relevant passage for sound studies in the book) writes of the difference between 
hearing and listening (this latter very much analogous to Pierre Schaeffer’s projects of 
exploring sound in itself). 665 Permeating throughout Dolar’s examples of musical 
voice juxtaposed with voice as a servant of meaningful language, the dichotomy of 
the Italian soldiers casts its shadow. The politics of voice is to guard against the 
enjoyment of che bella voce! – to ensure the command is heard for practical, just and 
expedient ends. Dolar, just over 140 pages after recounting the Italian soldiers joke on 
page three, writes: 
 
[W]e can draw a provisional demarcation line between hearing and listening, 
and between meaning and sense. To be brief: hearing is after meaning, the 
signification which can be spelled out; listening is, rather, being on the lookout 
for sense, something that announces itself in the voice beyond meaning. We 
could say that hearing is entwined with understanding—hence the French 
double meaning (double entendre!) of entendre, entendement, being both 
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hearing and understanding, intellect—that is, reducing the heard to the 
meaningful, reducing the audible to the intelligible; while listening implies an 
opening toward a sense which is undecidable, precarious, elusive, and which 
sticks to the voice. Sense (…) also alludes to the other use of sense: that of the 
five senses, of the sensual (to say nothing of the sensitive and sensible). The 
equivoque of sense and sense (sense of hearing) is, I suppose, structural; it is 
already encapsulated in the “sound and sense” formula, which could be read as 
“sense and sense.” 666 
 
What follows is an example of guarding against one sense: seeking to protect 
meaningful sense from the infectious jouissance of sound. How to have voice, used 
for conveying meaning, without risking the audience listening? How to ensure voice 
is heard and heeded for expedient and just ends but not listened to, not sensed and 
enjoyed, like the Italian soldiers do. 
Plato argues for the division between signifying voice and non-signifying voice, and 
further impresses the division over politics, morals and genders. The non-signifying 
sound of voice is repeatedly framed as being corrupting, infectious, immoral and, 
above all, feminine. In Symposium Eryximachus, records Plato (Plato ventriloquizes, 
as we shall see, most frankly through others), draws the engendering lines of 
signifying and asignifying voice most plainly: speaking is for men of good standing, 
moral just men, whereas music and singing is for women. The two, he repeatedly 
suggests, should be partitioned for the benefit of the former: ‘I’ve another suggestion 
to make. I don’t think we need this flute girl who’s just started playing. She can play 
for herself, or to the women upstairs, if she feels like it, but for this evening I suggest 
we stick to conversation.’ 667   
In Plato’s dialogue with Protagoras there is an eruption of the author’s contempt for 
musical frivolity, his disdain for the supposed femininity of asignifying voice and its 
enjoyment. Most secondary sources of this text focus on the first half (his frank 
dismissals of both women and musical enjoyment), however the continuum of 
speaking for men and voice and music for others continues into a diatribe against 
poetry. By the end of the passage, Plato has not only posited that sober conversation 
alone is the proper conduct of educated and respectable men, but also that even the 
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aesthetic pleasure of poetry is improper. Plato’s fidelity to logos is strict and 
orthodox. 668  
 
Conversation about poetry reminds me too much of the wine parties of second-
rate and commonplace people. Such men, being too uneducated to entertain 
themselves as they drink by using their own voices and conversational 
resources, put up the price of female musicians, paying them well for the hire of 
an extraneous voice – that of the pipe – and find their entertainment in its 
warblings. But where the drinkers are men of worth and culture, you will find 
no girls piping or dancing or harping.  They are quite capable of enjoying their 
own company without such frivolous nonsense, using their own voices in sober 
discussion and each taking his turn to speak or listen – even if the drinking is 
really heavy. In the same way gatherings like our own, if they consist of men 
such as most of us claim to be, call for no extraneous voices – not even poets. 
669  
 
Much of the anxieties, the horrors, about voice untethered from language – or at least 
not in the service of language – concern the corrupting sensuous musicality of flutes 
or pipes. To guard against such pernicious corrupting forces music should be subject 
to legislation, it should be controlled, ordered… codified. For Plato the stakes of men 
being exposed to voice unleashed from codifying order could not be understated.  
In Republic, which Dolar quotes in ‘The Metaphysics of Voice’, any shift of musical 
mode must be scrutinized lest it ferments disorder. 670 
 
A change to a new type of music is something to beware of as hazard to all our 
fortunes. For the modes of music are never disturbed without unsettling of the 
most fundamental political and social conventions….It is here, then, I said, that 
our guardians must build their guardhouse and post of watch.  It is certain he 
said, that this is the kind of lawlessness that easily insinuates itself unobserved.  
Yes, said I, because it is supposed to be only a form of play and to work no 
harm.  Nor does it work any, he said, except that by gradual infiltration it softly 
overflows upon the characters and pursuits of men and from these issues forth 
grown greater to attack their business dealings, and from these relations it 
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proceeds against the laws and the constitution with wanton license, Socrates, till 
finally it overthrows all things public and private. 671 
 
Republic is in the voice of Socrates, the narrator (although Plato’s kin Thrasymachus, 
and Glaucon and Adeimantus, amongst a few others, also feature). This is, however, 
an instance of Plato ventriloquizing through others: in this case Adeimantus. It is by 
no means an isolated example of diegetic masquerading in earnest place of first 
person committal.   
Plato’s sentiment here is expressed in vocabulary that could well express an anxiety 
of infection. Could he not also be talking about a virus or a bacteria based plague 
when he warns of what ‘insinuates itself unobserved’? Voice, in this register for Plato 
is the virus that corrupts societal order. Thus, it is a case of precautions; of guarding 
against the threat of voice. Plato’s horror and phobia of voice stems from his 
paradigmatic privileging, politicizing and engendering of voice over word, not – it 
should be highlighted – any recourse to empirical observation. In this sense Plato’s 
conceptualization of voice, his demarcations of voice for man and any other animal 
stand in stark contrast to the biological argument and empiricism of his student, 
Aristotle. 672 
Plato’s precautionary measures against voice without words for aesthetic pleasure, 
musical enjoyment, are most vigorously delineated in Laws. The control of music, 
enforcing its adherence to code, is part of the logocentric project we are partially 
charting in this question of voice. We see, in Laws multiple instances of Plato arguing 
for sound to be ordered into meaning, for phone to yield to logos.  
Laws is one of Plato’s ‘Socratic dialogues’, like Republic, philosophical and political 
questions and propositions are elucidated, demonstrated and argued via a fictional 
parlé; ventriloquized via diegetic figures. The premise of Laws is ‘three elderly 
gentlemen’ travelling from Crete to Mount Ida (Zeus’ birthplace), during which they 
discuss laws and constitutions (this discussion takes up the first three books). The text 
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follows presented below is from Book III. John M. Cooper notes, in a short 
introductory text in Plato: Complete Works, the ‘all apparently fictional’ men are 
named thus: ‘Clinias from Crete, Megilus, a Spartan, and an unnamed Athenian’. 673 
The words below are that of the unnamed Athenian. Could Plato’s veil of anonymity 
be any less transparent? Is it not the same sentiment, albeit much more elaborated, as 
expressed in Republic? 
 
Our music was formally divided into several kinds and patterns. One kind of 
song, which went by the name of a hymn, consisted of prayers to the gods; there 
was a second and contrasting kind which might well have been called a lament; 
paeans were a third kind, and there was a forth, the dithyramb, as it was called, 
dealing, if I am not mistaken, with the birth of Dionysus. (…) Now these and 
other types were definitely fixed, and it was not permissible to misuse one kind 
of melody for another. The competence to take cognizance of these rules, to 
pass verdicts in accord with them, and, in case of need, to penalize their 
infraction was not left, as it is today, to the catcalls and discordant outcries of 
the crowd, nor yet to the clapping of applauders; the educated made it their rule 
to hear the performances through in silence, and for the boys, their attendants, 
and the rabble at large, there was the discipline of the official’s rod to enforce 
order. Thus the bulk of the populace was content to submit to this strict control 
in such matters without venturing to pronounce judgment by its clamors.  
Afterward, in course of time, an unmusical license set in with the appearance of 
poets who were men a native genius, but ignorant of what is right and legitimate 
in the realm of the Muses. Possessed by a frantic and unhallowed lust for 
pleasure, they contaminated laments with hymns and paeans with dithyrambs, 
actually imitated the strains of the flute on the harp, and created a universal 
confusion of forms. Thus their folly led them unintentionally to slander their 
profession by the assumption that in music there is no such thing as a right and a 
wrong, the right standard of judgment being the pleasure given to the hearer, be 
he high or low. By compositions of such a kind and discourse to the same 
effect, they naturally inspired the multitude with contempt of musical law, and a 
conceit of their own competence as judges. Thus our once silent audiences have 
found a voice, in the persuasion that they understand what is good and bad in 
art; the old “sovereignty of the best” in that sphere has given way to an evil 
“sovereignty of the audience.” If the consequence had been even a democracy, 
no great harm would have been done, so long as the democracy was confined to 
art, and composed of free men. But, as things are with us, music has given 
occasion to a general conceit of universal knowledge and contempt for law, and 
liberty has followed in their train. Fear was cast out by confidence in supposed 
knowledge, and the loss of it gave birth to impudence. For to be unconcerned 
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for the judgment of one’s betters in the assurance which comes of a reckless 
excess of liberty is nothing in the world but reprehensible impudence. So the 
next stage of the journey toward liberty will be refusal to submit to magistrates, 
and on this will follow emancipation from the authority and correction of 
parents and elders; then, as the goal of the race is approached, comes the effort 
to escape obedience to the law, and, when that goal is all but reached, contempt 
for oaths, for the plighted word, and all religion. The spectacle of the Titanic 
nature of which our old legends speak is reenacted; man returns to the old 
condition of a hell of unending misery.” 674 
 
A sneering judgment is threaded though the (unnamed) Athenian’s derision of those 
who actively enjoy music and the emergence of the dithyramb (the anthem of 
Dionysus that shall be considered shortly). Like previous texts presented, in this call 
for control of music, rhythm, voice and poetry so as guard against the corrupting 
forces of sound (that run along gender vectors) a vocabulary of anxiety and contagion 
is evident, as is a tone of repulsion. 675 The dithyrambs that imitate the flute are 
contaminations. 
Trevor J. Saunders’ translation has a satisfyingly blunter tone of derision and disdain, 
a touch more hand wringing and hyperbole. Misuse is replaced with ‘perverted’ and 
‘catcalls’ is followed by ‘uncouth yelling’. But it is the lines concerning the poets that 
strikes the most familiar chord of an elder’s stubborn dislike of new forms of vocal 
aesthetics:  ‘Gripped by a frenzied and excessive lust for pleasure, they jumbled 
together laments and hymns, mixed paeans and dithyrambs, and even imitated pipe 
tunes on the lyre.’ 676 
Dithyrambs were choral poems connected to the worship of the birth of Dionysus. 677 
Dithyramb, as the texts evidence, were regarded as a voice-based portal into the de-
subjectifying state of Bacchic frenzy, associated with wine, libido expressed in terms 
of physical interactions: ‘springtime want’. 678 The unnamed Athenian in Laws, in 
Book II, during a dialogue with Clinias, touches on Dionysian revelry:   
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There is a little-known current of story and tradition which says that Dionysus 
was robbed of his wits by his stepmother Hera, and that he gets his revenge by 
stimulating us to Bacchic frenzies and all the mad dancing that results; and 
this was precisely the reason why he made us a present of wine. 679  
 
Nietzsche, in ‘The Dionysiac World View’, provides a sense of the aesthestic and 
human interactions associated with songs and festivities stemming from Dionysian 
worship: 
 
Dionysiac art, by contrast, is based on play with intoxication, with the state of 
ecstasy. There are two principal forces which bring naive, natural man to the 
self-oblivion of intense intoxication: the drive of spring and narcotic drink. 
Their effects are symbolized in the figure of Dionysos. In both states the 
principium individuationis is disrupted, subjectivity dis- appears entirely before 
the erupting force of the general element in human life, indeed of the general 
element in nature. Not only do the festivals of Dionysos forge a bond between 
human beings, they also reconcile human beings and nature. Freely the earth 
brings its gifts, the fiercest beasts approach one another in peace; the flower-
decked chariot of Dionysos is drawn by panthers and tigers. All the caste-like 
divisions which necessity and arbitrary power have established between men 
disappear; the slave is a free-man, the aristocrat and the man of lowly birth unite 
in the same Bacchic choruses. In ever-swelling bands the gospel of universal 
harmony' rolls on from place to place; as they sing and dance, human beings 
express their membership of a higher, more ideal community; they have 
forgotten how to walk and speak.” 680  
 
The prevalence of alcohol, the giddy swirl of dance and intoxication looms heavy. A 
number of other facets deserve mention: disrupted individualities, de-subjectification, 
a return to the mass of chaotic nature. Just, expedient, moral and political divisions 
are dissolved (Plato wincing here) in the deliquescence of social hierarchies. Most 
pertinent for the theme of this chapter is the spectre of contagion in the last line. Ever-
swelling choruses roll from place to place – there is a sense of proliferation, of some 
other agency yielding raucous murmuration in human bodies. A possessive and 
parasitic theme is threaded through the description. Not only are human beings de-
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subjectified and de-politicized but like a host riddled with a pathogenic parasite they 
lose the traits commonly ascribed as the privilege of the human animal – bi-pedal 
walking and speech. The pleasure elicited from unrestricted, asignifying, voice is, 
according to Plato dangerous and infectious, because (like the parasites 
Ophiocordyceps Unilateralis and Sacculina) it insidiously strips overtakes cognitive 
(reasoning for expedient ends) agency. Bacchic choruses dethrone man to a position 
of animality, to an animal that does not speak for the expedient or just – but most 
certainly sings. 681 
Plato’s particular anxiety of the contagious and corrupting forces of the Dionysian 
dithyramb echoes in contemporary authorities: during a review contemplating the 
closure of London’s Fabric nightclub the committee chair asked if lowering the BPM 
of music played inside the establishment would impact drug use. 682 A common 
practice at contemporary music festivals, when crowds rush forward, risking and/or 
crushing spectators in front, is for the music act to cease playing and request calm – 
withholding their performance until safer levels of crowd movement are re-
established. Section 63 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 contains a 
similar presupposition of the relationship music and social order. 683  
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In Plato’s Republic Socrates’ distinctly ocularcentric solution to the dangers of voice 
is to keep watch (rather than listen, or hearken) and ensure that these intoxicating and 
corrupting sounds of voice and music adhere to order. Dolar, rehearses Plato’s anxiety 
of musical freedom: it ‘should be treated with the greatest philosophical concern and 
the utmost vigilance (…) any license invariably produces general decadence; it 
undermines the social fabric, its laws and mores, and threatens the very ontological 
order.’ 684  
Decadence, chaos, the abandonment to baser passions and the dissolution of social 
and moral orders begin with music and voices not shackled to a signifying code, to 
order and meaning. It is, for Plato, a question of rightness, and to be ‘right’ is to be 
moral and just – thus, to be right, moral and just sound must signify – phone must 
signify, it must refer to logos. Sound and voice should not be enjoyed and 
experienced for their own sake, but must refer to a code or meaning: this is being just. 
Music and voice for pleasure are, for Plato, resolutely not right. Dolar presents the 
following text from Laws II in parentheses: ‘“It is commonly said that the standard of 
rightness in music is its pleasure-giving effect. That, however, is an intolerable 
sentiment; in fact, tis a piece of flat blasphemy”’ 685 Similar to the debilitating effects 
that uncontrolled and intoxicating sounds had on Maeldun’s men (and Odysseus), and 
similar to the Dionysian possession of forgetting how to walk and speak, music and 
song can render even the strongest warrior ineffective. 686 As Plato, in The Republic, 
frets: 
 
Now when a man abandons himself to music, to play upon him and pour into 
his soul as it were through the funnel of his ears those sweet, soft, and dirgelike 
airs . . . and gives his entire time to the warblings and blandishments of song, 
the first result is that the principal of high spirit, if he had it, is softened like iron 
and is made useful instead of useless and brittle. But when he continues the 
practice without remission and is spellbound, the effect begins to be that he 
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melts and liquefies till he completely dissolves away his spirit, cuts out as it 
were the very sinews of his soul and makes of himself a “feeble warrior.” 687  
 
Even the man of strongest and most virtuous body and soul can be corrupted and 
incapacitated by the infectiousness of voice, song and music. Plato’s prescription, 
Dolar presents, is that ‘music and the rhythm must follow the speech” (Plato 1978, 
Republic III, 398d, 400d). For the core of the danger is the voice that sets itself loose 
from the word, the voice beyond logos, the lawless voice.’ 688  
Concerns over the contagion of the Dionysian dithyramb have already been touched 
on. But this was not the only musical mode regarded to warrant caution and state 
control. Dolar recounts, it is not just singing voice that must be yoked to signifying 
shackles of ‘just’ and ‘right’ word and meaning: various musical modes are 
considered too; some with contempt, others with grudging acceptance. The Lydian 
mode is supposedly mollifying, “dirgelike” and induces laxity, thus these ‘are useless 
even to women who are to make the best of themselves, let alone to men”’. 689 The 
Dorian and Phrygian modes are the concessions, by virtue of being, supposedly, more 
suited to men and warriors.  
In each turn of these turns, musical modes and enjoyment of voice apart from word is 
framed as a problem to be guarded against. Contagious affects, insidious potentials to 
possess and rob the human animal of expedient traits that supposedly distinguish it 
from others are threats, and must be warded off and quarantined by the good men of 
the state who fear pleasure and jouissance from voice is a gateway to horrors, a ‘hell 
of unending misery’. 690 
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This final text continues the narratives from the previous two sections. How men have 
guarded against the ‘horrors’ of insidious voice, the partitioning of man and language 
from voice and other animals, is further examined. The disdain for flutes is pitched as 
a register of an insistence for the partition between logos and phone. How Alcibiades 
and Plato respond to Socrates’ voice in Symposium is explored. Here, a new theme is 
embedded in the thread of voice and horror: love. Alcibiades and Plato are tormented 
by a contagious and spellbinding voice; but this is the torment of love. In each 
instance these readings elucidate the distinct corporeality of insidious voice; how it 
infects and strips the host of agency. Themes of thrill and jouissance are then 
reincorporated to propose the horrors of voice – intolerable and tormenting – are an 
unbearable love.  
 
A conspicuous theme in the narratives of Plato and Aristotle is the flute. Like 
Odysseus’ men who protect against sensing voice by bunging their ears with wax this 
instrument has been repeatedly muted lest it corrupt men. The sensual (insensible) 
sound of the flute, sonicizing breath through its structure, is a leitmotif of sonic 
contagion and potential corruption. Those who seek to guard meaningful sense from 
sensual sensing have demonized the flute.   
 Demonization is not hyperbole. Pan the libidinal; erotic and joyous flautist 
(substituted by Ovid for Marsyas) is an aesthetic root of Judeo-Christian depictions of 
the Devil. Like pictorial representations of the Devil, Pan is also depicted or described 
as having the hindquarters and horns of a goat. The flute playing of Pan/Marsyas is 
frequently framed as a corrupting force, an unregulated force that threatens order, 
compliance and civil obedience. The figure of Pan also signifies untamed nature; 
depicted through his cavorting with nymphs and the display of enjoyment in music. 
Pan is often depicted as a flautist. The term ‘Panic’, the sensation of fear so strong as 
to negate cerebral logic or reason, replacing it with the ‘animalistic’ fight-or-flight 
activation of the sympathetic nervous system, derives from Pan. 691  
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There is a further horrifying incursion of the natural in the figure of Pan – a resonance 
between infectious voice that worms inside the ear and Pan’s cavorting. Pan is 
rapacious: libido unleashed. Recalling the rehearsed insidiousness of voice, its 
potential to incur, unwanted: both Pan and voice in the array of Western registers 
surveyed thus far, threaten unwanted dissemination (to be read with frank 
etymological connotations) in and through bodies.  
Adriana Cavarero, begins the chapter ‘Some Irresistible (and Somewhat Dangerous) 
Flute Playing’ chapter in For More Than One Voice: Toward a Philosophy of Vocal 
Expression with a quotation from Plutarch’s Life of Alcibiades: “He refused to play 
the flute, considering it a contemptible instrument unworthy of free men”. 692 
Although Plutarch is not the focus of the chapter, the sentiment, about Alcibiades, 
neatly expresses a theme running throughout her exploration of how he (Alcibiades) 
is used, ventriloquized through, by Plato in Symposium. The gist is that flutes are not 
for men, they are, as Emperor Chun might say, ‘devoid of sense and effeminate.’ 693 
They are also dangerous, a Pandora’s Box, that threatens to unleash the chaos of 
nature – desire, frenzy, bacchanalia. Not right for men of order. We shall come back 
to Cavarero’s commentary shortly, but first, by way of Dolar, let’s consider the flute 
and its mechanics as Plato and Aristotle deem it contraband. 
Musical instruments and their mechanics are not exempt from Plato’s scrutiny. The 
lesser the capacity to wander from prescribed modes the more acceptable the 
instrument; the antithesis of such an ideal is, of course, the flute that can freely flutter 
through sensuous, infectious and corrupting sounds. One can suppose that flutes, slide 
whistles and stringed instruments without frets would all go to the pyre under Plato to 
save the players temptation to stray into blasphemous and corrupting sonic 
expressions of no fixed mode. Aristotle parrots Plato’s fear and disdain for sound not 
yoked to logos, citing the flute as being inherently corruptive, intoxicating and 
dangerous. He aligns it with femininity, bacchic revelry and unchecked passions.  
Dolar, in ‘The Metaphysics of the Voice’ quotes Plato’s record of Eryximachus’ 
comment in Symposium – a request for the ‘flute girl’ to be removed: ‘I would like to 
make a further motion: let us dispense with the flute-girl who just made her entrance; 
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let her play for herself or, if she prefers, for the women in the house. Let us instead 
spend our evening in conversation. (Plato, 1978, Symposium 176e)’. 694  Tom 
Griffith’s translation is slightly more contemporary in tone. It is worth presenting here 
because of the sumptuous italicization that underscores the gender division within the 
scene and the self-congratulatory backslapping machismo of the men’s group. It 
reads: ‘I’ve another suggestion to make. I don’t think we need the flute girl who’s just 
started playing. She can play for herself, or to the women upstairs, if she feels like it, 
but for this evening I suggest we stick to conversation.’ 695  
Dolar summarises the line, emphasizing how flutes and their music are to be played 
by and for women whereas men engage in philosophy and conversation. 696 He then 
presents two texts from Aristotle’s Politics that ‘endorse’ this view. We shall return to 
Plato soon, for now there is more to be said about the passage from Politics than just 
an endorsement of Eryximachus’ suggestion in the Symposium.  
Aristotle argues for the reasons why the flute and certain modes of music are more 
undesirable, vulgar, and less expedient than others. Curiously, the closing sentiments 
of the section contradict Socrates’ insistence on restricting license to two modes of 
music and accept there is a place for the ‘vulgar’ instruments and other modes. To 
begin, Aristotle tackles the question of musical pedagogy. He asks: if music is taught, 
how best and via which instruments it should be involved so as to not corrupt or 
vulgarize? 
 
As to the vulgarizing effect which music is supposed to exercise, this is a 
question which we shall have no difficulty in determining, when we have 
considered to what extent freemen who are being trained to political virtue 
should pursue the art, what melodies and what rhythms they should be allowed 
																																																								
694 Dolar, A Voice and Nothing More, 46. This differs from the Hamilton and Cairns edited edition I 
have access to which reads: ‘I also propose that we dispense with the services of the flute girl who has 
just come in, and let her go and play to herself or to the women inside there, whichever she prefers, 
while we spend our evening in discussion of a subject which, if you think fit, I am prepared to name.’ 
Plato. The Collected Dialogues of Plato (Bollingen Series), 531. The 1978 edition Dolar cites from the 
same editors might well use a different translation. 
695	Plato, Symposium and Phaedrus, Trans. Tom Griffith (New York, USA: Alfred A  
Knopf/Random House, 2000), 13. 
696 Dolar, A Voice and Nothing More, 46. 
	 256	
to use, and what instruments should be employed in teaching them to play; for 
even the instrument makes a difference. 697 
 
Aristotle here, in contrast to Plato, is not as vehemently opposed to all music. He is 
not even opposed to musical enjoyment. But there is a question of which aspects of 
music are right to be indulged in. Because, as the following section evidences, 
without being conducted in the proper modes and methods of musical endeavor, there 
is the risk of succumbing to the side of musical enjoyment that is base – that same 
sound that animals find pleasure in: ‘Let the young practice even such music as we 
have prescribed, only until they are able to feel delight in noble melodies and 
rhythms, and not merely in that common part of music in which every slave or child 
and even some animals find pleasure.’ 698 It is at this juncture where Aristotle turns 
his attention to the flute, directly after a paragraph that draws equivalence between a 
certain form of common music that gives pleasure to animals and humans alike. 
‘From these principals we may also infer what instruments should be used. The flute, 
or any other instrument which requires great skill, as for example the harp, ought not 
to be admitted into education, but only such as will make intelligent students of 
music’. 699 He continues ‘Besides, the flute is not an instrument which is expressive of 
moral character; it is too exciting. The proper time for using it is when the 
performance aims not at instruction, but at the relief of passions.’ 700 In the following 
line, Aristotle complains of a further issue of flute playing – its mechanical denial of 
voice being used for educational and expedient ends: speech, words – one cannot play 
a flute and speak words. He writes ‘And there is a further objection; the impediment 
which the flute presents to the use of the voice detracts from its educational value. 
The ancients therefore were right in forbidding the flute to youths and freemen’ 701 
Not only does the flute deny oral articulation of consonants for speech but its playing 
results in an amplified and modulated emission of voice imbued breath. In a sense, it 
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is incompatible with speech: it disallows any just, moral or expediency-orientated 
vocalization and instead sounds an augmented voice.  
Song could be tolerated, provided it sticks to an approved musical mode – but the 
flute, because of its pneumatic and mechanical method of sounding notes, has an 
irksome tendency to stray off scale. The played flute relishes in everything that Plato 
argues to be corrupting, insidious, immoral and dangerous: it indulges in non-
signifying voice and capriciously blasphemes in sound. Aristotle states, in the closing 
segment of Politics VIII, in his discussion of the musical modes: ‘Bacchic frenzy and 
all similar emotions are most suitably expressed by the flute, and are better set to the 
Phrygian than to any other mode. The dithyramb, for example, is acknowledged to be 
Phrygian’ 702 
Let’s return to Plato’s Symposium. Cavarero, notes precisely this Platonic gripe of the 
flute’s doubled vocal corruption:  
 
the flute lets itself, dangerously, represent the phone in the double sense of the 
term: voice and sound. Whoever plays it renounces speech and evokes a world 
in which the acoustic sphere and expressions of corporeality predominate. It is 
the world of the Dionysian dithyramb, where the flute modulates rhythms that 
accompany an orgiastic dance.’ 703 
 
The flute is the doubling up of the qualities Plato (subsequently and Aristotle) wished 
to deny of voice. Not only does the flute veto the articulation of language or words 
but, additionally, it amplifies breath into sonorous song. The flute and various wind 
instruments are prolongations of the mouth: ‘they are all too similar to voice’ 704 
Flutes ‘require breath and thus impede the flutist from speaking.’ 705 Flutes project an 
infectious musicality and cast a spell on those who listen whilst silencing any verbal 
expression of expedient speech. Words, logos, sense and rationality are denied, 
leaving only the resounding possibility of intoxicating, sensuous, sound. 
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Cavarero’s analysis in ‘Some Irresistible (and Somewhat Dangerous) Flute Playing’ 
draws out further nuances concerning the presence of the flutes and voices. The issue 
of the flute is, within the diegesis, framed in a theological register qua the figure of 
Marsyas. On another level, Cavarero offers a more biographical reading of Plato’s 
text. The flute comes to be heard in a symptomatic context of Plato’s desires – which 
to say it is an object of repulsion, a phobia, for Plato. Cavarero’s commentary (of 
Alcibiades’ comments about Socrates, Plato’s teacher) does not employ these terms 
but it most certainly drives to suggest Alcibiades is voicing a personal sentiment of 
Plato’s in regard to his teacher.  
The passage can be read as a curious chink in Plato’s stoic aversion to voice and 
sound and his privileging of text and language. Plato, it almost goes without saying, 
was scribe to his teacher, Socrates. Socrates was an orator, not a scribe like Plato and, 
later, Aristotle. The briefest glance over Plato’s texts uncovers evidence he was 
anxious and fearful of the intoxicating sonic aspect of voice apart from language and 
the spellbinding qualities of music. Yet, he cannot, in the final instance, deny the 
influence and power of the sound of his master’s, Socrates’, voice. Is the textual voice 
of Alcibiades Plato’s veiled concession to his elder, a chink in his pathology of 
phone-denial? 
Let’s turn to the scene in question. At first Alcibiades’ presence is acousmatic: 
‘Almost at once we heard Alcibiades’ voice from the courtyard. He was very drunk 
and shouting at the top of his voice, asking ‘where Agathon was’, and demanding ‘to 
be taken to Agathon’.’ 706 Moments later he enters drunkenly. Cavarero writes: ‘he is 
in the grips of a bacchic frenzy, the Dionysian inebriation that is linked to the 
orgiastic rhythm of the flute. In keeping with this rhythm, Alcibiades stumbles his 
way into the room “half-carried by the flute girl”’ 707 Alcibiades’ sonic and raucous 
debut immediately couches him contextual harmony with Pan, and the Bacchic frenzy 
of the dithyramb. Aptly, it is ‘the flute girl’ who carries Alcibiades’ rambunctiousness 
and intoxicated zeal into the Symposium. 708  Carried, should be read here in the 
double sense. He might be physically supported by a young flautist, but he might also 
be carried off, intoxicated, compelled to revelry, by the flute. What is really carrying 
																																																								
706 Plato, Symposium and Phaedrus, 68-69. 
707 Cavarero, For More Than One Voice: Toward a Philosophy of Vocal Expression, 69. 
708 Ibid. 
	 259	
into the Symposium? Is Alcibiades carried in or carried away? This passage concerns 
more than the arrival of drunkenness. It is an almost literal array of all that Plato 
disparages. The flute, revelry, enjoyment, feminine and natural passions arriving in 
Bacchic form. 709 
After Alcibiades is seated he notices Socrates beside him. To begin he is a touch 
abrasive towards Socrates and explains he is trying to avoid him. He then orders a 
large cup, but grabs a bucket, and drains the wine. He orders Socrates to do the same 
but admits that ‘It doesn’t matter how much you give him to drink, he’ll drink it and 
be none the worse for wear.’ 710 Heed these two sentiments: Alcibiades wishes to 
avoid Socrates and Socrates cannot get drunk.  
After some discussion Alcibiades announces his intention to ‘praise Socrates using 
similies’ 711 Alcibiades likens Socrates to a Silenus-figure: ‘I think he’s very like one 
of those Silenus-figures sculptors have on their shelves. They’re made with flutes or 
pipes. You can open them up, and when you do you find little figures of the gods 
inside. I also think Socrates is like the satyr Marsyas.’ 712 Alcibiades, by likening the 
old man to a flute or a pipe is, by extension, suggesting that Socrates’ voice is not 
only intoxicating and spellbinding but that his external appearance betrays his inner-
worth. To but it bluntly, Socrates ‘face and body are ugly’ but his soul is beautiful – 
and it is through his voice that his soul is conveyed and transported to others. 713 
Alcibiades recounts: 
 
You may not play the pipes, like Marsyas, but what you do is much more 
amazing. He had only to open his mouth to delight men, but he needed a 
musical instrument to do it. The same goes for anyone nowadays who plays 
music – I count what Olympus played as really Marsyas’, since he learned it 
from him. His is the only music which carries people away (…) Such is its 
divine power, and it makes no difference whether it’s played by an expert, or by 
a mere flute girl. 714  
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There are a number of themes nestled within this passage. Firstly, the shadow of 
pederast homosexuality ‘as a model of cultural and political formation in the Greek 
aristocracy’ is alluded to (in part by double-entendres). 715   The backstory is 
Alcibiades’ spurned love for Socrates. His torment stems from his military service 
with Socrates in Potidaea where they were messmates. Alcibiades hoped that Socrates 
would ‘improve him’ and wined and dined him more than once. One evening, after 
plying Socrates with wine, Alcibiades suggested he stay, arguing that it was too late 
an hour for him to leave. Socrates agreed. Alcibiades then details what happened after 
the slaves had fallen asleep and the lights were put out. He goes on, in vino veritas:  
 
I decided it was time to abandon all subtlety, and say plainly what I was after. 
So I nudged him. “Socrates, are you asleep?” “No.” “Do you know what I’ve 
decided?” “What?” “I think you’re the ideal person to be my lover, but you 
seem to be a bit shy about suggesting it.” 716  
 
Alcibiades hoped to satisfy Socrates for his own improvement. Socrates, however, 
delicately declines and Alcibiades sleeps next to him. Alcibiades admits that he ‘slept 
with Socrates all night, but absolutely nothing had happened. It was just like sleeping 
with one’s father or elder brother.’ 717 Alcibiades, rejected but still full of admiration 
for Socrates, declares how he ‘went around infatuated with the man, No one’s ever 
been so infatuated.’ 718  
This monologue of Alcibiades is a duet. Alcibiades speaks not only for himself but 
voices Plato’s admiration for his teacher. Plato is ventriloquizing here. This is 
Cavarero’s point on the opening page of the chapter – a sentiment she traces from 
Martha Nussbaum’s more visual comment in The Fragility of Goodness: ‘The 
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718 Ibid. 
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enamoured Alcibiades speaks for himself, but he also speaks for the author: “the 
Symposium’s portrait of Alcibiades is in some sense Plato’s own self-portrait.”’ 719 
Alcibiades also tells the story of Marsyas and Olympus (or Zeus). Marsyas challenged 
Olympus to a musical duel. Challenging the Gods is doomed to failure: he lost, and 
his punishment was to be flayed alive, leaving only his screaming mouth. But 
‘Alcibiades’ adds a twist, his thesis here is that Olympus was really playing Marsyas’ 
music, not his own music. Alcibiades, running the same conceptual likening of speech 
and voice being as intoxicating and compelling as flutes and voices, feels he is just as 
transported and beguiled by the voice of Socrates even when others are poorly 
parroting his arguments: 
 
You have the same effect on people. The only difference is that you do it with 
word alone, without the aid of any instrument. We can all listen to anyone else 
talking, and it has virtually no effect on us, no matter what he is talking about, 
or how good a speaker he is. But when we listen to you, or to someone else 
using your arguments, even if he’s a hopeless speaker, we’re overwhelmed and 
carried away. 720  
  
Alcibiades, in likening Socrates to Marsyas and in the echo of his confession of his 
unrequited love, is plagued by Socrates’s voice – even when it comes from others’ 
mouths recounting Socrates’ arguments and wisdom. Like the contagious earworm 
victims sing and pass on to others, Socrates’ voice is everywhere; it sounds in the 
conversations and voices of others. Socrates voice is a ubiquitous and inescapable 
torment for the spurned Alcibiades who is nevertheless fascinated and captivated: 
 
When I hear him, it’s like the worst kind of religious hysteria. My heart pounds, 
and I find myself in floods of tears, such is the effect of his words. I used to 
listen to Pericles and other powerful speakers, and I thought they spoke well. 
But they never had the effect on me of turning all my beliefs upside down, with 
the disturbing realization that my whole life is that of a slave. Whereas this 
																																																								
719 Cavarero, For More Than One Voice: Toward a Philosophy of Vocal Expression, 68, see note 2, 
249. 
720 Plato, Symposium and Phaedrus, 73. 
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Marsyas here has often made me feel that, and decide that the kind of life I lead 
is just not worth living. 721  
 
Socrates voice, Alcibiades argues, torments, infects, plagues and is disseminated by 
others, through the bodies of others. There is a theme of contagion, insidious voice, in 
this love story. In this textual duet to Socrates, Alcibiades and Plato rehearse the age-
old plague of love. Specifically it is love for another’s voice, an explication of which 
runs into multiple equivalences of voice and love with earworms and parasites. 722 
Corporeal modulation, a horrifying stripping of agency, is even evidenced by the 
love-stricken Alcibiades: his heart quickens and he becomes tearful at the 
disseminated voice of Socrates in others. Socratean arguments and words cast a spell 
of distinctly physical consequence when piped though others’, even if they are poor 
orators.  
Alcibiades, in the Griffith translation provided above, likens hearing Socrates’ voice 
to hysteria, a mania similar to the extreme literary example of earworms detailed in 
‘Slimy & Wormy’, ‘‘Crazy’’ and ‘Parasites & Earworms’ sections of this chapter. 
Alcibiades torment is echoed in contemporary popular music songs such as Britney 
Spears’ (You Drive Me) Crazy (1999), Toxic (2004), I’m a Slave 4 U (2001) and Kylie 
Minogue’s 2001 hit Can’t Get You Out Of My Head whereby voice and love are 
framed as pernicious agents of mania. Alcibiades ‘feels his heart flutter in his breast, 
and he becomes a slave to what he hears.’ 723 He is plagued by a love that strips him 
of agency and bodily control and equally a voice manifesting in similar symptoms. 
The infectious and intoxicating spell of love is analogous to the compelling musical 
voice, the earworm that drives the victim ‘crazy’. 724  
																																																								
721 Ibid., 74. 
722 Such as Ophiocordyceps Unilateralis and Sacculina carcini. 
723 Cavarero, For More Than One Voice: Toward a Philosophy of Vocal Expression, 70. 
724 To take the similarities further, Alcibiades’ detailing of the virulent dissemination of Socrates’ voice 
(in others) is also reflected in modern music’s earworms: the endless re-plays of records, synthetic re-
soundings of the vocal performance that lodge in one’s consciousness and torment. In addition to 
contemporary popular music’s technological and consumerist re-production and dissemination the 
analogy between Alcibiades’ torment and modern pop can be identified in popular music’s proclivity 
for ‘cover’ versions, remixes, karaoke and tribute bands. Just as Alcibiades may hear others parroting 
the arguments of Socrates we too may be inadvertently exposed to poor reproductions. The 
contemporary hit record’s contagion and infectiousness mirrors Alcibiades’ torment in modality and 
symptom. 
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Alcibiades solution is to resort to the same aural evasion as Odysseus does when his 
voyage takes him within earshot of the Sirens. He mentions the Homeric poem and 
references the irresistibility of voice:  
 
Even now I know in my heart of hearts that if I were to listen to him, I 
couldn’t resist him. (…) So I tear myself away, as if stopping my ears against 
the Sirens; otherwise I would spend my whole life sitting there at his feet. (…) 
So I run for my life, and avoid him, and when I see him 725  
 
Plato’s response to such a captivating speaker and his voice is very different to 
Alcibiades’ reaction. Plato, unlike Alcibiades, stayed to listen to Socrates. In a sense, 
Alcibiades can be read as an alternative representation of how Plato feels (the love for 
his master’s enchanting sonorous voice) and what he does not (unlike Alcibiades) 
succumb to (the avoidance of the beguiling voice).  Whereas the flighty, charming 
and handsome Alcibiades flees the spellbinding voice of Socrates, Plato, by contrast, 
is prepared to stay and take notes. 726 Plato, textually speaking through Alcibiades, is 
describing by-proxy his love for his teacher’s spellbinding speech whilst also 
describing the solution of avoidance he admirably refused. Cavarero details: 
 
Alcibiades not only functions as the double face of himself and Plato, but also 
as the one from whom Plato wishes to distinguish himself. Alcibiades – who is 
beautiful, famous and charming – is an ambiguous figure on whom hangs, 
among other things, an accusation of sacrilege. (…) Alcibiades turned his back 
on Socrates; he stopped his ears in order to extract himself from the teaching of 
Socratic logoi. On the other hand Plato, the legitimate heir, stayed to listen – all 
the while worrying about to eliminate precisely the enchanting aspect of this 
listening. Plato, in other words, found his own way to stop his ears – namely, 
through the devocalizing of logos. 727  
 
																																																								
725 Plato, Symposium and Phaedrus, 74. 
726 To make a brief analogy with academia, Alcibiades is the exciting and engaging student who is first 
to speak to his teacher, glass in hand, at a soirée. Plato, by contrast, is the studious pupil who takes 
copious notes that are revisited, poured over and absorbed later on, in silence, in private. 
727 Cavarero, For More Than One Voice: Toward a Philosophy of Vocal Expression, 70. 
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In this rich section of Plato’s Symposium are two modes of confronting and/or dealing 
with the horrifying, contagious, infectious and captivating voice. Alcibiades’ (Plato’s 
thinly veiled ode to his teacher’s enchanting voice) ‘incorrect’ reaction is to flee and 
avoid the sonorous facet of speech. Plato, however, has a much more inventive and 
metaphysically drastic solution.  
‘Socrates does not write; he speaks. Logos comes out of his mouth and effectively 
enters the ears of his interlocutors.’ 728 Plato, by writing down the words of Socratic 
speech, by setting to text the words and cleaving logos, language, soul and meaning 
away from the corrupt, unjust, inexpedient, feminine and enchanting sound of voice, 
devocalizes logos: Plato, inscribes a method of having his teacher’s words without 
having to bear his voice. The essence of Socratic logoi is recorded as silent text 
without the corrupting sounds of voice. Logos sans Phone. Voice vivisected from 
language, thought and intellect without its messy sonic viscera.  
This is Plato’s bifurcation (of himself and Socratean speech), his pathology of love 
and denial. On one hand Plato must, albeit via textual proxy, admit Socrates’ voice is 
wonderful, enchanting and unbearably captivating (like love). Yet he does not wish to 
be so captivated, because for him, or at least the ideal and political side of him, it is a 
despicable and dishonorable enjoyment, an enjoyment of voice he disdains. It is 
precisely because of this corrupting sonic-beauty that he likens voice to the ugly and 
flute-like exterior of the Silenus-statues. For Plato, Socrates’ speech (logos housed 
within a beguiling voice) is akin to his ugly external appearance containing wonderful 
internal knowledge and wisdom. The Silenus-statue, with their blasphemous flute-like 
outside but god-like interior is Plato’s analogy of Socrates’ speech. Plato’s operation 
of de-vocalizing logos, is akin to getting to the gods housed within the Silenus-statue 
whilst doing away with the presence of the corrupting external flute. This is one of the 
wonderful insights Cavarero draws out:  
 
[the] rhetorical surface of the Socratic logoi is ugly, but the content is 
beautiful. Alcibiades stops here. His drunken discourse has reached its end. 
The whole platonic philosophy, however, without a drop of wine in its veins, 
goes well beyond this. It devocalizes logos. It cuts off its sonorous skin and 
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founds in its place an order rooted in the videocentric and noetic sphere of 
thought. It makes speech an acoustic shell of an idea.’ 729  
 
Plato, regarding voice and music as the undesirable, corrupting and distracting sonic 
shell of noetic thought, sought to flay this troublesome external phone from the logos 
it harbored. The likening of Socrates to Marsyas (who was flayed as punishment) 
reveals Plato’s metaphysical operation of separating thought, logos, from voice 
phone. It is this annexing of voice from thought, sound from order, phone from logos 
that underpins the previously detailed regulations of voice.  
Horror, the unbearable, intoxicating and corrupting horror of voice, is a constant 
theme threaded through such operations. Both Alcibiades and Plato sought to be free 
from contagious voice. Alcibiades (throwing the proverbial ‘baby out with the bath 
water’) couldn’t bear Socratic logoi wrapped up in voice and denied himself both: he 
fled from both logos and its sonic shell, the voice. The canny scribe Plato however, in 
a devocalizing procedure of flaying of his master’s voice, sought to isolate knowledge 
from its corrupting sonic shell. Plato sought to preserve Socratic logoi by partitioning 
speech and separating logos from its vocal skin and receding into the silent textual 
realm of language. Alcibiades and Plato are equally troubled and plagued by the 
contagious and spellbinding nature of voice. Both are tormented by Socrates’ 
insidious voice that can rob the listener of agency, but both cannot help but fall for 
such a voice. It is an unbearable love. Each has their solution to the dangers, the 








A different account of voice, object a voice contra ‘the object voice’, is presented 
here. The first chapter, which most forcefully levels criticism and elaborates 
departures from Dolar’s account of voice, is at times nigh on a retort to the widely 
referenced yet seldom critiqued A Voice and Nothing More. Indeed, this text is an 
intervention. The contention laid out is to confront the body where Dolar does not. 
The contribution of this thesis, the central claim, seeks not only to provide an 
alternative conception of the Lacanian voice qua object a (as a point of great 
significance for the body) but also, by addressing the body, argues for an implicit 
horror. This unpacks a rich synthesis between recent theorizing of horror (the work of 
Thacker, Trigg and Woodward) and voice studies and the Lacanian object a voice. 
This intervention-cum-synthesis is the mode of the thesis’ central claim – that 
intrinsic to the question of voice and body is horror. By turning towards the body in 
considerations of voice, contra Dolar, horrors abound. This claim impresses not only 
the horror of the object a voice but also the distinctly corporeal aspect of object a – 
seeking to alloy this concept back to the body from which it has tended to be 
estranged in recent commentaries.  
 
Dolar’s methodology of is one of veils. In the introduction he argues that meaning and 
aesthetics obfuscate the object voice. He considers the hidden source body, the 
acousmatic voice, at length. He praises the Pythagorean curtain that allows a voice to 
be heard without the body seen, as ‘a stroke of genius’ that stands at the ‘very origin 
of philosophy’. All these moves, like a magician’s cloak, operate within a structure of 
horror: that is to say the book’s methodology for articulating ‘the object voice’ 
couches it in the lacuna of thought that, as Thacker’s argues, defines horror. The 
horror vocabulary that peppers his arguments is symptomatic of this. According to 
Dolar ‘the object voice’ is beyond the horizon of meaning and aesthetics. Horror, 
following Thacker, is beyond the horizon of thought. Dolar’s repeated impressing of 
the epistemological void ‘the object voice’ (the ‘aphonic silent voice’) resonates in is 
a couching that stands in philosophical symmetry to Thacker’s framing of the 
unknown objects of horror. The text presented here explores this overlap but does so 
with sustained attention to the body. By considering the question of the body beyond 
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the veil of language and aesthetics voice qua object a is articulated as an object of 
horrors.   
 
Within the first chapter, ‘Beyond the Veil of this World’, there are a number of 
questions simmering. Future projects will further develop the arguments made here. 
Firstly, the role of voice in Lacan’s life is a particularly rich avenue to pursue. 
Roudinesco has commented on the biographical-theoretic parallel of the names of the 
Father (Lacan’s favorite daughter never had his name albeit for a brief period before 
acquiring the Miller name). A continuation of this praxis might be to consider the 
significance of a man whose fame was built upon his voice, its proximity to the 
elusive archive of his thought, but whose voice ate itself in later life. Lacan receded 
into knot-speaking: silence and mutterings were regarded as deep thought but may 
well have been symptoms of a brain tumor. Late in life Lacan continued public 
appearances but spoke little, the few odd words or exclamations he did ‘say’ were 
subject to over-interpretation. The emperor’s new clothes, played out by the new 
French emperor of the talking cure. (Incidentally, and it is surprising Dolar does not 
touch on this in his ruminations on the The Wizard of Oz, Lacan inaugurated the École 
freudienne de Paris (EFP) by way of a recorded message played in tape recorder, 
after which he then burst into the room and added a number of additional points of on 
top of his own recording). 
 
The subsequent chapters here are near sub-chapters that extend the premise of the 
first. Each of these chapters, unpack and approach the central claims of this thesis via 
considerations of voice, object a voice and the body on different levels: they perform 
the horror of turning to the question of body in voice in a trio of registers. Each of 
these avenues into the horrors of voice – and ultimately object a voice – unpack the 
central claim via different levels of regard to the body. ‘Violence’ examines the local, 
developmental and evolutionary aspects of vocalization. ‘Changes’, moves away from 
the question of vocalization to consider what significance a voice holds for bodies in 
flux. Insidious, by extension, focuses more heavily on questions of what happens to 
bodies subjected to voice. This arc runs from the horrors, violence and damage of 
vocal production to the horrors, violence and infection of reception. These three 
different thematically tethered articulations serve as a triptych to illustrate that turning 
to the body in terms of voice and object a voice horror emerges. This trio of 
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consecutive explications fosters the centrality of the question of the body in voice qua 
object a and also draws out how within this prospect, intrinsic to voice qua object a, 
horrors are concomitant.  
 
‘Violence’ evidences how the act of vocalization is a site of corporeal trauma; that 
vocalization is in service of a voice from without: one that wreaks violence upon the 
body subjected, maimed, in the torture house of language. A number of avenues of 
research are prompted in this text. ‘Violence’ provides an acute focus on vocalization, 
what it means to give voice – what is required of the body? Amalgamations of 
Lacanian theory and other theory texts with this question is uncommon. Provided here 
is a focus on vocalization, not voice – standing in a minority within the field, 
especially in terms of engagements with Lacan. This angle is missing from Dolar’s 
text, and many others, who quickly consider what it is to hear voice but neglect 
questions of the body that emits such a voice. A key drive in the research of this 
chapter was to draw voice away from any human privilege, to render voice as 
inhuman, and thus horrific by virtue of the decentered subject. Here, the notion of the 
human animal is presented. This is the grain of a line of research that could not be 
accommodated in the required format. The trajectory of this thought was to articulate 
voice as a register of the inhuman in us, to develop that through the corporeal 
transformations of werewolves and supernatural figures (partly via Michael Jackson), 
to continue the theme through bacteria and slime before, finally, concluding with a 
chapter arguing for plant voice – to systematically, in arguing for the horrors of voice 
in relation to bodies – result in the prospect of voice present and ‘resonant’ in forms 
of life we are commonly deaf to. The move would frame object a voice as silent, 
inhuman, horrific and confounding but also active, of agency and autonomy 
indifferent to our narrow audition of the world. This unaccomodated thread is 
certainly a more positive and affirmative framing of object a voice. The move would 
resolve the genre horror negative of the inhumanity of voice to be a rich locus of 
transversal possibilities. Indeed, to synthesize object a voice with Thacker’s 
conception of horror places the drive in a negative and limiting remit of a particularly 
fraught zone. Is horror such because it departs from particular expectations of the 
body, of life, and affect? In light of Thacker’s bibliographies this negative horror 
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should be challenged. 730 This is the driving force of the final chapter – to impress how 
the horror of the body in object a voice – is not necessarily and exogenous threat but a 
psychological and political reception of voices (vocalities): Platonic prejudice.  
 
‘Changes’ is a chapter that argues for the significance of voice in sounding out 
horrific change from a lacuna, sounding a changing body through a corporeal vessel. 
The figure of Michael Jackson in the text, as a body of multiplicities, flux and horror 
has emerged to be prescient. Indeed, the reading is more apt for biographical parallels 
than one thought possible some years ago. What began as an excavation of latent 
horrors has, by the time of editing, been retroactively glossed into an explicit register. 
Once again, there is a closer more biographically determined reading that could be 
drawn out of this text. There is reticence to pursue this angle over and above the 
concern of being too eager to fold a person’s work and its commentaries into 
biographical details. Not least because Jackson’s voice does not need representation: 
others do.  
 
‘Insidious’ adds to a number of commentaries that will be continued to garner foci in 
various disciplines. The figures of the Sirens, how voice is treated in ancient Greek 
texts, and themes of contagion and slime all add most directly to sound studies. The 
chapter errs on the question of the bodies within the dynamics of contagion and 
incursion. There is a lot of material omitted from this this chapter that concerns 
popular music and contemporary spread of earworms. Development of this thread 
would certainly draw on the material presented here. 
 
Finally, there is a question running through all these chapters that cannot be 
accommodated in the current form but could now be generated from the arguments 
and readings presented. Desire and love have been brushed up against at each turn. 
(Dolar’s previous texts concerning voice come within Gaze and Voice as Love 
Objects). From analyses of Lacan’s ‘Sow!’ example, to the click in Freud’s ‘A Case 
of Paranoia Running Counter to the Psychoanalytic Theory of the Disease’, to 
Clorinda in Tasso’s The Liberation of Jerusalem, to Michael Jackson, to the 
vocalization of Ernst away from the breast, desire and love percolate each context. 
																																																								
730 H.P. Lovecraft’s presence in Thacker’s texts is notable. Lovecraft was relentlessly hostile to 
different bodies, in life and work.  
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The notion of love in the Greek texts, the leitmotif of spell, enchantment and 
intoxication in the sirens, even the common phrase ‘lovesick’ to evoke the pathogens 
introduced to bodies – all these seams could be applied to questions of voice and 
horror in terms of love and desire in an affirmative and positive vein. This is a 
question that unfolds a rich array of possible reading trajectories. Thus, I shall end on 
a question: if, in terms of voice, horrors are confrontations with the unthinkable and 
unknown then perhaps love and desire are vectors of hope in there being other voices, 
equally lost, in the mist? Rather than fleeing voice like Alcibiades, or devocalizing – 
muting – voice like the scribe Plato, perhaps we should listen beyond the mist; 
hearken with hope past the dreads and horrors of epistemological lacunae to pursue an 
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